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SUMMARY
The migration of East Indians to the Dominions was an unorganised 
exercise. Indian membership in the British Empire gave them the status 
of British subjects and Imperial citizens but the Dominions were 
opposed to coloured migrants. By 1900 Australia and New Zealand had 
established their immigration policies-for.'.’Whites only*. Canada 
experienced the East Indian migration after 1900. It coincided with 
that of other Orientals, namely Chinese and Japanese. Meanwhile 
ideas of social Darwinism prevailed in the North American continent. 
There arose an organised labour movement on the Pacific Coast. These 
factors reinforced the anti-Oriental feeling which resulted in the 
outbreak of anti-Asiatic riots at Vancouver. Exclusion of East 
Indians was the basic policy of Imperial and Canadian leaders. But 
an open ban on Indians could create a difficult situation with the 
possibility of its exploitation by anti-British elements in India. 
Therefore, effective but indirect restrictions were imposed on East 
Indian immigration. However, at times, such prohibitory immigration 
regulations could not sustain the test in the law courts. The
migration question reached its climax with the arrival of the 
Komagata Maru in Vancouver but the failure of this enterprise 
completely reversed the migration trend. In its repercussions it 
contributed to the eruption of anti-British unrest and a revolutionary 
movement in the Punjab. Demands for equal treatment of Indians 
echoed all over India,
After the First World -War restrictions on Indian wives and
children to join their husbands and fathers in Canada became a focal 
point. This matter was settled under the arrangement of Reciprocity 
of Treatment made in the Imperial War Conference (1918), Restrictions 
on further migration from India remained in practice,
V/ith the granting of independence to India and Pakistan, Canada 
sensed the urgency of coming to an understanding and arrangement With ; 
them. India could use this excuse for leaving the Commonwealth.
Canada agreed to accept a small fixed number of South Asian immigrants. : 
By the 1960s Canadian economic needs for skilled manpower increased 
tremendously while ideas of social Darwinism waned. The arrival of a 
large number of Europeans from various parts of Europe changed the 
Canadian outlook. Economic prosperity and radical changes in Canadian 
commercial and industrial life set aside the Asiatic take-over fear. 
Characteristics of South Asian migrants changed to a very great extent. 
Worldwide development of rapid transportation and communication helped
to create a better understanding. Canada decided to apply her 
immigration regulations without racial regard. This transformation
of the Canddian immigration policy from complete exclusion to equal
acceptance has economic and social reasons. It is a paradox of history
to find East Indians being excluded when India was part of the British
Empire and now being accepted when the Empire is part of history.
commas
Summary ..................;      .......
Contents • > •.     •    • • • • • • • • • •  ..........
Acknowledgments    ...... ................... ..
Chapter I Introduction; Arrival of the British in India and 
economic and industrial condition of India at that 
time. Impact on agricultural, industrial and social 
set-up of India. Indian reaction and response 
towards changing circumstances. New problems - 
spare manpower. Abolition of slavery in the British 
Empire. Indians suitable slave substitutes - a badge 
of inferiority. Problem of treatment of Indians in 
colonies. Increasing Indian population and empty 
spaces in British colonies. Lord Salisbury's 
proposal for planned Indian emigration. Indian 
government's inaction, reluctance and suspicion with 
regard to aneemigration policy. Self-governing 
colonies ^Domini ons_7 of Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand with small populations. Different economic, 
social and political systems and need for migrants. 
Attitude of Imperial and Indian governments toward 
Indian migration. Ideas of social Darwinism and 
its impact. Indian migration to British Columbia 
and social, political and economic conditions on the 
Pacific Coast of Canada. Labour unions' opposition. 
Exclusion of Indians and their status as British 
subjects. Progress of Indians* exclusion to 
acceptance - a unique part of immigration studies 
within the Commonwealth relations. ................
Chapter 2 Beginning of Indian immigration into Canada and its 
coincidence with the influx of other Orientals - 
Chinese and Japanese. Migration of Indians into 
the United States and its result. Asiatic Exclusion 
League and the factors leading to the Vancouver 
riots of September 1907* ...........................■■■
Chapter 3 The increase of Japanese immigration into Canada. The
reaction of (a) British Columbia and (b) the Dominion
Government. The control of immigration by agreement 
: with Japan, # #.##*•*.•••• •.. .•••••••••* • • • • #•••••••
Chapter ^ Solution of remaining problem of Japanese immigration
from Hawaii, Incidental effect of "continuous 
passage" Order in Council on the position of Indian 
immigrants. Mission of Mackenzie King to confer 
with British authorities on the subject .
Chapter 5 Proposal to move the Indian immigrants to British,
Honduras and its results; Mackenzie King's visit 
to India; the indifference of the Government of India 
towards this problem.           .........
Page
2
A
7
8
31
61
78
103
Chapter 6 Immigration Act, 1910; protests of Indian immigrants;
exclusion of Indian wives and children. Petition to 
the Imperial Conference 1911; India Office Memorandum 
on the position of Indians in the Dominions; Pleas for 
Temporary Admission of non-immigrant classes; and 
question of Wives and Children. Indian deputation in 
Ottawa, interview with Robert Rogers; Dr. Sunder 
Singh's tour of Ontario and its opposition, Indian 
delegation in England; protests in India and Canada; 
interview with Hardinge. Imperial government's 
proposals of passport system, Indian government's 
rejection,............;....................... . . . . . 1 2 6
Chapter 7 Indians* desperate attempts to unlock the barred
gates of Canada, The case of ’'Thirty-Nine Indians".
The legal battle in the courts. Chief Justice 
Hunter’s judgement. Canadian press reaction* The 
Bhaghwan Singh and Hernara Singh incidents. The 
Artisans and Labourers Regulation, December 1913. • • • • 1^5
Chapter 8 Voyage of Komagata Maru - Gurdit Singh* s scheme and
arrangements of the project. Komagata Maru's arrival 
in Vancouver, May 19lA. Dr* Sunder Singh's appeal to 
Ottawa and his tour of Ontario and Quebec. Immigration 
question in Canadian Senate and House of Commons.
Ihdilin press and public reaction. Reaction of Canadian 
press, politicians, and various organisations. Delay 
by Immigration Department. Long detention of Immigrants . 
in quarantine; their Mandamus Writ. Test Case.
Deportation Order. Indians' protests and appeals to 
Dominion Government, Unsuccessful midnight attempt of 
Immigration officials. Arrival of Rainbow and Martin 
Burrell. Cause of delay. Burrell's promise. Peaceful 
departure of Komagata Maru. Appointment of Glogstoun.
His recommendation of No Compensation and encouragement 
of litigation, Trouble among Indians, Killings of .
rivals. Death of.Hopkinson. Conclusions. ........
Chapter 9 The return of the Komagata Maru. Gurdit Singh's
approach to the British consulates in the Far East for 
aid. Arrival in Calcutta. Emergency War Regulations 
in force. Special train arrangements for the returnees 
to be taken to the Punjab and subsequent refusal by 
Gurdit Singh. Budge Budge Riots, Loss of life. The 
Komagata Maru Committee of Enquiry and Its findings.
Return Home Movement among Immigrants. Discovery of 
anti-British movements among Sikhs and Muslims in the 
Punjab. Alarm and panic in the Punjab government.
Outbreak of violence. I'assing of Defence of India Act. 
Suppression of anti-British Movement. Complete 
reversal of Immigration attempts. No more organised 
attempt by Indians to force their way into Canada. .... • 26£
Chapter 10 India's war effort. Importance of Sikh community for 
Indian army. Lord Hardinge's famous speech about 
changes in Indian emigration policy. Austen Chamber­
lain's meeting with Sir Robert Borden, India Office's 
comprehensive plan. Hardinge’s memorandum on: 
questions likely to arise at the end of the War.
Views of Indian National Congress, Dr. Sunder 
Singh and his appeals to Ontario public.
Formation of India Canada league. Representation 
of Presbyterian Church, Lionel Curtis and his 
meeting with Borden and Roche. His tour of Canada, 
Australia, Hew Zealand and India. Chelmsford and 
Curtis and the question of Indian participation in 
the Imperial War Conference 191?. Indian migration 
question inllmperial War Conferences of 1917 and 
1918* Agreement on the Policy of Reciprocity of 
Treatment, Permission for Indian families and 
visitors. Canadian press reaction. Indians*
Chapter 11 Implementation of Arrangement of Reciprocity between
India and Canada and admission of wives and children. 
Denial of Franchise Rights for Indians in Canada. 
Imperial Conference 1921 and Indians * disabilities 
in Dominions, Sastri*s tour of Australia, New Zealand 
and Canada, Press controversy. Indians* Franchise 
question in Canadian House of Commons, Indians* 
disabilities and Imperial Conference 1923® Sapru- 
Srauts clash. Anti-Oriental atmosphere on the Pacific 
Coast and its academic justification. Khalsa Diwan 
Society’s continued efforts for Indians* franchise 
rights. World War and its impact on Indian question. 
Grant of Franchise. Admission of Indians as a 
especial case. Indian independence and her relation­
ship with Commonwealth. Cold War and new problems. 
Agreement of Quota system with India and Pakistan. 
Changes in Immigration Policy under Conservative 
Government 1957-19^2. Scramble for skilled manpower 
in 1960s and points system in migration policy. 
Increase in South Asian migration. Ugandan Asians 
question and Canada*s humanitarian gesture. Loophole 
in Immigration Regulations and new amendments.
exclusion from Canada 324
Chapter 12 Some Concluding Re fie c tions
Conclusions 386
452
Appendices I
II
III
IV
479
480
481 
484
Bibliography
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I must first acknowledge the assistance which was forthcoming 
from the public Archives of Canada the Dominion Manpower and Immigration 
Department, Statistics Canada and the Department of the Secretary of 
State# I am especially thankful to Mr# James L.D. Cleary, Chief 
Information Officer, Canadian Immigration, London; Dr# E. Ziegler, 
Director Manpower and Immigration Department, Mr. D.R. Bradley, Chief, 
Demographic and Social Characteristics Section, Statistics^) Canada;
Mr. Bryan Corbett, Archivist, Public Records Division, Public Archives, 
Canada; and Mrs, J.M, White, Dominion Archives Representative in London.
I am also indebted to Professor Henry F. Angus, Mr. H.H. Stevens, 
former M.P., Dr. Freda Hawkins of the University of Toronto, Professor. 
Michael Ames and Dr, Harry Hawthorn, Univesity of British Columbia for 
granting me interviews. I must express my thanks to Mr. Ran jit S. Hall, 
Chief, Immigrant Services Operations Division, Manpower and Immigration 
Department and his friends, for long and inspiring discussions on the 
subject of Canadian immigration. My thanks go to the members of staff 
of the many university and specialised libraries in Britain and Canada 
who unstintingly helped me throughout my research and put their resources 
at my disposal. I am thankful to Dr. David Taylor and Professor Adrian 
Mayer of the School of Oriental and African Studies, London for their 
help and encouragement. I must express appreciation of the guidance 
offered by Mr. Brian Scott of the S.O.A.S. Library, in the preparation 
of the graphs which figure in this thesis.
I am very grateful to Professor Bruce McFarlane of Carleton 
University for his assistance and guidance and valuable introductions 
to Canadian officials during my periods of research in Canada. Above 
all I am highly indebted to my supervisor, Professor A. Tropp for his 
constant and generous help and inspiring guidance throughout the years 
during which this thesis was in preparation.
CHAPTER I
Introduction: Arrival of the British in India and economic
and industrial condition of India at that time. Impact on 
agricultural, industrial and social set-up of India. Indian 
reactions and response towards changing circumstances. New 
problems - spare manpower. Abolition of slavery in the British 
Empire, Indians suitable slave substitute - a badge of inferiority. 
Problem of treatment of Indians in colonies. Increasing Indian 
population and empty spaces in British colonies. Lord Salisbury’s 
proposal for planned Indian emigration. Indian government’s 
inaction, reluctance and suspicion with regard to an emigration 
policy, Self-governing colonies ^ Dominions^ o£ Canada, Australia 
and New Zealand /with small populations. Different economic, social 
and political systems and need for migrants. Attitude of Imperial 
and Indian governments toward Indian migration. Ideas of social 
Darwinism and its impact. Indian migration to British Columbia 
and social, political and economic conditions on the Pacific Coast 
of Canada, Labour unions* opposition. Exclusion of Indians and 
their status as British subjects. Brogress of Indians’ exclusion 
to acceptance - a unique part of immigration studies within the 
Commonwealth relations. •
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries British 
merchants and adventurers went to India in the enterprising spirit 
of the times. Exploration and expansion of commercial opportunities 
were the prime motives in their initial overtures. They were not 
aiming to establish a vast political power; instead, their main 
purpose seemed to be to engage themselves in normal trade. However, 
the prevailing anarchy in India and the danger of piracy at sea 
compelled them to arm themselves and to solicit the backing of the 
British government. Rivalries among European traders, jealousies 
among Indian rulers, and a decaying feudal system in the Indian 
society had created volatile conditions in India. The East India 
Company (British traders) therefore sought protection of their 
established posts (settlements and factories) by the use of armed 
and trained soldiers. Through the years, v/ith the scientific use 
of their armed power and diplomacy, the East India Company became 
the master of the Indian sub-continent.
At that time the majority of Indians lived in villages which 
were almost self-sufficient units. Each village grew most of its 
own food and provided, from its resources, for the simple wants 
of its inhabitants. All the cloth and often the raw material for 
it, sugar, dyes, oil for food or lighting, household vessels, and 
agricultural implements were manufactured or produced by-imembers of 
the village Community who were remunerated by a share of the
'I
village produce.
The money needed to pay government dues and to purchase outside 
goods was acquired by the sale of surplus food grains or agricultural
1 See A.R. Desai, Rural Sociology in India (Bombay, 1929)*
products required by neighbouring villages. These business
transactions were effected by traders who lived in large villages
and travelled to smaller communities. The system worked well and
for the most part villagers were able to maintain not only their
self-sufficiency but also a high degree of artistic and industrial
development as well. The Industrial Commission appointed by the
British Government of India acknowledged this in its report:
At a time when the west of Europe, the birthplace 
of the modern industrial system, was inhabited by 
uncivilised tribes, India was famous for the wealth 
of her rulers and for the high artistic skill of her 
craftsmen. Arid, even at a much later period, when 
merchant adventurers from the West made their first 
appearance in Indiar the industrial development of 
this country was at any rate not inferior to that 
of the more advanced European nations.^
India was a great manufacturing and agricultural country. Her
2products found their way to European and Asian markets. According 
to Professor Vera Anstey, Indian methods of production and of 
industrial and commercial organization could stand comparison with
'Z
those in vogue in any other part of the world. However, the 
establishment of British rule did bring about some changes. For 
example the government introduced new and efficient systems of 
communication in India by the construction of railways and roads. 
Also the opening of the Sues Canal** in 1869 brought about a trade 
revolution. It saved time and shortened distance, diminished risks 
and brought greater certainty to traders. Thus the new system of 
communications plus the increased trade through the canal provided
1 Cmd. 32. Report of the Industrial Commission 1916-18, p. 6.
2 See Romesh Dutt, The Economic History of India (London, 1906).
3 Vera Anstey, The Economic Development of India (London, 1929), p.
4 D.A. Farnie, East and Wbfet of Suez, The Suez Canal in History 
(Oxford, 1969)7 p* 363*
a direct link between the Indian towns and the manufacturing centres 
in Britain. Since Britain was then the world’s foremost economic 
and industrial power the Indian economy soon became tightly bound 
to that of Britain.
The increase in land revenue and the linking up of Indian villages 
with coastal towns through railroads and to Britain by speedy ships 
changed the agrarian poonomy of India. There was a marked increase 
in the quantity of grain and produce available for sale to distant 
towns and overseas markets. Yet production of crops for local 
consumption steadily decreased. This commercialization of agriculture 
resulted in far-reaching social and economic changes in India. The 
same railroads which carried away crops brought back machine-made 
industrial products to villages. Cheaply manufactured British goods 
began to descend like an avalanche upon the markets of more accessible 
Indian towns. The first wave of British machine-made imports had a 
devastating effect upon the working future of Indian craftsmen and 
artisans. Villagers no longer depended on the skills of others for 
goods they needed. The new economic system was a buy and sell 
arrangement and this changed the self-sufficient nature of the
'I
Indian village. The result was that masses of peasantry formed 
what was to become a vast permanent army of unemployed and under­
employed, and this army was continuously reinforced from the ranks
of the impoverished craftsmen. However there were benefits that ._
were to be realized from the new arrangements. The establishment 
of British rule had brought law and order to India. Measures were
1 See Daniel H. Buchanan, The Development of Capitalist Enterprise in 
India (New York, 193*0»PP» 4, 13, 17 and 129-131; D.A. Farnie, 
op.cit., pp. 362-376; and V.P. Dhital, "Some Aspects of Indo-British 
Trade during the Twentieth Century, with special reference to Capital 
Goods", M.Sc* thesis, University of London, 1938, pp. 17-23.
'I
also taken to control such hazards as famine and epidemic. Yet
nothing could be done about the relentless growth of population.
The census figure rose from 206,162,360 in 1872 to 332,837,778 in
1931*^ But this demographic increase was not accompanied by a
corresponding increase in economic opportunities. The loss of
traditional methods of livelihood threw increasing numbeis of
artisans back upon agriculture, and the land could not adequately
support a continually rising quantity of people. The Government
of India was informed by its own team of investigators that;
There have been and are hard times for hand 
.weavers and such like handicraftsmen whose 
employment is reduced by competition of machine 
■made goods.
The landless labourers in the thickly populated \ ■
rural tracts ... live poorly now, as they have done 
in generations past and their wages-or earnings are 
in some districts still very small.
And twenty-twoyears later the Royal Commission on Labour in India
reported:
Over large jtarts of India, the number of persons 
on the land is much greater than the number required \ 
to cultivate it appreciably in excess of the number 
it can comfortably support. In most areas, pressure 
on the land has been increasing steadily for a long 
time .... There has always been a substantial class 
of landless labourers earning a meagre living in gooji 
seasons and apt to be reduced to penury in bad ones.
The employment of such a large amount of manpower continued to be a
difficult and pressing problem that made the Indian labourers vulnerable
to exploitation.
During the period that Britain became master of India slavery
and the slave trade were abolished in the British empire. The
1 See B.S. Bhir, "Pressure of Population on land in India: A Regional
Approach", Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1955, PP* i~3*
2 Census of India 1872, and 1931*
3 Cd. ^956 Memorandum on Some of the Results of Indian Administration
during the Past Fifty Years of British Rule in India (1909)» p* 27.
k Cmd. 3883. Royal Commission on Labour in India Report (1930-3^)» P* '***•
emancipated slaves refused to work on any condition except of their
dislocation of work on plantations in the Colonies, and in some cases, 
in the utter ruin of the proprietors. This was followed by an 
unprecedented industrial depression on the plantations. Two
the economic situation of the different Colonies in the West Indies. 
These committees recommended the exploration of new sources of labour. 
The Colonies of the East Indies and West Indies at first tried Chinese 
labour but after a short experience found it to be unsatisfactory. 
India, however* had a disciplined culture adapted to tropical
agriculture and Indians were willing to work; The huge Indian populatio
with its vast number of unemployed provided an inexhaustible reservoir
of manpower, sufficiently advanced to be ready to migrate tqt sufficiently
backivard to accept less favourable terms of employment. At this time
India was under British control as were most of the tropical colonies
where plantation agriculture was practised. Because of this, when
planters approached the Indian government they were allowed to recruit
Indians to work on plantations. For a time the importation of indentured
labour from India provided a substitute for slave labour in many parts
of the tropical colonies of the British Empire. In poverty-stricken
India it; was not difficult to recruit \*/orkers who were willing to
accept a period of hard labour in a distant land at a lov/ wage as an
alternative to starvation in India* However* there were abuses of the
Contract labour system and soon a stress situation developed between 
Indian migrants and native workers. The distinction between slaves
and contract labourers was not always empirically clear since both did
the same type of work for the same type of masters. The legal or
analytical differences between the two might be important but in
own free -will for their European masters. This resulted in a serious
parliamentary committees were appointed in iSh2 and l8*f8 to report on
practice the contract labourers ran the gamut from enforced servitude 
without chattel ownership to carefully stipulated intervals of work 
obligation terminated abruptly when contracts ended. As such this 
contract labour system or indenture system was virtually another 
form of slavery. At the expiry of their indentures or contract some 
Indians returned home while others stayed on either as free petty 
traders or farm workers. With this new development of a competitive 
situation for European small businessmen, labourers and farmers, 
the European planters resorted to imposing restrictions on the 
immigration of Indians who were not under indenture. Eventually 
the Indians’ position as a slave-substitute and the restrictions 
placed upon free, Indians in the Colonies became the subject of 
criticism by Indian leaders. Indians were emphatic about their 
claim for equal treatment as^subjects of the British Empire. Soon 
the question of their treatment ©broad gained importance out of all
proportion. Thus, even though the system of indenture was abolished
*\ .......
in the early part of the twentieth century the repercussions of the
restrictions on ther emigration and their treatment as less favoured
--S^jects during this period v/ere recalled by Indians in immigration
disputes in later years.
2
The population of India was the largest in the British Bnpxre, 
and the average increase over the period of one decade was about 25
million people. The Indian situation seemed to be proof of the
3
famous theory of Maithus who described man's capacity to increase
1 For a detailed account of Indians' emigration as indentured labourers 
see Hugh Tinker, A New System of Slavery. The Export of Indian Labour 
Overseas 1850-1920 (London, 19W)«
2 : According to the first Census of India (1872) the population was
206,162,360.
3 ^apthus believed that the power of population was infinitely greater 
than the power in the earth to produce subsistence for man. The
ratios Malthus had i& mind were:
Population: 1 - 2 - - 8 - 16 - 32 - 6*t.
Subsistence: 1 - 2 - 3 - ^ ~ 3 - 6 - 7*
See Warren S. Thompson, Population Problems (Hew York, 1963)* -pp.1*t-l6 
T.R. Malthus, An Essay on the Princples of Population, Book IV; and 
Gordon R. Taylor, Doomsday Book (London, 1970), ~
his means of subsistence as less than his capacity to multiply his
numbers. Malthus asserted that man -was able to increase his subsistence
only in arithmetical progression whereas his numbers tended to
increase in geometrical progression. He further argued that fertile
land was limited and not capable of sufficient improvement to support
man * s increasing population. Thus the relationship between level
: 1of Irving and population can be expressed:
. Level of living . H a t ^ l  Jtoourc.0
° Population
Material Sources = National Resources of various kinds
+ Industrial products + Related 
Capital Resources.
It was impossible, therefore, for any economic development to produce
2substantial results in face of the increasing population. Observing 
the pressure of population and its problems and being keenly aware that 
British rule with its technologjbal advances had only increased the 
seriousness of the situation, Lord Salisbury, the Secretary of State 
for India, had proposed a scheme of emigration to the Government of 
India in 1873;
Having regard to the greatness of our Indian population 
- to.._tihe-._„iP5>,obabili^ y^ that, under the protection which
the British Government affoi^ ds^ "from depbpuiation-'by weiiS: 
and, as far as possible^ from famine and other evils, that 
population must continue very greatly to increase, especially 
in the healthier and more densely peopled parts of the country 
where the numbers already press on the means of subsistence, 
and the lowest classes are at all times little removed from 
want, it appears to me that, from an Indian point of view, 
it is desirable to afford an outlet from these redundant 
regions to the tropical and sub-tropical dominions of 
Her Majesty, where people who can hardly earn a decent 
subsistence in their own country may obtain more lucrative 
employment and better homes.
While, then, from an Indian point of view, emigration
1 Joseph L. Fisher, "The relationship of material resources and population 
to economic and social development", in P.N: World Population Conference 
1965, Vol. Ill, p. 313.
2 Vera Anstey, op.cit., p. k?1*.
properly regulated and accompanied by sufficient assurance 
of profitable employment and fair treatment seems a thing 
to be encouraged oh grounds ofhumanity, with a view 
to promote the well-being of the poorer classes, we 
may also consider, from an Imperial point of viev/, the 
great advantage which must result from peopling the 
warmer British' possessions,' which are rich in natural 
resources and only want population, by an intelligent 
and industrious race to WhGm the climate of these 
countries is well suited, and to whom the culture of the 
staples suited to the soil, ana the modes of labour and 
. s e t t l e m e n t ,  are adapted. In this view, also, it seems 
proper to encourage emigration from India to Colonies 
well fitted for an Indian population.
Influenced by the above considerations, I would ask 
your Lordship in Council to consider whether there 
might not properly be a considerable change in the 
attitude of the Indian Government towards emigration; 
whether the Government and its officers might not more 
directly encourage emigration and superintend the system 
under which it is conducted - provided it is fully 
satisfied on all points with regard to each Colony 
which avails itself of such a system."5
But in a carefully drawn up reply the Indian government pointed out:
... we do not believe that any amount of emigration 
that is likely to take place will have more than an 
infinitesimal effect on the population,...
Our objections have reference to the effect which 
the direct and active interposition of the Government 
in this matter would be likely to have on the minds of 
a people prone to regard viith the utmost suspicion 
; the acts and motives of their foreign rulers, and
especially on the minds of the uneducated classes from 
which the emigrants are drawn; and to the difficulty.
. - - rr-.-^5drdE^b^r^sment_ijiiwhich^.the..Government1 Would-'frecoge-_
involved by undertaking responsibilities'"towards the r “ 
Colonies on the one hand, and towards the emigrants on 
the other, which it would be practically impossible for 
it todischarge ina satisfactory manner.^
The Indian government turned down the scheme of emigration. Its
main argument rested on an undetermined fear of some type of political
trouble and the creation of suspicion among Indians regarding the
government’s motives if It would encourage emigration. Of course
the decision to emigrate is based on a number of motives which differ
1 Lord,Salisbury, Secretary of State for India to Viceroy of India,
March 2^ , 18731 quoted in Cd« 5192 Report ... on Emigration from India,
2 Govt, of India to Secretary of State for India, May 3» 1877, quoted 
in ibid., pp. 8-9*
in individual cases. However* the desire to become better off
■ ■ <1
has always been a dominant factor in migration movements. In India
agricultural over-population provided a major incentive for
emigration. This push factor was so strong that Indians were willing
to migrate for the sake of employment at very -low remunerative
2 ■' 
conditions. Migrants in such circumstances are drawn to areas
where economic opportunities are abundant and where they will
receive relatively high remuneration for their work.-
The push mechanism of acute pressure of one kind or another
such as compelling poverty teas always present in India and therefore
the desire to emigrate was strong. The British Empire offered other
migration opportunities besides the plantation colonies, namely
such self-governing colonies as Canada, Australia and New Zealand.
These colonies had small populations of European origin and vast
unpopulated areas. The indigenous population in these Dominions
was not important any more in their economic development. Thecclimatic
conditions were different from those colonies in the tropics and had
seasonal changes somewhat like Europe. Each colony had a democratic
system of government based on the British form and each enjoyed
self-governing status* Culturally, these Dominions appeared to be
an extension of European civilization. But there were different
working conditions in these colonies. The question of the difference
between indigenous and imported labour forces versus European masters
1 See Julius Isaac, Economics of Migration (London, 19^7)» P* 3*
2 See U.K., The Determinants and Consequences of Population Trends
(New York, 1993), p. 113*
3 See Warren S. Thompson, Population Problems (New York, 1965), p* 373*
k Speaking about the dynamics of interaction in migration, Brinley
Thomas remarked in his analysis that in the migration process there 
are always "push” and i'pull" elements. The former corresponds to the 
interests of the emigrating country and the second to the immigrating 
country. According to his conclusion the pull element is normally 
stronger than the push element. But in the case of emigration from 
India the push factor seems stronger than the pull element. See 
Brinley Thomas, Migration and Economic Growth (Cambridge, 195*0 •
did not exist. The social structures of these Dominions were 
radically different from those of other British colonies. They 
needed migrants to populate their large empty areas and to aid in 
their economic development. Since India was the most congested part 
of the British Bnpire she could most easily provide the required 
manpower. Such movement of peoples was facilitated, in theory at 
least, by the fact that they were all British subjects and members 
of the same Empire. But membership of the British Empire could not 
give India and the Dominions a common social and cultural denominator 
and it was the difference in social and cultural backgrounds that 
made the Indian seem so alien to western civilization.
Migration is one of the most obvious instances of complete 
disorganization of an individuals role system, hence some disturbance 
of social identity and self image tied to the system is to be expected. 
Viewed from this aspect migration has a desocializing effect.
Immigrants coming into the new societies miss the access to the 
elementary mechanisms of a stable social structure. They are ignorant 
of the proper definition of the situations in which they have to 
participate and have no clear idea about either the roles they are 
expected to fulfil or the opportunities for entering the roles they
•" -j
desire. The process of migration entails not only a shrinkage in
the number of roles and groups in which the immigrant is active but
also, perhaps,principally, some degree of shrinkage and transformation
2of his whole status, image and set of va3.ues. In every migratory 
movement economic, social and cultural differences as well as new 
working conditions among receiving countries do present problems and 
can result in the success or failure of the migrant’s absorption into
1 See J. Ben-David, ’’Ethnic Differences or Social Change?” in Between 
Past and Future edited by C. Franskenstein (Jerusalem, 1953)*
2 S.N. Eisenstadt, The Absorption of Immigrants (London, 195*01 PP« 5“6
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the host, country. In India the need for migration was everywhere 
evident and the government should have facilitated the movement of
peoples from India to the less populated colonies. However, any
■ - v  "■ 2
mass movement of Indian people was unthinkable under British rule. ;
The British were afraid of the effect that the racial bias of the
colonies towards Indians would have on the continued existence of
British domination in India and this fear was entirely justified,
as I -.'will attempt to point out In this thesis. The Indian
government, however, admitted that the advantages of migration to
:" ; 3
individual Indian migrants would be "unquestionably great’*.
Emigration, unlike,v/atci*, flows wherever possible from countries of
a low standard of living to countries.with better opportunities and
a higher standard of living. But this, pull mechanism, though it
existed in the Dominions, did not work for Indians. The Government of
India did not initiate or encourage any such movement. Dasher, in its
fear of consequences to its own well-being, it adopted a ’do nothing*
policy and justified it by saying that government action could not .
relieve the pressure of population. This "laissez-faire" attitude
contributed not only to the lack of any clear emigration policy for
Indians wishing to leave their country but also/the harsh treatment
of Indians in the colonies whose governments initiated immigration
policies to exclude them. The British government in India was caught
between its obligation to Indians and the desires of the colonies
and unfortunately never solved the dilemma.
Sir Alexander Morris Carr-Saunders, a renowned authority on world
1 J.A, Jackson, Migration (London, 1969), p. 15*
2 See .Raghavan Iyer, "Utilitarianism and all that", South Asian Affairs, 
Number. One, pp. 16-22.
3 Cd. 5192 Report of the Committee on Emigration from India to the 
Crown Colonies and Protectorates (1910), p. 12.
population, pointed out that 85 million British people lived outside 
the British Isles and similarly there were about 200 million Europeans 
living outside Europe. The European countries were helped by 
overseas emigration during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Because of this they escaped from some of the economic difficulties 
to which the rapid growth of their population might otherwise have 
led. However, no such mass movement of Indians was planned to 
alleviate the population explosion in the sub-continent and only a 
small number of Indian migrants found their way to the predominantly 
white Dominions of Australia, New Zealand and Canada. Such movement 
was only an individual and adventurous exercise. Australia and New 
Zealand managed to keep the Indians out by various effective methods.
By the turn of the century, therefore, these two Dominions did not 
face any Indian migration problem. Canada, on the other hand, admitted 
a small number of Indians and her attempt to exclude others without 
insulting their British citizenship was an exercise in diplomatic 
racism that this thesis attempts to trace.
In the later part of the nineteenth century and the barly part 
of the twent5.eth century, the idea of the superiority and supremacy 
of the white race over coloured peoples on biological bases was 
quite popular in studies in North America and Britain. Evolutionary 
theories about the development of human beings, as propounded by 
Darwin, were accepted. The subjugation of colonial people was held 
to be justified by the natural superiority of the colonisers. An 
authority on the history of the period concluded that though economic 
factors were important in the growth of imperialism, the prevalence
1 See Sir Alexander Morris Carr-Saunders, World Population (Oxford,
1936), pp. I65-I69*
2 See U.K. Population Growth and the Standard of hiving in Under-Developed 
Countries (New York, 193*0« P* B. • ■ ■■. ■: "
of evolutionary teaching was perhaps crucial. It is not only justified 
competition and struggle but introducedaan element of ruthlessness 
and immorality that -was most characteristic of the whole movement.
Social Darwinism preached separation of races. |t was elegantly 
expounded by Sir Arthur Keith in his booklet Ethnos. In America . 
the leading spokesmen of the idea of Social Darwinism were H.F.
Osborn, Madison Grant and Lothrop Stoddard.
The popular image of the United States of America with regard 
to its ability to absorb various; migrant groups had been that, of a 
melting pot* This image implied the necessity of ’’melting”, of 
becoming Americanised, and this carried the suggestion that ethnic 
differences were undesirable and that efforts to maintain them 
were un-American. Since all newcomers must be assimilated there 
was always the fear that if America were admitting immigrants of 
poor stock it would lead to a general deterioration of the American 
population. It was argued that through struggle and conflict certain 
societies and groups came out on top, therefore certain migrant 
gioups were preferred over others. Any interference with this 
process of struggle was thought to have an adverse effect on social 
development by encouraging poor quality stock to increase at the 
expense of the superior. Superior races and groups, in fact, could 
become polluted by mixing with inferior races and groups or by social
1 William L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism (New York, 1951)* P* 95
2 For a detailed account of Social Darwinism see Sir Arthur Keith,
Ethnos or The Problems of Race considered from a new point of view 
(London, 1951); Charles C. Alexander, ’’prophet of American Racism: 
Madison Grant and the Nordic Myth”, Phylon 23, 1962; Madison Grant,
The Passing of the Great Race or the racial basis of European History 
(London, I917); H«F. Osborn, From Greeks to Darwin.An outline of the 
development of the evolutionary idea (New York, 1894); Lothrop Stoddard 
The Rising Tide of Color against White World-Supremacy (New York, 1920) 
and Clashing Tides of Colour (London, 1935)*
3 See Thomas F. Gossett, Race: the History of an idea in America (Dallas:
Southern University Press, 1963)* — - —  . . “
policies which did anything to alleviate the struggle between the two.
Through such theories racism and aggression could be viewed as serving
a principle of general social evolution.
By the end of the First World War, these aggressive and racist
theories were to become an important operating principle in the
immigration policies of North America. In the U.S. they found
expression in such books as Madison Grant's The Passing of the
Great Race. Grant and other writers denounced open immigration
policies which encouraged poor stock. Even eastern and southern
Europeans were thought to be diluting the superior breeds from Western
Europe and Britain. The melting pot was supposed to be receiving too
many ingredients. Eventually in response to such doctrines and the
public.'-attitudes.;which the doctrines had created in the U.S., certain
formal discriminatory restrictions were imposed upon immigration. Canada,
with her close geographic, economic and cultural proximity with the U.S.
was naturally affected by such theories.
It was during this time and under these circumstances that
East Indian migration to Canada began at the turn of the century.
For the most .part such migration was the- adventurous activity of
a few.Indian (mostly Sikh) soldiers and servicemen who reached the
province of British Columbia on the pacific Coast of Canada, This
2initial movement consisted of migrants mainly from the Punjab.
1 PierreL. Van den Berghe in his wellknown work, Race and Racism;
A Comparative Perspective (New York, 19b7) described America as a socially 
pluralistic society along racial lines despite its cultural homogeneity.
He viewed racial cleavage and conflict as inherent in the nature of 
V. competitive society and saw racism as a control to the preservation of 
the.Western cultural tradition. Karl Marx had also linked racism to 
the total structure of the society of which it’was a part and insisted 
that the race problem had determinants in the economic institutionsand 
struggle for power and privilege in the society. See also Lydio F. Tomasi, 
The Ethnic Factor in the Future of Inequality (New York, 1973)*
2 The Punjab was'strategically located on'India's north-west frontier and was 
known to be a military province. The loyalty of the population was of 
paramount importance to the British for their control over India. See 
William W. Reinhardt, The Legislative Council of the Punjab 1897-1912 
(Duke University, 1972).
These Sikh soldiers, in spite of their small number as a group in 
India, were renowned for their military and political service to 
the British.rulers .in-’Indiav Their loyalty and devotion to the 
Crown was a matter of some pride to these men. But if the Sikhs 
were the most loyal British subjects they were also the most unusual- 
looking and conspicuous in India. Their unshaven beards, long hair 
and turbans plus their strange manners and customs were decidedly 
a shock to the American-influenced west coast province of Canada.
In addition, British Columbia's attitude to the Sikhs was an important 
consideration for Ottawa because the Dominion government was afraid 
to lose this distant province to the U.S. Thus the immigration 
status of East Indians was fraught with prejudice and political 
manoeuvering right from the start.
At this time British Columbia had only a small population.
Its geographical location placed it furthest from Europe and its 
high mountain chain seemed to isolate it from the rest of Canada.
It was the last choice for settlement of migrants from Europe; indeed 
those migrants from the north of England who had settled there 
considered that they lived in a special province whose pioneering 
conditions called for special consideration from the federal government 
at Ottawa. The problems and insecurities facing workers In British
'I
Columbia were enormous. The entire economy of the province was 
based on specialized resources responsive to and dependent upon the 
vagaries of external markets. A much larger percentage of the wage 
Income of British Columbians as compared to Canada as a whole 
derived directly from the export of goods and services and as such 
was dependent ugon the rise and fall of world prices. Since large
1 See Martin Robin, Canadian Provincial Politics (Scarborough, 1972)*
sections of British Colu?Qbian industries were prone to the conflict 
and the. frontier conditions which obtained in the American Pacific 
North-west and mountain states the Canadian province felt that 
its economic future and even the present understanding of its special 
problems were more closely linked with the United States, large 
numbers of workers were employed In industries such as lumber, 
miningi long shoring and maritime trades which- were plagued by - 
harsh surroundings, a high accident rate, geographic&l and social 
isolation, a continuous turnover of manpower and unstable family 
conditions. Workers in these outlying communities developed an 
intense group consciousness, and a cohesive isolation. Gradually 
the westernprovince developed large-scale industries and out of 
this grew -a .new capitalist class. At this time,- however, this 
industrialism produced a virile labour movement intent on maintaining 
its right through a strong organization of workers. Unfortunately 
this precarious labour situation was beset by waves of Oriental,
Eastern European. and American immigration of workers who were ready
to give their services for relatively low wages and this created an
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unstable labour market in the eyes of organized labour.
Asian migrants in particular with their coloured skins, different 
modes of dress and vdllingness to work more cheaply as labourers 
seemed to the Canadian workers in British Columbia a threat to their 
economic future. Organised workers began to unite against this 
invasion and soon labour unions had their grip on all working classes. 
Labour leaders were immediately interested in acquiring political 
importance. They were quick to realize that the authority of the
1 See Paul Phillips, No Greater Power: A Century of Labour in British 
Columbia (Vancouver, 19&7)*
2 P. Gladstone, "Unionism in the Fishing Industry in British Columbia", 
Canadian Journal Of Economics and Political Science, XVI (February 
1950), p. 2. , . ~ ,
labour unions as a strong pressure group in the working-of the two 
democracies on either side of the border in North America could be 
strongly established by a well organised labour force. Testing the 
full extent of their power the labour leaders pointed out that the 
brunt of the impact of increased Oriental migration would not fall 
upon large property owners, capitalists or technical experts (who 
would indeed benefit) but upon the common labourer. Unions, therefore, 
included exclusion of Oriental workers as a part of their programme 
of labour welfare. Since the development of the'West Coast of North 
America was in its early stages, it needed a large number of workers 
who were not easily available from the eastern parts of Canada and 
the United States. Canadians considered the Pacific Coast as their 
last choice for settlement because it was geographically remote and 
was known to have harsh working conditions. Only thoroughly working- 
class European migrants who were unable to establish themselves in 
the east made their way to the Pacific Coast. Such settlers felt 
insecure about their abilities and their job security. Any competition 
or even the possibility of such competition from hard-working Asians 
naturally made them feel threatened. Under such conditions labour 
union leaders desiring to establish their own political influence 
were not slow to make full use of Oriental immigrants as scapegoats.
On the other hand the capitalist class, desiring to establish 
their industries, encouraged Oriental immigratioqand this fact was 
equally cited by the unions as an example of labour exploitation.
Since Orientals, particularly Indians, were unfamiliar with the working
of unions and hampered from learning about them by the language 
barrier and the hostility of the organized workers, they showed 
indifference to union membership and were absent from union strikes 
and lockouts. Because of this they were branded as blacklegs, strike 
breakers and a menace. The press reaction to Asiatics on the Pacific 
Coast ii/as equally hostile and its sensationalism contributed to the 
feeling against Orientals. In British Columbia the Conservative Party 
was able to win the election on the strength of its anti-Oriental 
slogans. Such was the feeling generated against the As3.atic immigrant 
at that time, that soon both political parties (Conservative and Liberal) 
professed their support of anti-Asiatic hysteria and the heated 
atmosphere resulted in anti-Oriental riots in September 1907. Demands 
for a complete ban on Oriental immigration were a direct result of 
all this political manoeuvering and emotional blackmail.
In order to win labour votes in provincial and federal elections, 
both political parties had to become involved in this local immigration 
problem. Both parties, therefore, showed their enthusiasm in 
convincing the labouring classes that they were aiming to achieve 
immigration control with the decrease and ultimately exclusion of 
Orientals as immigrants to Canada. The seeds of discrimination and 
exclusion were thus sown and fertilized and everyone - labourers, 
labour leaders, politicians - hoped to benefit from the harvest.
Prejudice and discrimination towards immigrants may be based 
on tradition or ignorance, political opportunism or fear and the 
hostility varies in its intensity according to the amount cf 
emotionalism invo3.ved with the issue in question. The host country 
is largely responsible for setting the attitude in which general 
and particular classes of immigrants are to be reodved and to
determine whether or not they will be a threat to the economic
conditions, social set-up, political system or religion of the
established population. Since the benefits of increase in population
are general in application and are slow in making themselves felt,
the more personal and emotional issues are usually those that receive
the most popular attention. Therefore, the dislocations and injuries
to the int erests of established groups and classes which may be the
immediate consequence of an influx of newcomers are quickly felt,
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are resented,.and often exaggerated.
This was the case with Oriental- ‘immigrationobn the.Pacific' 
Coast. It quickly became the target for attack by labour leaders 
and this movement gained wide labour support. Politicians of both 
major political parties, anxious for the popular vote, jumped on 
the anti-Asiatic bandwagon. Thus, when the-East'Indian migration 
began the atmosphere in British Columbia waa already hostile. Even, 
though East Indians were British subjects and citizens of the Bx'itash 
•Empirethey were not .welcome. The Dominion government, its own 
racist views strengthened by the British Columbian attitude, adopted 
restric tive and discriminatory policies .towards Indians and tried 
to establish their effective exclusion. Their status as British- , 
subjects did not help them to enter Canada} rather it led to a 
fear of inexhaustible numbers of Indian migrants coming to Canada 
and changing the ’western cultural atmosphere of the country* The 
,immigration question became an insoluble issue throughout the British
1 Alan Richardson, ”A Theory and a Method for psychological Study-odf 
Assimilation”, International Migration Review, Vol. II, No, 1,
Fall 1967, pp. ZZW.
2 See Vkli, Chamberlain, Canada Today and Tomorrow (Boston, 19^2).
Empire for it created s colour and race consciousness which had its 
"repercussions in the politics of India, Britain and Canada. 
Unfortunately the effective exclusion of Indians from Canada, which 
was the basic policy of the Dominion, had the tacit approval of the 
Imperial and Indian governments. This, in turn, served as the 
greatest contributory factor for anti-British movements in the 
once loyal province of the funjab during the First World War.
The Indians* exclusion was officially agreed upon under a 
diplomatic arrangement made under the Reciprocity of Treatment 
resolution in the Imperial War Conference of 1918. This policy 
continued till 19^ -7 v/hen India and Pakistan became independent 
countries. In the post-war period after the Second World War the 
Dominion government rep2.aced this policy of exclusion with an 
agreement to accept a smnlij/hurnber of Indian migrants under a quota 
system in 19U?1. In 19^7 Canada adopted a universal immigration policy 
and by 1972 Canada accepted a reasonable number of Asian expellees 
from Uganda.
Over a period of many years the Dominion governments^ immigration 
policy as it concerns Indians has moved from exclusion to acceptance. 
The question of colour and the assimilation of peoples of such 
different cultural backgrounds has no doubt been a major problem in 
the governments* desire to maintain harmonious internal and external 
relations. Yet the migration of East Indians within the British 
Empire occupied a position out of all proportion to the small mumbers 
involved, for this migration became an issue of fundamental importance 
in Commonwealth relations. However, Canada has managed to bring about 
changes in her immigration policy and subsequently has set a workable
example for other Commonwealth countries.
It is curious to note that when India was.part of the British 
Empire, Indians were excluded from Canada. Yet after the end of 
British rule in India, South Asians were accepted. Similar changes 
in the immigration process have since been introduced into the 
immigration policies of Australia and New Zealand in recent years.
In Canada this process of passing from complete exclusion to equal 
acceptance of East Indians as migrants was due to a variety of factors. 
These include asocial and cultural forces, economic realities, political 
expediencies and the impact of science, technology and a general 
wind of change blowing over the post-warjworld scene.
The public archives of Canada are now open to 19^7»the private 
papers of government officials and the India Office records are also 
available for research purposes. These original sources have not been 
used so far. Dr. David Corbett*s work in 1957* Professor Anthony 
Richmond’s investigation in 1967, and Dr. Freda Hawkings book of 
1972 describe Canadian immigration policy in general. The important 
question of the migration of Indians within the white Commonwealth has 
been uninvestigated and unreported before this dissertation. In an 
age when movement of peoples from under developed countries to lands 
that offer greater economic opportunity is a serious topic to be 
considered by many governments, the East Indian migration into Canada, 
its rejjercussions on intra-imperial relations and Commonwealth 
relationships provide a timely and interesting field for research.
This dissertation, therefore, is a study of the East Indian migration 
question with regard to Canadian policies for the past 68 years 
during which time the world political order and general attitudes to 
race have undergone changes unknown throughout the previous two
hundred years. Itis hoped that the favourable results obtained 
by Canada’s changed immigration policy will serve as a useful example 
to other countries which may have to consider similar problems.
CHASTER 2
Beginning of Indian immigration into Canada and its 
coincidence with the influx of other Orientals - 
Chinese and Japanese. Migration of Indians Into the 
United States and: its result. Asiatic Exclusion 
League and the factors leading to the Vancouver riots 
of September 1907*
Canada was practically unknown to the Indian labouring 6'lasses 
up to the end of the nineteenth century. The long distance between 
India and Canada might have been the cause for this, but an equally 
contributing factor was that there was no direct arrangement for 
sea-travel. The Indians who first came to Canada were all soldiers 
or policemen who had been in the service of the British government 
at Shanghai, Hong Kong and other parts of the Far East. During the 
Boxer War in China, Britain had sent a detachment of the Indian array
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there and she had also sought immediate assistance from Japan to 
order to relieve pressure on the European legations and nationals, 
and to safeguard her mercantile interests. In this way these 
Indians came into contact with other nations, and realised the 
importance of their service in the international struggle. Travelling 
abroad and crossing the ocean fostered in them a spirit of wander-lust 
and either at the time of retirement from the service or while on 
leave of absence some of them crossed the Pacific to Canada.
Eater, in 189?., Queen Victoria’s Jubilee was held in London and 
Indian troops were sent there to participate in the celebration. 
Thereafter they were sent back to India via Canada. The idea was 
that the troops might see different parts of the Empire. The Indian 
soldiers were much impressed and told their colleagues and relations 
at home about the wealth, abundance and fertility of Canada as 
well as the opportunities it afforded to new settlers. Through 
the reports of soldiers stationed in the Far East who visited
1 Ian H. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: the Development of Two 
Island Empires'" 189^1907 (London, 1966), pp. 90-91.
2 Sir Claude MacDonald, The Japanese Detachment During the Defence 
of Peking Legation. June-August 1900 (London, 1913-14), pp. 1-20.
Canada and then settled there and later from soldiers returning 
from the Jubilee, Canada was introduced to the Indian population as 
a land of tempting opportunities. But the earliest Indian immigrants 
; came not from India proper but from Indian communities already 
settled in Malaya, Hong Kong and Shanghai, where Indians were 
generally employed as night watchmen and police constables, a large 
number having previously been soldiers. These men were mostly of 
good appearance and strong physique, but they had little knowledge of 
English. In the new land they steadily found employment of a far
more remunerative character than could,be obtained in Hong Kong
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and China. Their success in Canada resulted in a slow in-flow of
new immigrants from India.
There is no official record to show how many Indians entered .
Canada before $uly&904, when the system of recording the jjarticulars
of fresh immigrants was first introduced. The first arrivals got
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jobs and began to make a lot of money. According to a British
Columbian official:
They are mostly Sikhs. They are most useful in the 
lumber industry and the Mayor of New Westminster 
told me that they helped to save the lumber people 
there.^
Minto, the Viceroy of India, was also full of praise for the Sikhs.
He wrote to Grey, the Governor General of Canada, that the Sikhs were
1 S.N. Singh, HCanada<s New Immigrant”, Canadian Magazine, XXVIII
(1907), p. 388.
2 Colonial Secy.Hong Kong to Secy, to Govt, of India, March 23, 1907, 
File 3330, L/P & J/6/780.
3 The Indian labourers could get one dollar and fifty cents a
day whereas in India they could earn only fifteen rupees a month. 
This represented a substantial increase in income, even allowing 
for the difference in the respective costs of living. Memorandum 
by Col. Swayne, Bee. 30, 1908, File 273, L/P & J/6/L137-
k Adrian, Govt. House, Victoria B.C. to Col. Williams, Govt. House, 
Ottawa, Dec. 13, 1906, Minto Papers, M.995*
the best men that India could produce and that no country could 
import any one better than they. The Sikhs were very fine soldiers 
but they also had a strongly developed money-making instinct, and 
being adventurous and prepared to rough 'djt they were quite ready to 
cross the Pacific for batter financial opportunities. In this venture 
they were initially encouraged. Manual labour v/as scarce and wages 
were high in British Columbia, and a supply of able-bodied Indian 
labourers ready to work well for a moderate wage and giving no trouble
in the matter of trade unions was distinctly useful to white
- V- 2 ■ : ■ ■ ” • - -employers.
According to the Immigration Office, Vancouver,45 Indians entered
British Columbia between July 1, 1904 and June 30,1905 and the figure
for the next year was 3^7• These settlers wrote to their friends and
relatives at home describing the *enormous wealth* (by Indian standards) 
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that could be won. The result was that more shipments of workers 
began to arrive from India, where wages were extremely low. The 
Sikhs had already thrown away the caste and religious prejudice against 
foreign travel and migration, and they were well-known for their 
allegiance to and reverence for the British Throne. As British 
subjects, they preferred to migrate to a country belonging to the 
British Empire, for their economic betterment. So before long, 
migration from India to Canada became considerable. A contemporary 
writer testified to the situation in the following manner:
1 Minto to Grey, Jan. 23» 1907» Minto Papers M. 995*
2 Austen Chamberlain to Hardinge, Sept. 10, 1915» Iiardinge Papers 121.
3 Robertson to Cory, May 8, 1918, R.G. 76» File 536999* Vol. II.
4 MacInnes, who was a secret agent for the Government of Canada for 
the investigation of reasonsfor Indian immigration, also stated 
that Indian immigration began spontaneously as a result of 
Hindus’ letters home saying h$w easy it was to make money in 
Canada. Maclnnes to Oliver, Minister of the Interior, Ottawa,
Oct. 10, 1907, C.O. 886/1.
I was recently travelling through the far eastern 
countries and had the opportunity of observing how 
eagerly these letters were circulated by recipients, 
read with interest, and decisions were made with 
precipitate haste to take the earliest opportunity 
to go to a British^country, where honest, hard work 
earned competence.
From the Canadian point of view there was such a scarcity of
unskilled labour that the salmon canners of British Columbia petitioned
p
for relaxation of restrictions on Chinese immigration. Similarly
the Canadian Pacific Railroad Company asked for admission of an Asian
labour force, and The Times carried the report that a considerable
number of East Indians could be imported into the province of British
Columbia to relieve the labour situation.^ The demand for Indian
immigrants was so tremendous that almost anybody was employed; and,
as a contemporary witness says, so many employers asked him to help
them get these men (Indian immigrants) that if he had over a hundred,
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he could easily have placed them. They were a stout able-bodied
group pf men, of whom a large proportion were ex-soldiers. Their
5
conduct had been exemplary. They were men of enterprise and courage
and their ignorance of the English language had not deterred them
from seeking work in distant countries like Canada. The condition
of the main body of the Indian immigrants was more satisfactory than
6could have been anticipated. They were law-abiding, and their 
entry into Canada was quite according to the law, but ignorance of 
the English language i*as their major handicap, therefore the
1 S.N. Singh, “Canada’s New Immigrant”, Canadian Magazine XXVIII 
(1907), p. 388.
2 The Times, August 10, 1906.
3 Ibid., August 13, 1906.
4 Daru of the Geological Survey of Canada to Under Secretary of State 
for India, Nov. 19, 1906, File 3330, L/P & J/6/780.
5 Col. Falk Warren to Under Secy, of State for India, Nov. 22, 1906, 
File 3330, L/P & J/6/78O.
6 Col. Falk V/arren to Under Secy, of State for India, Jan. 2, 1907, 
File 3330, L/P & J/6/78O.
contemporary observers - Col. Falk V/arren and N.D. Daru - suggested 
to the Dominion and Imperial governments the need for some official 
interpreter to be appointed.
Similarly another contemporary witness, Mr. Norman W. Greine, 
Chairman of the Ceylon Association, after paying a visit to Canada, 
observed that the services of Indians could be utilised in fruit- 
farming, and there was a need for the appointment of some officials 
to look after the Indians on their arrival. It Would be quite in 
keeping with the spirit of humanitarianism and Christianity to help 
fellow subjects.
On September 20, 1906 the Ottawa Citizen published a thoughtful 
leading article on the matter.. Therein it stated that the immigrants 
were a fine, high spirited class of men, and were descendants of the 
men wfao had stood by Great Britain in the Indian Mutiny of 1857-8 
and had ever since been treated with honour and distinction. The 
article especially commended the Sikhs, and added that they were 
muchisuperior to many white immigrants, such as Dukhobors, Galicians, 
and other Southern European races.
The Canadian province of British Columbia had already experienced 
the penetration of the Chinese and Japanese long-before the arrival 
of the Indians. The discovery of the gold mines of Cassiar and 
Caribou and later on the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway 
led to the import of Asiatics into the .'province. It Was practically 
the only province in Canada where any strong feeling against the Asiatics 
ever existed because it was the only place where Asiatics settled 
in number. The Chinese coolies were the first to come. As long as 
the construction work of the Canadian Pacific Railway went on, their
1 Norman W. Greine, Chairman, Ceylon Association, London to John 
Morley, Secy, of State for India, Sept. 20, 1907, File 3330,
L/P & J/6/780.
2 The Times, Sept. 21, 1906.
presence was not considered objectionable. Labour was scarce, and 
the speedy construction of the mountain section of the transcontinental 
railway required a large number of labourers. But soon after the 
completion of the road the coolies left their camps to become resident 
in the cities, towns and villages. Here they competed in the field 
of labour connected with various industries and a strong prejudice 
grew up whenever the two races - Mongolian and Caucasian —  came into 
contact in any area of work. This led to frequent petitions to the 
Dominion Parliament. A Royal Commission was appointed to investigate 
the matter, ana it presented its report in 1902. The report stated 
that as the standard of living among the Chinese differed widely 
from that prevailing in British Columbia, it was probable that a 
great upheaval in the economic conditions of that province would 
ensue, and grave injury would be inflicted on the working classes 
if a large influx of Chinese labourers took place. The.Commission, 
therdbre, recommended that any further immigration of Chinese 
labourers ought to be prohibited, and that until this prohibition 
became.effective the capitation tax should be raised to five hundred 
dollars.
The Indians were also bracketed with the Chinese, but the problem
was that the Indians were subjects of the British Empire whereas the
Chinese and the Japanese were aliens. The continuous entry of Indians
was vehemently opposed by white workers, who were afraid that the new
immigrants would jeopardise their job prospects. A campaign of
calumny and vituperation continued to be waged against them, and the
politicians who sought to maintain the labour-vote were obliged to 
2sustain it. The Mayor of Vancouver protested to the immigration
1 Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 0ct. 30, 1906, C.O. 866/1.
2 Col. Folk V/arren and N.D. Daru to Under Secretary of State for 
India, Nov. 22, and Nov. 19, 1906, File 3330, L/P & J/6/?80.
department against the landing of a large number of indigent British 
Indians in that city, Similarly Mr. Templeman, Minister of Inland 
Revenue, stated that he favoured the policy of the ’closed door’ 
to races whom it was impossible to assimilate. He added that he
p
referred to Orientals, East Indians and Southern races. Organised
labour, unions such as the Victoria Trades and Labor Council and the :
Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners of Vancouver urged
the Dominion government to stop Indian immigration into Canada.^
The City Council of Victoria also demanded the complete stoppage
of Asiatic penetration into the province. The Ottawa Free Press
; expressed the fear that Oriental labourers would destroy and drive
out white working classes from the Pacific Coast,-' R.G. McPherson,
member of parliament for Vancouver, went to Ottawa in the hope of
securing Federal action to prevent the Indian influx into British 
6
Columbia, The Trades and Labor Congress of Canada (the main national 
organ of labour unions) in its session held at Winnipeg on September 17, 
1906 demanded a complete ban on Oriental immigration.r
On the whole anti-Indian in its attitude, the press on the
1 The Times, Sept, 10, 1906.
2 Ibid., Sept, 14, 1906.
3 Victoria Trades and Labor Council to Minister of the Interior,
August 6, 1906 and Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and
Joiners, Vancouver to Minister of Emigration, August 22, 1906,
R.G.76, File 336999? Vol. I; and Harold A. Logan, Trade Unions 
in Canada; Their Development and Functioning (Toronto, 1946),
p. 466.   " ■ ■ •
4 Victoria City Council to Minister of the Interior, Sept. 22, 1906,
R.G. 76, File 336999, Vol. I.
3 Ottawa Free press, Sept. 22, 1906.
6 Montreal Daily Herald, Sept, 22, 1906.
7 Montreal Star, Sept. l8, 1906.
pacific Coast (Canada and the United States - West Coast) had,
according to N.D. Daru, scrupled not only to publish misleading
information about the Indians, but also to garble interviews with
1such employers of labour as were hostile to Indian immigrants.
The extent to which the public were misinformed can be judged from 
the following extract from an article published by the Canadian 
Magazine; ■
The class of Hindus that have invaded British 
Columbia are commonly known as Sikhs, meaning 
the lower class, entirely dependent upon their 
physical capabilities - those who have no set p 
aim in life. They are the coolies of Calcutta,
A similar attitude was displayed by the Vancouver World, which
had been conducting a campaign against Indians and writing inflammatory 
3
articles. All of this was to reflect the opposition of white
Canadian workers, who, according to the Toronto News, considered
if ■
their interests to be threatened. At the same time the ignorance 
on the part of the majority of Indian immigrants about the Canadian 
way of life and their inflexible attitude, towards one another and 
their environments, contributed to continued hostility. Dr. A.S.
Munroe who was medical officer and immigration agent at Vancouver, 
observed:
They are constantly quarrelling among themselves, 
and are the most litigious people I ever saw. They 
are dirty and unsanitary in their personal habits....
In character they are iin many respects like children, 
very ignorant and never satisfied. They are the most 
cringing and servile people I ever met with and for 
lying they have no equals.5
1 N.D. Daru to Under Secretary of State for India, Nov. 19» 1906,
File 3330, L/P & J/6/780.
2 J. Barclay Williams, ’’Canada’s Nei* Immigrant’1, Canadian Magazine, 
3DCVIII, 1907, p. 3S*K
3 Guy Audrin to the Dominion Govt., Dec. 13* 1906, Minto Papers M.995*
and Vancouver World, Sept. 12, 1906.
** Toronto Nev/s 1 Jan. 10, 1907.
5 Munroe to Scott, August 16, 1906, R.G.76* File 336999* Vol. I.
Similarly Dr. G.L. Milne, medical officer and immigration agent at
Victoria, stated:
... they are a quarrelsome and contentious race, 
and on^the least provocation, appear in the police 
court.
So it is not surprising to find that Blake Robertson, assistant
superintendent of immigration in Ottawa, after paying a visit to the
Pacific Coast, reported to the Canadian government that Indians were
2 ;not desirable as permanent inhabitants of Canada. The result of
this hostile propaganda was that the official attitude became very
rigid in order to discourage Indian immigration. The alarmed Mayor
of Vancouver sent an urgent telegram to the Colonial Office in London:
. -'East Indians being shipped to British Columbia in 
large numbers and under misrepresentations respecting 
the state of the labour market, feeling acute against 
people responsible ... please take such action as you 
may deem necessary to prevent further shipment.3
The Colonial Office forwarded this telegram to the India Office,
but the Government of India could take action in the matter only if
the Indians left India under contract to work, such emigration being
regulated by the Indian Emigration Act 1883, and being permitted
only to certain countries with which a definite arrangement had been
k  ■: .■ -
made. But if they left India as ordinary travellers to other lands,
or if they came from the Far East and emigrated from that area under
contract to work In Canada, this would not involve an infringement
of the law. The Government of India had no power to control the
movements of Indians sailing under such contracts from countries
1 Milne to Scott, August 16, 1906, R.G.76, File 336999* Vol. I.
2 Blake Robertson to Scott, Dec. 26, 1906, File R.G.76, 33&999*
'■ VOI. I. ;
3 Mayortg£eV»gcouver to Under Secretary of State for Colonies,
London,/oit. $, 1906, File 3330, L / P & J /6/78O.
4 The Act could have no bearing upon the Canadian question unless 
the Dominion Government itself thought of importing Indian labourer 
under contracts made in India. Austen Chamberlain to Hardinge, 
Sept. 10, 1913, Hardinge Papers, 121.
other than India, It appeared probable that many of the Indians 
who had found their way to British Columbia were men who had wandered 
in the Far East in search of employment. The Secretary of State 
for India instructed the Indian government to discourage emigration 
to Canada and warn the intending emigrants about the bleak chances 
of employment in that country under whose laws, in the event of
p
their destitution, they could be liable to deportation.
On the other hand, the Canadian immigration authorities tried to
justify the proposed discouragement of Indian immigration on the
grounds that the climatic conditions of British Columbia - damp and
cold weather as compared to India’s hot and dry climate - were
unsuitable, and that Indians would find it impossible to merge with
the Canadian society because of their rigid caste system; and
finally, that Indians were generally unskilled for the type of
7
work available in^British Columbia, Acting on the request of
the Canadian government, the Governor of Hong Kong ordered the
h
publication of posters in Urdu and Gurmukhi bringing these facts
to the notice of any Indians settled in Hong Kong who might be
h ° -
planning to go to Canada.
The Indians do not seem to have taken much notice of the so- 
called "factors”, which were in any case generally incorrect. For 
the climate of the Punjab, from where most immigrants had originally 
come, was very severe and British Columbia was comparatively mild. 
Again, most Indian immigrants were Sikhs, and the rest generally 
Muslims. Neither believed in the £aste system, which was peculiar
1 India Office Minute No. J & P. 3330/06, Nov. 19 , 1906, File 3330,
,& J/6/780.
2 India Office Minute No. 9697-9709-112, Dec. 13, 1906, File 3330,
3 Memo, by W.I). Scott of the Immigration Branch, Nov. 2, 1906, File 
3330, L/F & J/6/780.
k Languages spoken by Indians from the Punjab.
5 F.D. Lugard, Governor Hong Kong to the Secretary of State for 
Colonies, Sept. 30, 1907* File 3330, L/P & J/6/780.
to the Hindus. Finally, the Canadian Pacific Railway and the lumber 
industry appreciated the skill, work and;ability of the Indian 
immigrants.
The pace and volurae of Indian irmriigration further increased 
when a combination of vested interests began to work. The Canadian 
Pacific Railwa5f started propaganda in India for. the sale of* tickets 
for Canada in their interests as carriers. They did this in order
to replace their diminished Chinese steerage traffic which almost
v
ceased after the imposition of the five hundred dollar head tax. 
Witnesses Numbers 3 and5 who gave evidence before the ’’Royal Commission 
Appointed to Enquire into the Methods by which Oriental Labourers 
were induced to come to Canada 1908**,exhibited notices posted up 
in villages describing Ganadian immigration requirements and stating 
that tickets might be bought from Jardine Matheson and Co., Calcutta, 
or Messrs. Gillanders, Arbuthnot and Co., Calcutta, agents for the 
Canadian Pacific Railway. Similarly Witnesses 10, 12 and-13 all came 
as a result of having been attracted by similar notices posted in 
their villages describing the opportunities in Canada, and stating 
where the tickets could be had. According to a confidential despatch 
of the Government of Bengal, Gillanders Arbuthnot and Co., Calcutta, 
acting as labour agent for the Canadian Pacific Railway, had shipped 
over 1200 people, chiefly Hindus, since March 1907 to Canada. They
apparently went on a distinct engagement to the C.P.R. Mr. Montagu
• 5 .
Woods, one of the Counsel acting for the Hindus- in British Columbia
1 Maclnnes to Frank Oliver, Minister of the Interior, Oct. 10, 1907» 
C.O. 886/1.
2 Royal Commission Report 1908, pp. 76-80.
3 Ibid.
k Minto to Morley, Secretary of State for India, 26 Sept., 1907*
Minto Papers M.1007.
5 The term ’’Hindu” has been used here rather loosely for it is not 
restricted to people who followed Hinduism but is applicable to all 
Indians.
in 1908 produced a poster, copies of which were said to be displayed 
throughout India. The poster described the conditions of Indian 
immigration to Canada:
For Hindus going to Canada:
Hindus who desire to go to Canada can have full 
information from the Company’s Agents for the 
Canadian Pacific RailwayRoyal Mail Steamship 
Line Ho, 8, Clive Street Calcutta. 1
The Canadian Pacific Railway* a Conservative organisation* had
no objection to making difficulties for a Liberal government. Among
these difficulties was Asiatic immigration. Therefore, by the
"simple and ingenious logic of the Party"* it was "expedient to
pfetch in as many cargoes of immigrants as possible". The sale of 
tickets in India was to serve both the economic and the political 
purposes of the G.P.R.
The position was also exploited by "certain individuals" whose 
motive was to make money by hook or by crook. The immigrants in 
the first Instance were mostly ex-soldiers. They belonged to a 
lower economic group of Indians, lacking any schooling or training 
in Western disciplines except a few odd duties as an unskilled labour 
force. The majority of them were not conversant even with the 
language of the country (Canada). This made them vulnerable to 
exploitation by their less scrupulous and clever compatriots who, 
like Dr. Davi Chand and his relatives* worked for personal gain.
The Under-Secretary of State for India was informed by a contemporary
1 Memo, by Maclnnes to Oliver* Minister of the Interior, Ottawa, 
March 1**, 1908, C.0.886/1.
2 Morley to Minto, March 26, 1908, Minto Papers, M.IOO8.
3 The Canadian Pacific Railway headed by Sir. William-Van Horne threw 
its considerable weight against the Liberals and financially 
supported the Conservatives in the elections of 1911* See Khayyam 
Zev Paltiel* Political Party Financing in Canada* p. 2k,
k Report of W.L. Mackenzie King 011 his Mission to England to confer 
with the British authorities on the subject of Immigration to 
Canada from India, p. 8.
source, about Davi Chand as follows:
Dr. Davi Chand who has been here nearly two
years and is supposed to have been writing letters 
to India inviting working men to this country. He 
meets boats on arrival or meets the men (Indians) 
in the street and obtains from them sums varying from 
two to ten dollars on promise of securing employment 
which he has never been known to perform. He has been 
prosecuted three or four times but being witty and 
well-provided with funds while his prosecutors were 
not, always managed to escape conviction. He 
practises medicine in the Indian system and also tells 
fortunes. It is said he used to do similar things 
under a different alias in Australia from where he 
was expelled. 1
The exploitation by Davi Chand was testified to by Witness No. k 
who stated that he had received letters from his countrymen in Canada 
among them a brother who had been induced to come by a letter from 
Davi Chand, He further stated that the letter had sent tickets and 
altogether been responsible, he thought, for V? persons entering 
Canaaa. Similarly Witnesses 7 and 9 had been sent tickets and 
promised work by Davi Chand.
The Royal Commission of 1908 concluded that immigration from 
India owed its existence to:
(1) The distribution throughout certain of the rural districts 
of India, of glowing accounts of the opportunities of 
fortune-making in the province of British Columbia, 
visions of fields of fortune so brightly hued that 
many an Indian peasant farmer, to raise the money for 
the journey, had mortgaged to the lender of the village 
his home-stead and all that it contained at a rate of 
interest varying from fifteen to twenty percent.
■ (2) The activity of certain steamship agents who were
desirous of selling transportation in the interest of 
the companies with which they were connected and of 
themselves profiting by the commission reaped.
(3) The activity of certain individuals in the province of 
British Columbia ... who were desirous of exploiting 
their fellow subjects ....^
1 K.P. Daru, Indian Govt. Technical Scholar attached to the Geological 
Survey of Canada, to the Under-Secretary of State for India, Nov. 19 
1906, File 3330, L/P & J/6/780.
2 Royal Commission Report, 1908, pp. 77-80.
3 Mackenzie King, Report on l1.. Immigration to Canada from India, 1908
p. 8.
Thus we find that Indian immigration in Canada started with Sikh
' '■ ■ 'i
soldiers coming from parts of the Far East outside India, and slowly
extended to their friends and relatives in India. The rosy impression
about Canada, that the Indian soldiers acquired while returning from
the Queen’s Jubilee celebrations or the visit by Indian soldiers to
Canada, after their participation in the campaign against the Boxer
Rebellion in China might have been the starting point of this movement
After 1905 it made sudden strides chiefly as a result of systematic
exploitation by steamship companies for political and economic motives
2Certain individuals like Davi Chand and his relatives tried to
exploit the situation for their personal benefit. Consequently it
accelerated with the letters (with money orders enclosed) sent home
by fortunate first comers.
The gradual increase of Indian immigration into Canada coincided
with a large influx of Japanese and Chinese. After the imposition of
restrictions on Chinese immigration, the people of British Columbia
did not consider their presence a threat because the Chinese did not
claim a position of equality with the Europeans. They confined their
activities to certain limited menial occupations, and were mostly
employed as domestic servants, laundrymen, cooks and kitchen-help,
labourers in clearing forest lands, inside workers at canneries and
3as above ground workers at collieries. They were reliable workers 
and their attitude towards the Europeans was one of peace at any 
price.
Similarly, the Indians were good workers and were employed in
1 Emigrant, Indian Emigration, Oxford 192^, p. 7^ *
2 Governor General of Canada to the Secretary of State for Colonies, 
April 27, 1908, C.O. 886/1.
3 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, January, 1908, I6V9.
the saw millsor clearing land. They too were inoffensive and 
peaceful. Their work was appreciated by their employers. Being 
British subjects, they were able to enter Canada without any hindrance, 
since until the end of 1907, there was no restriction from the Indian 
or Canadian governments to check their influx.
• •.IJp. to-;19P$i • emigration from;; Japan,was regulated by the general 
Act which gatfe the government power to issue instructions from time 
to time as to the passage of persons who might be permitted to . 
emigrate. Under this policy, emigration from Japan could take place 
\ Only with the consent of the Japanese Government, whose Foreign Office 
exercised complete control over the matter. Nobody could obtain a 
passport without the permission of the Foreign Office and without a 
passport no one could emigrate. All emigration agencies were thus 
under government supervision.
But by the end of the nineteenth century, Japan had become 
a modern industrial and commercial power of the Fast and she aspired 
to enter into the ‘Fellowship of Nations*. So the Anglo-Japanese 
Cosimercial Treaty was; signed on July 16, 189^. Then, in 1902, the 
Anfelo-Japanese Alliance ...was formed to meet the threat of Russian 
expansion in the Far East. Hostility to the Russians, however, 
declined after the v;ar of 190^ 9- By 1907 the alliance was aimed, 
in so far as it was aimed at any power, at Germany. The Canadian
1 Sir Edward Grey, then parliamentary under-secretary at- the Foreign 
Office, wrote that the Government acted because "the time had come 
when dealings with Japan might be put on the same equal terms that 
exist between nations of European origin’*. See E. Grey (Viscount 
Grey of Fallodon), Twenty Five Years 1892-1916, Vol. I, p. 23.
2 For Great Britain the alliance grew steadily in importance at a 
time when the naval race with Germany was looming and when the 
Liberal government was embarking on a programme of social reforms 
requiring increased expenditure. The alliance permitted her to 
concentrate her navy increasingly in home waters and delegate the 
task of defending British interests in the Far East and Pacific 
to Japan. Bee Ian H. Nish, op.cit., p. 3^ 2.
government’s attitude towards Japan was not dictated by Imperial 
interests but solely by Canadian interests. This policy was 
defended by Laurier, the Liberal Canadian Prime Minister, in 1903, 
when he spoke on Canadian-Japanese relations in the Canadian House 
of Commons:
We intend to have a trade between Japan and Canada.
.We intend to bring about a development of relations 
which exist between progressive people and our 
people.... We are t^ fing to promote trade between 
Canada and Japan ... because after all, vie are 
neighbour nations.
So Canada followed the example of Great Britain and concluded
a treaty with Japan on January 31» 1906 and this arrangement was
ratified by the Canadian Parliament in 1907. According to this
treaty
The subjects of each of the two high contracting 
parties shall have full liberty to enter, travel or 
reside in any part of the Dominions and possessions 
of the other contracting party and shall enjoy full ^ 
and perfect protection for their persons and property.
No sooner had the treaty been ratified than the Japanese immigrant
began to pour into the province of British Columbia. They came from
Japan directly or ffom the Island of Hawaii. Some of them came to
Victoria and Vancouver as bearers of permits to Canada, others
came with permits for the United States only, and many came with no
permits at all, claiming their rights under the treaty. In this
way the number of Japanese immigrants rose rapidly and the people
of British Columbia believed they'were threatened by the perils of
Ij.
an Asiatic takeover. The Japanese had started to compete with the 
Europeans in trade, work and employment.
1 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 1903, Vol. I, pp. 602-603.
2 Ibid., January 1908, 1652 and Canada Sessional papers 7^b,
3 Rodolphe Lemieux, Minister of Labour, Confidential Report of his 
Mission to Japan ... 1908, pp. 6-8. Lemieux Papers.
k Ibid.
The reason why the Europeans could not work for the same wages
as the Asiatics - Chinese, Japanese and Indians - was that the
individual cost of living of the Asiatics did not exceed one half
the amount normally spent by a Canadian of the same class* Moreover
the Asiatics had no families to support in Canada.
By the end of the nineteenth century Indians had also started
going to such western states as Washington, California and Oregon.
But soon the growth of the Indian community was resented by the
white workers, for the Indian infiltration of cheap labour had
unfavourable repercussions for the U.B.labour organizations, In
the year 1906~1907 the United States of America was facing an economic
crisis. In order to cope with the situation the employers demanded
longer hours of work with lower wages. The only group of labourers
who fell into line with their demands were Indians to whom even those
unpalatable terms were better than the ones obtainable at home in India.
The Indians went to work when trade unions struck for higher wages and
better conditions because they were not cognizant of the conflict
between workers* organizations and the employers. Thus relations
between them and other workers deteriorated, and Indians became
unpopular as strike breakers and blacklegs. They were ostracized
by American labour groups and even subjected to intimidation and
punishment. They were frequently beaten and in many cases kidnapped
and put in cars which deposited them several miles away from the
2cities in which they lived.
As early as May 1905, an organization entitled "The Japanese 
and Korean Exclusion League" was formed at San Francisco. Its object
1 "There were signs of disturbance in the New tork Stock Exchange’*.
See M.P. Fairchild, “ Immigration and Crises", American Economic 
Rhview 1911, p. 757*
2 Press Report, Sept..1907, R.G.7, G21, File 332, Vo&. 199*
was the total exclusion of Japanese and Koreans from the United
States and its insular territory. The American Federation of Labour
had taken up the matter of exclusion of the Chinese, Japanese and
Koreans at its twenty-fourth session in November 190**. In 1907,
when the number of Indian immigrants into Washington, Oregon and
California increased, it changed its name from ’’The Japanese and
Korean Exclusion League” to the Asiatic Exclusion League. Its
leader, Olaf A. Tveitmoe, of the San Francisco Building Trades
Council.started a campaign against Orientals in his paper, Organized
Labor. He asserted that "the Asiatic would drag down white labor
to his lower level". In his address at the ’Labor Day* celebrations
at San Francisco on September 2 - reported in the Organized Labor of
September 7 - he emphasized that the mission of unionized labour was
"to guard the gateway of Occidental Civilization /~West Coast_J7 against
the Oriental invasion".
Anti-Asiatic rioting occurred in a few cities including Seattle,
Everett and Bellingham. In the most publicized incident at Bellingham,
in September 1907» six hundred lumberjacks herded some two hundred
A
Indians out of town with many immigrants suffering Injuries. A 
contemporary journalist delightfully reported that the "tawny 
subjects of Great Britain were as docile as cattle" and in one 
case, "a school boy drove in three of the timorous Asiatics who 
had once served in the soldiery of Great Britain". Another
1 Maclnnes to Oliver, Minister of the Interior, Ottawa, Feb. 13, 1908, 
C.O. 886/1.
2 Report by Maclnnes, File 1371* L/P & J/6/86**; and Jacobus ten Brock, 
Edward N. Barnhart and Floyd W. Matson, Prejudice, War and the 
Constitution (Berkeley, 1958), pp. 3**-35«
3 Organized Labor (San Francisco), Jan. 2, 1907- 
k Gov. Gen., File G.21, No. 332, Vol. 199* 1907.
magazine sarcastically entitled its account as ’’War with Great 
Britain’'. The Asiatic Exclusion League held Indians responsible 
for the riots by declaring that their willingness to work forlow 
.-.wages, and their filthy and immodest habits invited reprisals.
The U.S. administration was rather indifferent and did not take any 
effective measures for the protection of the Indians, as the following 
extract from the letter of the British Consulate of Portland, Oregon 
to Albert E. Mead, Governor of Washington State, Olympia will show:
...but the fact remains that, through intimidation 
they /"the Indians^ were driven from their lawful 
employment and that no apparent efforts have been 
made to iJunish those who were guilty of illegal acts, 
or to deter the commission of similar acts in the 
future. 2
The Mayor of Everett also confirmed that the ’’demonstration
possibly had the effect of intimidating these people to such an
3  .
extent that some four or five days later they left the city”.
Thus the Indians had to leave these states and they made their 
way to Canada. When this nev/s appeared in the press, Lord Grey, 
the Governor General of Canada, asked Laurier, the Canadian Prime 
Minister, to make necessary arrangements for the reception of 
Indian evacuees from the United States because they were British 
subjects m  need of the protection of the British Crown.
The Asiatic Exclusion League had been very active in the 
important cities of British Columbia during 1907. In September 
Mr. Ishii, the Japanese Commissioner, arrived in Seattle, and 
believing that he would remain there for several days, the League
1 Outlook, LXXXVII, 1907, pp. 51-52.
2 James Laidlaw, British Consulate,. Portland,Oregon to Albert E. Mead, 
Governor of Washington, Olympia, Nov. 19, 1907, File 4251,
L/P & J/6/839.
3 Report by Newton Jones, Mayor of Everett, Nov. 2, I907, File 4251, 
L/P & U/5/839.
4 Governor General of Canada to the Secretary of State for Colonies, 
Sept. 24, 1907, C.0.886/1.
had planned a hostile demonstration against the Asiatics in general 
and the Japanese in particular. But Mr. Ishii decided to leave 
for Vancouver before any demonstration could be carried out. However, 
upon learning of this the Secretary of the Seattle Exclusion League 
(Mr. A.B.: Fowler, who had led the attacks on Indians at Bellingham) 
boarded the same train for Vancouver. Acting upon Mr. Fowler’s 
instructions the Asiatic Exclusion League of Vancouver arranged for 
a parade to,be followed by a public meeting in the City Hall oh 
September 7» 1907- The City Hall was; literally v;ithin a stone’s 
throw of China Town and was not much removed from Powell Street 
where most of the Japanese resided at that time. Fowler proposed a 
march through the Chinese and Japanese quarters. Some boys, 
directed by Fowler, began to throw' stones and then the crowd turned 
into a mob, invaded China Town and swept on to the Japanese quarters. 
At first the Japanese met the invading force with passive resistance, 
then, arming themselves -with sticks, bottles and knives, they routed 
their persecutors. The following morning, Sunday, further trouble 
occurred. In the ensuing rioting the Japanese showed their fighting 
skill, turned upon their assailants and routed them. They patrolled 
the streets in their special quarters carrying revolvers and knives
i
and did the job of the police.
The Indians took refuge in their Gurdawara (Sikh temple) and 
in the mills where they worked. They were mild-mannered and
inoffensive. They did not carry any weapons as did the Japanese.
They were fellow-subjects of Canadians under the British Crown and
p
desired to•live peacefully. They were, however, equally unacceptable
1 Colonist, Sept. 8, 1907; Seattle Post Intelligencer, Sept. 8 , 1907
Canadian Annual Review, 1907 (Toronto, 1908), p. 38S; and Province
Sept. 9» 1907-
2 Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs, Vol. 2 (Princeton, 1966),
pp. 168-170.
because they appeared to be odd people who were unable to adapt 
themselves to their new situation: far less than the Chinese and 
Japanese did they attempt to make their customs and dress conform 
to Western ideas. Their turbans, their flowing beards, their dark 
skins gave them an unkempt appearance, however clean they actually 
might have been. V.
The news; of riots shocked Ottawa officials. In the meantime 
the situation seemed likely to be aggravated by the arrival of the 
steamship Monteagle on 11 September, 1907, with 900 Indians on
'I
board. Mr. Alexander Bethune, Mayor of Vancouver, reacted promptly
and sent a telegram to Sir Wilfrid Laurier:
Nine hundred Hindus arriving today, steamer Monteagle. 
Neither accommodation nor employment for them, nor is 
it possible to house them under sanitary conditions.
Shall we^house them in drill hall at Dominion Government’s 
expense.
Mayor Bethune was rather outspoken on the exclusion question.
But equally vocal against the Asiatics was Mr, R.C, Macpherson, M.P.
(Victoria, B.C.), who voiced the heated atmosphere of the labour
halls and Exclusion Leagues by telling the Montreal press the day
after the riot that:
If the Federal Government does not step in and put 
a stop to the already humiliating state of affairs 
in British Columbia, with regard to the present influx 
of Asiatics, there is going to be another episode like 
the Boston tea party and something has got to be done
quickly to stop this thing.^
The British Columbian government headed by Conservative Premier
Sir Richard McBride, had already exploited the Oriental immigration
question to the full extent in the provincial election of February
1 Of course Alexander Bethune was a member of the Vancouver Asiatic
Exclusion League. Report by Maclnnes, Oct. 10, 1907, File 3320,
L/P & J/6/780.
2 Mayor A. Bethune to Laurier, Sept. 11, 1907, C.0.866/1.
3 Quoted in the Canadian Review of public Affairs, 1907, p. 3^7-
' ' ' ■ *\ r1907. Seeing the popularity of anti-Asiatic elements on the Pacific
2Coast, it had publicized its strong opposition to Oriental immigration.
Two days prior to the general election in British Columbia, the
Province (a Conservative paper) printed a sensational front page
article declaring that Liberals had made a secret agreement with
the Grand Trunk Pacific Railroad that in the case of a Liberal victory
in the election it would beallowed to import 50,000 Japanese workers.
The Liberal party was faced with the impossibility of replying to
the Conservative charges at length, because the latter were made on
the eve of the election. In this way McBride very skilfully, through
his criticism of the Dominion immigration policies, achieved the
.5
largest majority in the pojmlar vote. So after the September riots
McBride took up his old uncompromising stance against the so-called
*Oriental’ invaders. He was a witty politician with his finger on 
6the popular pulse. His opposition to the Oriental immigration 
became quite vociferous. The Governor General of Canada, however, 
accepted the fact that although the Indians were ’’excellent fruit 
pickers” and would be of invaluable assistance to the fruit farmers
. 7
in the picking and packing seasons, they were nevertheless not wanted.
T Brian Ray Douglas Smith, ’’Sir Richard McBride: A study in the 
Conservative party of British Columbia, 1903-1916”, M.A. Thesis 
(Queen’s University, Kingston, 1955)* p. 77*
2 Mary E. Hallett, ”A Governor General’s Views on Oriental Immigration 
to British Columbia, 190**-1911"» B.C. Studies, no. l*f, 1972, p. 56.
3 Province, February 1, 1907.
k Roman Hromnysky, ’’The Western Canadian Regional Governments and the 
Federal System 1900-1930", M.A. Thesis (University of British Columbia, 
Vancouver, 1965)* P*
3 Ibid. and Martin Robin, Canadian Provincial Politics (Scarborough, 
1972), p. **6.
6 Nev; York Evening Post, October 26, 1907.
7 Gray, Governor General of Canada, to Minto, Governor General of 
India, November 20, 1907, Minto Papers, M. 995*
Similarly, Mr. Alex MacLaren, the lumber man, recognized and
appreciated the working ability of the Asiatics and wrote in 
favour of Asiatic immigration in the Winnipeg Telegram on October 22,
1907:
- We: employ Chinese, Japanese and Hindus in our mills.
We are forced to employ this outside labour for there 
is very little common white labour to be had and what 
there is, is little better than the hobo type....
On the other hand, we have the Oriental day in and 
day out. He does his work well and we have no trouble.
They are living in houses that we' have built for them, 
pay their rent regularly and usually the Chinese and 
Japanese are far more cleanly than the common white 
labourers. If any of them wants to get away for a 
while, they arrange to have somebody else to talee their 
places and show some consideration for the interests 
of their employers, White men are holding all important 
and high-wage positions in our mills, These men are all 
right - they are skilled labourers - but it is the^common 
white labourers that we havegotthat are no good.
All the violence against the Asiatics came from the labour element 
2alone, and,, according to Lord Morley, was engineered from the United
States. The chief speakers at the same meeting in Vancouver which
preceded the riot were E.A. Fowler of Seattle, Secretary of the Asiatic
Exclusion League, and W.A. Young of Seattle, an organizer of the American
Federation of Labour, The labour elements in Vancouver and in Seattle
and Bellingham were very closely linked. So in spite of the shortage of
unskilled labour, the Asiatic Exclusion League succeeded in filling
the minds of the people with the fear of Asiatic invasion as a
threat to their own economic security. Minto on the basis of his
experience as Governor General of Canada, said:
British Columbia was, and no doubt still is, a 
tferribly corrupt province, and labour questions 
were much run by the United States ’Boss1.^
1 Winnipeg Telegram, October 22, 1907.
2 Itobert E. Wynne, "American Labor Leaders and the Vancouver Anti-Oriental
Riot", Pacific North-West Quarterly, October 1966, pp. 172-178.
3 Morley to Minto, March 26, I908, Minto Papers M. IOOS.
k Minto to Morley, April 15, 1908, Minto Papers M. 1002.
Public opinion had been turned against the Asiatics. While 
informing the Imperial authorities, the Governor General of Canada 
quoted the following headlines from the Vancouver Semi-Weekly World 
of 8th November, 190? to describe the situation in British Columbia:
(1) Evidence of Chief of Police of Vancouver before Commissioner 
Mackenzie King re- Anti-Asiatic riots.
(2) Evidence of Inspector Mulhorn before Commissioner Mackenzie 
King re- anti-Asiatic riots.
(3) Eeturn of Hindus from American territory to British 
Columbia, owing to mob violence at Everett, United States 
of America, 5th November.
(if) Close of Commissioner Mackenzie King^s enquiry as to 
Japanese damage claims.
(5) Commissioner Mackenzie King’s further Commission to 
enquire into the working methods of the Oriental 
employment agencies.
(6) Protest from Asiatic Exclusion League against employment 
of Asiatics on steamships receiving Canadian subsidies.
(7) Speech of Honourable Joseph Martin to Asiatic Exclusion 
League (Mr. Martin is a stormy petrel whose presence 
generally denotes an approaching storm).
(8) Letter of protest by Japanese Consul Morikawa to the 
Mayor of Vancouver.
(9) Interview with Mr.: F.C. Wade, K.C. re- Asiatic immigration.
(10) Japanese Employment Agencies,
(11) Cable from Vladivostook - Japan said to be preparing for 
war with the United States.5.-
The Canadian Government while showing a conciliatory spirit
to the problem, however, represented that unchecked immigration from
A '
India would lead to anti-Asiatic rioting. The Governor General 
asked the British Colonial Office to regulate Indian immigration by
1 Colonial Office to India Office, Nov. 15, 1907, File 3330, L/P & J/6/?80 
Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, telegram, Nov. l4, 1907,
File 3330, L/P Sc J/6/780.
2 Governor General of Canada to Colonial Office, Nov. lA-, 1907, C*0. 886/1
3 Vancouver World, Nov. 8, 1907.
India Office Minute, Nov. 18, I907, L/P 8c J/6/780.
the introduction of a passport system under which a small number of 
Indians, agreed between India and Canada, should be allowed to come
to Canada, further requesting that Canada should be allowed to deport
all Indians coming without passports.
Grey, the Governor General of Canada, ,was strongly in favour of 
checking the emigration of Indians at its source and taking no action
in Canada. From the Canadian point of view it was better, if possible,
to prevent Indians from starting out rather than to have them turned 
back on arrival after they had paid for passages. Although an Order 
in Council was submitted to the Canadian Governor General for approval 
to refuse permission to an Indian to enter Canada unless he possessed 
a minimum of 200 dollars, hs said he would withhold his assent to 
such an order if the Indian government agreedito his suggestion.
Thus, on November 1907, the Canadian Government’s proposals were 
telegraphed to Minto, the Indian Viceroy.
But for the next sixty days the Indian government remained silent *
about the immigration issue, no doubt because 1907 was the fiftieth
anniversary of the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857* There was much bad feeling 
throughout India and Minto vas aware of the real danger that might 
result from the resurrection of sympathy v/ith the Sepoy Mutiny. In 
June 1907, he had informed the King about the existence of the danger 
of contamination of the Native Army through the disloyal press. The
1 Governor General of Canada to the Secretary of State for Colonies,
telegram, Nov. 11, 1907, File 3330, L/P & J/6/780.
2 India Office Minute, Nov. 18, 1907, me-3330,:';L/P;i-:i/6/78'6.
3 Colonial Office to India Office, Nov. 15, 1907, File 3330, L/P & J/6/78O.
b On June 13, 1907 Minto wrote to the King; ”But though the Viceroy beli-eves
things are settling down, he does not think that we are quite out of the
wood yet, and so long as the disloyal Press is allowed to continue 
its atrocious publications which are circulated in the shape of 
pamphlets to the troops, though every endeavour is being made to 
stop or seize them, the Viceroy cannot think the danger in respect to 
the Native Army has ceased to exist.” Minto papers, letter to H.M.
No. 23.
Indian government faced its greatest danger from terrorists and 
agitators bent on sowing seeds of unrest. By 1907, the Punjab was 
suspec ted as a centre of subversive activities. In May 1907, there 
had been a political riot in Paialpindi; mobs wrecked the gardens 
and damaged the houses of the deputy commissioner, district judge, 
superintendent of police, and missionaries, and assaulted scattered
■'j
Europeans. The Indian government might have been preoccupied with 
more pressing problems such as agitation against the Partition of
p . . ■ .
Bengal" and the rise of an extreme wing in the Indian national
Gongress, Agitation against the Colonisation Bill in the Punjab, the
problems created by the activities of Lajpat Hai and Ajit Singh,
their arrest and deportation,demanded the immediate attention of the
Indian administration. Bengal was also full of terrorists' activities*
Lady Minto noted in December 1907 how in Bengal,
... all these miserable students possess fire arras 
and that Hare, the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, 
is evidently scared; he has aged considerably since 
his appointment.^
Similarly Minto noted that on December 6, 1907 an attempt was made
to wreck the train carrying the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, and
on December 23, 1907* B.C. Allen, District Magistrate of Dacca, was
: ' • k
seriously wounded by a revolver shot but his assailant escaped.
1 Diary, Minto Papers, M. IO69.
2 Bengal, the largest of British India's seven provinces, containing 
some 85 million people, more than a quarter of the sub-continent's 
total population, was divided on October 16, 1905, by the creation 
of the new province of Eastern Bengal and Assam, This partition 
avowedly undertaken by government solely in the interests of 
administrative efficiency, evoked an unprecedented storm of 
popular (predominantly Hindu) protest when it was realized that 
the newly created.province would have a Muslim majority of some
6 million. The scheme was denounced by politically conscious 
Indian nationalists as the most naked and insidious example of 
British government's policy of divide and rule. See Z.H. Zaidi, 
"Partition of Bengal 1905-1911'”, University of London Ph.D. thesis, 196A.
3 Diary, Minto Papers, M. IO69.
A Ibid. : ■ ■
Thus the immediate situation of the British in India was extrei 
 precarious j and over and above all this was the hostile Anglo-Indian 
 opinion. ictivities of the terrorists and extremists and
the moaning of moderates, who brought to Minto*s notice tha 
 nothing was done there would be grave consequences. There were also 
 sectarian and religious differences,
--With all this unrest confronting him, the Viceroy had still not
decided what action to take on the matter of the immigration issue 
when, on 13th December, he received a private letter from Arthur 
Godley, the Under Secretary of State for India, requesting Kinto to
make an effort to restrict Indian immigration by means of passports,
which method, if successful, could be extended to deal with similar 
situations, arising out of Indian migration to South Africa and 
Australia. In this way the Imperial Government would be relieved
question
from a very disagreeable difficulty. Godley wrote that the immigration / 
was a;very touchy one.
Up to the end of 1907, the Indian government did not take any 
action in the matter in spite of the urgency expressed in Ottawa 
and London * and only after a long consideration of the immigration 
question did the Government of India telegraph its policy decision 
to the Secretary of State for India on January 22, 1908.^ It was 
unwilling to place any restrictions of the kind suggested by Canada 
on the migration of free Indians, because it would need special 
legislation which lvas not advisable at that time in view of the state.
1 See Cd. 9I9O Sedition Committee Report; Sir Valentine Chirol,
Indian Unrest (London, 1910); and India Old and New (London, 1921);
Duni Chand, The Ulster of India: An Analysis of the Punjab Problems
(Lahore, 193^)5 and Gulshan Rai Bhatnagar, Collected Reflections on 
a Few Punjab Problems (Lahore, 1921).
2 Sir Arthur Godley remarked, "The whole question is one I heartily
dislike - we in this country talk much cant and humbug about it."
V Minto’Papers,;''M. 1007.
3 Viceroy of India to Secy, of State for India, telegram, Jan. 23, 1908, 
File 1371, .'L/P & J/6/864.
of public feelings against the British in India. Then the Indian 
government also objected to the introduction of passports or to the 
establishment in India of an examining office to stop the migration 
of persons who were physically unfit and inadequately supplied with 
money. The Canadian government, therefore, was left with the 
responsibility of preventing Indians immigrating to Canada. The 
Government of India, hov/ever, recognized the conciliatory attitude 
of the Dominion government and hoped that no express discrimination 
would be made against Indian subjects. It was reluctant to take any 
action in this connection because after all India, was a conquered 
country and whatever a foreign government might do, the very nature 
of that rule.would make it unpopular. The Indian government’s inaction 
in the matter might be interpreted as an example of indifference and 
reluctance to act. The government failed to see the problem in its 
right perspective and did not even consider a proper travel 
arrangement for Indians from India to Canada. Even the state of affairs 
of those Indians already in Canada was absolutely ignored. The 
Canadian government’s proposals could lead to a workable solution of 
the problem of the Increasing influx of Indians into Canada. The 
Canadian government was not unsympathetic to the Indian government’s 
problems but at the same time it wished to forestall further anti- 
Asiatic rioting in Canada by the adoption of some moderate means of 
controlling the number of Indians who should be allowed!into the 
country in any specified time. Certainly preventing men from starting 
out from India by the implementation of the passport system seemed 
a more humane method of controlling immigration than turning Indians 
away after they had made the journey all the way to Canada. But the
1 The Agha khan, "Some Thoughts on Indian Discontent", National Revisit, 
London, February 1907, p« 951*
Indian government was unwilling to make any decision about this 
problem for fear of jeopardizing its own position. Therefore, the 
Canadian government, denied any cooperation from India, was forced 
.to implement policies of restriction of Indians at its own Canadian 
harbours. During this time anti-Indian feeling v/as somewhat 
■•aggravated-by the hostile attitude towards large numbers of Japanese 
immigrants, and the Canadian, government’s method of dealing with 
the Japanese question had a decided bearing on the future immigration 
policy for Indians as well.
CHARTER 3
The Increase of Japanese Immigration into 
Canada* The Reaction of (a) British Columbia
(b) The Dominion Government. The Control of 
Immigration by Agreement with Japan.
Japanese immigration into Canada was limited to a small
number up to the beginning of 1906 because the two governments
had a mutual understanding. Since the Japanese government
had itself restricted emigration, the Canadians were not required
to pass any restrictive regulation and their attitude was relaxed
because;there was no danger of undue inflation of the labour market
by such small numbers of Japanese. But in January I906, Canada
became party to the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation made between
Great Britain and Japan in 189 .^ By the very first paragraph of
Article One of this Treaty, the Japanese were unequivocally given
the same rights as those of any British subject in Canada, and the
Canadian government, acting on its faith in the existing understanding
between the two governments, v/as prepared to adhere to its terms
absolutely and without any reserve. In view of this the Canadian
Prime Minister \/as justified in using the following language when
on January 15, 1907* he moved the second reading of the Bill (No. 23)
respecting the treaty between Canada and Japan:
I would, however, observe that, so far as Japanese 
labourers are concerned ,.. for the last five or six 
years, there has been no Japanese immigration to speak 
of into British Columbia. Some few years ago, when 
we increased to ^ 500 the poll-tax which had been in 
existence for many years against Chinese immigration, 
we persistently refused to extend the same prohibition 
: against Japanese immigration. The reason which we gave 
at that time was that Japan v/as an ally of Great Britain 
and we could not treat Japanese as we had treated the 
Chinese population. This was actually accepted by 
British Columbia itself, and I may say that our 
task in that respect v/as made easy because the 
Japanese Government has restricted the immigration 
of their own people. At the present time the 
Japanese Government do not allow immigration from 
their provinces with the exception of a very-few 
from each province. I think it is not more than
four or five from each province, that is all that 
the Japanese Government permit to leave the Empire 
of Japan and therefore practically there has been  ^
no emigration to British Columbia from the country.
It was on the faith of this tacit understanding that the
Japanese would continue to regulate emigration from their country
that the Canadian parliament gave its sanction to the treaty and it
was not, therefore, expected that Japan would avail herself of the
letter of Article 1 of the treaty. However, between January and
October in 1907, 8125 Japanese, 1266 Chinese and 20^7 Indians
arrived in Canada and though their arrival was met with hostile
demonstrations, these did nothing to stop the influx of Orientals
into Canada. Canadians were alarmed at this increase in numbers
which in the case of the Japanese was directly attributable to the
treaty. In fact the Japanese immigrants to Canada were of two types,
those who entered directly from Japan, and those who came from other
areas, such as the Hawaiian Islands which lay outside the jurisdiction
of the Japanese government.^
Those Japanese immigrants who had come from Hawaii, had been
employed in the sugar and rice fields by the planters of the Hawaiian
Islands. When the Planters* Association of Honolulu, an organization
of employers formed for the protection of their mutual interests,
reduced the wages of the Japanese labour force, the Japanese started
to move to the Continental mainland - Canada and the United States
of America - where the shortage of manpower and the comparatively
higher wages were the main attractions. To counteract this loss of
1 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 1906-7, Vol. I, p. 803.
2 Lemieux Report, On his Mission to Japan, 1908, p. 6. Lemieux Papers.
5 Mackenzie King, Report of Royal Commission, On the methods by which 
the Orientals have been induced to come to Canada, 1908, p. 9»
manpower the planters' Association influenced the U.S. Administration 
so that the entry of the Japanese into America from the Hawaiian
i
Islands was banned. As a result of this, large numbers of Japanese 
from these islands who would formerly have gone directly to the 
United States, now used British Columbia (Canada) as a spring-board 
for their entry.
Moreover, the Canadian Pacific Railway made a contract with the
Canadian Nippon Supply Company of Vancouver for the supply of a
labour force. Besides this there were several other companies whose
agents supplied them with Japanese labour under contract from Japan.
While these agencies might have increased their activities as a
result of the depression and unemployment which swept Japan following
the Japanese victory over Russia in 1905* their main stimulus was the
3 ■shortage of labour in British Columbia. A substantial labour force 
was required for fruit gathering, for agricultural development and 
for industrial expansion. Since European workers were always on 
the move for better prospects while Orientals were thought to be 
loyal and reliable, the capitalist class of British Columbia
1 Dominion of Canada, Sessional Paper No. 7^h, Vol. 18, Session 1907-8,
pp. 167-8.
2 Maclnnes, the Secret Agent of the Canadian government, mentioned in 
his report dated October 2, 1907, the following agencies:
i The Japanese Boarding House Keepers* Union of Vancouver British 
Columbia Limited, 
ii The Canada Nippon Supply Company Limited, 
iii S. Gotch 
iv The Nittch Employment Company, 
v The Japanese General Contract Company Limited.
The first, second and fifth were incorporated under the provincial 
Companies Act, The Boarding House Keepers’ Union cooperated with 
the Japanese Boarding House Keepers’ Union of Honolulu in bringing 
about the recent influx from there. (Maclnnes Report, Oct. 2,1907, Grey papers
■3 The Victoria (B.C.) Board of Trade recommended in its annual report:
(a) The appointment of agents for procuring labourers from Britain.
(b) A scheme of assisted passage for intending immigrants.
(c) The relaxation of head tax on the Chinese in order to cope with 
the labour shortage in British Columbia.
^ee The Times, Nov. 30* 1907*
encouraged Asiatic immigration. The effect of this v/as to defeat the
law imposed by the U.S. Administration on Japanese immigration. In
order to counteract this, the Planters*Association of Hawaii encouraged
and financed an agitation on the part of the American Asiatic
Exclusion League, ostensibly to support their desire to exclude
Japanese from the mainland of the North American continent but in
reality to stem the outflow of cheap labour from their own islands.
This situation was bound to have its effect on British Columbia
which lay separated from the older portions of the Canadian Dominion
by vast stretches of prairies, and by four ranges of well-night
impassable mountains while it adjoined the western portions of 
■ 2
the United States. :
On the other hand the professional labour leaders on the 
Pacific Coast were keen to maintain a shortage of labour, so that 
with the demand greatly exceeding the supply, it would be an easy 
matter for them to enforce their terms and conditions of employment. 
Thus theoover-jealous labour unions together v/ith persistent campaigns 
by street orators caused the situation to deteriorate. British
Columbia, though rich in resources, v/as hindered in development by
the high price of labour.-
This situation was not clear to the Canadian people who saw the 
arrival of Orientals as a real threat to their social and domestic 
welfare and, as stated earlier, this influx v/as thought to be the
1 Report of the Royal Commission on the methods by which the Orientals 
have been induced to come to Canada, 1908, p. Vi.
2 The demonstration preceding the riots in Vancouver was led by 
Frank Cotteril, president of the Federation of Labour of the State 
of Washington, A*E. Fowler, Secretary of the Anti-Japanese and 
Korean League of the same state, and George P. Listman, a prominent
labour leader of Seattle. See The Times, Sept. 30* I907.
3 The Times, Sept. 30, 1907.
by-product of the treaty with Japan of 1907* The Anti-Asiatic League 
demanded immediate abrogation of this treaty and the introduction of 
effective measures to stem the Asiatic immigration into British 
Columbia. Even Robert Borden, the opposition leader, tried to 
confuse the situation for political endsV He blamed the Canadian
2government led by Sir Wilfrid Laurier for the influx of the Japanese.
He declared that the Japanese trade treaty permitted "the entire
population of Japan to migrate to Canada if they desired to do so;""?
The Vancouver .World.’wrote an editorial on "the Asiatic Question"
on September 30^  1907» It accused the eastern politicians -
manufacturers, rail-road corporations and banking companies - of
indifference towards this problem. It branded them "slave traders
of the l8th century” and declared that eastern trade interests"would
not be allowed to sell the province for a mess of pottage. It warned
that the a: Grand Trunk Pacific and the All Red Line might prove to 
too
have been purchased/dearly if it resulted in British Columbia being
if
handed over to Asiatics for settlement.
The propaganda thus carried out on the West Coast of Canada made
the situation quite explosive. The Japanese residents in British
Columbia had armed themselves. There was a danger of riots breaking
out even as a result of street fights between vdiites and Japanese.
The secret agent to the Canadian government warned that in case of
riots the position would be out of control and British Columbia
5  -
would align with the United States.
 ^ Province, Oct. 8, 190?.
2 Vancouver World, Sept. 25, 1907*
3 Cited in the Canadian Annual Review, 1907, p. 392.
** Vancouver World, Sept. 30, 1907*
5 Maclnnes to the Minister of the Interior, Oct. 2, 1907, G.O.886/1,
Numerous allegations were made against the Japanese. Kipling 
wrote that because they were unmarried, enterprising, thrifty, 
hardworking, they could underbid, undersell and out-work the 
European workers. They were accused of taking no interest or share 
in the political and social life of the section in which they lived, 
They had no local pride, no desire to help to make the locality 
better and took no interest in their neighbours. Indeed, they formed 
communities of their own apart from the local residents. They did
not have any instinctive respect for British laws and institutions,
. y  ■
wnich were regarded rather as a means of oppression. It was also
alleged that they insisted on converting each difficulty into an
international dispute. Therefore it was thought to be unwise to
admit them to Canada especially in view of the fact that they had
behind them a sensitive, war-like, aggressive people and a strong
government, which would resent any injustice inflicted on fellow
Japanese. It was feared that naturalization would follow immigration.
Once let in the earners nose and only time would be needed to see the
entire body forcing, its way into the tent. There was an outburst
of hysterical fear among certain classes of people in British Columbia
2that the country was in danger of becoming "an annex of Asia".
The Japanese, moreover, were keen competitors with the European 
working men in Canada and it made them a more serious danger. There 
were already 25*000 Asiatics in British Columbia and in an &nglo-Saxon 
community where democratic institutions prevailed, the introduction 
of such large numbers of alien racesiinherently ignorant of the 
most elementary principles of self-government, could not but by itself
1 Eudyard Kipling, "Oriental Immigration", The Times, Oct. 11, 1907.
2 See The Times, Oct. 28, 1907*
be''inimical .to. a. vast alien colony, exclusive, inscrutable, 
unassimilative with fewer wants and a.lower standard of living 
than themselves, maintaining intact their customs and characteristics, 
their ideals of home and family life, with neither the wish nor the 
capacity to amalgamate* Their mere pressure of numbers would undermine 
the very foundations of the province. British Columbians, therefore, 
considered with passionate and unalterable conviction that to safeguard 
the future and distinctiveness of their own race and civilization, 
the free ingress of Orientals must be restricted. In this way there 
existed a deep-seated popular determination to exclude from even 
the sparsely-settled territories the concentrated masses of the 
Orient.:1
The contacts of the Japanese immigrants with the whites were 
virtually confined to the occupations in which they worked together 
and such relationship between workers is generally competitive. The 
whites, having lost out to the Japanese in labour competition, took 
their case to the community at large by means of press and protest 
meetings and demanded protection against foreign-born alien labourers, 
fishermen or businessmen whose lower standard of living and resultant 
low wage demands were a severe threat to Canadian workers. Many 
white workers felt so strongly that they insisted on publicly 
expressing their views with the result that public opinion in 
British Columbia, and indeed throughout Canada concerning Japanese, 
was determined by the attitudes of a vocal minority who met and 
dealt with the Japanese in occupational situations on conflict bases. 
Various interests across the border (United States) exploited the
1 Lemieux, Report on his mission to Japan on the subject of the
influx of Oriental labourers into the Province of British Columbia, 
1908, pp. 8-9* Lemieux Papers.
situation to the maximum extent. It was unfortunate that the Mayor 
of Vancouver,■ Mr. A. Bethune, was not a decisive 'man for, had he 
been so, the protest arid parade against the Japanese would never have 
been allowed and, given sufficient explanation everyone would have 
supported him, for even the labour union would have seen the 
wisdom of preventing such disgraceful action. If this had been 
the case the American exploitation of the situation could have 
been avoided, :
As the situation stood, hoitfever, there was some need for federal
instructions, and, after considering the matter, the Dominion government
decided that Rodolphe Lemieux, Minister of Labour and Postmaster-
General, should proceed immediately to Japan to confer with the
Japanese authorities about the largely increased influx of Oriental
2
labourers into British Columbia. But the Asiatic Exclusion League
*2
protested against the proposed mission of Lemieux to Japan. Its 
packed meeting instead demanded the abrogation of the Treaty with 
Japan and urged remedial legislation for Asiatic immigration control. 
The appointment of Rodolphe Lemieux was, however, hailed by the 
Montreal Gazette (a Conservative journal)opposed to the Liberal 
Government of Canada). It appreciated the delicate and difficult 
mission of Lemieux and hoped that success in this matter would
, ■' ' ' ' 5
increase his reputation as a diplomat.^ The Times commented that
Lemieux, tactful and suave, with many of the arts of the French
V : . £
diplomat, was decidedly the right person for the right job. Lord
1 The Times, Sept. 30, 190?.
2 Ibid., Oct. 10, 1907.
3 Vancouver World, Oct* S, 1907* 
k: Province, Oct. 8, 1907.
Grey, the Governor-General of Canada, was quite pleased with the
v  ■ ■
proposed mission of Lemieux,
un Japanr the Vancouver riots had excited little comment in
the press# The gist of the few leading articles-which.appeared was
that although anti-Japanese feeling in British Columbia was no new
thing, the recent outbreak was due to the exceptionally large numbers
of Japanese immigrants from Hawaii, turned back from San Francisco
and other ports on the American Pacific coast by new anti-immigration
legislation introduced by the United States government. The prompt
action by the Canadian government and local authorities at Vancouver
to seek a solution to the immigration problem and the tone of the
2Canadian and British press were much appreciated. In an effort to
avoid further complication in this irritating question the Japanese
government decided to impose a heavy deposit requirement (50,000 yen)
on emigration companies and as a result of this measure, six emigration
3
companies had to close their businesses.
The Japanese government seemed anxious to control its emigration 
and to maintain good relations.with Canada. Nevertheless there was 
at least one note of dissension. Speaking about the post-riots 
agitation in British Columbia against the Japanese, the Japan Times 
commentedj ;
Is it just that Japan should be asked to alter 
her treaties or bind herself with new stipulations, 
just because the unreasonable prejudice exists on 
the American Continent?
The position would be fairer if it were all men 
and organs that are in a position to guide the 
public opinion of Canada and America would do their 
utmost to reason down and stamp out the pernicious 
prejudice and that, therefore, Japan might be ^ 
persuaded in the meantime to exercise patience.
1 Grey to Sir Claude Macdonald, Oct# 23* 1907, Grey Papers.
2 Claude Macdonald, British Ambassador to Edward Grey, the British Foreign
Secretary, Oct# 2, 1907* Canadian Sessional Paper No. 7^h, Vol. 18.
3 Vancouver Daily Province, Oct. l*f, 1907#
^ Japan Times, Nov. 16, 1907*
By this time Rodolphe Lemieux (accompanied by Joseph Pope,
Under Secretary of State for the External Affairs of Canada) had 
reached Japan. He explained the purpose of his mission that he 
was not preparing for any change in the existing treaty but he 
desired to reach an agreement which would lead to the adoption 
of a beneficial programme for the future of both friendly nations.
Several meetings between the Canadian representatives and the 
Japanese officials took place. On behalf of the Canadian government, 
Lemieux presented a memorandum on the subject. He explained that the 
Canadian hesitation in becoming a party to the Anglo-Japanese Treaty 
was due to the fear of Japanese immigration, and Canada accepted the 
treaty on the assurance given by the Japanese Consul in Canada 
regarding control of immigration. He further Commented on the 
explosive situation in British Columbia resulting from the influx 
of the Asiatics. He pointed out the peculiar geographical position 
of British Columbia because of its distance from Ottawa and its 
nearness to the United States, with which it had a common irritating 
experience of Oriental immigration. The Canadian representative was 
equally appreciative of the benefits and implications of the treaty 
with Japan to the British Empire and the Dominion of Canada. He
suggested firstly that Japanese Immigration be restricted to 300
2  . ' . ■ . :.vpersons per year.
Count Hayashi, the Japanese Minister of Foreign:Affairs, rejected 
the Canadian suggestion. He pointed out that the Canadian delay in 
accepting the treaty arrangement was due to the existence of the most
favoured nations clauses in the treaties of Great Britain with Belgium
1 The Times, Nov. 18, 1907*
2 Lemieux, Report on his Mission to Japan, p. 1Vand Appendix A to
the Report, pp. 26-28. Lemieux papers.
and Germany. As such the immigration question had no bearing on the
delay. The Foreign Minister denied giving any assurance regarding
restricting Japanese immigration into Canada and also refused to
amend the treaty arrangements. He told the Canadian delegation if
they came with the idea of procuring an amendment to the treaty by
fresh convention or otherwise, his government would not consent
2even to consider any proposal in that sense.
Rodolphe Lemieux, the Canadian representative, had realised that
being a proud, and sensitive people, the Japanese ttfould not admit that
racial prejudice against them would continue, especially when their
nation was rapidly progressing. Japanese naval and material supremacy
had already been established. The Japanese system of government,
their educational and industrial progress were at par with those of 
3Western nations. Lemieux was of the opinion that another factor
to be considered was that the natural progress and development of
British Columbia was not possible without Asiatic labour because
Europeans as a rule rarely reached the Pacific Coast. So the Japanese
contribution in this regard should be welcomed. Therefore Lemieux
could see that in the outwardly friendly and cordial atmosphere of
negotiations, he could nevertheless get only a declaration from the
Japanese government, that of exercising a close discretion in limiting
if
the number of immigrants to Canada.
Public opinion in Japan was evidently opposed to the conclusion
’' ' ; 5of any convention restricting the movements of Japanese labour.
1 Memorandum by Count Hayashi to Lemieux, Dec. 21, 1907s pp. 29-32,
Lemieux Papers.
2 Joseph Pope to Laurier, Dec* 9» 1907, C.O.*f2/918/1523*
3 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, January 1908, 1639*
h Lemieux, Report on his Mission to Japan, 1908, p.9. Lemieux Papers.
3 The Times, Oct. 28, 1907.
■However, as earlier stated, the Japanese government was not
responsible for the sudden increase of Japanese immigration into
British Columbia. As a matter of fact the Japanese government
opposed any such move because the area of their influence was
Manchuria and Korea and any emigration from their country to North
1
America was considered a national loss. The Japanese Foreign 
Office had already issued restrictions on the intending emigrants 
to the Hawaiian Islands because the government intended to exercise 
close supervision so that possibility of any fraud could be
- '  - ■ 2 - v
eliminated.
During the course of negotiations Lemieux was convinced that 
the Japanese government sincerely desired to stop any further agitation 
in British Columbia. For this they were willing to restrict voluntarily 
within reasonable limit the volume of immigration to Canada. Therefore, 
he asked the Japanese Foreign Minister if he could have a written
assurance as to the intention of their government so that he could
- l f - 1  _  _  ' ■ - • ' ' ■ ■ ■  3place it before nis~oicn-government-on-his-return to Canada• In
reply to this Count Hayashi wrote
... that although the existing treaty between Japan 
and Canada absolutely guarantees to Japanese subjects 
full liberty to enter, travel and reside in any part 
of Canada, yet it is not the Intention of the Imperial 
Government to insist upon the complete enjoyment of 
the rights and privileges guaranteed by those stipulations 
when that would involve disregard of special conditions 
which may prevail in Canada from time to time.
Acting in this spirit and having particular regard 
to circumstances of recent occurrences in British 
Columbia, the Imperial Government have decided to 
take efficient measures to restrict emigration to
1 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, January 21, 1908, l657-
2 The Times, Nov. 18, 1907.
3 Lemieux to Hayashi, Dec. 23, 1907, Lemieux Report on his Mission
to Japan, p. 19* Lemieux Papers.
Canada. In carrying out this purpose, the Imperial 
Government, in pursuance of the po&icy above stated 
will give careful consideration to local conditions,
■ prevailing in Canada, with a view to meeting the
desires of the Government of the Dominion as far as 
Is compatible with the spirit of the treaty and the
dignity of the State.1
In order to implement this understanding the Japanese government 
intended to apply two sets of regulations. By the’first set of 
regulations, the Japanese emigrants"whomight be permitted to go to 
Canada were the following:
(a) prior residents in Canada and wives and children.
(b) those; specially engaged by Japanese residents in 
Canada for bona fide and domestic services.
(c) contract emigrants whose terms of contract, works
to be done names and standing of the intended employers 
were satisfactorily specified.
(d) agricultural labourers brought in by Japanese agriculturalv 
holders in Canada,^
All these classes were obliged to have certificates issued by
Japanese Consular authorities. By the second set of regulations the
Japanese Consuls in Canada were instructed not to Issue certificates
for contract labourers unless they received the approval of the
Canadian government, while for agricultural labourers, their number
was to be limited to ten for each one hundred acres of land owned
by the Japanese. It was also clearly stated in that letter that:
With reference to domestic and agricultural labourers 
mentioned in the regulations, the Japanese government 
do not contemplate that under existing circumstances 
these two classes should exceed four hundred annually.
There were three choices before the Canadian government:
(a) The status quo.
(b) The abrogation of the treaty.
1 Kayashi to Lemieux, Dec. 23, 1907, Lemieux Report on his Mission 
to Japan, p. 19, Lemieux Papers.
2 Lemieux Report on his Mission to Japan, p. 20, Lemieux Papers.
3 Hayashi to Lemieux, December 23, 1907, Enclosure (b) Lemieux Papers.
(c) The acceptance of the proposed arrangement.
The maintenance of the status quo was out of the question because 
the situation in British Columbia was serious. The abrogation of the 
treaty would require a six months* notice. What other arrangement 
could Canada make? Imposition of heavy poll tax leading to the 
practical exclusion of the Japanese would mean a serious breach in 
the Treaty alliance between the Mother Country (Great Britain) and 
Japan. Japan would resent it as a most unfriendly act. Ganada could 
not ask Japan to brand her subjects as an inferior race. On the 
other hand, for Canada, the abrogation of the treaty would result in
p
the loss of important commercial advantages with a market of fifty 
million people.
The proposed arrangement was a fair and convenient compromise.
Recommending it to the Canadian cabinet for acceptance, Lemieux stated:
The assurance given by Count Hayashi on behalf 
of the Japanese Government is a solemn engagement 
which Canada is bound to accept in good faith. The 
fact that it is given of her own free will makes it 
more binding on Japan.5
The hew arrangement was called a Gentleman’s Agreement and it
h ■ ,
was accepted on 15 January, 1908.
Direct emigration from Japan was thus restricted to reasonable
5
limits and the Japanese Foreign Minister told the Diet (Japanese
Parliament) on January 28, 1908 that the question was definitely
settled, they had conceded no treaty rights and their prestige had 
6
not suffered.
1 Lemieux* statement in the Canadian House of Commons. Cited in The 
Times, Jan. 23* 1908.
2 On being asked about the amount of trade with Japan, the Canadian Minister
of Customs (Wm. Paterson) said $ 2,621,036 for 1907* see Canada, House
of Commons Debates Jan. 8, 1908, Vol. I, p. 897*
3 Lemieux, Report on his Mission to Japan, Jan.12,1908,p.2*+,Lemieux Paperb.
Jan.1A, I9O0.
h Governor-General of Canada to Secy, of State for Colonies, telegram,/
Grey Papers.
£ Japan Gazette, Peg. 28, 190?.
6 The Times, Jan. 29* 19°8.
As for the Japanese emigration from the Hawaiian Islands the
Japanese government had stated that they were powerless to check it.
Once Japanese were out of Japan their movements could not be controlled
by the Japanese authorities. This difficulty was solved by the
' -1
enforcement in Canada of the .Alien Labour Act which was up to this
time used against the importation of contract labour ffom the United
States of America. Then on January 8, 1908 an Order in Council was
passed by the Dominion Government prohibiting the landing of
immigrants in Canada unless they came from the country of their
origin or citizenship, by a continuous journey on through tickets.
This order at once excluded from Canada the Japanese labourers who
might come from the Hawaiian Islands or any places other than Japan.
Since the Japanese government was not responsible for the influx
of Asiatics, and could not be adcused of bad faith, why should the
Canadian Minister of Labour go to Japan and make a hue and cry about
it? The reason, of course, was to tell the people of British Columbia
that there could be no diversity of interest between any part of the
Dominion and the whole, that British Columbia's problem was Canada's
problem. Thus the Gentleman's Agreement with Japan was made
entirely to appease British Columbia. The Dominion government tried
to minimize the chances of the subject of Oriental immigration being
used by the U.S. labour leaders as a pretext for anti-Canadian
government propaganda. A complete understanding of the problem was
hreached by the Canadian and Japanese governments. The exact 
limitation of the Japanese reaction was of course known beforehand,
1 Joseph Pope to Laurier, Dec. 9* 1907* Pope papsers.
^ The Citizen (Ottawa), Jan. 22, 1908.
3 Mackenzie King to Lemieux, Dec. 30* 1907* Lemieux Papers. 
k Japan Daily Mail (Yokohama), Dec. 27, 1907*
especially its expression of inability to deal with the Japanese 
coming from the Hawaiian Islands. The Dominion government's solution 
of this kind of immigration not only stopped the indirect Japanese 
immigration but also made it virtually impossible for Indians to 
migrate to Canada,
It has been shown that in order to meet the various forms of 
opposition to Japanese immigration from within her own Western 
territories and those of the United States, Canada established a 
formal understanding with the Imperial Japanese Government by which 
direct immigration from Japan was closely controlled. However, the 
bulk of the immigrants came, not from Japan but from the Hawaiian 
Islands and since the Japanese government felt no responsibility 
for these the Canadians were free to deal with this aspect of the 
problem as they found fit. But the very steps they took to inhibit 
the Japanese influx, though not apparently directed against the 
Indians, dealt vriLth the Indian position as effectively as with-, 
that of the Japanese, and it is with this point that the next 
chapter will deal.
CHAPTER k
Solution of remaining problem of Japanese 
immigration from Hawaii. Incidental effect 
of "continuous passage" Order in Council on 
position of Indian immigrants. Mission of 
Mackenzie King to confer with British 
authorities on the subject.
The Gentleman's Agreement between the Japanese and Canadian 
governments successfully solved one aspect of the immigration problem. 
There remained, however, the question of those Japanese who entered 
Canada from Hawaii and that of Indians from the Far Eastern countries. - 
These questions needed delicate handling. On the first issue, the 
Japanese government was unwilling that any of its subjects should be 
explicitly barred from Canada, and therefore the problem of Japanese 
immigrants from Hawaii must be carefully considered; on the second 
issue, the Canadian government, aware of its Imperial responsibilities, 
was unwilling to affront so important a member of the Imperial 
community as India. Direct representation to India on this matter 
had evoked little response, for as stated earlier, the Indian government, 
already beset with the threat of insurrection, was unwilling to provoke 
domestic hostility by acting against the interests of its own people.
The problem was solved by a stroke of superb diplomatic skill.
Under Section 30 of the Immigration Act (Statutes of Canada, 1906)
The Governor General in Council may by proclamation 
or order, whenever he considers it necessary or 
expedient prohibit the landing^in Canada of any 
specified class of immigrants.
The Canadian authorities had full power to take any actionihey thought
fit to solve the immigration problem. On the strength of this they
passed, on January 8, 1908, an Order in Council to the effect that
whenever the Minister of the Interior deemed it to be necessary any
immigrants might be prohibited from landing in Canada unless they
came from the country of their birth or citizenship by a continuous
journey, using through tickets purchased before leaving the country.
1 Revised Statutes of Canada, 1906, Vol. II, p. 1715*
This immediately and effectively stopped the inflow:of-.-the
Japanese and (as has been previously stated) this "continuous passage
regulation11, as it came to be ’.'known,- chanced to be so framed as to
apply with equal force against the Indian immigrants as well. It so
happened that there was no direct steamship communication between
Indian and Canadian ports, e change of steamers being necessary at
Hong Kong, Shanghai or some other Far Eastern port. In the words
of the U. S. Commission Report, 1911, the effectiveness of Indian
exclusion has been summed up:
While Hindus are not specifically excluded or in fact, 
even mentioned in the Canadian immigration act, or 
; orders of the Governor in Council, relative thereto
practically insurmountable barriers have been erected 
against them.^
The Imperial government in London felt, too, that this measure by
2the Canadian government would stop Indian immigration altogether.
But the Canadian government was in favour of reaching some rational 
understanding with the Indian authorities about this issue. There 
were two precedents by which the Asiatic immigration was handled.
One was the way in which the Chinese immigration had been dealt 'with, 
by poll-tax. The other was the measures taken to meet the situation 
with the Japanese i.e. the direct negotiations endeavouring to get 
the other government to adopt the necessary restraints itself. The 
latter method was obviously simpler and more satisfactory, it was 
the one the Laurier government attempted to follow, but it had to 
be modified to a certain extent because the Indian government was 
not willing to restrict emigration from their country."'’ The direct 
refusal to admit Indians might have seemed a domestic affair to
1 U.S. Immigration Commission Report, 1911, p. 629*
2 India Office, Minute, January 17, 1908, File 1371« L/P He J/6/86 .^
3 India Office to Colonial Office, January 30, 1908, File 1371*
I,/P & J/6/86b.
the working classes of British Columbia but the Canadian government 
had to consider that India was the greatest part of the Empire. 
Therefore, the matter needed to be handled with great care and 
delicacy. Ottawa and London were uncomfortably situated between 
Vancouver and Calcutta. Mackenzie King, the Deputy Minister, who 
had already headed the Royal Commission ona"Methods by which the 
Oriental labourers have been induced to come to,Canada", was chosen 
to confer with the British authorities on the subject of immigration 
from the Orient, and immigration from India in particular.
The agitation against Asiatic immigration was equally strong 
on the West Coast of the United States of America. When President 
Roosevelt came to know about King♦s proposed visit to England, he 
expressed a desire to meet him. So Mackenzie King met the U.S. 
president who communicated his deep concern about the Oriental 
immigration on the pacific Coast. The president took up the position 
with characteristic vehemence that the brown and white races could 
not assimilate. They should keep to their respective areas. He 
stressed that the feeling on the Pacific Coast was so violent that 
unless some action was-'taken, by'the' U.S. and the Canadian governments 
against the forcible encroachment of Asiatics, the Western States 
and British Columbia would take the lav; into their own hands. The 
central theme of Roosevelt*s remarks was that the interests of both 
Great Britain and the United States called for a common approach
1 Theodore Roosevelt as a student at Columbia University, School of 
Lav;, was influenced by Burgess who had received a large part of his 
graduate training in Germany and was a staunch believer in the 
superiority of white races. See R. Hofstadter, Social Darwinism
in American Thought, pp. 130-131*
2 Grey, Governor General of Canada to the Secretary of State for 
Colonies, Feb. 5, 1908, C.O. 42/918/58^.
to the problem of Oriental immigration. If, he said, the two 
countries were insensitive to the feeling against Orientals on the 
Pacific Coast, a new republic embracing British Columbia and the
Pacific States of the U.S. would be formed between the mountains
- - 1
and the sea. Therefore it was thought that the U.S. and British 
governments should not be indifferent to the demand for restrictions 
on Oriental immigration which emanated from the Western Coast;of 
North America. The hostility towards Oriental labourers was too 
strong to be resisted by the U.S. or Canadian governments and it 
would be better if the British government knew the intensity of 
this hostility. The U.S. president had emphasised to Mackenzie King
his determination to protect his working people against the Oriental
: • ' ‘  ■ 3
competition and to populate the West with white people. He told
Mackenzie King:
What I would like to accomplish is not merely 
an understanding for today but some kind of 
convention between the English speaking peoples, 
whereby, in regard to this question it would be 
understood on all sides that the Asiatic people 
were not to come to the English speaking countries 
to se and that our people were not to go to 
•theirs.
5 ’ " ■ ■ • ■
Laurier agreed with him and president Roosevelt expressed his delight 
at Laurier*s proposal to send Mackenzie King to London in order to 
explain the Dominion government’s position vis a vis the Asiatic 
immigration.
At the same time, the Asiatic Exclusion League held its
1 Roosevelt claimed that it v/as Mackenzie King who made this prediction 
(Morison, Roosevelt Letters VI, pp. 919-20).
2 J. Bryce, British Ambassador in the U.S.A. to Foreign Secy., Feb. 5,
1908, C.0.886/1.
3 Mackenzie King Memorandum regarding meeting with Roosevelt, Feb. 10,
1908, F.O. 371 A 7iv ^ 810.
.k Mackenzie King Diary, Feb* 25, 1908, King Papers.
9 Laurier to Roosevelt, Feb. 1, 1908, Morison Roosevelt Letters VI,
pp. 917-918.
international convention at the Labour Temple in the City of Seattle, 
Washington, on 3rd February 1908, and decided to influence, and if 
possible to dictate, the immigration policies of Canada, the United 
States of America and Mexico in regard to all Asiatics. This could
the Provincial Legislature of British Columbia had passed the Immigration
Act mt 1908 on 11th February. Its main feature was that it included
under the head of "prohibited immigrants" any person who, when asked
to do so by an officer appointed under the Act shall himself fail
to write and sign in the characters of any language of Europe. The
mention ,of any "language of Europe" showed that it was directed
against Asiatics but the Act had the merit of not specifying any
particular race and therefore as a choice of evils became something 
■ 2of a model; however, the courts of Brxtish Columbia held that it 
was invalid as contravening the Japanese Treaty and the Dominion Act 
which sanctioned that treaty.^ The question then arose whether 
(although the Act did not apply to the Japanese) it could apply to 
the other Orientals. The Order in Council (of January 8 , 1908) kept 
out Indian immigrants as it required Asiatic immigrants to come to 
Canada by direct voyage and no ships sailed directly from India to 
Canada, so this restriction proved effective. But in the middle 
of March 1908, a new aspect to the problem arose when, at Vancouver,
1 Maclnnes to Oliver, Feb. 13, 1908, C.O. 886/1.
2 C.P. Lucas, Asst. Under Secy, for State for Colonies Memorandum
be achieved by controlling the votes of the working classes. The 
Canadian delegate to the convention said that, in March 1908, he 
would organize a parade at Vancouver against the Oriental immigration. 
He hoped that it would "lead to something exciting In the meantime
July 1908, C.O. 886/1
3 Canadian Annual Review, 1908, p. 5^ *1 •
the S.S. Monteagle landed a shipload of some 200 Indians, most
of whom had come direct from India as the S. S. Mont eagle was a
'■ \  " .
■special ship. ;.
At this point the■provincial government of British Columbia
applied its Immigration Act of 1908 and arrested the Indians. The
Bench of the Province refused to support the popular cry against
the Orientals, and when the application for a writ of habeas corpus
was made, it was granted by Justice Morrison. An appeal was made
to the British Columbia Supreme Court but Justice Morrison*s order
was upheld on the grounds that:
, Parliament by the Immigration Act Revised Statutes 
of Canada 1905 Chap. 30 having provided a complete 
Code dealing with the immigration the British _
Columbia Immigration Act, 1908 is inoperative.
The voyage of the S.S. Monteagle frustrated the direct passage
regulations as well, and since there was no ..legal means of barring
the Indians the Dominion government feared a strong local reaction
from British Columbia.
On March 7, 1908 the House of Assembly of British Columbia
passed a resolution asking the Imperial government to appoint a
Royal Commission to enquire fully into the circumstances of Asiatic
immigration into British Columbia, The motion was aimed against
the Dominion government but it was described by McBride (British
Columbia premier) in a letter to Hopwood (Under Secretary at the
Colonial Office) as in effect
... an endeavour to secure the full and impartial 
investigation by means of a Royal Commission into 
the whole question of Asiatic immigration.5
The premier was convinced that such investigation would prove
1 Maclnnes to Minister of the Interior, March Ik, 1908, C.O. 42/918/12219*
2 In re Narain Singh et ul,, British Columbia Reports, 1907-8 13, p. ^77*
3 McBride to Hopwood, March 18, 1908,C.O. **2/927/11698.
the necessity of taking strong measures to preserve the small white ; 
population from being utterly swamped by an undesirable immigration.: 
But such a move to discuss the Asiatic question with self-governing 
Colonies in the form of a Royal Commission or a Conference and to 
arrive at agreement upon general principles of Imperial application 
had already been turned down by Lord Elgin, the Colonial Secretary.; 
When questioned about this proposal in the House of Lords by Lord 
Ampthill on February 10, 1908, he replied that it would be difficult 
to initiate fresh discussion on the subject. As a matter of fact 
the Imperial government was well' aware of the view held by the 
self-governing Colonies which regarded the Asiatics as a great 
nuisance.
The 'working classes on the Pacific Coast feared that the Asiatics 
would endanger the hard-won rights of the free-wage earners because 
they were used to something less than normal white standards. The 
problem of Asiatic labour was the problem of incorporating into the 
labour force men whose image was that of unfree men ready to undersell 
their labour. The acceptance of this under-class group into a rising 
industrial society was a complex problem. Moreover, with the^growth 
of democracy in politics and trade unionism in industry, the manual 
workers began to grasp the truth that one way of raising the wages 
of labour was to limit the supply of labour and when their competitors 
were not of their own race, colour or religion and did not share 
their aggressive labour ideas, they demanded their exclusion. The 
political leaders both of the government and of the opposition had 
to agree with this trend in the labour movement. After all, the labour 
vote was of reasonable weight in elections. The Dominion government
1 Colonial Office Minute by C.F. Lucas, Feb. 11, 1908 regarding the 
question by Lord Arapthill, G.O. 532/7/^233«
was thus confronted with a difficult .'problem-'when the local agitation, 
as inspired by the Anti-Asiatic league, was quite active. There was 
even the danger of anti-Asiatic riots breaking out in British Columbia. 
Co the Canadian government could only satisfy the British Columbians 
if it was to announce exclusion of the Asiatics frora Canada. But 
Ganada could not do this while she was a constituent member of an 
Empire which was Asiatic in three-fourths of its population. It was 
of the utmost' importance to Canada to maintain amicable relations
with other Asiatic peoples. Open exclusion of Orientals involved
India, an important portion of the British Empire, and Japan, ally 
and friend of Britain, Canada’s mother country. With regard to this 
complex situation the Canadian prime Minister laurier stated:
(i) that the Indians having been accustomed to 
the condition of a tropical climate were 
quite unsuited to Canada.
(il) that if their immigration to Canada were
allowed to go unchecked, a serious disturbance
to industrial and economic conditions in
British Columbia would result.
(iii) that an effective restriction of immigration 
from India was desirable.**
The Premier stated in the Order in Council that inability of 
Indians to adapt themselves to surroundings so entirely different 
inevitably brought upon them much sufferings and privation and 
because of this consequence complete restrict5.on was desired not 
less in the interests of the Canadian people than in the interests 
of Indians themselves. But the restriction on Indian immigration 
involved the India Office and Colonial Office at London. Because 
of the great importance of such considerations, complete interchange 
of views between Imperial and Dominion governments was necessary. 
Mackenzie King was already familiar with the subject of Oriental
1 Laurier, Memorandum, March 2, 190S, File 1371» L/P & J/6/864.
immigration and its many bearings, and therefore, the Dominion
government chose him to go to England to confer with the Imperial
authorities on this delicate subject. In the meantime the question
of Indian immigration was also discussed in the Canadian Senate
when a motion was put forward by Senator MacDonald (of British
Columbia), who said:
That it is expedient that the natives of British 
India should be limited to the smallest possible 
number, if not entirely prohibited. That the 
Government of the Dominion should at an early date
invoke the aid and counsel of the Imperial Government
to mitigate the present prospective influx of so 
undesirable a class of people.^
But the mover was unaware that Mackenzie King had already begun work
on this subject and when informed of the fact and after various
expressions of opinion on the desirability of restriction on Indian
immigration had been made, the motion was withdrawn. However the
Asiatic Exclusion League in British Columbia had expressed its extreme
2dissatisfaction with Laurier and demanded complete exclusion of
3"
Indians from Canada.
Mackenzie King reached London on March 1^, 1908 and stayed there 
till the middle of April. He saw Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary,
John Morley, the Secretary of State for India, and Elgin, the Secretary
■ ifv'
of State for the Colonies, together with-a number of senior civil 
servants - Sir Charles Hardinge, Sir Francis Hopwood, Sir Charles 
Lucas. He also met Whitelaw Reid, the American Ambassador, and other 
public figures such as V/inston Churchill, L.S. Amery, Lord Cromer, 
Austen Chamberlain, A.J. Balfour and Lord Lansdowne. The Asiatic
1 Canada, Debates of the Senate 1907-1908, pp. 480~4.
2 The Times, April 16, 1908,
3 Ibid., April 22, 1908.
V  Canadian Sessional Paper No. 36a, 1908, p. 6 .
question was, however, mainly discussed with the Secretary of State
for India, John Morley, whose appointment to the post had aroused
great enthusiasm throughout India. Morley v/as known to be a liberal
and],a disciple of John Stuart Mill. . He had written the biography
of Gladstone, the champion of the Irish Home Rule. The Indian
National Congress were enthusiastic about,his appointment and looked
to him to apply the same liberal attitude to their position. But
they were bound to be disappointed. It v/as true that Morley hoped
to introduce a more representative element into the Government
of India but there were limits to his liberalism. He did not believe
that Gladstonian principles could be applied to non-Western societies,
and he deprecated as fallacies the view that by some natural lav; or
other abstract proposition, all men were fitted for identical social
and political institutions. He told his Scottish constituents on
one occasion that it was absurd,
... because a fur coat in Canada at certain times 
of the year is a most comfortable garment, therefore 
a fur coat In thefoeccan of India is a sort of handy 
garment which you might be happy to wear.^
On another occasion he stated:
I should be guilty of criminal folly if I were 
to feel bound to apply the catchwords of our
European liberalism as principles fit for an
Asiatic congeries like India.
However, no matter how strongly he held these opinions, he was
in no position to give them public voice in these delicate negotiations.
To support openly the Canadian position, would be to cause an already
1 Morley, Speech at Arbroath, October 21, 190?, reported in The Times, 
Oct. 22,; 1907- ,
2 Morley to Smith, January 2, 1907, quoted by Stephen E. Koss in 
John Morley at the India Office 1903-1910 (New Haven, 1969)1
p. 130.
serious situation to deteriorate further. He and his colleagues in 
London heard with interest what Mackenzie King had to say, but the 
latter claimed at once that he had no x>roposals to make; his purpose, 
he stated, was to advise the British authorities of the seriousness 
of;the position in Canada, caused by Indian immigration. He spoke 
of the danger of riots against the Indians anet argued that by customs, 
ill-health and ignorance of the language, they were ill-suited to 
the conditions in Canada. Kestrietions, he felt, ere to the advantage, 
of the Indians. Many of these had died, all had been victimised by 
the steamship companies, and the climate was cold compared with that 
of India. He v/as undeterred by the fact that the climate of 
British Columbia was more favourable than that of India and stressed 
in his argument that it was in the best interests of British Columbia 
to develop slowly with a white population holding a multiplicity of 
small properties in their ov/n right, than in the hands of a few 
gigantic capitalist enterprises flourishing at the expense of cheap 
Oriental labour. The fear of an Asian ascendancy springing from 
this had, he felt, to be dispelled in the minds of the white population.
Mackenzie King, however* pointed out that British Columbia had 
considerable natural resources but the Indians lacked the initiative 
and skills to develop them. Moreover, this fault limited their 
ability to obtain highly paid jobs and made them the last people 
employers would willingly choose. In this way the chances of their 
success were quite limited. He also put forward the case of American 
close identity and possible intervention in the matter by stating 
that.: .
The proximity of the United;States to Canada added
an element which complicated the situation. I thought
1 Mackenzie King*s Memo, on his Mission to England, May 2, 1908, p.5,
Lemieux Papers.
Z Ibid., p. 6 .
the President ^ Roosevelt_7 and a large number of
American citizens were only too glad to develop 
the opinion that the interests of the Canadian and 
American Viest were identical, and that the United 
States .was the proper protector of the peoples on 
the shore....
There were people in British Columbia only too 
interested in creating the impression that because 
Of the distance, the public men at Ottawa did not 
appreciate the situation on the Pacific Coast and 
were indifferent to it.... There were other persons 
who vjere, interested in pointing out that there v/as 
no use of the people of British Columbia looking to 
Ottawa for help, that the Anglo-Japanese alliance 
made it impossible for them to take any action in 
the matter of Japanese, and that British connection 
made it impossible to do anything oh account of the 
Hindus....Nothing would suit the purpose of the 
Americans better at this moment than that some 
trouble should break out in Vancouver....
That there was no doubt in the world that the 
interests of the Pacific slope north and south of 
the boundary line were'the-same; at the same time 
I did not think it was necessary for us to demonstrate 
that to the world, and that we might, in the interests 
of the Empire, go ahead and make our arrangements 
between ourselves. That Sir Wilfrid laurier recognized 
the obligations and responsibilities of Empire, as well 
as its advantages, and that he was the first one to 
take the view that all being of one household, we 
! should endeavour to quietly settle any differences 
among ourselves, and make our arrangement such that 
the outsider need not have any thing whatever to 
do with it,...^
After listening to these representations John Morley remarked
that he thought that the case as presented by Mackenzie King was very
reasonable and defensible? ; and he enquired if an arrangement similar
to a Gentleman's Agreement with Japan could be a satisfactory way. of
dealing with Indian immigration. But the Dominion government turned
it down by saying:
Emigrants from India are absolutely,unsuited to 
our climate and conditions of life.'
Mackenzie King pointed out that the Dominion government desired
Mackenzie King, Diary, March 20, 1908, King Papers.
Mackenzie King to Laurier, March 20, 1908, Laurier Papers.
Acland, Deputy Minister of Labour to Mackenzie King, March 2b, 1908, 
Lemieux Papers. V '-
1 - 
2 
3
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exclusions of Indians from Canada. Canada had,of course, already 
made a request for making some rational arrangement with India in 
the latter part of 1907 but the indifference on the part of the Indian 
government and its fear of possible repercussions had resulted in 
delay and the virtual expression of a ”do nothing policy”. So far 
as the example of the ’’Gentleman’s Agreement” was concerned, the 
strong position of Japan as a  big power defending the South Eastern 
portions of the British Empire, her established supremacy over Russia 
and her position as a rising market for Canadian products had made 
her a Special case for Canada, and India simply could not be compared 
with her. The Bindusthan (Calcutta) rightly pointed out that Canada 
could not afford to make strong Japan angry, whereas for x^ eak India
she did not care, and it questioned the worth of British citizenship
■ ■ 2 to Indians.
Morley was persuaded by King’s arguments, but was not certain 
how restrictions could be imposed on the Indians. He told Mackenzie 
King that there wan already unrest in India. Although he and Minto, 
the Viceroy of India, had sought the cooperation of the moderate 
members of the Indian;National Congress and new measures had been 
adopted to assuage the Indian Muslims, extremists still dominated the 
political field. Besides, the majority of immigrants were Sikhs 
from the Punjab, the proposed colonisation bill was already causing 
unrest there and there was, consequent to this, the threat of disaffection
1 Mackenzie King, Memo, of his Mission to England, May 2, 1908, p. 9» 
Lemieux Papers.
2 Hindusthan (Calcutta), March 21, 1908, Bengal Newspaper Reports,
March 190*8.
3 Mackenzie King, Memo, of his Mission to England, May 2, 1908, p. 5» 
Lemieux Papers.
k As mentioned in chapter 2.
1
among the Sikh troops. Further, their cause had been embraced by 
the Indian press and already the Tribune and the punjabee had been 
sued for libel. As a gesture of conciliation Lord Kinto had vetoed 
the bill, and the land and water taxes had been reduced.
So although a complete understanding was reached., between 
Mackenzie King and Morley, no definite and clear action could be 
taken for any move to exclude Indians, especially the punjabee Sikhs, 
from self-governing colonies, for such action was bound to be exploited 
by political rebels in India and trouble could be expected there.
As the Indian influx into Canada was only an adventurous affair 
it had neverubeen organised or supervised by any government authority. 
Instead some educated people from Bengal in the eastern part of India, 
who had also found their v/ay to; British Columbia, had subsequently 
assumed the leadership of the Indian community. As such they were 
busy in exploiting the ignorant Punjabees. When Mackenzie King left 
Canada on his way to England, it was already suspected by these 
Indian leaders in Vancouver that the authorities contemplated 
restrictive and protective measures in regard to Indian migrants 
coming to Canada. Therefore they could foresee that the impact 
of any restrictive regulations might well prove to be a threat to 
their economic prospects. They held a protest meeting at Vancouver 
and wired to Morley,
1 The Hindustan addressed a message to the native forces In British ; 
India: Bande Mataram, ’’Sepoy mat bano - salutation to the mother 
land, do not join the army” Civil and Military Gazette, July 28, 
1907. Morley in a speech in Parliament, said, "In this agitation 
special attention, it is stated, has been paid to the Sikhs, who
as the House is aware, are among the best soldiers in Indh."
House of Commons, Indian Debates Session, 1907* June 6 , 1907* 
p./i77*
2 C.J.Q*Donnell, The Causes of Present Discontent in India (1908),
Mass meeting. Natives of India protect deportation,
exclusion from Canada. British subjects claim
protection throughout :the Empire, If our interest
overlooked, brothers in India must necessarily
resent your Government’s neglect 1- U d h a y r a m
' \ The moving spirits behind this protest were Taracknath Das, an 
interpreter in the United States Immigration Office, Dr. Davichand
and his nephew Udhayram who were involved in it because their work as
Suppliers Of Tnrtisn Ishnnr frnv»i^  W r* 1 r»-P Tjidian
community, ana tneir Dusiness or provision stores were all dependent
on Indian immigrants and immigration. Believing that their source
of easy income was in danger they resorted to threats of revolt in 
India in the event of Indians being excluded from Canada,The
Dominion government took this protest as a bluff, but when Mackenzie 
King met John Morley in London, his attention was drawn to this protest.
I am discussing it with the Indian Government and in ' 
concert with the Colonial Office here - with an 
envoy of the Dominion Government of Canada with the 
hope of bringing to an end, if possible, this extremely 
difficult, intricate and possibly dangerous question.
A parallel case, that of Indians going to the United States of
1 Telegram received in India Office on March ?At 1908, File 1371*
L/P & Jf6/86k.
2 Mac Inn es to Oliver, telegram, March 23, 190&, CIO. k2/9'\9/'\k6$7.
3 ”1 sat last night next to M. Gupta, member of Council at the India 
Office, a native of Bengal. He thinks as weXall think that the effect 
on Indian feeling of exclusion of Fast Indians from the colonies is
very serious”. See P.C.Lucas, Assistant Under Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, Minute, April 30, 1908. C.O. ^2/919/1^67.
k The Parliamentary Debates, 1908  ^Vol. 186, p. l*K)*f.
The Imperial government did, however, think that the repercussions 
from restrictive measures aiming at exclusion of Indians from Canada
were bound to have serious implications owever, the Secretary
of State for India, when questioned about the Indian protest meeting
at Vancouver and the telegram they had sent said in the House of
Commons
America, occurred in the weeks preceding Mackenzie King*s visit to
England, and John Morley had then requested Minto, the Viceroy of
India, to issue warning to intending immigrants about the unfavourable
conditions for Indians in that country. The Secretary of State was
quite cautious about the repercussions of such a warning as he
specifically pointed out to Minto:
The possibility of ill-treatment must not be discussed 
by notification, which must not go beyond the 
statement suggested,^
Bo in spite of the broad agreement of purpose between Mackenzie 
King and Morley, the Secretary of State suggested to Minto that he 
should convince the Indians that their migration to Canada was exposed 
to exploitation, sufferings and privation and as such it should be 
stopped in their own interest. His urgent telegram to the Viceroy 
of India emphasized that although Canada could not be prevented from 
making regulations to exclude or restrict Asiatic immigration, her 
government, nevertheless, did not desire to sanction measures 
excluding British Indian subjects that would weaken the bonds of 
Imperial citizenship. = Yet if the Dominion government were to veto 
British Columbia’s anti-Asiatic proposals an awkward conflagration 
might be kindled. The Dominion government wished to stop migration 
at its source and searched for reasons to make^such action seem 
beneficial to Indians. For the most part emigration from India was 
caused by shipping companies who wanted passengers and by private 
speculators. Mortality among passengers was high. Those Indians 
who landed in Canada were confronted by hostile climatic and working 
conditions and the ill-will of competitive labour. Such conditions 
were not those that propaganda in India had led the immigrants to
1 Morley toMinto, telegram, March 17, 1908, Minto Papers, M.1013*
expect. Therefore to save Indians from disappointment and the danger 
of being turned back destitute the Canadian government requested that 
regulations limiting emigration should be imposed on shipping companies 
at Indian ports. Morley suggested to Minto that this could be achieved 
by the introduction of a permit system for the intending emigrants.
Morley explained in outlining these measures in his private 
correspondence with Minto, that the Anti**Asiatic League of the United 
States of America v/as confederate with the League of the Same title 
in Canada and if the problem of East Indian immigration with resulting 
trouble continued and if the Dominion government for any reason threw 
cold water on British Columbia legislation against it, the spectre 
of secession would come into view. The probabilities of this had 
been heightened since many Americans had found their way to British 
Columbia. In any case, John Morley appreciated the difficult 
situation, and tried to make a strong case for restriction on Indian 
emigration to the North American Continent. He observed to Minto:
No wonder that an Exclusionist policy prevails; and
I much suspect that if you;and I were not Indians
for the moment, we should be iSxclusionists. 2
But the Government of India opposed the suggestion that Indian 
emigration should be restricted by the introduction of a permit system. 
It issued warnings to the people as to the risks run in emigrating 
to Canada, and it expressed its understanding that the new regulations 
of the Canddian government requiring immigrants to come direct from 
the country of their birth or citizenship on through tickets would 
have the effect of restricting emigration and make it impossible for
1 Morley to Minto, telegram, March 25, 1908, Minto Papers M 1013*
2 Morley to Minto, March 26; 1908, Minto Papers, M. 1008.
any company other than the Canadian Pacific Railway Company to sell 
tickets on their regular lines, as it was the only steamship company 
having steamships running to Canada. So the Indian and the Dominion 
governments issued a warning to the Canadian Pacific Company and 
asked them to stop selling tickets to intending Indian migrants.
The steamship companies were clearly given to understand the Governments 
of Canada, India and Great Britain would view with disfavour any 
action on their part calculated to foster any further immigration 
from'India :to Canada. ;
The Government of India, moreover, issued statements and warnings 
to the intending Indian migrants about the difficulties that immigrants 
would encounter and the strict Canadian'regulations, and, in this way,
- . 3
the rosy impression about Canada as a land of opportunity was offset.-
Then Mackenzie King examined the Indian Emigration Act of 1883
and discovered that emigration of contract labour from India to Canada
was illegal. The Act was framed for protection of Indian labourers
who might be induced to leave India and to work under indenture. Such
emigration was limited to countries mentioned in the schedule of the
Act and Canada v/as not in that schedule. Therefore, on the suggestion
of Mackenzie King, Morley told the Indian government that the position
would be improved were it impressed on the steamship companies that
it was unlawful under this Act for an Indian to migrate to Canada
5
under an agreement of hire.^ The Indian government publicized this
6suggestion throughout India.
1 Minto to Morley, telegram, March 31, 1908, File 1371, L/P & J/6/86 .^
2 Mackenzie King, Memorandum on his Mission to England, May 2, 1908, 
pp. 12-1^, Lemieux Papers.
3 Canadian Sessional Paper No. 3&a, p. 7* Report of W.L. Mackenzie King 
on his Mission to England, 1908.
k Mackenzie King to Morley, April 1, 1908, File 1371, L/P & J/6/86 .^
5 Morley to Minto, telegram, April 16, 1908, C.O. ^ 2/926/21707*
6 Minto to Morley, telegram, May k, 1908, File 1371, L/P & J/6/86*f.
The Imperial government, the Indian Viceroy and the Canadian 
representative, Mackenzie King, agreed that the most effective method 
to restrict the emigration from the Orient in general and India in 
particular was by the application of the regulation issued on January 8 , 
1908,- which as already stated empowered the Minister of the Interior 
to prohibit thelanding in Canada of persons who came otherwise 
than by direct ticket and by continuous journey from the country of 
their birth.or citizenship. It v/as held by the Department of the 
Interior that this regulation specified a Class of immigrants and 
therefore was within the terms of section 30 and that the authority 
for it was contaxned in section 10 of the Immigration Act, But 
while Mackenzie King v/as busy in London with the imperial authorities, 
this regulation was applied to the Indians coming on the Canadian 
Pacific Railway Steamer S.S* Monteagle. It v/as challenged in the court, 
and the resulting court order stated that while the Act empowered the 
Governor General in Council to exclude, it did not -empower the Governor 
General in Council to delegate that power to the Minister of the ' 
Interior as the Order purported to do, and therefore the order v/as not
■ V X  '
warranted by the Act and could not be enforced. In this way the 
continuous passage regulation v/as set adide and the persons were 
permitted to land. But as the Dominion government thought it absolutely 
necessary that the intent of the Order should be carried out, a new 
Order was passed at once. It was redrafted in a form which gave the 
Minister of the Interior the right of discretion in the administration
1 Canadian Sessional papers 36a Report by Mackenzie King, p. 9*
2 Revised Statutes of Canada, 1906, Chapter 93*
3 Re Behari Lai et al, British Columbia Reports, Vol. 13, pp. 1907-8.
of the Order. Yet even then the Dominion government was afraid that 
the validity of this Order might be questioned, so it was thought 
advisable to amend the Act so as to make express provision for the 
exercise of the authority taken by the Order which provision did 
not expressly exist m  the Act as it stood. Accordingly, an amendment 
to the Act was prepared expressly authorizing the Governor General in 
Council to pass an order excluding the class of immigrants. As this 
measure was of immense importance in the administration of the 
immigration lav/ the Canadian government thought that it should be 
embodied in the law itself. So while negotiations with the Imperial 
government were still on, this amendment of the' Act v/as presented, 
debated and passed in the Canadian House of Commons. On the passage 
of this amendment, a new order was drawn up prohibiting the landing
of any immigrants who came to Canada otherwise than by continuous
3
journey from the country of their original citizenship.^ These measures
reinforced the principal intention of restricting Indian immigration
into Canada, without mentioning their name at all.
At the same time the Canadian Prime Minister, Sir-Wilfrid Laurier,
could say that the continuous passage regulation applied to
Hindus to British subjects and to foreigners of 
all nationalities,... The Hindus are not in any 
different condition from anyone else.7.
However, it was true that due to the peculiar circumstances of the
case, the Indians were singled out for particular restrictions by
the operation of the continuous passage regulation.
1 Governor General of Canada to the Secretary of State for the Colonies
30 May, 1908, File 1371, L/P & J/6/86if.
2 Canad&, House of Commons Debates, 8 April, 1908, pp. 663^-33-
3 P.C.932 May 27, 1908.
k Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 1907-8, p. 3^90*
In this waythe necessity of enacting legislation either in
India or in Canada which might appear to reflect on fellow British
subjects in another part of the Empire was wholly avoided. At the
same time Canada also avoided the creation of the impression that
she was not deeply sensible of the obligations which citizenship
within the Bnpire entailed. No wonder Dr, O.D. Skelton, contemporary
observer and later biographer of Sir Wilfridlaurier, also praised
this measure: :
laurier quietly *.. sought a course of action which 
while carefully conserving Canadian interests, would ^
not involve complications for the imperial authorities.
But six years later the facts of this continuous passage regulation
as applicable to Indians were substantiated in the Canadian House of
Commons v/hen H.H. Stevens, M,p., said in the House in 191^:
The honourable gentleman /"referring to Mr. Lemieux, 
Minister in 1908 responsible for drafting the OrderJ  
knew, and his government knew that there was no 
steamship line direct from India to Canada and that 
therefore, this regulation would keep Hindus out and 
at the same time render the Government immune from 
attack on the ground that they were passing regulations 
against the interests of Hindus who are British 
subjects,^
The basic theme, however, of Mackenzie King's mission to England 
was to prove the unsuitability of the Indians as migrants to Canada, 
to establish the Canadian desire and right over her immigration policy 
and to convince the Imperial authorities that Canada should remain a 
white man1s country because of economic, social, political and national 
requirements. A decade later, Mackenzie King explained his policy 
of Asiatic exclusion from Canada on the basis of an ethical proposition
1 O.D. Skelton, Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier (Oxford, 1922)
Vol. II, p. 353.
2 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 191^, 1333*
3 Canadian Sessional Papers No# 35a, King Report, 1908, p. 7*
of political economy. This general proposition he defined as 1The
haw of Competing Standards':
Assuming there is indifference in the matter of 
choice between competing commodities or services, 
but that in the case of such commodities or 
services the labour standards involved vary, the 
inferior standards, if brought in this manner 
into competition with a higher standard will 
drive it out, or drag the higher down to its 
level.^
It was only a special case of the general proposition about competition 
framed by the classical political economists. It had, however, a 
special interest for the use that was to be made of it} for Mackenzie 
King decided that the state must protect higher standards and prevent 
lower standards from coming into competition with them. In the light 
of this law, he evolved his policy of Asiatic exclusion from the 
Canadian labour market. In this way he provided a scientific and 
moral justification for what the mobs of British Columbia demanded.
As a matter of fact Mackenzie King could see the emphatic demand
for Asiatic exclusion coming from a strong vocal/iinority of U.S.
born labour leaders on the pacific Coast. Of course, the increase
in population in British Columbia due to U.S. immigration could be
2 •
expected to be pro-U.S. in outlook. He was, therefore, convinced 
that the Laurier administration at Ottawa could not go against it 
except at the risk of losing votes - the very basis of political 
power in a parliamentary democracy. So Mackenzie King accepted 
what the prejudice of the Anti-Asiatic League suggested, and throughout 
his mission to England he tried to do only one thing and this was 
to justify the exclusion of Asiatics from Canada. He could not
1 W.L. Mackenzie King, Industry and Humanity {Toronto, 1916),
pp. 66-80
2 Minto to Morley, April 15, 1908. Minto Papers M. 1008.
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oppose the anti-Asiatic element in British Columbia, Therefore in
■ 2 ■ '
his later academic work his support for the Asiatic exclusion on 
the basis of great truths of political economy was only a justification 
of political expediency based bn the racial prejudice on the Pacific 
Coast,
. On his return from England, Mackenzie King made a claim in his '
report to the Canadian government that a satisfactory solution of the
vexed problem of emigration from India had been found. The Mall and
• ■ 3 ’■
Empire, Toronto, hailed the report and published it with due prominence.
The Hindustan, Lahore, Punjab, criticised it and branded it "grossly
unfair" and urged all Indian people to unite in requesting the
Indian government to adopt retaliatory measures against Canada and
boycott the Canadians and their manufacturers. it added that on
the one hand British statesmen spoke of the people of India as
citizens of the British Empire but on the other hand they were excluded
from emigration to the Dominions. The paper criticized it as a
disgraceful inconsistency.
The Indian leaders of the immigrant community in Vancouver had
already started the publication of the Free Hindusthan (Free India)
in April 1908. In the first issue they protested against restrictive
measures of the Dominion government and, at the same time, they
appealed to the British government to use its discretion in their
Interest* They felt bitter about their treatment in British Columbia
and requested their leaders in India to take all possible steps to
1 Mackenzie King had written to Lemieux when he was coming from Japan not 
to call or see Bunsmuir, the Lt. Governor of British Columbia, as he was 
not pox^ ular with the Anti-Asiatic League because of his employing Asiatic 
labour* Mackenzie King to Lemieux, Dec. 30,. 1907- Lemieux papers.
2 Mackenzie King, Industry and Humanity, op.cit.
3 Mail and Bapire (Toronto), May 7, 1908.
^ Hindustan (Lahore), May 22, 1908. Punjab New§japer Deports 1908.
3 Ibid., May 15, 1908. Punjab Newspaper Reports.
arouse the feelings of the masses in order to stop the Canadian  ^
restrictive measures. Their paper the Free Hindusthan carried the 
titles "Resistance to Tyranny is obedience to God". It was an appeal 
for action against the Dominion government/ At the same time they 
sought to align the sympathies of the Muslim members of the immigrant 
community as well. They also blamed the British government for 
famines in India. So substantially they were preaching.sedition.
The Times of May 22, 1908 contained an article from its special 
correspondent at Vancouver, in which it was stated that there were 
good reasons for believing that a seditious movement in India was 
being directed from the Pacific Coast. The correspondent said that 
Indians were subscribing money for seditious purposes and that 
Hillside, now New Westminster (B.C.), was a centre for revolutionary 
agitation. The correspondent added that there v/as a certain school 
ostensibly for the instruction of English to Indians, which was 
actually being managed by agitators for the purpose of imbuing Indians 
with revolutionary ideas. The article mentioned the Free Hindusthan 
and its editor T.N* Das.
The Vancouver Nei&Advertiser of June 12, 1908 contained a reply
to the despatch in The Times. It was written by Taracknath Das who
signed as "Editor of the Free Hindusthan" admitting the existence of
a school at Vancouver, where the Indians were taught how to read and
write English as well as about their rights, and it was under these
circumstances that Mackenzie King justified the exclusion of Indians
on the ground that they were using a part of Canada as headquarters
2for seditious propaganda against the British rule in India.
1 Free Hindusthan (Vancouver), April 1908.
2 Mackenzie King to Lemieux, July 21, 1908, C.O. 886/1.
In the light of Mackenzie King’s report the Canadian government
issued another Order in Council prohibiting entrance into Canada of
all Asiatics other than those who had two hundred dollars in their
: possession-at the time of their arrival, :At the same time, however,
the Dominion government, excluded from the operation of this Order
nationals of countries with which it had special arrangements
respecting immigration (which eliminated the Japanese) and those
concerning whose countries special statutory regulations existed
■ p
on the part of Canada (which excluded the Chinese). It justified 
this measure by stating that Asiatics belonged to labouring classes 
and their ignorance of the language and way of life in Canada made 
them unsuitable for settlement. Further they had no colony of their 
own people. Therefore the object of the Order was to keep out all 
immigrants who had not sufficient money to make themselves temporarily 
independent of unfavourable industrial conditions on arrival in Canada.
Nevertheless it was true that this Order in Council in point 
of fact was only applied to Indians yet again actually without 
mentioning them by name. Nhen Borden, the Opposition leader, asked 
in the Canadian House of Commons, what was the Government’s policy
in regard to Japanese and Hindu immigration the Minister of the Interior,
. . v.'\ ■ k
Oliver, might reply with outward truth "The same in each case”.
The attitude of the Dominion government was ostensibly one of
reconciliation and of arriving at some rational understanding with
the Indian government regarding Indian immigration into Canada. The
1 June 3, 1908 C,0, k2/9'\9/Z22 .^
2 Ibid. ,
3 The Times, June 22, 1908.- 
^Canada, House of Commons, Debates 1907-8,
Indians were British subjects and at the same time Canada was a 
young self-governing Dominion. As such it showed regard for sister 
portions of the Empire, and in dealing with this type of problem 
of Imperial importance, Canada hesitated to take an independent line.
But the Government of India showed its persistent Indifference to 
solving the problem. It expressed its inability to agree to the 
introduction of a passport system or permit system. It seemed,indeed, 
to be indifferent to the plight of emigrants for there was no one 
to look after the Indian migrants and they could be and were exposed 
to oppression by anybody and everybody, yet the Indian government 
sought to maintain a determined silence about the whole issue. But 
in the end it agreed to the virtual exclusion of Indians from Canada, 
the result of which amounted to a poll-tax and the continuous passage 
regulations. When Mackenzie King visited Britain in March/April 1908 
exclusion of Indians was his starting point in his negotiations with 
the Imperial authorities about Indian immigration problems. The 
outcome of the deliberations in London was the academic justification 
for this exclusion policy on the basis of climatic, social, economic 
and political conditions. His mission was successful, and on his 
return, the Canadian government armed itself with powerful regulations 
for stopping the entry of Indians into the Dominion. At this time
the Indians realized the terrible truth about the futility of their
*1 . v ' ■.
British citizenship.
With the application of these drastic administrative and legal 
regulations (i.e.) "continuous passage" and 200" regulations, the 
Canadian government was quite successful in stamping out any chances 
of Indian penetration into Canada. It is not, then, to be wondered at 
that the number of Indians entering Canada in the next year dropped from 
four figures to one figure only, and that number was six.
1 Hindusthan (Calcut ia), March 21", 1908, Bengal Newspaper Report, 1908.
CHAFTER 5
Proposal to move the Indian immigrants 
to British Honduras and its results; 
Mackenzie King’s visit to India; the 
indifference of the Government of India 
towards this problem.
By the end of June 1908, the Dominion government had eliminated 
any possible loop-hole through which Indians could enter Canada.
The remaining problem concerned those who were already present in 
British Columbia. The Immigration Department undertook to investigate 
the matter and asked J.B. .Harkin, the private secretary to the
■ i ■ '
Minister of the Interior to report. Harkin reported that there 
were 3000 Indians in British Columbia and that out of this number 
something like 700 were out of work. He added that hundreds of them 
had been out of work all summer and those v/ho had employment had 
been working for reduced wages. In view of the limited prospects 
of employment even for white workers, Indians were going to face a 
severe winter without money or any means of livelihood. Harkin 
pointed out that under such circumstances the question of deportation 
of unemployed Indians would arise, and in order to avoid this,he
suggested that arrangements mijght be made for moving them to the
■ 2 ■ 'West Indies in order to provide labour for the plantations. These
3proposals were passed on to the Canadian High Commissioner in London 
who paid a special visit to the Colonial Office with a view to 
induce the British authorities to send their coolie ships to 
Vancouver for this purpose. However, this proposed coolie indenture
system required the approval of the Government of India and its
5 '■■ ~ ■ 3
supervision was necessary to anyssuch scheme* -
In the meantime the acting Governor of British Honduras submitted
1 V/.D. Scott, Immigration Superintendent to Harkin, July 8, 1908.
J.B. Harkin, The East Indians in British Columbia, p.4.
2 Harkin to Scott, July 10, 1908, C.O. 886/1.
3 Scott to Canadian High Commissioner, Aug. . 27, 1908, C.O. 42/921/33369*
4 Canadian High Commissioner to Colonial Office, Sept. 40, 1908, File 1371*
1/^
5 India Office to Colonial Office, Aug. 27, 1908, C.O.323/340/31373*
an urgent request from the colonists there for the recruitment of 
Indian labourers. The colonists stated their dire need of a labour 
force because the only available labour In that colony was that of 
the Caribs and American Indians, who were either sailors or little 
Inclined to engage themselves in agricultural labour. In these 
circumstances, the Imperial authorities decided that the Indians 
should go to British Honduras as free labourers, and in that i/ay 
the colony would get libour without all the restrictions and 
disadvantages of the indenture-system.^ The Colonial Under-Secretary 
(Sir Francis J.S. Hopwood) pointed out that he was in favour of 
making use of Crown Colonies wqnting labour to provide work for 
Indians wishing to migrate. Such migration, in fact, could not 
only ease the congestion in India but would also be a measure to 
placate Indian subjects who complained of restricting colonial
immigration policies, by shov/ing them such facts as would prove
A  ■■■ ■ '
that the British Empire was open to them. By chance Col. E.J.C.
Swayne, the Governor of British Honduras, v/as on leave in England
and the Imperial authorities asked him to return to British Honduras
• • 6 
via British Columbia and meet the Indian community there as well.
At the same time the Dominion government was informed that it should
arrange to send three or four leading Indians as delegates to report
on local conditions because it was considered that such a mission would
be advisable in order to obviate the possibility of misunderstanding.
1 Governor, British Honduras to Colonial Office, Sept. 2, 1908,
C.O. 123/^29/34262U
2 Colonists to Governor, British Honduras, Sept 1,1908, C.O.123/259/34262
3 Colonial Office Minute by A.B. Keith, Sept. 14, 1908, CIO.42/921/33369*
4 Colonial Office Minute by C.P. Lucas, Sept. 15, 1908, C.O.42/921/33369*
5 Col. Swayne was familiar with Hindustani, the common language, because 
he had served earlier in India.
6 Colonial Office, Minute, Sept. 15, 1908, C.O. 42/921/33369*
It was further suggested that a Canadian official of standing should
accompany the delegation. On October 9, 1908, the Canadian
government issued an Order in Council authorizing the sending out
'2of a delegation such as proposed by the Colonial Office and James 
B. Harkin was chosen as a government representative. He was to be 
assisted by William C. Hopkinson, an Anglo-Indian official of Calcutta 
Police (India) who was on leave in Vancouver, as an interpreter. The 
proposal was laid before the Indians in a meeting composed of Indians 
themselves and a number of citizens of Vancouver and the selection 
of two delegates was agreed upon. The Indians selected Nagar Singh 
(a Sikh) and Sham Singh (a Hindu) as their representatives.*^ It was 
considered that such a course would be advisable in order to represent 
the two main groups of Indian immigrants in Canada.
The delegates left Vancouver on October 15$ 1908, and arrived 
at Belize, British Honduras on Sunday the 25th October. The colonists 
of British Honduras, after holding a number of meetings, decided 
to offer a three year contract, for fifty hours work a week at 
eight dollars a month with rations and twelve dollars without rations. 
Rent free accommodation was also offered. The delegates were shown 
around the various places in the country and they also met some Indians 
who had been brought there from the ifest Indies.*^  After about two 
weeks stay in the colony the delegation returned to Canada. On 
November 6, 1908 Harkin submitted a report that the Indian 
representatives after fully examining the country for themselves were
1 Colonial Secretary to Governor General, Canada, Sept. 19, 1908,
File 275, I./P & J/6A137.
2 P.O. 2389, October 9, 1908.
3 Harkin to If. Cory, Deputy Minister of the Interior, Oct* 16, 1908, 
File 275, L/P 8c J/6/1137*
k The majority of the Indians were Sikhs, but some were Hindus and a 
small number of Punjabee Muslims were also there in British Columbia.
5 Harkin to the Minister of the Interior, Dec. 20, 1908, File 1371*
L/P & J/6/S6k.
very much pleased with what they saw, and so favourably impressed 
with terms and conditions offered in British Honduras, that they 
hoped that the colony could accommodate 30Q0 Indians easily. * ,'
Meanwhile federal elections were to be,held at the end of October 
1908 and Asiatic exclusion was the main issue in British Columbia.
The British Honduras scheme was reported in the press in the middle 
of October, and at once a sensational atmosphere was created. The 
Mayor of Vancouver called a meeting to discuss the Asiatic question 
at the insistence of the Anti-Asiatic League. Some injudicious 
speeches were made. According to Col. Sway$e, Governor of British 
Honduras, the political parties, being intent on capturing the 
anti-Asiatic labour votes, at once gave out in the press that it 
was proposed to deport 1000 Indians. The Globe and Traveller (London) 
declared that Canada was a white man's country and this being so the 
Canadian authorities were going to transport the Indian population 
to British Honduras. It commented that such a scheme was the 
solution to the anti-Asiatic feeling in British Columbia by entirely
eliminating the source of the problemt and added that if the scheme
: ’ ■ a
fell through the Indians should be scattered in the West Indies.
The Daily Province, Vancouver had run these front-page headlines;
WILL SEND HINDOO COLONY 
TO HONDURAS
IMPERIAL AUTHORITIES WILL HELP : 
and it, too, commented that the entire Hindu colony would be moved to 
British Honduras. In an editorial the paper justified the scheme by
1 Harkin to the Minister of the Interior, November 1908, File 275*
2 The New York Herald, February 8 , 1909.
3 Swayne to Officer Administering British Honduras, December 20, 1908,
File 275* L/P & <1/6/1137*
^ Olobe and Traveller (London), Oct. 16, 1908.
.5 Province (Vancouver), Oct. 16, 1908.
stating that the climate of British Honduras ivas like that of India, 
warm, and labour conditions were less exacting than those in British 
Columbia where Indians were foredoomed to an existence devoid of all 
hope of comfort or advancement. The Victoria Colonist opposed the 
Indians on the hypothesis that if Canada were thrown Open to Oriental 
immigration, it would be Orientalized. The Victoria Times remarked 
that the Canadian government had solved the Indian question so far 
as British Columbia was concerned; the entire Indian colony was to 
be moved from British Columbia to British Honduras.^ The Victoria
Colonist sav; Oriental immigration as the most irremediable political
k : -curse. Seeing the popularity of Asiatic exclusion, Maclnnes, the
Liberal candidate for parliament, had announced himself heartily in
its favour. An Indian employee of a hotel in Vancouver had to be
sacked when a dozen white employees threatened to strike if he '.was-'
6retained in service. Robert Borden, the leader of the Canadian
Conservative Party (Opposition) declared:
The Conservative party stands for a white Canada, 
protection of White labour, and absolute exclusion 
of Asiatics.?
The Times commented that unquestionably British Honduras was in favour 
8 -
o f w h i t e  Canada. In this way the press created, for the coming 
elections, an impression that an attempt would be made to deport 
the whole Indian community to British Honduras on the ground that
T  Province (Vancouver), Oct. 20, 1908.
2 Victoria Colonist (Victoria), Nov. 2h, 1908.
3 Victoria Times, Oct. 16, 1908.
4 Victoria Colonist, Oct. 20, 1908.
5 The Times. Sept. 7, 1908.
6 ■ Ibid.
they were destitute, had become a public charge and were physically
unfit to sustain the rigours of the Canadian climate. While the
delegation was away in British Honduras, the Indian community in
British Columbia could see the hostile press reports regarding
their removal from Canadian soil. They held a protest meeting
and sent telegrams to the Imperial and Indian governments*
Sikhs in Victoria protest against orders of 
being removed to British Honduras, willing 
to stay in Canada, if forced to vacate, would 
prefer to go to India.
Their paper, the Free Hindusthan, pointed out that the Imperial
government was opposed to having a large number of retired Indian
soldiers in a country with democratic political institutions, lest
they might be inspired with the ideas of political freedom. Opposing
the British Honduras scheme the paper stated;
We believe that Resistance to tyranny is 
service to Humanity and a necessity of 
Civilization.
Similarly the business section of the Indian community whose trade 
depended on Indian customers could realise the possible setback to 
their business. So in order to dissuade the Indians, they contacted
a Sikh scholar, Professor Teja Singh who was formerly principal of
Khalsa College, Amritsar (Punjab, India) and had managed to join
Columbia University, New York. When he came to visit Vancouver in
October 1908^ Teja Singh soon occupied the leading position in his 
community and by the time the delegation returned from British 
Honduras he was virtually head of the Indians in Canada. SO Teja 
Singh issued his first warning:
1 Viceroy of India to Sec. of State for India, telegram, Oct. 28, 1908
File 275* L/P & J/6/1137*
2 Free Hindusthan (New York), November/December, 1908.
3 Col. Swayne to the Colonial Office, December 30, 1908, C.O. 386/2.
We are all said to be under the same law.... Then 
why is it, that we are not allowed to work even 
as labourers under the flag whose prestige we 
have maintained over half the globe at the cost 
of poor starving India*s blood and money.^
He branded British Honduras as a convict island like the Andaman
Islands in the Indian Ocean where British Indian convicts were sent
and warned that such a scheme would arouse a harmful reaction in 
2
India. But the most important announcement he made was:
They ^ the delegates to British Honduras^/ informed 
me that the bribe was offered them by Mr. Hopkinson 
at a town named Tancret.... They were told that they 
could keep it if they made a favourable report.
They took the sack and later found that it contained 
$ 3»000.... The delegates, of course, never intended
to betray their countrymen in British Columbia. As
soon as they found out the amount of bribe, they 
returned the money. On their trip, the interpreter 
assured them that money was no-object, and that their 
every wish would be gratified.
Then there was a further announcement in the Vancouver newspapers on
November 23 that the Indian community held a general meeting, heard
reports from the Indian members of the delegation and decided not to
have anything to do with the British Honduras scheme. The Dominion
government immediately sent Harkin, its representative, to Vancouver
to investigate. The interpreter stated that on the return journey
from Belize he was requested by Harkin to obtain a written statement
from the Indian members as to their opinion of British Honduras; they
however, refused to comply but he refuted the charge of attempted
bribery. Then Harkin, accompanied by some prominent local people,
tried to contact the Indian community in order to explain the position
about the British Honduras scheme, but it resulted in lengthy
1 Quoted in the Vancouver World, Nov. 21, 1908.
2 Ibid.
3 Quoted in Province, Nov. 23* 1908,
k Hopkinson to Harkin, Nov. 23, 1908, File 1371, L/P & J/6/864,
arguments with Teja Singh. Ultimately Harkin wrote to the chief of
the Sikh Temple at Vancouver demanding a full statement about the
■ : : ■ -j ■' , ■ ■ ■ : '
allegation. In reply the Sikh Temple Managing Committee submitted
translations of extracts from the diaries of both the Indian delegates.
Both delegates had written that while at Orange Walk in British ;
Honduras, Hopkinson had handed a bag of money to Nagar Singh but the
entries did not show any clear statement about either the amount of
money or an attempt of bribery. However, the minutes of the Sikh
Temple meeting in this connection stated:
In a way, a temptation in the way Of money was also 
cleverly arranged. This was in the form of a money 
bag handed over to Nagar Singh by the interpreter.
Nagar Singh who had it states that he counted about
# 3,000 worth of bills in it. It_was apparently a
clever hint, though not an offer.
In the light of these hazy documents, and in the absence of any clear
proof, the charge against the interpreter did not contain any
k
substance. Moreover, the affidavit of Hopkinson refuted it altogether 
while the other Indian delegate stated that he saw the bag but did not 
know the amount of money. Furthermore, the Dominion governments’ 
representative knew nothing about it. The charge of attempted bribery 
was made by the Sikhs in very guarded language. They asserted that 
the Dominion representative knew nothing about it, and the whole
incident had been instigated by British Honduras planters. Teja
Singh had given this story to the Vancouver World, and Vancouver 
press reporters, at the same time, but later on before publication 
he notified these newspapers both by telephone and by letter that
1 Report by Harkin on British Honduras Scheme, December 1$J08, pp. 19-20.
2 Extracts from the diaries of Nagar Singh and Sham Singh, Nov. 3»
1908, Harkih3Raport, pp. 21-27,.
3 Extracts from the Minutes of the Sikh Temple meeting, Vancouver,
Nov. 22, 1908, Harkin Report, pp. 20~30*
4 Affidavit of William G. Hopkinson, Dec. 7, 1908, Harkin Report, pp.31*33*
3 Affidavit of Sam Singh, Dec. 24, 1908, Harkin Report,pp. 29-3*1 •
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the story should not be used. Thus he avoided any possibility of 
court action against him and at the same time convinced the Indian 
immigrants that the scheme was unreasonable.
In order to prevent any possible attempt by the Canadian government 
to deport the Indians on the grounds of being destitute, Teja Singh 
decided to form a society which was in fact a labour union, using as 
a rendezvous a Sikh Temple, built in 1906 at Fairview End Avenue, 
Vancouver. It was also decided to provide assistance to indigent
Indians by forming a labour employment bureau in order to keep them
' ’ V  , 2 ' -  ■ ■ ’ ; -
off the street. Teja Singh formed the Guru Nanak Mining and
Trust Co. Ltd., received contributions and made applications for
. V .  . - 3  ' ; ' :
registration from the Government.< He also made arrangements to
purchase a tract of land in North Vancouver to be divided into market
h
garden lots and worked by Indian labourers. Their one common 
desire was to remain in British Columbia, Canada, where they believed 
they had a right to remain unmolested. At the same time stories were 
spread about that in British Honduras the condition of old Indian 
coolies was extremely miserable. It was reported that water was 
sold to those Indians, the purchase of which absorbed a considerable 
part of their pay, and that yellow fever and mosquitoes had possession 
of the country. Besides this, the distance of British Honduras from 
India was much greater than that of Canada from India. -Teja Singh 
also started giving public lectures and press interviews expressing 
his indignation and resentment at what he thought to be unfair treatment
1 Teja Singh to the Vancouver World, Nov. 22, 1908*, Harkin Report, p.l8 .
2 Col. Swayne to Colonial Office, December 30, 1908, India Emigration 
proceedings 1909, Vol. 8241,
3 Ibid.
4 Vancouver World, Dec. 10, 1908.
5 Col. Swayne to Govt, of British Honduras, Dec. 20, 1908, File 273,
L/P 8c J/6/1137.
of Indians as British subjects. But he was quite anxious to show
-I
the loyalty of the Sikhs to the British Empire. In this way Teja 
Singh fried to frustrate the Dominion government's plan of moving 
the Indian immigrants from British Columbia to British Honduras,
It is hot surprising that his efforts in thds regard were praised
2 - ' ■
by the Indian press.
On the other side Col. Swayne, the Governor of British Honduras,
who had served in India and v/as familiar with the languages spoken
. . - 3
by the Indian community, reached Canada to look into this problem.
He v/as already briefed at the Colonial Office in London. He met
Laurier, Canadian Prime Minister, Lord Grey, the Governor General
of Canada, and a large number of officials and prominent people who
were familiar with the problem of Asians in British Columbia. During
his stay he particularly toured the towns where Indian immigrants
were at work. He undertook this mission with twoobjects in mind:
(a) to help Canada in solving this Indian immigration problem and
(b) to procure an agricultural labour force for his colony, British 
Honduras. The Indians with their amenity to discipline were thought 
to be entirely suitable for agricultural v/ork in British Honduras, 
and Col. Swayne expected that he could get them 1,500 Indians who 
were thought to be out of work in British Columbia to agree to go
to British Honduras. He requested the Canadian authorities to put 
him in touch with any'Cmemployed Indians. But even his private 
efforts discovered only three Indians v/ho v/ere at that time in
1 Vancouver World, Dec. II, 1903.
2 Tribune (Lahore), March 1^, 1909.
.3 Colonial Office Minute by C.P. Lucas, Assistant Under Secretary of 
State, Oct. 21 and 23» 1908, C.0.42/921/38if17, Nov. 11. 1908, and 
Colonel Swayne to Colonial Office Nov. 10 and 30, 1908, 0.0.42/921/41172.
4 Ottawa Citizen, January 4, 1909*
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receipt of allowances from their employed brethren. Despite his 
knowledge - of Indian languages and his intensive search, he could 
not discover any Indian labour force and ultimately he came to the 
conclusion that there was no justification for the view that "a large 
number of Indians there were unemployed and in distress". It v/as
p
entirely the contrary. So far as the question of deporting
unemployed Indians was concerned, it seemed solved for there were
noneUnemployed and therefore none to deport.
In the meantime the Government of India expressed its serious
doubts about the ultimate result of the proposed transfer of Indians
from British Columbia to British Honduras because they were mostly
Punjabees and many of them had been soldiers who were not likely to
settle quietly as settlers or labourers. They looked rather for
' 3
employment as policemen, messengers or industrial workers. Col. 
Swayne, while addressing the Canadian Club at Ottawa, gave the
opinion that the Indians were well fitted for the industrial work
^ : :
in which they were engaged in British Columbia. They were saving 
an average of thirty-five dollars a month whereas the wages in 
British Honduras were only eight to twelve dollars a month. They had 
come to Canada, leaving their families behind in India, with the 
object of saving enough in five years to return and release their 
farms from mortgages and buy others. Therefore the British Honduras 
scheme had no attraction for them. He pointed out to the Dominion 
government that the climatic conditions in British Columbia were ■
1 Swayne to Officer Administering British Honduras, Dec. 20, 1908, 
File 1371» L/P * & J/6/86*t.
2 Minto, Summary of the Admn. of Earl of Minto, p. 110, Minto Papers 
; M 859. ■ . ■'
3 Viceroy of India to Secretary of State for India, telegram, Dec. 6 , 
1908, File 1371, L/P & J/6/86*f.
k Ottawa Citizen, January 1909.
not so severe as the Indians were accustomed to in their native
country, and it would be impossible in-future.to urge climatic
considerations as a reason for discouraging the emigration of
1Indians to British Columbia on humanitarian grounds. It v/as 
considered by a medical authority th&t in the severe winter of 
1907-1908, a smaller number of Asiatics were admitted into hospitals 
or suffered from pulmonary infections, than would have been the case
p
with an equal number of white men under similar trying conditions.
The mill owners in British Columbia preferred to employ Indians
rather than white men, because Indians could be relied upon to give
continuous employment;however, a rising demand for their labour
could encourage their immigration. Another point to be considered
was that those who were already in Canada might return to India with
a large sum of money and this would have a disquieting effect on the
native population. Though Col. Swayne could not discover any strong
feeling against the Indians on the part of the majority of the white
population, he nevertheless opposed the large scale migration of
Indians to Canada. The hostile reception from the local labour
element and the policy of exclusion on the Pacific Coast could serve
as an instrument of propaganda for those undesirable socialist
lecturers coming from the United States of America. The Imperial
authorities could foresee the reaction in India, caused by the return
of immigrants who were infected with new ill-digested socialist 
3
xdeas. Such a situation could contaminate the Indians, especially
1 Col. Swayne to Governor General, Canada, Memorandum on Matters affecting
the East Indian Community in British Columbia, Dec. 30,1908, File 1371» 
L/P & J/6/86*f.
2 Dr. MUnroe, attached to the General Hospital and Emigration Department 
at Vancouver, B.C., made these observations: Memo, of Col. Swayne,
Dec. 30, 1908, File 275, L/P 8c J/6/1137.
3 Memo, by Col. Swayne, Dec. 30, 1908, File 275* L/P & J/6/1137.
the Punjabi soldier class. At the same time, the extreme element 
in India could easily discover in this an excuse for their violence 
and crime against British rule. ,
/■//■■The British Honduras scheme, then, was based on political
consideration. In the summer of 1908, whenihe Dominion government
expressed its concern about the poor employment situation in British
Columbia and its adverse effect on the Indian immigrant community
the position was really quite otherwise. The Dominion government
requested the Colonial Office in London to bring to the notice
of various authorities interested in emigration to Canada the
demand for farm labourers. But at the same time the Imperial
authorities in London pointed out to the Government of India that
it would'be most undesirable to publish for general information
in India a notice which might give the impression that Indian
2 ■agricultural labourers v/ere wanted in Canada. The Dominion
government wanted to show to the influential anti-Asiatic element
in British Columbia that it v;as doing something positive to get
rid of the Indian immigrants and in this v/ay it could combat the
Asiatic exclusion propaganda from the Conservative opposition for
the coming election; The Conservative Party exploited the situation
by a clear declaration in favour of Asiatic exclusion and at the
same time by blaming the Liberal administration for its mild stand
on the Oriental problem in British Columbia. The Conservative
3
newspapers openly propagated exclusion. But'with the announcement 
of the British Honduras scheme the Conservatives in their election 
enthusiasm created an impression that the Dominion government was
 ..    mmtmmmimmntmm
1 High Commissioner for Canada to Colonial Office, May 12, 1908, File 1371, 
L/P & J/6/86*f.
2 Colonial Office to India Office, May 15, 1908, File 1371, L/P & J/6/864.
3 Province, October 15, 1908.
contemplating a forcible deportation of the entire Indian community.
On the other hand the well-off section of Indians, being highly
dependent on continued immigration for its economic and political
survival, made a determined effort to ruin the scheme. Their paper,
the Free Hindusthan, pointed out that the Imperial government v/as
opposed to having a large number of retired Indian soldiers in a
country with democratic political institutions, lest they might
be inspired with the idea of political freedom, and in this way
the very foundation of British rule might be in danger.
The maintenance of the Sikh Temples, their priests, and their
religious leadership were also dependent on the Indian immigrant :
community and bn their cooperation, subscription and attendance.
The moving of a fair section of Indians from British Columbia could
be evidently foreseen by the Sikh priests as a great danger to
their very basis of existence on Canadian soil* Obviously then,
the Sikh temples with their religious leaders played a great part
in defeating the Dominion government’s efforts in this regard. Of
course the Sikh -priests and-.well-off section of the community made
their concerted efforts to wreck the scheme and succeeded in
inviting, and later on hiring, Professor Teja Singh, to help them
realise their aims. The latter happened to come from an insignificant
origin and desired for some kind of authority leading to publicity*
and his former service in" Khalea College, Amritsar and his knowledge
of Gurmukhi-(the language in which the Sikh Holy Book is written),
2 ■helped hkm to attract the Sikhs. * So within a short time Teja Singh
1 ; Free Hindusthan (Hew York), November/December 1908.
2 C.J, Stevenson Moore, Director of Criminal Intelligence to Government 
of India, history sheet of Teja Singh; June 10, 1909, File 1309*
L/P Ik J/6/930 .
utilized, his training as Professor of English literature and 
qualified pleader; he succeeded in occupying the position of 
unchallenged leadership of the Gikh§. in Canada. Thus the British 
Honduras scheme was attacked from the Sikh temple with full force.
The native press in India, especially in the Punjab, expressed 
doubts about the rewards for Indian loyalty to the British government 
It cited the example of the Sikhs, the most loyal section of the 
Indian population, and pointed out that their loyalty to the Crown 
was rewarded bybeing turned out of Canada. Thus the scheme 
provided the hostile press with ammunition to attack the British 
government*^ :
But the most important factor for the failure of the scheme 
was economic. The amount of money which each Indian could save in 
British Columbia was at least thirty five dollars a month after 
paying his entire living expenses, whereas in British Honduras an 
Indian could only hope to gross tv/elve dollars a month out of which 
he was- to pay/for his boarding. : Further, the mild and comfortable 
living conditions in British Columbia were far better than the 
inclement weather and hard life in British Honduras. The scheme 
thus had no attraction for the Indian community in Canada. In spite 
of the fact that the Government of British Honduras maide an open 
offer for future Indian migration from British Columbia, no one was 
willing to go to British Honduras because the Indian immigrants 
considered the terms offered there humiliating and en bloc declined 
the offer. In addition to this the Colonial Office, which encouraged 
the scheme in the first instance, subsequently regretted its initial 
■association with the proposal, stating:
1 Sheri-Babar, Lahore, Dec. 12, 1908, Funjab Newspaper Reports, 1908
* ,V the proposal to take the Indians to British 
Honduras v/as a stupid one. . •* We vrere misled by 
the theory that the Indians were badly off but 
Governor Swayne discovered that they were making 
a comfortable livelihood. 1
In this way the British Honduras scheme ended id.thout any significant
result. But the Oriental problem had made its Impact in the election
of 1908. Though the Liberal Party increased its majority elsewhere,
it lost three seats in British Columbia including its Minister,
. Temple/nan.^
Mackenzie King was appointed to represent Canada in the
international Opium Commission in China early in 1909. The British
Honduras scheme for moving the Indian immigrants from the Canadian
Pacific Coast and the loss of the federal election by the Liberal
Party in British Columbia kept the Indian immigration question very
much alive. The election speeches in autumn] 1908, created an
atmosphere which could lead to some misunderstanding between the
Dominion and Indian authorities. As the arrangement with Japan was
Working well, the Canadian government suggested that Mackenzie King
should go to China via England and India and should discuss the issue
• x
with the Imperial and Indian governments^ in order to negotiate an 
arrangement on the lines of the Gentleman*s Agreement that had been 
made with Japan. Mackenzie King reached London on December 22, 1908 
and spent the Chrismas vacation with Morley, the Secretary of State 
for India, who however, regarded the emigration question between 
India and Canada as virtually settled and gave more importance to 
the opium traffic and political unrest in India. He considered 
Mackenzie King’s visit to India ”to be worth silver and gold” and
1; Colonial Office Minute, A.B. Keith, May 9 , 1913* C.O. 42/975/14653.
2 Province, Vancouver, October 2?, 1908.
3 Grey to Laurier, December 2, 7, l4, 1908; Grey to Crewe, December 8, 
1908, Grey Papers; and Laurier to Crewe, December 11, 1908, File 1371* 
I/P & J/6/864.
requested him to discuss these matters with the Indian government
officials and political leaders.
Lord Minto, Viceroy of India, was informed by telegraph that
Mackenzie King was coming to discuss the emigration question and
would also like to meet some Indian representatives. But the
Viceroy was dubious about the outcome of any meeting between Mackenzie
King and Indian leaders on this issue and expressed his fear that
the discussion would be guided by circumstances. He, however, agreed
that he would arrange discussion with the officials of the Government
of India.v So on arrival in India in the middle of January, 1909
Mackenzie King met the Viceroy, Lord Minto, together v/ith two members
of the Viceroy's council and heads of several departments and other
A
people whom it was thought advisable to see. He found that the 
Indian government was not at all desirous to raise the emigration 
question in the minds of anyone by inviting discussion which might 
precipitate criticism. He observed that the agitation in India 
was more or less acute against the treatment of Indians in SOuth 
Africa and Australia because Australia denied any form of admission 
to Indians on the policy of complete Asiatic exclusion. South Africa, 
on the other hand, having invited the Indian workers, was then 
unwilling to concede the privileges which the Indians claimed as 
subjects of the Empire. The Canadian attitude was, surprisingly,
.■V:. • C v ■;
appreciated by the British officials in India.- So as such Canada 
could not be brought into any controversy aligned with South Africa 
or Australia* Under these circumstances Mackenzie King realized
1 Mackenzie King to EarlyGrey, January 1, 1909, King Papers.
2 Morley to Minto, telegram, December 23, 1908, File 1371* L/P & J/&/864.
3 Minto to Morley, telegram, December 24, 1908, Minto Papers M 1013.
4 Mackenzie King to Laurier, January 31* 1909, King Papers.
5 Mackenzie King to Earl Grey, January 31* 1909, King papers.
that any formal agreement v/as neither feasible nor expedient.
Moreover, the official attitude of the Government of India was that:
(a) India must be entirely passive, and would do nothing, not even 
object to legislation which prevented Indians going to Canada so long 
as it was not aimed specifically at Indians, and (b) the trouble having 
originated'with the shipping companies, which had been subsequently 
controlled, and with only a very remote possibility of emigration 
taking place from any other source, matterswere better left as they 
were. Mackenzie King then asked a direct question about the 
deportation of destitute Indians from Canada. The Indian government 
replied that no feeling was likely to be excited in India if 
deportation of destitute Indians was resorted to, but they would
2
not advise the appearance of anything like wholesale deportation.
In these circumstances Mackenzie King advised the Dominion government 
to let sleeping dogs lie: an attempt to formalise the system of 
exclusion wouldonly start them barking at Canada. Therefore, when 
he was interviewed by Hirstman, The Times correspondent in India, 
he said that he had explained the Canadian attitude to the Indian 
government and that the arrangement in existence was working
satisfactorily for "it was decided best not to raise the subject in
. 3  ' ■' ■■■-
the press lest it might provoke queries". ■ Consequently no news
appeared in the Indian press about Mackenzie King’s visit to India.
During his visit to India Mackenzie King saw a number of British
officials in the Government of India and asked their opinion about -
1 Minto to Morley, March 11, 1909, Documents on Canadian External 
Relations, pp. 596-7, and B. Robertson, Secretary to Govt, of 
India Department of Commerce and Industry, Memorandum, January 21, 
1909, King Papers.
2 Mackenzie King to Laurier, January 31,. 1909, King Papers.
3 Mackenzie King, Memorandum re: Emigration from India to Canada, 
February 5 * 1909, King Papers.
Indian emigration to Canada. He reported to Laurier that the answer 
was that Indians were entirely unsuited to the Dominion and that 
nit is in every way desirable that, Canada should be kept for the 
white races and India forthe blacks as Nature appears to have 
:decreed11 •; -....--Mackenzie-King was fully convinced that the exclusion 
of Indians.was not only approved by the Indian government but was 
also the natural course to be adopted and he duly advised the Dominion 
government to this effect. But how did he come to this conclusion?
The people he saw were British officials who were not very happy with 
a considerable section of the Indian population. Only over a month
before his arrival in India the situation was reported in this way:
y. White India-prepares'for war. British in India 
send families home. Alarming conditions....?
The racial discriminatory attitude of the British officials in-
India could be observed by any visitor at gatherings of minor officials
Concerning this Mackenzie King noted in his diary:
We had an example at dinner tonight of the kind 
of thing which I believe works most injury. The 
Indian gentlemen who had been showing us about, 
who had been unfailing in their courtesies, were 
neither of them present at dinner with us, though
the elder of the two sat through the whole of the
dinner on a chair apart, looking on at the guests
enjoying themselves. Later in the evening, when 
the dance was taking place, he was not seated within 
the circle, but moved about explaining the different 
. d a n c e s .  There was no excuse for this thing in India, 
x-' -Where men are refined, educated and noble in purpose 
there should be no distinctions between them. To 
do so is to place a badge of inferiority by the one 
on the other.7
Besides Mackenzie King could see that:
The traditional attitude of the English towards ... 
the brown man ^Indianj7, has been one of making him 
feel his inferiority.*?
1 Mackenzie King to Laurier, January 31, 1909, King papers.
2 Mackenzie King, Memorandum re: Emigration from India to Canada, 
February 5* 1909, King Papers.
5 Vancouver World, Dec. 10, 1908 (the main headline)
k Mackenzie King, Diary, January 25, 1909, King Papers.
5 Mackenzie King to Lord Grey, June 1, 1909, King Papers.
However, Mackenzie King’s own prejudicial views on the Oriental 
question in Canada were well known before his mission to India. In 
his election speeches in autumn 1908 he attacked his opponent, Col* 
Joseph Seagram* for employing Orientals for his racing stable and
'•'I .
raised the Asiatic exclusion slogan in Ontario. Therefore, Mackenzie ;
King’s mission to India quite naSvely justified his prior convictions
(or political expediencies) on this matter* So the Indian government’s
position was that it expressed its satisfaction and appreciation of
the arrangement that quietly excluded toost Indians from Canada, and it
2
raised no objection against the restrictive measures. At least for 
the time being, the Indian officials could put this issue under the 
carpet. Of course the matter should receive no publicity lest it 
should cause embarrassment to the British rulers in India. Lord Minto 
expressed his gratitude to the Dominion government for not doing 
anything which might increase his administrative difficulties. But 
it should not be supposed that Canada’s action appealed in quite 
the same way to the Indian people. A case was recalled in 1926 by 
Bourassa, the French-Canadian member of the Dominion Parliament, who 
said that he remembered being in London in 1911, at the time when 
Canada’s naval policies were being so anxiously discussed. What 
was really the best contribution Canada could render to the Imperial 
cause, Bourassa had asked a high official of the India Office. ”If 
you could bring British Columbia to open her door to Hindu immigration”,
was the reply. ’’That would be worth all the dreadnoughts you could
. ■ 3build in ten years.”
1 Globe (Toronto), October 31, 1908.
Minto to Laurier, March 1, 1909, Minto papers M. 996. 
3 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 1926, l80*f.
CHAPTER 6
Immigration Act, 1910; protests of Indian immigrants, 
exclusion of Indian wives and children. Petition to 
the Imperial Conference 1911; India Office Memorandum 
on the position of Indians in the Dominions; Pleas 
for Temporary Admission of non-immigrant classes; . 
and question of Wives and Children. Indian deputation 
in Ottawa, interview with Robert Rogers; Dr. Sunder 
Singh’s tour of Ontario and its opposition. Indian 
delegation in England; protests in India and Canada; 
interview with Hardinge. Imperial government’s proposals 
of passport system, Indian government’s rejection.
, Though the scheme of moving Indians from Canada to British
Honduras failed, the Government of India had accepted the de facto
exclusion of Indians from the Canadian labour market. At the same
time it had repeated its inability to restrict Indian emigration by
legislative or administrative order in India, However, Col, Swayne
had reported in 1908 that the demand for Indian labourers in
Canadian industries, and the returning home of the Indian immigrants
v/ith large sums of money could create a large-scale scheme of Indian
migration to Canada, Therefore the Dominion government thought
there was need to arm itself with a more powerful weapon for
restriction. For this purpose in 1910 a new Immigration Act was
passed, in which ’’continuous passage” and 200” regulations were
both included. This act went even further in attempting to exclude
Indians. By section 38 sub-sections (b) and (c) it enacted that
the Governor General in Council might, by proclamation or order in
council whenever he deemed it necessary or expedient,
... prohibit the landing in Canada of passengers 
brought by any transportation company which refuses 
or neglects to comply with the provisions of this 
Act....And might prohibit for a stated period or 
permanently the landing in Canada of immigrants of 
any specified class, occupation or character.^
Under the new Immigration Act fresh Orders in Council were put
through for the ’’continuous passage” regulation and 200 regulation”.
But as the case had been in the past, these regulations, in point of
fact, were only applicable to Indians. In addition, the Dominion
government then acquired the authority to use specific restrictions
1 Col. Swayne’s Memorandum on British Honduras scheme, December 1908, 
File 1371, L/P & <1/6/86*+.
2 Immigration Act, 1910.
3 P.C. 920, 1910.
*+ p,c. 926, 1910.
immigrants in Canada, The < 
of a million dollars a year
if it should be necessary. But on the other hand, in spite of 
 these restrictive regulations, there was definitely a need for
Canadian government spent over a quarter
 in bringing,the advantages of Canada
before the British public and in facilitating the movement of
-|
British people to Canada, However, the Dominion authorities became
quite nervous when they came to know about a scheme by which the 
Indians could bring immigrants from Calcutta to Vancouver, fulfilling
possible Indian influx,
Indian immigration had almost stopped in 19.09,-..yet in spite 
of strict regulations the Indians continued some encroachment on 
British Columbia, The j^ erlod from 1909 to 191^ was the time of 
protests, litigation, deputations and representations to the Canadian,
Imperial and Indian authorities against the Canadian immigration 
regulations as applied to Indian migrants. There were, however, 
during this time, two successful attempts made to enter Canada by 
educated and clever Indians who later became spokesmen for the 
Indian immigrants. The first was Dr. Sunder Singh (a Punjabi Sikh) 
who was trained at Glasgow, Scotland. He managed to reach Halifax 
on the S.S. Virginian, early in 1909 and fromtthere he made his way
' ii
to Victoria. He engaged himself in commercial activities, started 
a paper for the Indians and became an active champion of the Indian
1 Oliver (Canadian) Minister of the Interior to Parliamentary Under Secretary 
of State for Colonies, October 3» 1910. C.O.^2/939/3^25**.
2 Immigration Inspector, Vancouver to Deputy Minister of the Interior,
October l^ f, 1910, C.O. >2/939/33682.
3 Immigration Agent, Vancouver, to Deputy Minister of the Interior,
November 28, 1910, C.O. >2/939/333^2.
> J.O. Smith, Assistant Superintendent of Emigration, London to J.II. MacGill, 
Immigration Agent, Vancouver, April 12, 1912; and Hopkinson to Scott, 
April26, 1912, File 273, L/P & J/6/1137-
p
the continuous passage and 0 200 regulations.~ The scheme did not 
materialize^ and the Canadian administration felt relieved of the
■
cause. The second was one Hussain Eahim. Kis real name was Chagan 
Lai and he was born in Porbander State in Rathiwar (Western India).
He went to Japan and became a partner in business with Jamshe&ji 
Kaneckji Kanporia. Seven years later, being left in sole charge of 
the business, Ghagan Lai began to speculate and involved the business
in difficulties. He then fled to Honolulu with a large sum of money
2 *5under the assumed name of Hussain Rahim. In January, 1910 Ghagan
Lai arrived in Vancouver tinder the name of Hussain Eahim and obtained
admission to Canada by representing himself as a tourist desiring
to visit Montreal. In April, he began to interest himself in the
Indian immigration question and a month or two later the immigration
authorities, finding that he intended to settle in Vancouver and
had assumed management of a company trading in real estate, warned
him that he was liable to deportation. In October, 1912, he was
arrested, but the Dominion government foiled to deport him because
he had arrived in Canada before the passing of the new Immigration 
5
Act. But he was quite indignant at the treatment he received at 
the hands of the Immigration authorities.^ Soon his criticism of 
the Canadian immigration policy, and his successful attempt to 
stay in Canada brought him considerable publicity and subsequently 
he styled himself as one of the spokesmen and champions of the 
Indian community in Canada.
The nevj Immigration Act of 1910 made it virtually impossible 
for an Indian to enter Canada and by this act even the wives and 
children of the Indians already in Canada were excluded from
1 Hopkinson to Cory, March 26, 1912, File 275, L/P & J/6/1137*
2 Hopkinson to Cory, May 9* 1912, File 273, L/P & J/6/1137.
3 The New Immigration Act was passed later.
k Hopkinson to SoDtt, July 11, 1911, C.O.^2/9^8/25235.
3 Governor General of Canada to Colonial Office, April 16, 1912, C.O*
2^/959/13153•
6 J.H. MacGill, Immigration Agent to Cory, Deputy Minister of the Interior, 
00^.28,1910,0.0.^2/939/36276.
admission. Of course, the words "wives and children” did not appear 
in the Orders in Council ana similarly there'was no Order in Council 
issued under the Immigration Act which was specifically passed 
forbidding a certain class of citisens in Canada to import their 
wives, and children. But the ajiplieation of the continuous passage 
regulation made it extremely unlikely that any Indian man, woman 
or child could gain entry into Canada. The exclusion of Indian ■ 
women and Children does appear to be a legal accident, but it was 
a fact that the Dominion government failed to make a special 
regulation in spite, of a flood of protests, memorials and press 
. statements from the Indians, and it is, therefore, understandable 
that in the period 191Q~1919, Indian immigrants in Canada were 
mainly concerned with the gaining of permission for the admission 
of wives and children. At the same time permission for entry was 
also sought for Indian tourists, visitors, students and businessmen 
for a temporary stay. By these means, the Indians who wanted to 
come to Canada organized attempts to force their way into Canada.
Many.protests against the Canadian immigration policy were 
already aired by the Indians even before the passing of the new 
Immigration Act. The Indians held their meeting at Vancouver on 
April 2*f, 1910 and listed their grievances against the immigration 
regulations. They especially complained that the Canadian immigration 
laws were inconsistent with the Imperial policy because they 
discriminated against the people of India,.who were,of course,
British subjects. Indians were required to produce a sum of two 
hundred dollars before landing and they were ineligible for Canadian 
citizenship after six months of residence; v/hereas these regulations 
were not applicable to other British subjects who wished to come
to Canada. Furthermore, Indians especially protested about:the 
 continuous passage regulation which pplicable
to Indians only and therefore made their entry into Canada impossible
They also cited specific examples of Indian residents and Indian
students who were refused admission to Canada 1 Copies of these
protest resolutions were sent to the Indian press and to the India ;
Office, hondon. Then theDominion government was approached by the
Imperial authorities in this matter. In reply, the Canadian
administration sent a copy of an Order in Council- justifying the
stand. It.stated that the law did not absolutely debar Indian
Immigrants and Indians would be admitted if they complied with the ;
200 regulatlon’S^continuous passage regulation’1 and passed the
medical examination at the time of entry. It further stated that .
2these regulations were applicable to all Asiatics alike. But this
justification on the part of the Canadian government was not
communicated to the Indians until April 1911, when the Indians
submitted another petition regretting the silence on the part of
the authorities regarding their previous request. The'document' v/ent
on to say that:
Our petition to the Canadian Government did not 
succeed in securing any assurance of any kind ,••
/ and our rights of British citizenship are completely 
ignored..,. In the meantime the immigration laws are 
being applied with increased harshness and injustice 
against us ... and all the harshest regulations seem 
to be made especially against the people of India.
Concurrently about 300 Indian residents in the United States of
1 The Indians sent a memorial to the Viceroy of India and the India 
Office in Bondon: India Office to Colonial Office, June 2, 1910,
C.O. 886/ V
2 P,C« 1^89, August 1, 1910; India Office Minute, Sept, 12, 1910; and 
India Office to Governor General of India, Sept, 30, 1910, File 568,
3 Indfens in British Columbia to Crewe, April 1911» File 568, L/P & J/S/IOS^ f. 
k Daily Mews-Advertiser, Vancouver, April 18, 1911.
America sent a memorial to the Secretary of State for India through 
the British Consul at San Francisco. In that memorial stress was 
laid upon the'difficulty experienced by Indians owning extensive 
property in British Columbia in visiting that province in order 
to protect their interests. They cited specific cases in which 
entry to Canada was refused though they were ready to abide by the 
conditions imposed on other British subjects. Furthermore, they 
referred to other Orientals - Chinese and Japanese — who were allowed 
to enter Canada. Thereupon the India Office, London, forwarded 
this memorial through the Colonial Office to the Canadian government 
with a request for a report as to whether the existing legislation 
involved any real hardship in the case of persons wishing only to 
make temporary visits for business purposes. In reply the Canadian 
government confined itself to the defence of its policy of restrictions 
and gave little satisfaction on the particular points requested. The 
difficulty with the immigration policy for these Indians in the United 
States, it explained, arose from the existence of the continuous 
passage regulation. It added that the United States authorities 
were very strict, and if an Indian, after being admitted to Canada 
for a visit, were found to be undesirable, there was no legal means 
(since he was not a citizen of the United States) of shipping him 
back there. This being the case, the Dominion government explained 
that it had no alternative but to apply the restrictive provision 
of the immigration laws. Furthermore it did accept that the Chinese 
and Japanese were exempted from such regulations.^ The Imperial
1 Petition to Secretary of State for India from the Secretary, Friends 
of Hindustan, received in India Office with a forwarding letter from 
the British Consul General, San Francisco, on June 2, 1910, C.O.886/^ ,
2 Secretary of State for Colonies to Governor General of Canada,
February 9i 1911* C.O. 886/^ .
3 P.C. 70^, April 6 , 1911*
government termed this a "very poor reply” and observed that the 
Canadian government "did not grapple with the problem at all".
The authorities in London and Calcutta were of the opinion that /the 
greater facilities should be extended to persons to visit Canada 
for temporary and bona fide business purposes. They-believed that 
a special permit could be issued under section h of the immigration 
Act 1910, for temporary visits.
In India the political situation was taking a serious turn.
Lord Hardinge of Penshurst was appointed Viceroy in 1910. The Minto- 
Morley reforms began to work and the Muslim League, a Muslim political 
party formed in 1906  ^had come into the field as a counterpart of 
the Indian National Congress. The policy of *let sleeping dogs lie’ 
as practised by Minto was replaced by Hardinge*s more positive 
alignment with Indian sentiments. King George V, who had visited 
India as Prince of Wales, decided to revisit India at the end of 1911* 
Before the King arrived the Viceroy wanted to remove all the possible 
difficulties which could be exploited by Indian agitators. The 
King was equally anxious at this time to make a gesture of kindness 
and good will towards Indians. The Viceroy (Hardinge) could foresee 
the importance of India as a supplier of soldiers for the British 
army and as a shield of protection in case of world war. It is not 
difficult to understand, then, that the Government of India during 
this period, was very sympathetic to the cause of Indians outside 
India, Canada was not the only country having Indian immigration
1 Colonial Office Minute, by A,B. Keith, April 23, 1911* G.0.^2/9^7/13198.
2 Government of India to Secretary of State for India, May 5* 1911*
^.0. 886/5A,
3 L*H. Zaidi, "King, Viceroy and Cabinet”, History, 196**, pp. 171-18**.
problems. South Africa, Fiji, Mauritius and the West Indies had 
already a large number of Indians coming to their territories as 
indentured labourers in place of the slave labour force after the 
abolition of slavery. In South Africa, the Indian indentured labourers 
had extended their stay after expiry of their terms of indentures; 
they used to do petty trading and started competition with the 
Europeans. The presence of natives, coloured people, Indians and 
Europeans had created a rather complicated situation there. British 
East Africa had brought in a large number of Indians to build and 
run the railways. The Dominions in the Pacific - Australia and New 
Zealand - had experienced Indian penetration as freelance workers, as 
Canada had done. In short, the Europeans in the Dominions; numerically 
few in themselves with large lands needing development, had a dire need 
for a labour force and when they could not find it in the indigenous 
native races, they welcomed or tolerated the Indian migrants. But
'i
eventually they were obliged to compete with them, and the white 
Australian policy and the Natal Act of South Africa were already known 
to be measures designed against Indian entry there. So the Government 
of India was confronted with the problem of looking after the Indians 
abroad, who were in a complicated position of competition and were no 
longer welcome.
The Muslim League, which had heretofore been branded by the Indian 
National Congress as a narrow-minded organization working for the 
interests of a small pro-British minority in India, now became a 
champion for the cause of the Indians abroad. It submitted memorials 
and proposals on the subject of Indian migration policies to the 
Imperial authorities. It sent a comprehensive memorandum about the
problems, difficulties and disabilities of Indians in the Dominions.
In Asking for redress for Indians abroad the Muslim League emphatically 
stated the importance of India as a great conti’ibutor to the Imperial 
defence force and reminded the authorities of India's three-fourth 
population under British rule. It also stressed the geographical 
importance of India as a halfway house between Britain and Australia. 
The Muslim League regretted the ill-treatment of Indians and their 
exclusion from those Dominions under the British flag, which was 
supposed to be an emblem of equality and justice par excellence.
The Muslim League warned that such disabilities and indignities 
imposed on Indians could be used by the enemies of the British rule 
in India to ferment disaffection amongst the most loyal section of 
the Indian community. Furthermore, it exx?ressed the fear that such 
a situation could damage Indian bonds with the Dr.pire. Therefore 
the League made the pleas that exclusion of Indians should be based 
on Imperial considerations and the condition of Indians already in 
the Dominions should be ameliorated. For this purpose the Muslim 
League requested that the whole Indian migration question should 
be discussed in the forthcoming Imperial Conference in which Indian 
participation should be of a more representative character.
In the meantime New Zealand had already proposed to include the 
Asiatic migration question on the agenda of the Imperial Conference 
and it had severely opposed the employment of Indians on ships 
coming to New Zealand, For the most part, the Dominions did not 
seem to realize the wide bearings of the Indian migration question.
1 The London All India Moslem League to the Colonial Office, Nov. 11, 
1910, 0-0. 886/3,
2 Governor, New Zealand, to Secretary of State for Colonies, Nov. 29* 
1910, File 5G9* X/P & J/6A062.
3 Extract from the Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives,
New Zealand, Sept. 23, 1910,0,0.886/3.
The India Office expressed its concern that it foresaw serious trouble
if anti-Indian resolutions were passed or moved at the Imperial 
Conference. Similarly the Colonial Secretary (Harcourt) was impressed 
with the gravity of the general situation. Therefore the Imperial 
authorities decided to make absolutely clear the seriousness of the 
question to the Dominions. This could be very effectively and
frankly done through full interchange of views at the forthcoming
2 ' V  ' •
Imperial Conference, 1911*
But inthe Colonial Merchant Shipping Conference of 19©7, the
grievances of Indians were discussed only with reference to the
Navigation laws of Australia and New Zealand. The disabilities imposed
by the Australian colonies on Indian seamen were warmly debated. A
resolution was moved that the Conference was "opposed to the employment
of lascars, coolies, Chinamen, or persons of any other race on any
vessel owned, registered or chartered to trade in the Commonwealth of
Australia and New Zealand". This resolution was opposed by the Colonial
3
Office and at last it was withdrawn. Judging by the attitude of
the Australian delegates on that occasion, the chances of any useful
result being attained by discussion of Indian grievances in the
kImperial Conference were slight. Nevertheless the Imperial government
decided to form an Interdepartmental Committee and to prepare a
memorandum for informal but confidential discussion of the most
general aspect of this question in the forthcoming Conference. There
was a fear of agitation and criticism in India in case of the
6publication of proceedings of the Conference, but the Imperial
1 India Office, Minute by E.S. Montagu, Under Secretary of State,
Dec, 20, 1910, File 509, L/P & J/6/1062.
2 India Office to Colonial Office, Dec. 28, 1910, File 509, L/P & J/6/1062
35o7, ■
3 Cd./Colonial Merchant Shipping Conference, 1907* p* 316.
k India Office Minute by Holderness, Secretary India Office, Dec* 17,
1910, File 309, L/P & J/6/1062,
5 India Office to Colonial Office, Dec. 28, 1910, File 509, L/p & J/6/1062
6 Viceroy of India to India Office, telegram, May 5 , 1911, File 509,
L/P & J/6/1062.
authorities thought that it should be known that they had taken a
sympathetic view of the Indians* grievances and had endeavoured to
1 ■ 
secure them a fair and considerate treatment. Therefore the India
Office prepared a detailed memorandum on the migration of Indians
and its implications in all the Dominions.
The memorandum contained emphatic statements about the cultural,
political and numerical Importance of India for the British Empire.
It regretted the policy of exclusion of Indians from the Dominions
under the British crown and it especially pointed out the privileges
allowed to Indians by foreign countries while the. British Dominions
denied them. Moreover the India Office deplored the misunderstanding
that all Indians were either illiterate labourers or petty traders.
It stated that India, with a population of some three hundred million
inhabitants, possessed an ancient civilization of a very high order
and offered the finest military material in the world for the Imperial
forces. Furthermore the memorandum severely criticized the restrictions
imposed by the Dominions on Indian visitors of distinguished position,
who could move freely in the best society of any European capital.
It pointed out that while under the new reforms introduced in India,
the Indians were associated'with the British administration,
unfortunately the discriminatory treatment of Indians in the
Dominions would undermine all efforts on the part of the Imperial
2
government for co-operation and pacification of Indians in India.
Though the Government of India accexrted the right of the 
Dominions to control immigration, it denounced the discriminatory 
treatment of Indians and advocated their fair treatment. However,
1 India Office Minute by H.Risley,June,9,1911,File 509, L/P & J/6/1062.
2 Cd. 57^6-1. Papers laid before the Imperial Conference, 1911, 
pp. 273-278.
the Viceroy (Hardinge) and the Secretary of State (Crewe) agreed
i
that the matter should be discussed as a confidential subject.
The Hindu Friend Society of Victoria, British Columbia, also 
submitted a petition to the Imperial Conference and they cited 
specific examples of hardships meted out to Indians living in the 
United States, who owned property in Canada. They requested a 
change in Canadian immigration regulations to facilitate the entry 
of Indian visitors and the families of those who were already in
Canada - entry at least on the same terms as the Chinese and Japanese
■ 12 ■ ■" ■ or even Negroes. Lord Hardinge, Viceroy of India, also urgently
requested the granting of easy admission facilities to Indian
students, tourists and traders as non-immigrant classes and without
any immigration restrictions.
Lord Crewe, the Secretary of State for India, spoke to the
Imperial Conference about the general principles upon which the
question of Indian emigration and immigration into the Dominions was
founded. He had observed the question from different standpoints;
first as Colonial Secretary, and secondly as Secretary of State for
India, and in both offices had concluded that no more difficult,
nor in some bf its aspect s,s;more critical, question could be discussed
at the Conference than the one regarding Indian immigration and the
treatment of Indians within the various self-governing colonies.
Indeed, this difficulty between white and coloured races had seemed
to him, even when he was Colonial Secretary, to threaten not only
the well-being but the actual existence of the Empire as an Empire
1 Viceroy of India to Secretary of State for India, telegram, May 5* 1911, 
File 509, L/P & J/6/1062, and Crewe to Hardinge, telegram, May 15, 1911, 
Hardinge Papers 95-
2 Cd. 57^6-1, Papers laid before the Imperial Conference, 1911, pp*.279-281.
3 Hardinge to Crewe, telegram, May 2k t 1911, Hardinge Papers 95*
because there was no complete and perfect solution of the problem 
as It manifested itself in labour competition and/or objections 
to close intercourse between races in the various colonies.
Yet while he recognized that Indians had a claim for consideration 
both as loyal subjects of the British Crown and as men whose 
intellectual and historical heritage was as impressife as that of 
Englishmen, he realized that mere adoption of heroic legislation 
was ho short cut to the solution of the question of Indian immigration 
into:the self-governing Dominions, who had the liberty to lay down 
the rules of their citizenship. He confidently submitted, however, 
that the relations between India and the rest of the Enpire might 
be muGh improved by the cultivation of mutual understanding/ and, 
speaking on behalf of the India Office and the Government of India, 
he said they would do their best to explain to the people of India 
how the position stood in the Dominions. In return he thought they 
were entitled to ask the prime ministers of the self-governing 
Dominions to make known in their respective areas how.deep and 
widespread the feeling on this subject was in India.
On the question of the distressing problem of Indian disability 
in any part of the British Empire, all political factions in India, 
all castes and creeds, drew together. The problem of immigration 
within the Dominions, therefore, was a valuable weapon for those 
in India who wished to attack British rule there. He suggested that 
to ease the political situation in India, the Dominion governments 
might, within the limits which they had laid down for the admission 
of Indians, make the entrance of Indians more easy and more pleasant 
than'it had been in the past. If it became knovm that within those 
limits the Indian subjects of the Crown would receive a genuine
welcome in the Dominions and would not be looked upon with suspicion, 
this should greatly improve relations between India and the Dominions.
With regard to the treatment of Indians already living in the 
Dominions he suggested to the Dominion ministers to do all they could 
to inform public opinion of the general claim of Indians to considerate 
and friendly treatment as fellow subjects and as loyal subjects of 
the British Crown. Although concerned about the general problem of 
the treatment of Indians in the Dominions, he believed that the Mother 
Country should not be implicated in difficulties between various parts ■ 
of the Empire, and need not be if a genuine understanding existed 
between the Governments of the Dominions and the Government of India. 
Since the major problem of Indian immigration lay specifically with 
the separate Dominions, he urged the governments of these Dominions 
to make every effort to show an accommodating and friendly spirit 
towards India, for until pleasant terms existed between India and 
the Dominions there could not be, nor could there be maintained, a
•i
United Empire.
But the representatives of the Dominions were unanimous in
their determination for restrictive immigration policies against
?  '• ■ ■
Indians. They advocated the policy of Indian exclusion and asserted
their right to do so as Dominions. In spite of this long discussion
at the Imperial Conference and the presentation of petitions and
memoranda, the endeavours of the India Office, London, did not bear
any fruit. The whole matter amounted to nothing more than an academic
debate.^ Opposition to Indians on the Pacific Coast continued to be
1 Cd. 57^5» Imperial Conference, 19*11, Minutes of Proceedings. Full 
text of Lord Crewed speech, pp. 39*+-399*
2 Cd. 37^1, Imperial Conference, 1911, Precis of the Proceedings,
pp. 7>77*
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echoed in the British Columbian press,
A new development in the Indian immigration problem occurred
in the middle of 1911 when one Indian immigrant, Kira Singh, visited
India and returned to Canada with his wife and child. The Canadian
immigrationofficials refused to let his wife and child enter the
country on the grounds that they had not complied v/ith the "continuous
passage regulation". The matter was taken to the law courts* The
case aroused much interest among the Indian community in British
Columbia. Before the case could come up for hearing in the court,
the Indians appealed to the Dominion government to exercise its
discretion in the matter. H.H, Stevens, the member of the Canadian
Parliament from British Columbia, paid a special visit to Ottawa
and briefed the Minister of the Interior on the implications and
interests of the situation. The result was that the Canadian
government ordered that Hira Singh’s family could remain in Canada
2
but this case -was not to establish any precedent for the future.
The Indian immigrants decided to send a deputation to Ottawa 
to see the new government ministers who came to power after the 
Liberal party was defeated in the general elections of.1911* They 
thought that the Conservative government led by Sir Robert Borden 
might take, a different and more sympathetic look at their problems.
A delegation composed of Dr, Sunder Singh, Professor Teja Singh,
Raja Singh, and the Rev, :'L.W. Hall (who had been a missionary for 
some years in India) went to Ottawa and sought an interview with 
Robert Rogers, the Minister of the Interior. They submitted a
1 Vancouver World, June 1^ , 1911.
2 Hews Advertiser (Vancouver), August 6 , 1911.
3 . Ibldy ,-r'Qctoberg28y%191lV^ -:C^ uv-r )». -jet ■ 1:« i..
petition to the Minister, based on the fact that Indians were loyal 
British subjects who had willingly served the Crown and who had = 
beeir promised equal treatment by reigning monarchs of the Empire, 
Because of this they did not wish to be discriminated against nor 
classed as aliens by the Canadian government. They found the 
immigration restrictions imposed upon them excessively harsh and 
degrading. In particular they objected to those regulations that 
destroyed normal family life by forbidding Indian women to join 
husbands.living in Canada. Such compulsory separation of families 
was legally imposed upon incarcerated criminals but should not, in 
a civilised country, be practised against Indians who were British 
subjects especially when other Oriental immigrants - Chinese and 
Japanese - who were not British subjects were permitted to bring 
their wives. They also objected to the continuous journey restrictions 
and defined .it as unreasonable and requested that it should be either 
modified or repealed. The petitioners repeatedly stressed the point 
of their being British subjects with a subsequent right to travel to 
or reside in any part of the Empire. Furthermore the delegation 
stated that Indians in Canada were good and law-abiding citizens > 
and were economically: stable. Nevertheless, as a safeguard against 
any Indian in Canada becoming a public charge, the delegation 
expressed their willingness to give security bonds with the immigration 
authorities, but at the same time they desired that the amount . 
required for an Indian to enter Canada be the same as that for other 
nationalities and not the specially prescribed amount of two hundred 
dollars. The deputation also desired that restrictions on Indian 
students, merchants and tourists entering Canada be removed. The 
main point stressed by the Indian representatives was the desirability
of one standard immigration policy within the Empire for all British 
subjects, including Indians.
In reply to this representation by the Indians, Robert Rogers, 
the Minister of the Interior, stated that the Indians already in
■, \ p
Canada were allowed to bring their families provided they conformed 
to such existing regulations as the direct passage from India and 
possession of the amount of tv/o hundred dollars per person. The 
Minister also told the Indian deputation that he would send an 
officer to British Columbia to make a study of the whole problem of 
Indian immigration and grievances. The deputation was well satisfied 
with the treatment at the hands of the Canadian government arid was
confident that the promised investigation would result in the
■ • h
restrictions being still further-eased. The Indian community in
Vancouver rejoiced at this news of their success. The Minister of
thqlnterior appointed F.C. Blair of the immigration department to
proceed to British Columbia and investigate the subject of Indian
immigration and settlement in connection with their request to be
allowed to bring their wives and children. But soon the Indians
realised that their achievement was nothing concrete and that they
had been only temporarily appeased. The Globe (Toronto) flashed
the news that the government had handed over to the Indians in British
6 - - V  !
Columbia a large sized gold-brick. However, nothing was stated
clearly in the official communique published in this regard. At
this time three members of the delegation, Professor Teja Singh,
1 Full text of the Petition of the delegates of the United India 
League and the Khalsa Divan Society, Vancouver, B.C. is in the 
P\R.O. File, C.O. 42/985/5277.
2 The Times, Dec. 16, 1911.
3 Globe (Toronto), Dec. 16, 1911.
4 Evening Citisen (Qttawa), Dec. 15% 1911»
5 Ottawa Citizen, Dec. 18, 1911.
6 Globe (Toronto), Dec. 16, 1911.
7 Ibid.
Raja Singh, and the Rev* V,L. Hall returned to British.Columbia. but 
Dr* Sunder Singh .(who was a Glasgow trained doctor and held an M.D.; 
degree from that University and who was also editor of the Indian 
newspaper Sanssr) stayed in. Ontario. Dr. Sunder Singh decided to 
try to persuade the eastern sections of Canada to his point of view.
He felt the Easterners would not be biased because they were 
geographically.removed from British Columbia and remote from its 
problems and could have no fear, as the British Columbians had, of 
anCOriental take-over. He decided to present his case before the 
Canadian public. At Ottawa he, addressed the Empire Club on 
December 28* 1911; later he spoke before the Canadian Club at 
Toronto. In these speeches and many others he explained about the 
Sikh religion and the contribution of the Sikhs to the British 
Empire, especially emphasizing their loyalty as soldiers and their 
fine qualities as citizens and family men. Ho regretted the exclusion 
of Indians from Canada, and presented a convincing case on their 
behalf. It v/as quite amazing for the people in eastern Canada to 
know about the presence of Indians in British Columbia and certainly 
they were surprised to hear about the restrictive measures against 
them. So, Dr, Sunder Singh’s presentation was warmly received. He 
succeeded in enlisting the support of quite a few important public 
figures-and a cofmnittee.was'formed- to work for the cause of the 
Indian community in Canada. At a public meeting heldon December 29, 
1911 at Toronto,, a resolution was passed that:
, this meeting believes that injustice to fellow 
British subjects as well as the highest interest of
f* ,
1 Empire Club of Ottawa, Speeches 1911-12, pp. 112-116.
2 I.R. Broad, Sikhs in Canada, pp. 3“*^ .
the -.British Empire demands immediate action to relieve 
conditions; and hereby appoint a-committee composed of 
Hr* J.K. Macdonald, President, : R.A. Falconer, Dr.
Sunder Singh, Rev. Dr. T. Wilkie, J.A. Paterson K.C.,
K.E. Irvine K.C*, Mr. John Firstbrook(Mover), and 
Mr. Thomas ^est (Seconder) to bring these matters to 
public attention and to take such steps as they deem 
advisable to the end that injustice may be moved.^
Dr. Sunder Singh in ;this way was able to arouse considerable
interest in the Indian problem. The Canadian Missionary Boards
especially were impressed and decided to represent the Indian case
before the Dominion government. Mr. J.K* Macdonald and Sir Robert
Falconer paid a visit to Ottawa to place their pro-Indian point of
■ 2
view before H.H. Stevens, the member of the Canadian parliament 
who was a staunch supporter of Indian exclusion* No real understanding 
was reached however and an academic and propaganda exerciseUndertaken 
by Dr. Sunder Singh did not finally bring any fruit, for the 
immigration policy of the Dominion government was not at all altered. 
Dr. Sunder Singh’s tour of Ontario went on well but a note of disquiet 
was already there before his arrival in Toronto. The local leading 
newspaper, The Globe, wrote a lengthy editorial on ’’The Orientals in 
Canada”, in which it did accept the loyalty and sacrifices of the 
Sikhs for the British supremacy in India. But it added that the 
Oriental difficulty was fundamentally a complicated problem of 
Canadian democracy. It opposed the Indian immigrants because they 
were not Suitable for the working of democracy. . Furthermore it 
stated that British Columbia with its small population had enough
complications, and there was not any need for another complicated
3
addition in the form of Indians.
The labour element in Ontario was equally concerned about the
1 Mail and Empire, Dec. 30, 1911*
2 Ibid.
3 Globe, Toronto, Dec. 22, 1911#
possible effects of amendment in the immigration laws, so it was
not surprising to find that on January 1912% the District labour
Council met at Toronto and passed a strongly vrorded resolution which
condemned any relaxation of immigration lav/s in favour of any
particular grqup of Indians. The labour Council expressed its
utter surprise that a religious body such as the church organizations
should ally itself-with the parties that were agitating in favour
of the admission of Indians into Canada simply becausethey were
British subjects. The labouring classes were fighting for the
uplifting of humanity and the betterment of social conditions. The :
introduction of the Asiatic races into the Dominion of Canada meant
the lowering of moral and social standards, they believed. The
churches were warned that if they continued their support for the
admission of Indians, then the organized labour would sever its
2
relations with the churches and fight them to the finish.
In the Labour Council meeting John W. Bruce, from the Organisation 
of the Plumbers* Union, who had lived in Australia and South Africa 
and had recently returned.from a trip to British Columbia, painted 
a lurid picture of the Indian immigration question in South Africa.
He said that the lowering of the immigration barriers in favour of
these people was a menace to the wage workers of the Dominion. He
understood that Dr. Sunder Singh had been in the city raising an 
agitation for the admittance of Sikhs to Canada and had secured the 
co-operation of the Manufacturers’ Association and several missionary 
bodies. He accused the Manufacturers’ Association that their support 
for the Indian cause was only based on their dire need to obtains 
large number of labourers at a cheap wage, Mr. Bruce made a special
1 Mail and Empire, Toronto, Jan. 5* 1912.
2 Ibid. •'
point that if the Indians were allowed to bring their, v/ives and 
children, they would claim the right to attend the public schools, 
which meant that the Canadian young generation would become 
contaminated by all the vices of the Orient. /
At this point Dr. Sunder Singh proceeded to attack organized 
labour in its own stronghold. On January 26, 1912 he addressed a 
representative gathering of labour men at the labour Temple. He 
pointed out that the presence of the Sikhs caused little labour 
competition as they were doing work which few, if any, white men 
would undertake. He asked why the Dominion government should 
discrifoinate against the Sikhs when it admitted Japanese and Polish 
women. But in the same meeting Dr. Sunder Singh was strongly 
opposed by the labour bodies. One labour leader (James Simpson) 
spoke, attacking the Ministerial Association for having backed Dr. 
Sunder Singh’s appeal. Just because Canada was a part of the Empire 
there was no reason why she should have the burden of some other parts 
cast upon her. The whole movement for the admission of Sikh women 
was but a prelude to the introduction of cheap labour and lessened 
wages. J.W. Bruce concurred and advocated continual exclusion as 
the only policy to safeguard the wage earners. He made the point 
that if the admission of Indian women was accepted, an agitation
if
would soon follow for admission of all classes of Indians.
The missionaries of the pacific Coast were equally concerned 
about the possible relaxation of immigration lav/s in favour of Indians. 
So the Ministerial Association of Vancouver wired their protest to 
the Dominion government against any proposed admission of Indian
1 Mail and Empire, Toronto, Jan. 1912.
■ 2' Ibid., Jan. 27, 1912.
women into Canada. Unlike the religious bodies in eastern Canada,
the V/est Coast clergymen did not support the view that Indian
immigration into Canada should be made easier. Their telegram further
warned that admission of people who were incapable of assimilation
2 'was injurious to the national life of Canada. Consequently any
support which Dr. Sunder Singh had anticipated from the church
organizations was shattered by the clergymen on the Pacific Coast.
Relaxation of immigration restrictions on Indians was opposed
throughout Ganada. The Victoria City Council had decided not to
3
employ Indians inany civicwork. The Ottawa Free Press warned that
Indians could underwork, undersell, and underlive the white Canadians
. v . . \ k
and therefore, they must be kept out. The Victoria Trades and Labor
Council strongly requested the Dominion government not to relax the
5
restrictions on Indian immigration into Canada, Even the Building
Trades Council of Ottawa vigorously requested against the admission
of Asiatic races into the country.^ The District Trades and Labor
Council of St. Catherines emphatically condemned any attempt to
lessen restrictions governing immigration that-would allow Indians
7
to settle in Canada with a plurality of wives, H.H. Stevens, the 
Member of Parliament from Vancouver wrote a long article in The Manitoba 
Free press opposing the relaxation and analyzed the character and 
doings of the Indian delegation which went to Ottawa. The M.P. stated:
1 Extracts from Vancouver Papers in File 536999» Vol. 4.
2 Mail and Empire, Toronto, Jan, 28, 1912.
5 Victoria Colonist, July 12, 1911.
^ Ottawa Free Press, Jan. 6 , 1912.
5 Victoria Trades and Labor Council to Borden, Dec. 28, 1911* R.G.76,
. File 536999, Vol. 4.
6 Building and Trades Council of Ottawa to Robert Rogers, Jan. 10, 1912,
R.G.?6, File 536999, Vol. 4,
7 District Trades and Labor Council, St, Catherines, to Minister of 
Immigration, Jan. 19, 1912, R.G.76, File 536999, Vol. 4.
'■'.■■■'■.■This Sunder Singh is one of the cleverest rascals in 
Canada. He is a professional agitator and trouble 
monger, instead of being a philanthropist, he is an 
unscrupulous exploiter of his more ignorant fellow- 
countrymen, living on his v/its. He ... handles ' 
business matters for other Hindus at ahandsome profit 
to himself. He is altogether undesirable^and 
unreliable and a menace to the community*
The health authorities in Vancouver branded the Indians as undesirable
2because they were filthy and the immigration^authorities were also 
not in favour of Indian immigration. W.D. Scott, the Superintendent 
of Immigration at Ottawa, stated clearly;
. Personally I do not look with favour upon the 
Immigration of Hindoos. I am convinced that 
they are not a good class of people to encourage 
to come to Canada, and! would greatly regret any 
alteration of the law or regulations which would _ 
result in an increased number of the people arriving.^
Similarly the premier of British Columbia had clearly informed Borden
that he was determined to oppose any Oriental immigration into his
Vprovince.
The Dominion government remained quiet on this issue.^The
matter of admission of Indian wives came up in the Canadian House of
Commons on February 5, 1912 when Lemieux (Opposition) asked Prime
Minister "Robert Borden whether the Indians in future would be allowed
to import their wives* He replied that the matter was receiving 
6consideration. But about three weeks later the position was quite 
clear. The Minister of the Interior was asked whether or not it
1 Manitoba Free Press, Winnipeg, Jan. 27$ 1912.
2 Extracts from Vancouver Frees in File 536999*
3 W.D. Scott to Cory, Nov. 23* 1911* R.G.76, File 536999* Vol. k,
McBride to Borden, Nov. 6 , 1911, Borden Papers, Vol. 19*
5 MacGill toScott, telegram, Dec. 25, 1911* R.G.76, File 536999,
Vol.
6 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, February 1912, 2^57,
was the intention of the Dominion government to relax the immigration
restriction -.with regard to Indian 'women. Ilia reply was in the
: .. \  . '
negative* Thus the efforts of the Indian deputation to Ottav/a 
and subsequent endeavours, of Dr. Sunder Singh were, not successful*
-When he reached British Columbia his countrymen, felt disgusted end 
lost faith in their leaders. They demanded that the deputationists 
should refund $ 1 5 0 0 which they had spent on their journey to the
. ' : P
Canadian capital. But Dr. Sunder Singh called a public meeting of 
Indians and advised them to continue their agitation and in this i^ ay 
the matter v/ould go before the- Government, of • India and the Indian 
masses. ; Then.the Indian administration would be forced to take action 
as agitation against the Partition of Bengal had succeeded. Dr.
Sunder'Singh continued his campaign in the press, In April 1912, 
at his insistence, the Saturday Sunset wrote an article on "Hindu 
Immigration”. It discussed the economic success of the Indians in 
British Columbia and;their status as citizens of the British Bapire 
and made a strong plea to the Canadian government to allow them to 
bring their families to Canada. Concurrently with the campaign m  
Canada,.the agitation was also carried out in the Punjab press, the 
Punjabee (Lahore),, which carried a long letter from a ,"Hindu” in 
Canada preaching unity among various sections of the Indian community: 
in Canada, and seeking an able and intelligent leader to fight their 
cause. It added that there were enormous opportunities for economic
1 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, February 1912, 40Q4.
2 Hopkinson to Cory, Feb. 22, 1912; and Governor General of Canada to 
Colonial Office, March 3, 1912, C.O. 42/998/8^8236.
3 Hopkinson to Cory, March 16, 1912 and Governor General, Canada to 
Colonial Secretary, March 27, 1912, C.O. 42/958/10745* (The agitation 
against Partition of Bengal was carried on for six years and ultimately 
Bengal was reunited in.1911).
5 Saturday Sunset, /ipril 2?» 1912.
success for Indians in Canada, and for that a well organised attempt
«j
for Indian migration should be made. A second newspaper, the Tribune
(Lahore), while pleading the cause of admission of Indian women into
2Canada, branded the Canadian immigration laws as "cruel and inhuman”.
BalwantIn January 19121 two Indian immigrants, Bh&.g Singh and 
Singh, both residents of Vancouver, came back from India with their
.. x
wives and children and claimed admission for their families. The
immigration officials at Vancouver refused their admission because
they had not complied with the continuous passage regulation. They 
were to be deported on February 6 , 1912 but the time was extended in
order to ascertain whether they came by direct passage or otherwise
’' 5
The Indians appealed to the courts. However, the case failed, and
k
in April 1912 the Canadian government, by a special Order in Council, 
ordered the families of these men to be deported. They were arrested 
on April 30, 1912 and were to be deported on the S.S. Monteagle.
But the Indians filed a writ of habeas corpus in the British Columbia
Supreme Court and the case aroused a great deal of controversy in the
6 ■ press. The Indian immigrant leaders Husain Rahim and Dr. Sunder
Singh thought that it was the most suitable opportunity to consolidate
their position and to regain their falling support and confidence
with their fellow countrymen. Therefore they arranged to hold protest
meetings and sent a cable to the Secretary of State for India in
London to stop the deportation of their women and children from
Canada. They declared such action was a gross breach of Imperial
1 Punjabee (Lahore), March 30» 1912. Punjab Native Newspaper Reports, 1912.
2 Tribune (Lahore), April 191 1912.
3 Monthly Intelligence Diary for March 1912, p. .109,' 0.0.^2/959/11^00. 
k Canada, House of Commons, Debates, February 27, 1912, kOOk.
5 Tribune (Lahore), April 19* 1912.
6 Hindu (Lahore), May 30, 1912 and the Loyal Gazette (Lahore), May 12, 1912, 
Punjab Newspaper Reports 1912.
unity by attacking Indian homes* The India Office immediately forwarded
this telegram to the Golonial Office. By change the British Columbian
premier, Sir Richard McBride, was in England, so the Colonial
Secretary,(Karcourt) spoke to him. On May 23, 1912 the Dominion
government instructed the immigration officer in Vancouver to allow
the Indian women and children to remain in Canada. This action was,
however, not to be taken as a precedent for any subsequent ones that
might arise. , .
The Indians interpreted this decision of the Canadian government
as a victory1for their cause, achieved through protests, agitation
and litigation. They kept up their fervour with their protest
meetings. On June l6 , they assembled in the Sikh temple at Vancouver
and passed a hot-worded resolution condemning the quiet attitude of
the Dominion government and asking for the fulfilment of the pledge
given last December by the Minister of the Interior to their 
if
delegation. Then in August, 1912 they held another meeting and 
decided to cable G.K. Gokhale, member of the Legislative Council of 
India who was in England at that time, to visit British Columbia and 
take up the question of immigration and better treatment of Indians.
They subscribed $ 400 in the meeting for this purpose.^ But Gokhale
expressed his inability to undertake this mission because he was
' • „ : -  v . , ;  ' • ' •••■ 5
already committed to go to South Africa on a similar mission.
The agitation about Indian grievances was carried on in
India as well. A large public meeting v;as held at Bombay in which
a full account of difficulties and disabilities of Indians in the
1 Khalsa Diwan and Indian League, Vancouver, telegram to India Office,
May 6 , 1912, C.O. 42/966/14134.
2 Colonial Office Minute by Harcourt, May 10, 1912, C.O. 42/966/14134.
3 Tien Fang Cheng, Oriental Immigration in Canada, p. 148, and Cory to 
Reid, May 23, 19127 C.O. 42/959/lB603.
4 Vancouver Province, June 17, 1912. /
3 Hopkinson to Cory, telegram, Aug. 13* 1912, C.O. 42/960/27324,
6 Hopkinson to Cory, Oct. 3, 1912, C.O. 42/960/33946.
British Dominions was discussed, and a memorial was sent to the 
Imperial and Indian governments fcepeating earlier representations 
made to the Canadian authorities and particularly requesting the 
fulfilment of the “promise" regarding the admission of women and 
children. But it is rather interesting to note that the so-called 
"promised pledge of a responsible Canadian minister" was only a 
misrepresentation on the part of the Indian delegates. In this 
way a year passed and there was no definite settlement regarding 
the permission of entry for the wives and children of Indian immigrants. 
The Indians were then convinced that the Canadian government was not 
ready to amend the immigration laws. However, they continued their 
agitation. Through press statements they endeavoured to claim their 
right of admission into Canada on the basis of their Aryan blood 
and membership in the British Empire. They also claimed that even 
if they were not accepted as British subjects, they should be treated 
on a par with other Asiatics. But the Dominion government was
5
determined not to allow any Indian immigration into its territory.
■It Memorial of Sir Jarasetjee Jeejeebhoy, £t., Chairman of a Public 
Meeting held in Bombay on Wednesday, the 31st day of July, 1912,
C.O. 886/6.
2 Colonial Office to India Office, Jan. 17, 1913» C-0. 886/6 .
3 Vancouver Sun, March 7i 1913 •
4 Ibid., March 22, !913.
3 An unusual event occurred in April 1913 when the Deputy Commissioner 
Ferozepur (Punjab, India) wired the superintendent of Immigration 
Vancouver, inquiring about the chances of Indian emigration and 
citing successful cases. The Dominion government was taken aback 
and immediately wired to the Colonial Office, London: "It is
extremely undesirable for Indians to come to Canada and strongly 
advise that you use your utmost endeavours to effectively stop 
contemplated movement by so advising Government of India." Deputy 
Commissioner Ferozepur to Supdtt, Immigration, Vancouver, March 5» 1913 
C.O. 886/6 and Deputy Minister of the Interior to Governor General's 
Secretary, April 23, 191'31. C.O. ^2/969/16276.
At this time the Indians decided to send Balwant Singh, the
Sikh Temple priest at Vancouver, and his assistant harain Singh,
to the Colonial Office, London to present their grievance before the 
Imperial government. They were to be assisted by Hand Singh Sehra, 
(an Indian student from the United States) as an interpreter. At 
the end of April 1913 this three-man delegation sought an interview 
v/ith Hare our t, the Secretary of State for the Colonies. But the 
arrival of this delegation with an idea of appealing to the Imperial
government against the self-governing Dominion of Canada had a sharp
2 ■-
reaction in the Canadian press. However, the Colonial Secretary
refused their request on the grounds that the delegation should
approach.him through the proper channel, i.e. through the Governor
3
General of Canada. This action of the Colonial Office had a hostile
if.
reception in the Punjab press. The refusal could stir very serious 
mischief in the Punjab and would enable it to be said in India that 
the Imperial and Indian governments were so indifferent to Indian 
grievances that they would not even take the trouble to see the 
delegates who had travelled from British Columbia to London. Even 
if the Imperial government were to justify its refusal on the basis 
of constitutional practice in the Dominions, it could not off-set 
the bitter feelings In the Punjab. So the India Office suggested 
that the delegation should be invited to have an informal chat with 
the permanent officials of the Colonial and India Offices and in 
this way an interview with the Minister should be avoided.^ Thus
1 Khalsa Diwan to Governor General of India, January 9 *19 139 C.O. 886/6 .
2 Crewe to Hardinge, April l6 , 1913* Hardinge Fapers 119, and Vancouver 
Sun, March 17« 19I3» v
3 Colonial Office to India Office, April 23* 1913* C.O. 886/6. 
h Tribune (Lahore), June 3, 1913,
3 India Office Minute ^Personal note of Seton to Lambert 7» April 22, 1913* 
C.O. ^2/973A3Q53.
the. Imperial government officials arranged to meet the delegation.
The Indian deputation related their representations made to Ottawa 
in December 1911? and regretted the Dominion governments’ silence 
and inaction in the matter of Indian immigration. ‘ The delegation 
further stated that as they were on their way to India, they thought 
it worthwhile to bring their grievances to thenotice of the 
Imperial government. In reply,’ the officials (of the India Office 
and Colonial Office) explained to them that they had acted wrongly 
in going past the Dominion government and coming to London to approach 
the/Imperial authorities without seeking an interview with the 
Canadian minister concerned. Again it was pointed :out.that immigration 
was entirely in the jurisdiction of the Dominion government and the 
interference of the imperial government in such matters would be 
unconstitutional. Go the officials expressed their reluctance to 
take any action in the matter.
The Indian press severely condemned the attitude of the imperial 
authorities* The Desh (Lahore) commented that British statesmen 
were never tired of calling India the brightest and most precious 
jewel in the British Crown:and Indians respectable citisens of the 
British Empire, but when they were called upon to do practical good
to Indians, they did nothing. The Tribune of Lahore;.regretted the
'' h.
refusal of the Colonial Secretary to see the deputation. The
1 The Imperial government officials met only Balwant Singh and Narain 
Singh, hand Singh Sehra, the interpreter, was not allowed to 
participate because he did not belong to the Indian immigrant 
community in Canada. Besides the officials spoke to the deputation 
in Punjabi, and no translation was necessary. Note by Dunlop-Smith,
; political A.B.C. to Secretary of State for India, May 1^ , 1913,
Folio 2151, L/P& J/6/12^ 5*'
2 Colonial Office Minute, May 15, 1913, C.O. ^2/975/1^33-
3 Desh (Lahore), May *f, 1913, Punjab Newspaper Reports 1913*
V  Tribune (Lahore), June 3, 1913»
Observer (Lahore) called it:
Red-tapism and policy of non-interference in the 
•domestic affairs' of a colony could hardly go 
further."* '
!Ehe Kesari of Bombay lamented that the Indians had to go from Vancouver
2 3
to London to India in search of justice. !fhe Phoenix of Karachi
and the Gujrati (Bombay) regretted the inaction of the British
authorities in the matter.
Ihe Indian comiuunity in British Columbia, when they came to
know about the treatment of their representatives in London, held
a mass meeting and strongly protested against the refusal of the
Colonial Secretary to grant a personal audience to their deputation.
However, the delegation itself held a meeting with the Canadian
g
Indian Immigration Society in London, voiced their grievances and 
then proceeded to India. In the meantime the Indians in-Victoria (B.C.) 
were equally active and they too continued their protest meetings 
and requested their fellow countrymen to bring their complaints to 
the notice of the Viceroy of India.
.The."Ottawa Citizen flashed the nev/s that an Indian delegation 
was going to India to lay before their fellow countrymen a statement 
of their inhospitable treatment in Canada. Before leaving England 
the leader of the delegation was reported to have said that
1 i?he Observer (Lahore), June 18, 1913* Punjab Native Newspaper 
Reports, 1913*
2 Kesari (Bombay), July 22, 1913* Bombay Native Newspaper Report 1913*
5 Phoenix (Karachi), Sept. 6, 1913* Bombay Native Newspaper Report 1913
4 Gujrati (Bombay), Sept. 21, 1913* Bombay Native Newspaper Report 1913
5 Hopkinson to Cory, June 16, 1913* C.O. 42/970/24478.
6 Arya Fatrika (Lahore), June 7* 1913* Punjab Native Newspaper Report
1913* and the London Canadian-Indian Immigration Committees to 
Colonial Office, May 30, 1913* C.O. 886/6 .
7 Victoria Times, August 3* 1913*
Canada*s treatment of the Sikhs will do more harm to 
injure the British I&pire than the gift of six 
drea^ would have helped,**
Thereupon the Ganaaian Senate held a debate on June 2, 1913* when
Senator Bostock inquired if the Canadian government proposed taking
any action to deal with this matter. He blamed the government for
refusing permission to Indians to, bring their wives to Canada for
as a result;'of thi.s agitators in India had stirred up feelings against
the British government. Senator Douglas remarked that the action
of British Columbia towards the Indians was unchristian, unBritish,
and ungrateful* Senator Power said that,he hoped the Canadian
government would do something which would prevail upon the Indians
and prevent them returning to India boiling with indignation against
Canada and the Empire. Senator Cloran remarked that: :
The Government were afraid to treat them fairly, afraid 
they would lose a little political influence in British 
Columbia. They were afraid that McBride, the Premier of 
British Columbia would lose support if the present
Government dealt honourhbly and fairly with these people.
No greater crime could be committed by any individual or 
community, and especially by a Government supposed to be 
Christian than to prevent a man living with his wife and 
Children - no greater crime against the human race.^
Senator Lougheed (leader of the Government) blamed the late Liberal
government (led by Xaurier) for Canada’s unfortunate position. He
pointed out that public opinion in British Columbia was almost
unanimous on the question of Asiatic exclusion. However, in closing
the debate he assured the Senate that the matter was under consideration
before the Dominion government, but he was unable to say anything
5
about the outcome. On the whole the members were quite sympathetic
1 Citizen, Kay 30* 1913*
2 Montreal Gazette, June 3* 1913*
3 Canada, Debates of the Senate, 1913* p» 932.
Ibid., p. 933.
to the Indians.
In the meantime the three man delegation from Canada reached
India in the beginning of July, 1913 and by the middle of August
they had arrived at Lahore, the capital of the Punjab. There they
held a well attended protest meeting on August 18, 1913 and a long
memorial on the subject of ’Indians in Canada' was adopted. This
was followed by similar meetings at Ambala, Ludhiana, Jullunder and
Ferozepur. These gatherings were not only well attended but thoroughly
representative of all classes and creeds. Men of all faiths and
persuasions, Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs alike took interest in the
initiation and conduct of these meetings and they were presided
2 ■
over by the loyal section of the Indian population.
Then this delegation from Canada approached the Khalea Diwan 
(a Sikh religious society) at Amritasr and with their help they managed 
to have an interview toith Hardinge, the Viceroy of India.^ They placed 
before him the copies of their representations made earlier to the 
Canadian government and the Imperial government. The Viceroy expressed
his sympathy and promised that he would continue his endeavours to 
remove the disabilities imposed on Indians in Canada* He added that 
the Government of India had been in correspondence with London and 
Ottav/a on the subject and as a result the Canadian government had 
agreed to waive the Order requiring possession of two hundred dollars 
in the case of wives and minor children of Indian residents in Canada. 
However, the Viceroy regretted that the "continuous passage regulation" 
was still in force*' As a matter of fact the Government of India had
1 Punjabee (Lahore), August 26, 1913* Punjab Native Newspaper Report 1913*
2 Tribune (Lahore), Sept. 7, 1913*
3 Khalsa Diwan, Amritsar to the Chief Secretary to the Punjab Government, 
Nov. 20, 1913; Government of the Punjab to Government of India,
Dec, 10, 1913* C.O* 42/983/3277«
b Hardinge to Sikh Delegates, Dec. 20, 1913* Speeches, Vol. II,
pp. 189*190, Hardinge Papers,
expressed* as far back as December 1912, its strong disapproval of 
the immigration restrictions imposed on wives and children of Indians 
domiciled in Canada and had urged the Dominion government to grant 
them exempixon from the general provisions of the Immigration Act,
But the Ganadian authorities turned down the request on the ground 
that such an amendment woulcl result in the admissionof physically
p
and mentally unfit persons. * However, the Indian government was
not content with the Canadian reply, therefore it repeated its request
■ ■ 3    . -■" ’ ■
in July 1913* This time the Canadian government issued an Order in
Council stating;
Asiatic immigration as a whole is,not suited to this 
country and, under the circumstances it is not felt 
that the "Continuous .Journey” regulation could be 
replaced.
On the other side, the Colonial Office and India Office in London 
were quite keen to find some solution of this difficulty regarding 
the admission into Canada of wives and children of Indian immigrants.
The imperial government was concerned that if Canada were to consider 
any further restrictive measures it v/ould be difficult to get any 
solution to the problem. Therefore the Colonial Office came up with 
a proposal that if the Indian government should accept the responsibility 
of introducing the passport system for those intending to go to Canada, 
the Dominion government could be persuaded to work out a plan similar 
to the "Gentleman’s Agreement” established with japan. Then about 
four hundred Indians v/ould annually enter Canada and with a population
1 Government of India to 'Secretary of State for India, Dec. 19* 1912,
■. " ■File 568, L/P & J/6/106^.
2 Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor General of 
Canada, April 12, 1913, C.O. 886/6,
3 Government of India to Secretary of State for India, July 3* 1913*
C.O. 886/6,
h p.c. 2^48, Sept, 27* 1913*
of 7|r million Canada could easily absorb this small number. In this
way the problem of women and children could also be solved and at
the same time the preferential position of Japanese in Canada as
compared to Indians would also disappear. -/But;',the-Indian government
declined this offer saying:
Foe ling in India is, oiling to the Immigration. Act of 
South Africa, at present particularly high, and our 
acceptance of a passport system or any similar system 
with restriction of free emigration as its object would, 
we are convinced, raise a storm of indignation throughout 
the country* ^  ■.
The Viceroy (Hardinge) in his private correspondence with Crewe, 
explained that the introduction of a passport system for the intending
migrants needed new legislation and such a measure would be opposed
■ vi- • . x
bitterly in his own Legislative Council.
The attitude of the Indian government was quite strange. On
the one hand it refused to consider any proposal on the lines of the
Japanese agreement and on the other it continued to champion the
cause of Indian women and children desiring admission to join Indians
domiciled in Canada, But at the same time the Canadian government
was equally responsible for that confused situation* The continuous
journey regulation at that time, due to the absence of a direct
steamship service, affected the Indians primarily and directly, and
did not affect Europeans at all. In these circumstances no Indian
could enter Canada at all. When there was a real grievance, as
was the case with regard to the position of those Indians who had
been allowed to enter Canada, and who could not bring their wives
—  ’ • ~/l6276
1 Colonial Office Minute, April 23, 1913, C.O. 42/969/i India Office to 
Colonial Office, July 11, 1913, C.O. 42/973/23938; Colonial Office 
Minute, August 16, 1913, C>0. 42/970/28496; and Crewe to Hardinge,
; telegram, Sept. 17» I913, Hardinge Papers 97*
2 Viceroy of India to Secretary of State-for India, telegram,
Sept. 24, 1913, C.O. 42/975"37073.
3 Hardinge to Crewe, telegram, Sept. 24, 1913, Hardinge Papers 97*
and children to live with them, the Dominion government was'., not 
willing to make any concession. Sir Richard McBride, the British 
Columbian premier, had already indicated that he was determined to
'i
have no more Indians in his province. So the question of families
of Indians remained as difficult as it was in 1908 when restrictions
were first imposed. Another aspect of the Indian immigration problem
was admission of tourists, students and businessmen. The representations
of the Indian government at last succeeded in this regard. The
Canadian government expressed its willingness to issue permits under
section four of the Immigration Act 1910 to intending visitors. But
although the Indian government would be at liberty to announce this
decision in answer to specific enquiries in this regard, this decision
2 ;should be regarded as confidential.
The problem of Indian immigration into Canada was difficult to 
solve. As has been noted at the beginning of this chapter, the 
Canadian government sought to restrict Indian entry into Canada 
first by the continuous passage clause, the $200 head tax and the 
authority of the Governor General in Council to prohibit the landing 
in Canada of any immigrant for any reason at all. Although these 
regulations were generally applicable to all immigrants, the continuous 
passage clause made them prohibitory only to Indians while Britons 
were definitely encouraged to come to Canada. Since Indians were 
also British subjects they believed the Act discriminated against 
them.
Although Indian immigration had virtually stopped by 1909, the 
period from 1910-1914 was one of continuous protest by the Indians to
1 Colonial Office Minute by Earcourt, Oct. 23, 1913, C.O. 42/970/36272.
2 India Office to Colonial Office, Feb. 1, 1913, C.O. 42/973/3^60 and 
P.C. 3211, Nov. 16, 1912.
British, Canadian and Indian authorities against Canadian immigration 
regulations as they were applied to Indians. The Indians further 
objected to the Immigration Act because it. effectively, stopped 
Indian men already living in Canada from sending to India for their 
wives and children and also prevented Indian businessmen living in 
the United States from visiting Vancouver to protect business 
interests th€?re.
During this titee, however, the Imperial government was anxious 
to maintain good will in India. Britain did not wish hard feelings 
and discrimination against Indians by the Dominions to be used as a 
political weapon against British rule in India; nor did she wish to 
undermine the fact that India offered fine military material for 
Imperial forces; therefore, at the Imperial Conference, the Imperial 
government urged these Dominions to adopt a more liberal attitude 
towards Indian immigration. However, the representatives of the 
Dominions were unanimous in their determination to restrict Indian 
immigration.
After the defeat of the Liberal Party in 1911 Indians in Canada 
decided to approach the new Conservative government to seek some 
answer to their problems. An Indian delegation was sent to Ottawa 
from Vancouver to plead the Indian case before the Minister of the 
Interior. The mission was not successful and while the other 
delegates returned to Vancouver, Dr. Sunder Singh remained in Ottawa 
and appealed to the Canadian public for sympathy with the Indian 
plight. Although many people supported him, the Labour Organizations 
united against him and advocated continued exclusion of Indians as 
the only safeguard for Canadian wage earners. , By the end of February, 
I912 the Canadian government stated definitely that there would be
no relaxation of the immigration laws to allow Indian women into 
. Canada.
Even press editorials in Indian newspapers about the unfair 
treatment of Indians could not help the cause of Indian immigration 
in the colonies. Therefore the Indians in Vancouver decided to 
send a new delegation to the Colonial Office in London but the 
sought-after meeting v/ith the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
(Harcourt), failed to materialize and great bitterness was aroused 
with Indians in India and Ganada. The Indian delegation then went 
to India to lay their complaints before the Viceroy of India (Hardinge) 
and the Indian government’s correspondence with London and Ottawa 
resulted in the agreement of the Canadian government to waive the 
$ 200 clause in the Immigration Act in the £ase of Indian wives and 
minor children. But since they did not agree to modify the continuous 
passage clause it was still virtually impossible for any Indian to 
be acceptable by immigration authorities. Anxious to find some 
solution for the problem the Colonial Office proposed a passport system 
but this was turned down by the Indian government and the question of 
permission for Indian men In Canada to send for their wives and 
children from India remained unsettled.
From 1909 to 191^ the Canadian government was faced on one 
side with the demand of Indians for a fairer and more lenient 
immigration policy,on the other side with the refusal of the Canadian 
labour organizations to consider Indian claims for freer admission 
into Canada, and on still another side with the urgent requests of 
the British and Indian governments to reconsider the whole Indian 
immigration question. The labour organizations believed that the 
presence of Indian labourers in Canada would seriously jeopardise
the wagescale and working opportunities for Canndian workers.. The 
Imperial government believed that discrimination against Indian 
immigration by the Dominions would cause unrest in India and pose 
•a serious threat to the continuation of the Empire as an Empire.
And the Indians, as British subjects, considered themselves justified 
in seeking, if rxot equst-immigration status with the British people* 
at least a more liberal and humane policy than the Immigration Act 
of 1910 permitted. A workable solution to such varied problems was 
not readily apparent and the Canadian government was obliged to 
give the matter particular consideration.
CHATTER 7
Indians’ desperate attempts to unlock the barred 
gates of Canada. The case of nThirty-Bine Indians”•
The legal battle in the courts. Chief Justice Hunter’s 
judgment. Canadian press reaction. The Bhagwan Singh 
and Hermam Singh incidents. The Artisans and Labourers 
Regulation, December 1913*
The Indian immigrant leaders in Canada failed in their attempts 
to amend Canadian immigration laws in those particular aspects where 
they pertained to Indians, and their representations to the Canadian 
and Imperial authorities proved quite unavailing. However, one 
thing was definitely accomplished by the continued agitation/and the 
resulting publicity, and this was that the average Indian living in 
Canada was much more aware of aid sympathetic to the cause for which 
the leaders fought. With this renewed support the leaders carried 
their complaints to the Canadian courts. As I have mentioned earlier, 
the Canadian authorities granted exemption from the application of 
strict immigration regulationsj and in such instances the Dominion 
government always made it clear that these would not be taken as 
precedents for the future. However, the Indian immigrant leaders, . 
highly dependent for their political and economic survival on the 
continuation of Indian immigration or at least on Indian immigration 
as an active problem, convinced their illiterate countrymen in Canada 
and India that those isolated instances of the government's 
acquiescence were examples of their victories over the Canadian 
government.
Yet despite their boastful claims, Indians were not even able 
to buy tickets to Canada because the Canadian .Pacific Steamship Company 
was the only steamship company that offered passages and they had 
agreed not to sell any tickets to the Indians. The Governments of 
Canada and Great Britain had given stern warnings to this effect to
• v 1
all steamship companies which could possibly convey passengers from
1 As mentionedriearlier in Chapter
India to Canada. Then the New. Immigration'Act of 1910 especially 
empowered the Dominion government to deal with any steamship 
companies ignoring Canadian immigration regulations. Yet these 
steps on the part of the Canadian authorities did not completely 
stop the Indians from trying to force their way into Canada, for 
they then took legal action against the steamship compands which 
refused to sell tickets for their families. However, they lost ;
'=■■'■ 2 -
their case. . ..
In 1913* a Japanese,company, the Nippon Yusen Kaisha, owners of the 
I4aru Line of steamships, agreed to selXtickets to sixteen Indians ; 
and they arrived at Victoria in the fall of 1913* They had not 
complied with the ’'continuous journey1’ and "0  200” regulations. They 
were arrested and ordered to be deported. But before deportation 
could be carried out, there was before the Canadian courts the case 
of another thirty-nine Indians, and this case severely rocked the 
very basis of the Canadian laws under which the deportation was 
. -ordered.;.;:
The case of these thirty-nine Indians became a landmark in the
troubled and stormy narrative of Indians’ attempts to force their
entrance through the barred, bolted and locked gates of Western
Canada. Originally there were forty-six Indians who came to Canada
x
in October 1913 aboard the S. S. Panama Maru. They were determined 
to get admission by any means. Seven of them somehow proved their 
previous residence in the Dominion and accordingly were admitted as 
resident returnees. The other thirty-nine had neither been in Canada
1 Immigration Act, 1910.
2 Hindu Canadian, India’s Appeal to Canada, p. 8 ; and Hopkinson to 
Cory, Oct. 13, 1911, File 273, L/P &' J/4/1137.
3 The Times, 0ct* 29, 1913-
before, nor complied with the ’’continuous passage” regulation.
Therefore the immigration officials in British Columbia ordered 
their deportation. Pending deportation, they were confined in the 
detention house. The Indian community was outraged and their leaders 
resorted to protests, meetings and representations. The Sikh 
religious body, the Khalsa Diwan, held a meeting in the Dominion hall 
and protested against the action of Immigration Superintendent Reid 
in proposing to deport the thirty-nine Indians held at Victoria.
Another Indian protest meeting was held at Victoria and they sent 
anuurgent telegram to Lord Crewe, the Secretary of State for India, 
requesting him to stop the deportation of their detained countrymen.
In the meantime, Dr., Sunder Singh published a long article in his 
paper, the Sansar (Victoria), urging the Canadian government to release 
the thirty-nine Indians; and he put forward the new contention that 
the transshipment at Hong Kong did not in substance constitute a break 
in the continuous journey, therefore these thirty-nine Indians had
’if. . .
complied with the ’’continuous passage” regulations. However, the 
Canadian authorities did not accept this interpretation.
The protest meetings, the agitation and the telegraphic 
representations to London on the part of the Indian immigrant 
community in British Columbia provoked a very sharp reaction from the ; 
Canadian press on the pacific Coast. The Sun declared that Canadians, 
governed their own country and decided their immigration policy free 
from any dictation from Downing Street. It added that it was for the
1 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 191**, p. 1257*
2 Sun (VaneOliver), Hov. 10, 1913*
3 Telegram received in the India Office and Colonial Office on 
Nov. 22, 1913, C.O, 886/6.
k Sansar (Victoria), November 1913*
Dominion government at Ottawa and for no other.power to say what 
peoples of what classes should be admitted into Canada# Similarly, 
in an earlier issue, the Sun had commentdd that the migration of 
Indians to British Columbia was a menace to its economic problems 
and advocated a complete stop of such immigration. The Progressive
Club of Vancouver decided to approach the Dominion government in
■ -  3
favour of white British Columbia and white Gansda. It is quite
possible that the people on the Pacific Coast of Canada were influenced
by the Indian immigration problems in South Africa, which received
wide press coverage at that time. VJhile Indians agitated against
maltreatment in South Africa the press voiced the attitudes of the 
A
white races. The Sun was quite outspoken and questioned the reasons 
why Canada should allow Indian immigration merely because India was 
a part of the British Empire. Condemning the Imperial authorities, 
it observed that British statesmen were anxious to spread to the
uttermost ends of the earth ideals of Imperial citizenship which
5 V,
originated in the house of English shopkeepers.
But Indians felt that their claims to citizenship were valid, 
and they continued to petition to the Canadian courts for the redress 
of their grievances. The immigration question was thus moved from 
the administrative field to the legal arena. Indians filed an
application in the court asking for the issue of e^ /rit of habeas corpus.
In response to the court’s process, the detaining authorities contended 
that the impugned detention was under Orders in Council Do. 920 and
1 Sun (Vancouver), Nov. 13 > 1913*
2 Ibid., Nov. 10, 1913*
3 Ibid,y. Nov. 13, 1913*
k Province (Vancouver), Nov. 20, 1913*
3 Sun (Vancouver), Nov. 13, 1913*
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926 of Canada. Order No. 920, made under the Immigration Act of
9 and 10 Edward VII, said:
From and after the date hereof, the landing in Canada 
shall be and the same is hereby prohibited, of any 
immigrants who have come to Canada otherwise than by 
continuous journey from the country of which they are 
natives or citizens and upon through tickets purchased 
in that dountry or purchased or repaid in Canada.
Order No. 926, also mdde under the Immigration Act2 of 9 and 10
Edward VII, had declared,
No immigrant of Asiatic origin shall be permitted to 
enter Canada unless in actual and personal possession 
in his or her own right of two hundred dollars,
unless such person is a native or subject of an
Asiatic country in regard to which special 
statutory regulations are in force or with which 
the Government of Canada has a special treaty, 
agreement or convention.
None of the persons under deportation process complied with the law
of Canada given in the Orders in Council. On the other hand, it was
contended on behalf of the detenus that the parliament which enacted
the Immigration Act 9 and 10 of Edward VII only used the words "Asiatic
race" in the Act. Thus the words "Asiatic origin" used in the Order
No. 926 were in excess of the powers conferred on the Council which
made the Order. The words "Asiatic origin” have wider meaning than
the words "Asiatic race". The word "Origin” would include persons
born in India of British parents who had been domiciled there. Chief
' /■ 4 3 '
Justice Hunter, giving this situation as an example, held"^  that the
Order in Council No. 926 was ultra vires, hence invalid. The Order
No. 926 also required an immigrant to have two hundred dollars in
his own right in actual or personal possession. But the statute,
1 Section 36.
3 Section 37.
3 Re Narain Singh et al., British Golurabia Reports Vol. XVIII (1912-13), 
p. 506* ' '
under which the Order No* 926 was made, did not so require. Under 
the Statute it would be sufficient for an immigrant to have the 
money in a bank at Victoria. In this way the Order in question was 
bad in law.
Theiimpugned Order in Council No. 926 had already been held 
invalid on the grounds that it omitted the qualifying word '’naturalized” 
before the word "citizen” as required by the Amending Act. The word 
"native” used as a noun in the Order No. 920 also had a wide meaning, 
which could include a person of British race born iii India. The 
Parliament had used the word "native" as an adjective, qualifying 
the word "citizen". But it is clear that the word "native" includes 
more than native citizens. It cannot be supposed that parliament, 
which enacted the Act, intended that the persons of British race 
could be affected this way. Hence such a wide power contained in 
the Order No. 920 under the word "native" could not be upheld. The 
court concluded that the persons under detention should be released, 
but it was then contended by the counsel acting on behalf of the
, 2
Canadian government that the persons were held for misrepresentations.
As the, order of deportation did not disclose that misrepresentations
were the grounds for detention, Chief Justice Hunter remarkedj
Common justice requires, and I think Parliament 
intended, that when a person is ordered to be 
deported out of the country, the reason for so 
doing should be clearly stated in order that he might 
at least know what was the reason, and in any event, 
a reason stated in such fashion would not constitute 
a good return to writ of habeas corpus.^
As a 1st resort, the Counsel acting on behalf of the Dominion
1 Re Rahim, British Columbia Reports Vol. XVI (192)1), p. ^71*
2 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 191**, p. 1223*
3 He Narain Singh et al., British Columbia Report XVIII (1912-13) t 
p. 310.
government objected against the interference of the court with
deportation proceedings. Section-23 of the Immigration Act of 9 and
10 Edward VII was cited. - Section'23 .provided' that:
No court of any officer shall have power to 
review, quash, reverse or restrain, or otherwise 
interfere ..with any proceedings, decision or order 
of the minister, or any board of inquiry, or any 
officer thereof, had or made in accordance with the 
provisions of the statute relating to the detention 
or rejection of any immigrant.
It was held that such restriction with respect to jurisdiction of
the court only applied to proceedings which had been taken under
the authority of and in accordance with the provisions of the Act,
Chief Justice Hunter observed that:
... it would, indeed, be strange to find that the 
doors of the Court were shut against any person 
of any nationality, no matter what the act complained 
of might be.T
So Chief Justice Hunter gave a decision on November 28, 1913
condemning as illegal all the Federal Orders in Council which had
2
hitherto kept i^ he Indians out of British Columbia. The Chief Justice 
observed that the Canadian government’s action exceeded the powers 
conferred by the Canadian Parliament relative to Asiatic immigration* 
Theeonly grounds on which an Indian could be excluded were those of 
idiocy, disease, crime or mendicancy, the same grounds which applied 
against British-born citizens entering Canadian eastern ports.
This decision of Justice Hunter created a wave of sensation and 
panic up and down the country. The Vancouver World commented that 
the Canadian government should have the power to refuse admission
1 Re Thirty-Nine Hindus, Dominion Law Reports, Vol. 15, p. 191.
2 Governor General,of Canada to Secretary of State for Colonies,
Dec, 13, 1913* C.O. **2/9711 Daily News-Advertiser, Nov. 30» 1913*
3 The Times, Nov. 26, 1913*
to undesirable persons. The Globe (Toronto) remarked that the issue
was between those who wanted cheap labour and desired to establish
a society in which a different race would serve the part of a
peasantry in making fortunes of their employers, and those who
wished for an approach towards equality in opportunity, in racial
stamina, and in material comforts. It added that Canadians should
decide between a white man’s country and a country of racial 
2 ■exploitation. The Sun demanded immediate legislation for the
exclusion of Indians. It warned that a large number of Asiatics
would swarm to Canada aixd would defeat for ever all hopes of making
Canada a white man’s country. It further commentedj
They are vicious, untruthful and seditious people
whom we could not assimilate, if we desired to,
but whom we should not wish if we could as they 
would destroy the Canadian type mentally and 
physically.^
The Gaelic American (a United States newspaper from New York) stated
that the whole contention was a legal quibble. It warned that the
cheap labour of Indian immigrants and their lower scale of living 
were a menace to the Colonial working classes. It observed further 
thatF
Were the political and economic conditions of the 
people of India on the same plane as those of the 
Colonies, there would be little need, if any, for 
the Hindu to emigrate, but in his own country he 
is a political slave and economic helot, held down 
by the sword and liable to be slaughtered ... for 
political and economic reasons. The intrusiondf 
such in the self-governing Colonies is a distinct 
danger to their self-government and independence 
for the reason that it gives the Imperial Government 
in London the opportunity to interfere in the 
internal affairs, and insensibly to filch from them 
some of their self-governing rights and powers.V
1 Vancouver World, Nov. 27, 1913*
2 Globe (Toronto), Dec. 3i 1913*
3 Sun (Vancouver), Nov. 26, 1913*
4 Gaelic American (New York), Nov. 29, 19X3*
The Province considered that Indians were welcome as tourists and 
students, but they were unsuitable as workers in Canada. However,
it suggested that Indians could be a great success in the African
' *}
parts of the Empire. The Vancouver Hews termed the decision of
2 " '
Chief Justice Hunter a ’’radical one”.• The Sun predicted serious
trouble and Sir Richard McBride, the British Columbian premier,
■ ,V;' y. •' 3 :
warned that trouble would occupy the courts for a long time.
Commenting on Chief Justice Hunter’s decision on the Indian immigration
question and the possibility of an influx from India, the Globe
(Toronto) said: ;
The Hindu may be a good British subject, but he is 
not a desirable settler for Canada.■
So the decision of Chief Juetic:© Hunter created a legal crisis
in the policy of Indian exclusion from Canada. The Chief Justice
had declared the most effective but indirect regulation as invalid
and at the same time the old tacit understanding between the
governments of Canada and India about keeping the Indian exclusion
question under the carpet as Mackenzie King had realized in 1909
during his visit to India, came out in the open in Indo-Canadian
5  ■ ' . ' ■■■•  .
politics. :■>/.'
The British Columbian Premier, Sir Richard"McBride,- was not
slow to plunge into the debate. Even before the decision of the
court had bebn reached, he had declared proudly that he had discussed
the question of Indian migration with Sir Edward Grey, the British
V'' 6
Foreign Secretary. Then on December 1, 1913 he stated that the
1 Province (Vancouver)Dec. 2, 1913«
2 Vancouver Hews, Hov. 30, 1913«
3 Sun (Vancouver), Dec. 2, 1913.
4 Globe, Dec. 2, 1913*
5 See Chapter 3 for ray discussion of Mackenzie King’s visit to India.
6 The Times, Oct. 24, 1913»
judgment had brought about a critical state of affairs and one which 
would be given every possible consideration by the provincial government 
in order to protect the interest of the province* He added that he 
opposed the Indians, not on racial but on economic and social grounds.
The City Council of Vancouver also urged the Dominion government to
' ' ‘ . • ■ " - . 2 - 
take the necessary steps immediately.
The United States Commissioner of Immigration, A, Caminnetti,
paid a hurried visit to Victoria (British Columbia) and discussed the
implications of the court decision with Sir Sieherd McBride. He
expressed his satisfaction about the results of his interview with
the provincial premier. He subsequently disclosed, hov/ever, that
in the previous year United States officials had unearthed and
frustrated secret arrangements made by Indians for dumpings
... large number of the dusky turbanned undesirables 
at different points along the Pacific Coast,^
Then Caminnetti met H,H. Stevens, the Conservative Member of the
Canadian House of Commons and discussed the various phases of the
Oriental immigration problem. Both appreciated the other’s-point
of view and expressed their deep concern about the possible Indian
influx on the Pacific Coast. However the U.S. Immigration Commissioner
added that he had no personal prejudice against the Indians but that
he was opposed to them on the grounds that they were a menace to the
Occidental population because 60 to 80 percent of the population of
" k ■
300*000,000 natives of India were carriers of infectious diseases,
H.H* Stevens added to this complaint and repeated his strong opposition
1 Cited inr Province, Dec. 1, 1913*
2 City Clerk of Vancouver to Borden, telegram, Dec. 3* 1913* Borden
Papers, Vol. 30.
3 Cited in Province, Dec. 3* 1913*
V  Province, Dec. A, 1913,
to the admission of Indians because (according to him) Indians were
either infected by or susceptible to a certain chronic disease which,
while resembling tuberculosis, differed in many respects from the
dreaded scourge. He explained furthers
A peculiar feat lire of the insidious disease is that every 
Oriental even if not actually affected has a tendency 
to act as a carrier and thus the danger of transmission 
is quite greatly accentuated. The deductions made by the 
U.S. health scientists show that the introduction of men 
afflicted with a chronic ailment of this nature tends to 
deteriorate the white races with whom'they associate the 
same way as negroes in the southern states who brought 
the hook-worm into that country lowered the standard of 
vitality among the Occidentals thereA
The labour leaders in Ontario were equally concerned about the 
Chief Justice’s judgment. They argued that if the ship-loadiof Indians
could be dumped into Canada on the same terms as the immigrants from
2Britain, then the laws should be changed immediately. The Vancouver 
World warned that the immigration trouble in South Africa could 
ferment discontent and rebellion among India’s millions, which 
could spread to other countries. Indians, therefore, were quite 
unsuitable as elements in the Canadian population; Canada should; 
learn a lesson from the South African example.
IniIndia, the Indian National Congress was in its annual session
in December 1913* The Canadian court's decision was welcomed,
Happily for us the Chief Justice of British 
Columbia has condemned as.illegal all the Federal 
Orders in Council which have hitherto restricted 
the entrance of Indians into the Province.**
Just a few days before, Chief Justice Hunter* s decision had been 
given in the case of thirty-nine Indians, there happened an incident 
involving Bhagwan Singh, an Indian Sikh priest, in November 1913?
1 Cited in Province, Dec. 2, 1913*
2 Province, Dee. 1, 1913*
3 Vancouver World, Dec. 1, 1913*
k Indian National Congress Report, 1913* P* 87.
and it occupied the public attention in Canada for the next half year. 
Bhagwan Singh came to Canada under the name of Natha Singh on June 8,
19X3* He claimed to be an Indian returning to Canada and to have 
first arrived at Vancouver in 1906, remaining in British Columbia 
until October 23, 1912 when he sailed from Victoria to visit India.
He gave the names of several Indians resident in Vancouver who came 
forward and gave evidence that they knew Hatha Singh to be a previous 
resident of Canada. He appeared to be quite familiar with the names 
of local roads and streets. He stated that he was a labourer and 
had already worked in certain mills at Vancouver, But later it 
came to the notice of the immigration officials at Vancouver that
Hatha Singh was not his correct name and that he had never been in
■ 2 - ■
Canada prior to his entry in June 1913*
According to the intelligence reports of the Indian government
Bhagwan Singh had to leave his home in the Punjab in 1910 because
he got into trouble through abducting another man’s daughter.^ He
stayed in Malaya in the local Sikh temple at Perak as a granthi
(reader of the Sikh scripture and preacher) but soon was dismissed
on account of his seditious views. Then he managed to occupy a
similar position in Hong Kong where he was largely responsible for
frequent disputes amongst the Sikh community which eventually led ;
to serious litigation. As a result he was dismissed. Then he made
his way to Canada, When these facts came to the notice of the
Dominion government Bhagwan Singh was arrested on the charge of
attempting to gain admission into Canada by misrepresentation.
1 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 191^, p» 1239*
2 This information was published in the local Indian newspaper, the Sansar, 
Victoria, Aug. 5, 1913*
3 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 191^, p* 1233*
k Slattery and Iremonger, An Account of Ghadr Conspiracy, p. 33*
However, he represented to the Canadian authorities that he'was'a' 
priest, a holy man and a teacher of the Sikhs. He applied for a 
writ of habeas corpus against the immigration officers. It was 
granted by Justice Morrison but was ignored by the immigration 
officials, A second application was made and a second writ was 
issued* It was notified by telegram to Malcolm Reid, the Immigration 
Agent. But he ordered his arrest and deportation. On November 19, 1913* 
the vessel S.S. I&ipress was leaving for Hong Kong and the immigration 
officials thrust Bhagwan Singh aboard. The immigration authorities 
claimed their jurisdiction and overrode the British Columbian judge
from whom the habeas corpus writ had been obtained to prevent the
: "’ 'I. .1  . . . . . . I ' . ■■■■:' '3 '■ I  v .
deportation of Bhagwan Singh.
The incident (because Bhagwan was supposed to be a Sikh priest)
aroused bitter indignation among Indians in Canada, and it did great
harm in helping to spread sedition among these Indians, protest
meetings were immediately held at Victoria and Vancouver, The forcible
deportation of Bhagwan Singh was also denounced by the local press at
Victoria for it would do more damage to British prestige than a
' - a  ■ if ' ' v  ' "
thousand '’political speeches”. Many Indians threatened to leave 
Canada. A telegram was despatched to Borden, the Prime Minister of 
Canada, saying that Indians as a result of this felt it useless to 
appeal to the Canadian government for fair treatment.
1 Bftagwsn Singh was responsible for quite a few fights and disputes among 
the Sikh community at Vancouver. The magistrate of Vancouver issued a 
severe warning to Indians to refrain from disturbances in and about the 
temple. It was alleged in the court that Bhagwan Singh assaulted Dr.
Sunder Singh (a prominent Sikh leader) in the temple. Inspector David
Scott declared that almost every Sunday he had to turn out his reserves 
to quell fights and disputes at the Sikh temple. The inspector wished 
to warn the Sikhs that the patience of the authorities was becoming 
exhausted. See Province, Nov. 28, 1913*
2 Hugh Mailer to Ottawa Citizen, Dec, 7, 1913*
3 The Tiriies, Nov. 22, 1913.
-k. Ibid, :/-:
3 Ottawa Citizen, Dec. 7* 1913*
'Xhe United India League in Vancouver depicted Bhagwan Singh
as a social reformer of high intellectual order, who was greatly
respected among the Indians, Rodolphe Leraieux, the Opposition
spokesman on immigration in the Canadian -House of Commons, criticized
the action of Immigration Agent Malcolm Held. He quoted McMiell,
the counsel for Bhagwan Singh, as saying;
■■■■■..When the writ was served on Reid, he said in terms 
of the greatest contempt that he would not obey an 
order of. the Supreme Court of British Columbia.
Counsel said that Bhagwan Singh was bundled on to 
the ship and that he was brutally treated after 
being aboard the ship.^
The Opposition party further condemned the Canadian government:
♦••the whole trouble is caused by giving government 
officials judicial powers which they could not be 
trusted to exercise. Particularly in Oriental 
affairs one might as well set a blacksmith to repair
a watch as entrust the ordinary Canadian immigration
officer with handling of Oriental immigration situation 
in British Columbia.^
Rudolphe Lemieux warned that the Bhagwan Singh affair would be talked
- ■ ' • ' : ‘ ■'". h
about, brooded over, and deplored in every household in India.
But H.H* Stevens,- the Member of the Canadian Parliament from
British Columbia, defended the action of the Canadian government.
He stated that Bhagwan Singh was a rascal and had committed a deliberate
perjury in order to enter Canada, He further stated that Bhagwan
Singh was a x^ olitical and social agitator of a violent type. The
Minister of Justice (Doherty) justified the Dominion governments
handling of the Bhagwan Singh case;
1 Hindustanee, Jan. 1, 191^•
2 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 191*+, p* 1228.
3 Ibid., p. 1229,
k Ibid,
5 H.H. Stevens (for his opposition to Indian immigration into Canada) was 
branded as the ’’most misinformed, prevaricating, narrow-minded, 
inconsistent and perverse critic11 by the local Indian newspaper at 
Vancouver; See Hihdustanee, January, 191*+«
6 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 191*+, P* 1239*
• • • because he £ Bhagwan SinghJ? had falsely and 
fraudulently got into this country by misrepresenting 
himself as being somebody who he was not; and Bhagwan 
Singh before any valid writ of habeas corpus was 
served upon anybody at all with regard to him, was 
put upon a steamship and taken away.^
However, the deportation of Bhagwan Singh was termed as a martyrdom
2
throughout India and added a fresh count against British rule. The 
Desh (Lahore) commented that the white population of Canada was'.bent 
upon securing the expulsion of Indians even though such conduct might 
be against justice and morality. The paper demanded retaliation
. ' ; : -■■ 'O X '■ ■ -■
against the Colonials from the Indian government.
There was another instance when the Indian question of forced 
entry into Canada once again became hot news for the local press.
In December 1913 one Sikh, HernamSingh, secured his admission into 
Canada on the basis of his previous domicile there and he produced 
four Indians as witnesses to prove his claim. But later on the 
immigration authorities discovered that it was all a device to obtain 
entry into the Dominion. He was arrested, and the four Indians who 
testified to his being a Canadian resident at the time of his arrival
"if
were also detained and charged with perjury. Then after an enquiry 
by the board of immigration, Hernam Singh’s deportation was ordered.
The immigration officials gave the reason that Hernam Singh entered 
Canada stating that he had been previously in the Dominion, while 
it was contended on the other hand that such was not the case. As 
such, Hernam Singh came to Canada in contravention of section 33$
5
sub-section 7 of the Canadian Immigration Act, i.e. by misrepresentation.
1 Canada, House of Commons Debates, 191^, p. 1238.
2 F.C. Iseraonger and J. Slattery (of the Indian police Service), An 
Account of Ghadr Conspiracy, p. 35*
3 Desh (Lahore), Jan. 1,191^, Punjab Newspaper Report 191^#
k Vancouver News, Dec. 3, 1913* and Vancouver World, Dec. 2, 1913*
3 Full text of the proceedings of the immigration board of enquiry is 
available in the file C.O. 42/971/1^50*
A writ for habeas eorpus was taken out by MacHeill, the counsel for
Hernam Singh, in the Court of Justice Macdonald. It was contended
by the counsel that as the full board of immigration had not pronounced
in this case, the decision was not binding. Only seven out of eight
members of the bc^rd sat in this case. The Immigration Agent (Reid),
tried to convince the court by saying;
Under the Act, the Minister has the right to appoint
three or more officers of whom the inspecting officer 
in charge may be one, to sit as a board of enquiry.
When the board was appointed every inspector on the 
staff ~ numbering eight were appointed. Inspector 
, Hopkinson is away on special work and, in his absence
only seven sat at the Hernam Singh investigation.^
But Justice Macdonald upheld the contention and ordered the immigration
authorities to give up the man.
However, ;Malcolm Reid gave orders to his men in the court to have 
Hernam Singh arrested before he left the chamber. MacNeill protested 
about these new orders of the immigration agent and the judge issued 
another order that the man was not to be arrested within the precincts 
of the court house. The immigration authorities therefore, posted 
a party of forty constables outside the premises of the court and 
after a long watch of many hours, Hernam Singh was arrested when he 
was forced to leave the court premises. Later, when a full board of 
inquiry was held, the Canadian immigration authorities ordered his 
deportation from Canada. But Hernam Singh filed a second application 
of habeas corpus. However, he admitted the fact that Indians used
1 Cited in Vaneouver Hews, Dec, 11, 1913*
2 The whole drama of the Hernam Singh case involving court proceedings, 
sitting in the court, his ‘game of hide, and seek* and finally the 
immigration officials* and police constables' attempt to arrest
him were vividly reported in the local press. See Sun or Vancouver 
Hews, Dec. 11, 1913.
false photographs for the purpose of supporting bogus claims of
. seeking admission into Canada and that he lied to the Canadian
*1 7
government authorities. Justice Macdonald in his judgment observed;
... that this time the man had been properly found 
guilty of misrepresentation by a properly constituted 
board of enquiry and he must pay the penalty by being 
deported.
The decision of Chief Justice Hunter allowing thirty-nine Indians 
to enter Canada and the Bhagwan Singh and Hernam Singh incidents had 
aroused a wave of sensation among British Columbians. The local 
press and the politicians were quite concerned. In the meantime some
Indians came and had to be admitted in the light of Chief Justice
■x ' ■ : • . . V
Hunter's decision. This made a total of 88 for the months of April
if .' ■ ■ ■;.
to November, 1913 • The Dominion government had shown serious 
apprehension about the Indian immigration as far back as August 1913«
At that time it became known that an arrangement of direct steamship 
communication from Calcutta to Vancouver was being contemplated by 
the Indians. As a result of these persistent statements about the 
possible special steamship link between India and Canada, Robert 
Borden, the Prime Minister of Canada, and Sir Richard McBride, the 
Premier of British Columbia, held a special meeting at Ottawa.
The Governor General of Canada informed the Colonial Secretary that
it would be necessary to make drastic amendments to immigration
g ..■';7'7'7
regulations. The dominion government viewed with grave concern the
prospect of such a contemplated influx of Indians and warned that
 ^ Province, Hec. 19, 1913; and News Advertiser, Dec. 20, 1913*
2 Sun, Dec. 18, 1913-
3 Tien Fang Cheng, Oriental Immigration into Canada, p. 151. 
k Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 191^, p. 125^*
3 Victoria -Times, Aug. 18, 1913*
6 Governor General, Canada to Secretary of State for Colonies, telegram 
August l6, 1913; and Colonial Office to India Office, August 19* 1913 
€.0. 886/6.
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it would arouse and even inflame, public opinion xn Canada. ..The.
Indian community in British Columbia protested against the possible
restrictive measures and resolved to approach the Indian government
■ :v" ■ P :■
for redress,.; The Government of Canada then proposed to amend the
existing immigration regulations and to ban the landing at any
point of entry in British Columbia of any immigrants of the artisan
classification and of general or unskilled labour classification.
Upon learning this the Indian government issued ^Notification
warning the Indian people that the Canadian government in anticipation
of a very congested labour market in British Columbia had proposed
new restrictions on immigration. Because most of the Indian
immigrants were from the Punjab/the Government of the Punjab later
issued a special communique warning intending migrants to British 
5
Columbia.
After the decision of Chief justice Hunter, H.H. Stevens, the 
member of parliament from British Columbia, suggested the imposition 
of an educational test on all applicants from India seeking admission 
to Canada. The question of Indian immigration was under the constant 
consideration of the Canadian cabinet. The Minister of Justice
(C.J. Doherty) and his deputy, B.L. Newcombe, compiled a comprehensive
_ V;:,. 7
report for the consideration of the Canadian government. Urgent
communications passed between Ottawa and Victoria, The general opinion
1 P,C. 2218, August 25, 1913*
> 2 Victoria Times, Aug, 18, 1913*
3 Governor General, Canada, to Secretary of State for Colonies, 
telegram, Oct. 17, 1913, L/P & J/6/12^5.
^ Notification Ho. 9^6-9^61-3, November 7, 1913, L/P & J/6/12^5,
5 The Times, Dec. *f, 1913- .
6 Province, Dec, 2, 1913*
was that if immediate action was not taken, a ship-load of Indians 
would arrive at Victoria or Vancouver and that with the present 
feeling on the Pacific Coast, it might precipitate a riot with
'I
possibly serious results. Therefore the provincial and federal
governments inevitably desired to take some prompt action. However,
the Indian immigrants could foresee the introduction of further
restrictions. They.were quite active in their constant protests
and immediate telegraphic appeals were sent, to Lord Crewe, the
Secretary of State for India, and Lord Hardinge, the Viceroy of India:
Hindustanis of Vancouver island as a body desire 
that your Government protect our rights from new 
-immigration regulations.' Economic expediency in 
lieu of fundamental justice and fair play to 
Hindustani subjects of His Majesty virtually 
conceived in these regulations will not tend to 
cement India, more closely to the Empire....
The color bar which discriminates against us 
puts a stigma on all^the Hindustanis and which 
needs to be removed.
The main problem before the Dominion government was the acute
situation developed on the Pacific Coast of Canada as a result of
the judgment of Chief Justice Hunter. The government could avail
itself of clause 38 of the Immigration Act, 1910, which gave power
to exclude for a specified period any class of immigrants who
were considered unsuitable to the climate or were thought undesirable.
Under that class the Government of Canada could temporarily issue
an Order in Council forbidding the landing of all labourers and
artlsansat any port of British Columbia. That would not be an
open discrimination against Indians, but would ax^ ply equally to
all races and colours. The Indians then would not have any basis
1 The Times, Dec. 3, 1915*
2 Hindustanis to Crewe, telegram, Dec. 3» 1913* File 21511 L/P & J/6/12h5 .
for an appeal to the Imperial or Indian authorities against such ; 
action on the part of the Dominion government. The Indians would 
not be able to condemn such measures because they were not singled 
out for any particular restrictive legislation. Such an order 
would apply-.to- the Pacific Coast but not to the Atlantic ports 
and there would foe no prohibition of labourers or artisans entering 
British Columbia from Alberta. But in spite of all these possibilities 
available under the Immigration Act, the only difficulty was the 
special treatment arrangement with Japan.; This difficulty, however, 
was solved when an understanding was reached between Baron Makino, the 
Japanese Foreign Minister and the British Ambassador at Tokyo. The 
Dominion government had expressed its intention to amend the immigration 
regulations so as to prohibit the landing of any immigrant of either 
the artisan or the general or unskilled labour classification and 
had said that the regulation would necessarily bo couched in general 
terms and that it-would consequently not be possible to make any 
exception in favour of Japanese immigrants. But at the same time the
existing arrangement between the Japanese and Canadian governments
i ;AV:
would not foe modified.
So on December 8, 1913 the Governor General of Canada, in
Council, under and in virtue of the provisions of Sub-Section 3 of
Section 38 of the Immigration Act 9 10 Edward VII made an order s.to prohibit
From and after the date hereof and until the 51st day 
of March, 191*5, the landing at any port of entry in 
British Columbia, hereinafter specified of any immigrant 
of any of the following classes or occupation viz.:-
..-'Artisans;
Labourers skilled or unskilled.
This Order in Council specified the forty-three ports of British
1 Baron Maid.no to Conyngham Greene, British Ambassador in Japan, 
November 6, 19135 -a»d Greene to Foreign Office, telegram, 
November 6, 1913* 0*0. 886/6.
Columbia where entry of any immigrant in the above classes was 
prohibited. So the actual appearance of this Order in Council was 
of the most undiscriminating nature. All artisans and labourers 
were to be excluded from British Columbia and not even the word 
"Asiatic" was mentioned. However, in its practical application, 
the new order was to apply with full force to Indians only because 
. the Eiiropeans did not need the Pacific door for entry into Canada 
and the Japanese had a special arrangement. Moreover the decision 
to determine who belonged to the artisan and labouring classes was 
to be made not by the courts, but by the local Ifcmigration board, 
where, apparently, there was no need to support such decision with 
satisfactory reasons. There was also no appeal from the board's 
decision except to the Minister of the Interior. To make the 
restrictions quite severe and permanent the "continuous passage" 
and "# 200" regulations were reimposed by new Orders in Council.
This time the Dominion government's legal department was careful 
to leave no loopholes and lacunae which could be exposed to legal 
attack in the law courts. The new Orders in Council were phrased 
in close proximity with the clauses of the Immigration Act. The 
passage was then to be "continuous from the country of origin of 
which the immigrant was a Native or naturalised citizen"; the 
two hundred dollars must be possessed in "his own right" (but not
necessarily in his personal possession) by any immigrant of Asiatic
race. In these ways, Canadian authorities attempted to cope with 
the situation on the Pacific Coast and they felt satisfied that with 
the application of these three new Orders in Council Indians would
1 P,C. 26*f2, December 8, I913•
2 Hound Table 1923i 50* P» 399.
3 P.Cs, 23 and 2*f, 191*5.
be kept out of Canada even without mentioning any word about India 
anywhere in the statute books. The Dominion government Justified 
these prohibitory regulations by statingthe prevailing unemployment 
and poor working opportunities in British Columbia at that time.
The Globe (Toronto) remarked that the decision of Chief Justice 
Hunter had exposed the Pacific Coast of Canada to invasion by natives 
of India in a large scale. The Government of Canada, recognizing the 
serious lack of employment at the moment in British Columbia, had 
thereforeV passed this order £ IhC.26^2, Dec. 8, 1913^/ suspending 
the admission of all immigrants of the artisan and labouring classes 
irrespective of their colour, by way of the pacific or other British
' ■■ ■ x ' - ' ’
Columbian ports. The Times (London), while suggesting some restrictive
measures, observed that there was considerable unemployment in British
Columbia and towns like Vancouver and Victoria were glutted with
2
labourers and artisans.
In India, especially in the Punjab, strong feeling arose against
Canada because of the new regulations. The Khalsa Advocate (Amritsar)
called it an unconstitutional measure resorted to by the Canadian
authorities in defiance of the decision pronounced by the Canadian
judiciary. The Pars! (Bombay) asked if Christianity had disappeared
from the West and religion had been crushed under the weight of other
thin4s. The paper further questioned
... how the Indians prove a burden in Canada...* If 
the Indians cannot enjoy the right of freedom in the^
British Bnpire, they will hardly enjoy it elsewhere.
In another long editorial on January 21, 191^, the paper observed
1 Globe (Toronto), Bee. 12, 1913* ’
^ The Times, Dec. 9* 1913*
3 hhalsa Advocate (Amritsar), Jan* y\% 19lh, Punjab Newspaper Report 191^*
U Parsi (Bombay), Jan. 3, 191*+1 Bombay Newspaper Report 191^*
that Canada had finally banged, barred and bolted her door against
Indian immigrants and lamented that the new regulations marred the
effect of many an honest effort of British statesmen to win the
loyalty of Indians. It further championed the Indian cause:
They ^/~Indiano_/ do not like to be labelled as 
undesirables anywhere and cannot remain such in 
the British Empire.^ .
The Ittehad (Bombay) called the new Canadian Immigration measures
’’quite unreasonable". It questioned:
Is it not an insult to the British Government that 
the Canadians should object to the immigration of 
Indians who were the most loyal arnon§ the subjects 
of the British Empire?2
The new immigration regulations of Canada and the action of
South Africa towards Indians excited public opinion in.India and
caused a deep feeling of indignation among all classes, Hindus and
Muslims alike. They could not understand why the civil and political
rights enjoyed by them so fully in India and in England should be
denied to them in other parts of the Empire, or why the British
government they had been accustomed to regard as all-powerful should
3
tolerate a policy so opposed to its own principles.
Yet the Canadian government continued to justifytkhe new Order 
in Council by pointing out the high unemployment in British Columbia. 
This may have been true; but it was also true that Canada would need 
more immigrants. According to J. Bruce Walker, Immigration Commissioner
it VJinnipeg, the Canadian immigration figure for 1913 vras ^12,955»
^  ■ \  ■ 
the highest number of immigrants on record. J.O. Smith, officer in
1 farsi (Bombay), Jan. 21, 193A*
2 Ittehad (Bombay), Jan* 23, 191^, Bombay Newspaper Report 191^.
3 Sir Charles Roe, Chief Justice of the Chief Court of the Punjab in 
the Annual Register 1913» P* 301.
A  Canadian Annual Review, 1915t P» 98.
charge of the Canadian immigration service in London, was proud to 
state that over three million pieces of literature were given away 
in 1913 for the purpose! of attracting British migrants to Canada!'
He further stated that in 3*f,00Q schools in Britain large maps of
- j  . s;  ■.  . •
Canada were exhibited also for this purpose. As far as British
Columbia was concerned, the new restrictions on the Pacific ports
of entry did not hinder European immigrants who travelled via the
Atlantic and entered British Columbia from Alberta. The question
of unemployment in British Columbia looked like an academic
justification of a political expediency* Lord Hardinge, L^cefcoy
of India, explained the Indian migration question to the Indian
National Congress deputation on December 20, 1913- He stated that
... there is a very strong feeling among classes 
wielding considerable influence in Canada against 
any relaxation of restriction .*• the Chief Court 
Order has produced forcible protests and a demand 
for more stringent legislation.^
The demands for restrictions on Asiatic immigration were not 
really made because of unemployment in Canada. On the contrary, 
Asiatics would have been hired. But a number of working class 
Europeans on the Pacific Coast feared for their own job security 
and wage standard. The leaders of these men, therefore, missed no 
opportunity to use the immigration question in order to further 
their own political cause. At this time there was very little 
difference of opinion between the Conservativq&nd Liberal parties 
of Canada on this issue. The European and Asiatic civilizations did 
differ radically and the majority of the people in British Columbia 
were from European stock, and naturally their idea wqs to people
1 Canadian Annual Heview, 1913$ P* 103-
2 Cited in the Indian National Congress Report, 1913» P* 87.
the Pacific Goast with Europeans. The possibility of the unrestricted 
arrival of Indians in large numbers, as Justice.Hunter’s decision 
would have permitted, created a fear that Indian or Asiatic 
civilizations would dominate at the expense of the European civilization.
On the other side of the Pacific, Canadians envisaged the hundreds 
of millions of people crowded into Japan, China and India who might 
seek a better life in a new country. For the Pacific Coast,and the 
country beyond it were only sxjarsely settled and therefore seemed to 
beckon whoever came first. If hundreds of millions of people from 
India were looking for an outlet, as was. feared, they might find that 
outlet on the Canadian West Coast.
The danger of a sudden irruption of Asiatic peoples on the 
white man’s country has haunted the minds of Europeans since the 
days of Attila and Genghis Khan. Naturally the wave of fear, panic
and propaganda had revived the old fears and the Dominion government 
had to take action. But direct exclusion of Indians from Canada 
needed strong justification because India was the largest portion 
(in terms of pO£>ulation) of the British Empire. At the same time 
Indians could not realise how delicate and difficult was the task of 
the Imperial government of interfering in the action of a self-governing 
Dominion like Canada. Even on the most urgent problem of contributions 
to the Royal Navy, Canada had Consistently turned down suggestions 
from Imperial authorities. It could not be expected that the British 
government would pursue the case of Indian grievances to the extent
1 Entienne Dennery, Asia’s Teeming Millions, p. 229*
2 The question of contributions to the Royal Navy was the main topic 
discussed in the Colonial and Imperial Conferences before the 
First World War. See. Donald.C..Gordon, The Dominion partnership
^  • . ilMiiawwWWWWWIIWIi'IMiMI — —«
in imperial defence 1870-191 .^
of forcing the Dominion, government to do its bidding. Canada was
  1
the mistress of her own affairs in her own house. As far babk
as 1906, Justice Lord Aitkinson of the Supreme Court of Canada,
while upholding the government’s order of deportation in ’’Attorney
General for Canada versus Cain’, had quoted from Vattels, Law of
Nations, Book 1 (page 531) the following passage:
One of the rights possessed by a supreme power in 
every State is the right to refuse to permit an 
alien to enter that State, to annex what conditions 
it pleases to the permission to enter it, and to 
expel or to deport from the State, at pleasure, 
even a friendly alien, especially if it considers
his presence in the State opposed to its peace,
order and good government, or its social and 
material interest.
In spite of these legal rights enjoyed by the Dominions the
Canadian government avoided direct declaration of open exclusion of
Indians. On the other side of the border the United States
administration was equally concerned about the possibility of an
Indian influx and they proposed a strict physical test to check
this possibility. One paper in fact commented that the Indian was
’’like a nightmare”^ to the Americans. .
However, the legal activities by Indians in the Canadian courts
brought into the open that the ’Icontinuous passage regulation" was
really intended only to apply to Indians and not to Indian-born
Europeans, and in the meeting of the Indian National Congress held
at Karachi in December 1913» one congressman, Krishna Kumar Mitra,
condemning the Canadian action, said,
V/e ask the Canadian Government, "Why this unnecessary 
law? Why not tell the world that you would not allow 
Indians to go to your country?”^
1 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 191^, p# **362.
2 Norman Mackenzie and Lionel H. Laihg, Canada and the Law of Nations, p.284*
3 -■ Vancouver Province, Jan. 23, 1914.
4 Indian National Congress Report, 1913< p* 89.
Indian immigrants continued their efforts to bring in their 
countrymen. The decision of Justice Hunter showed the fickle nature 
of the Canadian immigration regulations which could not sustain the 
test when challenged in law courts. Meanwhile press comments and 
political speeches on the Pacific Coast were full of sensation and 
fear. The panicky Dominion government resorted to rearming itself 
with new regulations. It continued to refuse entry even to Indian 
wives and children whose husbands and fathers were already in Canada. 
The grievances of Indian immigrants were thus ignored. The political 
parties in India and anti-British elements found this a ready made 
weapon for convenient use. Neither the methods used by Bhagwan Singh 
and Hernam Singh for entry into Canada nor the high handedness of 
the Dominion administration could be justified.
U N P R O T E C T E D
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CHAPTER 8
Voyage of the Komagata Maru - Gurdit Singh1s scheme and 
arrangements of the project* Komagata Maru1s arrival in Vancouver, 
May 1914. Dr. Sunder Singh’s appeal to Ottawa and his tour of 
Ontario and Quebec. Immigration question in Canadian Senate and 
House of Commons. Indian press and public reaction. Reaction 
of Canadian press,politicians, and various organizations. Delay 
by Immigration Department, Long detention of Immigrants in 
quarantine; their Mandamus writ. Test Case. Deportation Order. 
Indians* protests and appeals to Dominion officials. Arrival of 
Rainbow and Martin Burrell. Cause of delay. Burrell’s promise. 
Peaceful departure of Komagata Maru. Appointment of Clogstoun.
His recommendation of No Compensation and Encouragement of 
litigation. Trouble among Indians. Killings of rivals. Death 
of Hopkinson. Conclusions.
The question of Indian immigration into Canada reached its 
most dramatic and climactic stage in 1914, The outstanding event 
was the voyage of the Komagata Maru from Hong Kong to Vancouver, 
with 376 Indians aboard; the journey and subsequent docking occupied 
front space in newspapers of many countries of the world. This 
Komagata Maru affair, as it came to be known, gained its widespread 
publicity in spite of the outbreak of the First World War in that 
same year* It was a crucial event, and the circumstances surrounding 
it, therefore, must be carefully considered.
The decision of Chief Justice Hunter in the ease of 39 Indians 
handed down in 1913» had been interpreted as a great legal victory 
for prospective Indian immigrants into Canada. Though the decision 
was based on a highly technical legal flaw (which was, of course, 
immediately rectified by the Dominion authorities) rumours were 
started in the Far East as well as in India that restrictions on 
immigration into Canada had been removed or at least rendered 
ineffective. Consequently many Indian residents in South East Asian 
and Far Eastern ports renewed their efforts to obtain passage to
*j ■
Canada. But steamship companies refused Indian immigrants on the 
ground that they were not likely to be admitted and that Cbeamship 
companies would have to carry back and maintain such persons when 
they were refused admission. Shipping companies had already been 
strongly warned about the serious consequences of carrying illegal 
immigrants to Canada. In spite of this warning, hovjever, Indian 
migrant leaders were planning to procure the special services of a 
ship which would be used solely for the conveyance of Indians to 
Canada. A young Hindu named Behari Lai Varma put himself forward as
1 Komagata Maru Committee of Enquiry, Report, 1915* P* 3*
an agent for this purpose and he started enquiries among shipping 
companies with regard to chartering a ship, but as he was a Hindu 
and a young man who carried no influence among the Sikhs,' he could 
not gain popular support and therefore, he did not succeed in his 
venture. 1
By January 191 *^ there were about 190 Sikhs gathered in the 
Sikh temple at: liong Kong av;aiting passage to Vancouver .when Gurdit
■■■■■■ 2 ■ ■
Singh arrived there. He showed himself at the Gurdwara- where he. 
delivered addresses to the people ostensibly on Sikh religious topics 
that carried Indian political overtones. He was a man of some age 
and ejp rxence; he posed as wealthy, and he had a gift of rhetoric. 
During his three vieek stay at Hong Kong, Gurdit Singh acquired the 
reputation of being devouty "especially since he attended the Gurdv/ara 
regularly and lectured there. The intending Indian passengers for 
Canada were convinced that Gurdit Singh was a thoroughly reliable man 
and they were prepared to put their trust in his leadership. They 
appealed to him to -assist them in obtaining passage to" British.Columbia 
The Sikhs "who desired to go to Vancouver were poor men with 
little formal education, who thought they needed a more influential 
and imposing man to represent them and make their arrangements.
However, their choice seems to have been ill-advised. Gurdit Singh 
had left, his home at Sirhali, DistrictAmritsar in the Punjab, Indio 
many years before and had carried on business as a contractor in
1 F. Slocock, Officer on Special Dutyy Directorate of Criminal 
Investigation, Govt, of India, Memorandum, Nov. J, 193A? Exhibit 100 
File 5028, L/P & - J/6A338.
2 Isemonger of the Punjab Police, Evidence, Confidential Proceedings 
of Komagata Maru Committee of Enquiry, Vol. XI, x^* 162,-File 9028, 
L/P & J/6/1938.
9 Bhan' Singh, passenger, Komagata Maru, Statement, Exhibit 28, File 
9028, L/P & J/SA338.
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Malaya and Singapore, yet when he came to Hong Kong in January 191V  
,he appeared to have no money* Largely because of this fact requests 
of the great: number of Sikhs in the temple attracted Gurdit Singh's 
pecuniary attention and he offered to make arrangements for their 1 
transportation to Canada. He asked them hovrmuch they could afford 
to pay for the journey, and when they told him they could manage £20 
to £25 each he promised to make every effort to obtain a ship for 
their journey across the Pacific. Towards the end of January 191^ 
he returned to Singapore v/here lie tried to purchase or hire a vessel. 
At the: same time a notice litho-printed in English, Gurmukhi and 
Urdu announced the formation of Sri-Guru Hanak Steamship Company 
and that Gurdit Singh had chartered a steamer to take emigrants 
directly from India to Vancouver. He sent many letters and notices 
tp zaildars (notables) in the Punjab representing that immigration 
restrictions in Canada had been removed, and that any one who liked, 
could go there easily, that he was coming to Calcutta with a steamer, 
and that those who wanted to go to north America should come with 
money and assemble at Calcutta. He signed the notice as Director 
of thefjri Guru Kanak steamship Company, invited correspondence at 
the HowrahGurdwara, Calcutta, and employed one individual, Sardara
7 ■ ' ■
Singh, to collect passengers. Concurrently he communicated to the
1 Colonial Secretary, Hong Kong to Colonial Office, London, .April "I**,-" 
191^, R.G.76, File 8795^5, Vol. I.
2 Bhan Singh, Statement, Exhibit 28, File 5028, L/P & J/6/1338*
3 Komagata Maru CoiMdttee of Enquiry Report, 1915* P* 5*
4 Iseraonger of the Punjab Police, Memorandum re Komagata Maru, Exhibit 
27, File 5028, L/P & J/6/1338.
5 Gurdit Singh, Notice, Feb. 21, 191^, Exhibit 30, File 5028,
L/P 8c J/6/1338.
6 Dr. Haghunath Singh, Medical Officer, Komagata Maru, Statement, 
Exhibit 107, File 5028, L/P & J/6A33S.
7 Isemonger, Memorandum, Exhibit 27, File 5028, L/P & J/6/1338.
Sikh Temple Committee at Hong Kong the details of his project. But
the intending emigrants at Hong Kong urged him to come direct and
not to go to Calcutta because they wanted to reach Vancouver before
the end of March 191^. They expressed their deep gratitude to
Gurdit Singh, saying
... we see you are benefiting us a lot by doing this 
public good. You have done a great deal for your 
country ....
Brother, we are really very much indebted to you 
for all this v/ork v/hich you have been good enough to 
do for us - poor fellows.^
Realising the desperate position of his fellow countrymen Gurdit
■ x
Singh asked them to deposit £10,000 in his account at Hong Kong.
But he could neither hire a ship at Singapore nor could he get any
deposit from the Sikhs. Besides this he could not sell any shares of
A
his newly formed company. In the third week of March, he returned
to Hong Kong without any vessel,but he was, nevertheless, still
able to convince his fellow countrymen about his prospective
arrangements for chartering a boat and leaving for Vancouver before
the end of March 191^* He further erroneously explained to them
that the lav/ regarding continuous passage to Canada had already
been repealed >  that the Canadian government had not made any new
laws - and that he had plenty of money and could show to Canadian
6authorities a sum of two hundred dollars on behalf of each of the 
Sikh migrants. The poor men were completely deceived by their 
unscrupulous countryman.
1 Committee, Sikh Temple Hong Kong to Gurdit Singh, telegram, Jan. 29, 
191^, Exhibit 31, File 5028, L/jp & J/6/I33S.
2 Ibid.
3 Komagata Maru Committee of Enquiry, Report, p. 5.
^ Bhan Singh, Statement, Exhibit 28, File 5028, L/P & J/6/1338.
5 Ibid.
6 Dr. Raghunath Singh, Statement, Exhibit 1C7, File 5028, L/P & J/6/1338.
Gurdit Singh then began enquiries for hiring a ship from Hong 
Hong and in this connection he met a shipping agent named A. Bune 
who was of German origin and a member of a small Japanese-Company/
Shinli Kishen Go Shi Kaisha. This company consisted of four or
■■ 1
five persons, but owned only one ship, the Komagata Maru. Even 
before the negotiations could be finalised Gurdit Singh started 
selling tickets at £20 per person. The Hong Kong police became 
suspicious about Gurdit Singh’s sale of tickets of a vessel which 
did not exist, at least in his name or under his jurisdiction, and 
therefore they arrested him. But he was set free because oS March 2*f,
191** the Komagata Maru was chartered by him for six months for $$,GQQ 
Hong Kong dollars.^ She mam terms of the charter were that Gurdit 
Sin$iwas to pay for the cost of the ship and all miscellaneous charges, 
such as harbour dues, pilotage and so forth. Besides these he was to 
supply all food to the passengers. One month’s charter money, 0 11,000 
as down payment was required immediately from Gurdit Singh and the 
second month’s charter money was to be furnished within one week before 
he sailed from Hong Kong.
At this time Gurdit Singh hurried the sale of tickets and began 
to assign various duties to prominent passengers. He appointed Daljit 
Singh, an educated person who had already worked as assistant editor 
of the Punjabee Bhain (a monthly publication devoted to the subject
1 Komagata Maru Committee of Enquiry, Report, p. 6.
2 At that time the fare from Ilong Kong to Vancouver -was' only £10 or
less but Gurdit Singh asked for £20 on the ground that it was necessary 
that he should receive payment in full not only for the single voyage 
but also for the return journey, in case the emigrants should be 
refused admission to Canada. See F, Slocock, Memorandum, Inhibit 100, 
File 5028, L/P & J/6/1338.
3 Dr. Raghunath Singh, Statement, Exhibit 107, File 3028, L/P S: J/6/133^» 
k Slocock, Memorandum, Exhibit 100, File 5028, L/j & J/6/1338.
of female education at Feroaepore ) as his secretary and he authorized
pohlo Ram to bring passengers from Manila to Nagasaki. Bir Singh was
appointed as Assistant Secretory and -was sent in advance to Shanghai
2to collect passengers. '
- Gurdit ,Singh applied to the Government of Hong Kong to grant 
"Passenger Certificate" to his passengers. Before complying with the 
request the Hong Kong authorities, however, confidentially eqqllired 
from the Canadian government if the passengers on the Komagata Maru
would be admitted. But the Dominion government maintained its silence
r' ■ ■ ■ ■' t ■ 3
in spite of repeated telegraphic reminders. Faced with what he
considered to be the delaying tactics used by the Hong Kong authorities,
Gurdit Singh issued legal notices through his solicitors, Messrs.
V/ilkinson and Grist, that he would sue the Government of Hong Kong
for damages.** The Hong Kong authorities, ultimately on April 4, 19lh,
issued the requisite Passenger Certificate for legally they had no
authority to refuse it. However, the Colonial Secretary of Hong
Kong stated the situation clearly to Gurdit Singh’s solicitors:
..• I am directed to inform you that the passenger 
certificate has now been signed, but that does not ^ 
mean that passengers will be allowed to land in Canada.
Under these circumstances the Komagata Maru started from Hong
Kong on April 4, 191** &t 5.3^ p.m.. displaying the Sikh religious slogan
1 J. Slattery and Isemonger, An Account of the Ghadr Conspiracy, 1913-15
p. 37. > ;V: -
2 Isemonger, Memorandum, Exhibit 27, File 5028, L/P & J/6/1338.
3 Governor Hong Kong to Secretary of State for Colonies, April 8 , 191^
C. 0.129 AlO/158^6.
h Dr. Raghunath Singh, Statement, Exhibit 107, File 5028, L/P & J/6/1338
5 Governor Hong Kong to Secretary of State for Colonies, April 8 , 191**»
c.o. 129A10/I58*f6.
6 Colonial Secretary, Hong Kong to Messrs. Wilkinson and Grist, April **,
191**, c.o. 129/^ 10/158^ 6.
of #Sat.. Sri' A-kal* 1 /^meaning God is True and Great_/» Afterwards, 
on April 8 , the Governor General of Canada did inform the Ilong Kong
government about Canadian immigration restrictions and these were
■■ - .v 3  ■ : V;
conveyed to Gurdit Singh*s solicitors in Hong Kong but no fruitful
action was taken. In the meantime the vessel arrived in Shanghai
on--’April 8 with 165 passengers aboard. Here 111 passengers joined
the party and the boat left Shanghai on April 14 arriving at Moji on
_  If.
April lo. At that time an urgent demand was made by the owners of 
the vessel for the payment of 22,000 dollars charter money which 
they had not received. There were other problems as well. The 
Komagata Maru was a light ship, so additional cargo was needed to 
give her stability. For this Gurdit Singh decided to buy a greater 
quantity of coal than was needed for the entire voyage and he hoped
to realize some financial return by selling the surplus quantity at
. 5
Vancouver. But at the time in Moji, Gurdit Singh was required to r
pay 22,000 dollars charter money, 10,500 dollars for the coal and
- .  - ■ : 6 
2,000 dollars for miscellaneous expenses. He called an urgent
meeting of the passengers in his Sikh temple in the ship / a cabin
in the Komagata Maru was reserved for Sikh prayers and congregational
meetings^/ and made a long speech. He said that he had - only 17, 000
dollars and the ship could hot go until the balance, i.e. 17,500 dollars,
1 Dr. Raghunath Singh, Statement, Exhibit 107, File 5028, L/P & J/6/1338.
2 Governor General, Canada to Governor, Hong Kong, telegram, April 8, 
1914," G. 0. 129/410/15846.
3 Colonial Secretary, Hong Kong, notification No. 249, April 1914,
C.O. 129/410/15846.
4 Yamamoto, Captain, Komagata Maru, Evidence, Confidential Proceedings 
of Komagata Maru Committee of Enquiry Vol. II, p. 4, File 5028,
L/P & J/6/1338.
5 Komagata Maru Committee of Enquiry, Report, p. 10.
6 Slocock, Memorandum, Exhibit 100, File 5028, L/P & J/6/1338.
was raised. He reminded them about the great sacrifices of Sikhs in
the past and stressed the importance of sacrifice at that very time
as well. He appealed to them to give him all the honey they had and
he made a solemn promise to return the money at Vancouver. Gurdit
Singh appealed to the Sikhs through their religious beliefs and managed
to extract from them everything they had. The deluded passengers
therefore, contributed a further sum of 12,OCX) dollars. The charter
money and port dues were paid; but the coal merchant agreed to
accept 2,500 dollars as part payment and the balance of 8,000 dollars
stood over the security of the vessel.~ In this way Gurdit Singh
solved his immediate financial difficulty. Another contingent of 86
passengers joined the group and the boat reached Yokohama on May 2,
191^* The stay at Yokohama was only a short one, nevertheless Gurdit
Singh managed to recruit another group of l*t passengers. There were
576 passengers on board when the boat left Yokohama on May 3» 191**
for the Pacific Const of"Canada. All the passengers were from the
Pun jab; 25 were Muslims but the others were all Sikhs, ■
Hews about the prospective historic voyage of the Komagata Maru
appeared in the various press reports from the Far East. The China
Press of Shanghai commented that the passengers of the Komagata Maru ,
proposed to’test once and for all the right of British subjects in
India to emigrate to Canada.” It further quoted Gurdit Singh as saying:
If the British Imperial Government endorses the 
publicity of Hindu exclusion from the colonies ^ t will 
precipitate the fiercest revolution in history.
1 Dr. Raghunath Singh, Statement, Exhibit 107, File 5028, L/P & J/6/1338.
2 M. Paske Smith, British Consul at Shiraonoseki to Conyngham Greene,
British Ambassador in Japan, May 2, 191**, File 1799, L/P & J/6/1310.
3 Komagata Maru Committee of Enquiry, Report, p. 6 .
^ China Press (Shanghai), May 12, 191*+•
The Osaka Mainichi (Osaka) reported that the Indian party included 
all sorts of people, statesmen* teachers and ministers, and it 
seemed that they were going to do something about their complete
- "l
exclusion from Canada* The Manila Times had already reported that 
ai- hundred Sikhs iijould take their holy book and present themselves 
for admission into British Columbia as a.Sikh religious mission like
p ' , - ■
Christian.priests. “ The Hindu (Lahore) fleshed the news that if these 
Sikh gentlemen were permitted to land they would then ax*rsnge themselves 
in procession end pay a visit to the Gurdwaras there. It further 
-commented:.:'
If however they are not allowed to land they will 
compel the Canadian authorities to accord a similar 
treatment to Christian missionaries also. This we 
think is a very reasonable treatment to the British 
Columbian authorities* regard for law and equity.^
The British Consul at Manila also informed the Canadian■government
' 4
that Indians planned their admission in the guise of a religious party. 
Therefore , the Dominion government knew that the Sikh religious mission 
was nothing more than a fraudulent attempt to evade Canadian immigration 
laws. However, the Dominion authorities had decided on their course 
of action. Although according to section 2(g)VI of the Immigration 
Act, 1910, “ Priests and Ministers of Religion1* were permitted to enter 
Canada as non-immigrants nevertheless the burden of proof rested 
upon immigrants claiming such right.^ kith this in mind the Dominion
1 Osaka Mainichi (Osaka), April 21, 1914.
2 Manila Times, April 6, 1914.
3 Hindu (Lahore), May 5, 1914, Punjab Hews Paper Report 1914.
4 Scott to Cory, May 6, 1914, E.G.76, File 879345, Vol. I.
5 Malcolm Reid to Scott, May 3, 1914, File 1799, L/P & J/6/1310.
6 Scott to Cory, May 11, 1914, R.G.76, File 879^43, Vol. I.
government had already instructed the immigration officials in British
Columbia not to alloy/ the Komafeata Maru passnegcrs to land,
Malcolm Reid, Chief of the Canadian Immigration Department at
Vancouver , i?as alarmed to knovr about the voyage of the Komagata Maru
via press reports which appeared in London through German sources and
he hurriedly informed the Canadian authorities at Ottawa:
... if this party is allowed to land, Gurdit Singh 
intends to organise a regular emigration service 
between India and Canada.
He then took all precautionary steps to make sure that the Komagata Maru
passengers should not be able to land. He made enquiries from the crew
and passengers of boats coming from and going to the Far East and he
sent an urgent wireless message to the captain of the Komagata Maru
on May 5, 1914:
Kindly wire me expected time arrival. Necessary you 
secure clearance immigration offipe before Customs 
Department can enter your vessel.*
The Komagata Maru was expected to arrive at Vancouver Island on May 21
and the Canadian immigration officials were alerted in this regard.
Meanwhile the Indian community in British Columbia was delighted
to hear the nev/s of the expected arrival. -The Vancouver Sun flashed
the news:
Furore among the Hindus about ship. Vancouver East 
Indians are excited over nev/s of coming immigrant steamer. 
Yesterday the Sikh temple which is vortex of Hindu whirlpool
here, gyrated with some unusual effervescence.
1 Canada, House of Commons Debate, April 17, 1914, p. 2739*
2 Malcolm Reid to Cory, telegram, April 16, 1914, File 1799 L/P LJ/6/1310.
3 Malcolm Reid especially went to Victoria in order to see VJ.K. Royds,
the British Vice Consul at Manila, who was on his way to England. See 
Malcolm Reid to Scott, May 5,1914, File 1799, L/P & J/6/1310.
4 Malcolm Reid to Captain S.S. Komagata Maru, wireless message, May 5, 1914
File 1799» L/P & J/6/L310*
5 Vancouver Sun, May 11, 1914.
The more excited part of the Indian community represented by
H* Rahim and Raja Singh, with the help of their socialist solicitor,
James Edward Bird, immediately hired a strong launch, Sitera Queen.
Their intention was to intercept the Komagata Maru and advise her
3
to come to Port Alberni, In this way they desired to offset the 
effect of Order in Council (PC. 26^2) which prohibited the landing
q
of artisans arid labourers at ^3 ports of entry in British Columbia.
Bov/ever Malcolm Reid and his colleagues at Vancouver suspected that
the Komagata haru might be in a position ?to land her passengers in
some unfrequented bay of the West Coast and they were careful to
guard against such an occurrence. The custom officials at port
Alberni were equally cautioned and they too took the necessary steps
6
to make sure that none of the passengers should land. But the 
local Indians were quite prepared to deal with any obstacle that 
was put in the way of the ship*s docking, and much of this unfortunate 
affair might have been prevented had they been successful in their 
attempt to contact the Komagata Maru which arrived instead at William 
Head on May 21, 191^. The port authorities..there put the boat under 
immediate quarantine, and the quarantine officer, Dr. Nelson, 
examined the papers of the vessel and raised the first objection
1 James Edward Bird acted as defence counsel in the Bhagwan Sing case.
2 Colonist, .'May- 21, 191**.
3 Hopkinson to Cory, May 27» 193A* C.O. ^2/979/22190.
A Port Alberni was not mentioned in P.G. 26^2 and the Dominion government 
realising it as possible point of entry hurriedly issued an Order in 
Council banning the entry of skilled artisans, skilled and unskilled 
labourers through Port of Alberni and port of New Port. See P. C. 13$9» 
May 29, 191^.
3 Province, May 22, 191^.
6 E.B. Gerald, Sub-Collector.of Customs at Port Alberni to Smith, 
Collector of Customs at Nanaimo, telegram, May 20, 19lA, R.6.76*
Pile 8795^5, Vol. I.
7 Malcolm Reid to Scott, telegram, May 22, 191^» R.G.7e, File 879!?^ 5»
Vol. Is Sun, May 22, 191**. g
that the boat had no bill of health from the last Japanese port from
which she had been cleared. He then appealed to Ottawa for, further 4
instructions in this matter and the Dominion authorities ordered
that the boat should beimoved to Vancouver and on the way the
quarantine officer should administer any necessary vaccinations to 
2the passengers. In this viay.the Komagata Maru with her variety of
3
Punjabi passengers reached Vancouver on May 23* ISftA* A correspondent 
of the Victoria Times who managed to go on board at Victoria observed:
-'-7'v--^ he'y presented a very brilliant spectacle as the many 
different coloured turbans moved quickly and silently 
about. The men were dressed in complete European 
out-fits, others wearing riding breeches and helmets, 
numbers with Mohammedan red caps passed;tightly down 
on their thick black hair, still others in native 
costumes and a few wearing khaki uniforms which they 
had used v/hen serving in the army. The majority of 
men had served in the British army, and they are a tall, 
handsome lot. They seem superior to the class of Hindus 
which have already come to this province. They stand
erect, and move with an alert action. All their suits
are well pressed, and their turbans spotlessly clean.
The most of them know a little of the English language 
and some of them converse in it remarkably well.
The Komagata Maru was ordered by the immigration authorities
to anchor in Vancouver harbour and the Japanese owners of the ship
immediately requested legal representatives from Messrs. C. Gardner
5
Johnson and Company of Vancouver who were to act as the owner’s agents. 
The harbour authorities had already set up a patrol to make sure that 
none of the Indians on board would gain surreptitious entry into Canada^
1 Province, May 22, 191^.
2 Scott to Malcolm Reid, telegram, May 22, 191^* R.G.7&* File 8795^5* Vol
3 Hopkinson to Cory, May 27* 191^* C.O.^2/979/22190. 
k Victoria Times, May 23* 191^»
5 World, May 22,191**.
6 Superintendent of Itnmigration, Statement of Incidents connected 'with 
the arrival of Komagata Maru at Vancouver, C.O. **2/980/31**78.
and the ultimate fate of the ship and its passengers was now to 
become a subject of great controversy.*
There were, of course, several points on which the Canadian 
government dould refuse to allow the admission of Indians into British 
Columbia. The first was the medical examination. If this proved to 
be pnisuccessful the authorities could apply the Order in Council 
vjhich prohibited the entry of artisans and labourers. The third 
point was the Order in Council requiring every Asian coming to Canada 
to travel by direct and continuous passage from the country of nativity, 
and to have / 200 in his possession at the time of his arrival. With'.'
all of these possibilities before him, the Minister of the Interior,
'v ■ ;S ■; 1 ■
Dr. Roche, could simply declare: "We are going to enforce the lav;",
and hove no doubt that the Indians would indeed be kept out. When
the passengers were medically examined a number of them ifere rejected
on medical grounds. Follovdng this there was a civil examination
inhere it was necessary that the Board of Enquiry should sit in
judgment in each individual case. "
* The passengers, by this time qnxious and confused about their
rights, decided to have legal coimsel and hired Messrs. McNeill, Bird,
McDonald and Darling, Barristers of Vancouver, who immediately wrote
to the immigration authorities in Vancouver:
Please take notice that we are acting for 378 Hindus 
on board ship and require and claim the privilege and 
right of being present on all examinations and boards 
of inquiry in regard to their right to enter Canada.
Barrister Bird further requested the immigration officials to permit
him to go to the boat to consult Gurdit Singh and his passengers,
/I.. Free Press (London, Ontario), May 23, &91**«
2 Scott to Martin Burrellv Sept. 2**, 191*** E.G.78, File 8799**5» Vol.
3 Malcolm Reid to Scott, May 23, 191**, R.G.78, File 8795^5 , Vol. 2.
but this was refused. The event was fully publicised in the press
end James Edward Bird was quoted as saying:
This tyranny is more like.Russian tyranny/ than any 
I have yet come across. Here is Gurdit Singh i/ith 
■almost 0 100,000 at stake on this trip, kept out in 
the harbor along with his fell ov/s, and I am not allowed 
to see him to get instructions from him, to give him 
legal advice and assistance in his difficulty. lie 
is even more a prisoner than if he ,were. in the peni­
tentiary.^
H. Rahim (one of the Indian immigrants at Vancouver) deploring
the action of the immigration authorities, said:
To seek admission to Canada is in no sense a crime, 
and yet the Hindus on board the ship are not given 
an opportunity of seeing their counsel which privilege 
is. not denied the worst of felons or criminals.^ .
Gurdit Singh demanded the appointment of a Royal Commission to enquire
'  3
into the whole, question of migration within the British Empire,• but
k
this demand was bluntly refused by the Dominion government. The 
immigration officials continued their board of. inquiries and Gurdit 
Singh made continued complaints and threats about the delaying 
devices of immigration;authorities and their involving him in
financial loss.- He then demanded the immediate sujjply of provisions
as well and if these were denied he threatened that he would be
compelled to wire to the Governor General of Canada;and His Majesty
■ 7  ■■• . . .
the King to complain about this wrong treatment. He refused in
1 province, May 27* 1914.
-2 Hlndustanee (Vancouver), June 1, 1914.
3 Leader (Allahabad), May 30* 1914* B.i. Hewpaper Report 1914.
4 Gujrati (Bombay), June 17* 1914, Bombay Newspaper Report, 1914-
5 Gurdit Singh to Malcolm Reid, June 2, 1914, R.G.7&* File 879543* Vol
6 Daljit Singh to Malcolm Reid, June 2, 1914, R.G.76, File 879545* Vol
7 Daljit Singh to Malcolm Reidi June 3* 1914* R^G.76* File 879545* Vol
.every-’way'to'...cooperate with the immigration board of enquiry and 
they were finally obliged to make some concession. The immigration 
authorities then permitted the counsel for Indians to interview Gurdit
• . . ■ j
Singh and his secretary Daljit Singh, in their launch. In consequence 
of this meeting Barrister Bird submitted a proposal to the immigration 
officials that Gurdit Singh would provide a proper detention shed 
to house his passengers on shore while the question of their entry 
was being determined. He also promised to furnish the immigration 
department with a boat for all jmssengers’ ordered to be deported.
. ; , . . 2
He himself wished to immediately return to India. But the immigration 
officials thought that such proposals-would show the government’s 
weakness and might lead to riots in British Columbia. The authorities 
also observed that to find a building to house 376 persons and to 
guard them during the course of complicated and lengthy litigation 
proceedings would be difficult, dangerous and expensive. -And they 
further expressed their reluctance to accept-'-a proposal which ■ might. 
give the detenus a chance to go on bail or otherwise frustrate the 
immigration laws. Besides, the immigration authorities could 
foresee that if at that time Gurdit Singh was allowed to return 
to India alone, it would cause a hostile storm against the Indian,
. . ■ 3 '■■-' :' -
British and Canadian governments. Accordingly the immigration
authorities refused to accej>t Gurdit Singh’s proposal. But Gurdit
Singh was not so easily subdued, and ho sent the following telegram
• to. the. King*: ?... '
Ho provision since four days. Reid refuses supply.^
Charterer and passengers starving. Kept prisoners.
1 Malcolm Reid to Scott, June 3* 191**, R.G.76, File 8795**5» Vol. 2.
2 Malcolm Reid to Scott, telegram, June 5» 191*** R.G.76, File 8793^5, Vol. 
■3 Ibid.
M Gurdit Singh to II.M. the King, telegram, June 191**» File 3601
I/P & J/6/1323.
He sent another telegram to the Governor General of Canada saying:
Reid disallowed my landing, have coal to sell.
Can't take more cargo - suffering heavy losses 
. and starvation. Charter money eleven thousand
bound to pay before 11th. Can't arrange unless 
go ashore, otherwise lose ship. Government 
responsible for damages. Reid disallows conversation 
V . w^ith.'ahy. body. Given many notices. No response. V
The immigration authorities, however, were under no obligation to
feed the passengers? it was entirely the responsibility of Gurdit
Singh. According to the conditions of the charter:
Charterers shall pay all charges and expenses 
arising through taking steerage passengers, and 
shall supply all provisions,water., galleys, and 
cooks, fittings and medicines, medical stores and 
' also doctor .... '
But because of the peculiar nature of the situation, the Canadian
"Z
government did decide to furnish the inrovisions. Gurdit Singh
then demanded the additional supply of 100 bags of flour, ginger,
cabbage, purified butter, milk, and even fifty live sheep or goats,
one hundred live fowls, two hundred boxes of cigarettes, red pepper,
spices, etc*; and crates of eggs. The immigration officers refused
to comply with this demand. Gurdit Singh and his passengers protested
against this refusal and declared they would go on a hunger strike.
They pretended to occupy themselves completely in their religious
singing and dancing led by their holy men. But the authorities
soon discovered that the passengers were fasting during the day and 
g
feasting at night and therefore their threat did hot'work. On
1 Charterer of Komagata Maru to Governor General, Canada, telegram,
June 7* 191^« Documents on Canadian External Relations 1909-lB, p. 6^7*
2 Cited in Hopkinson to Cory, June 6, 191^, C.O. **2/979/23312.
3 Governor General, Canada to Secretary of State for Colonies, telegram, 
June 10, 19M, C.O. 886/7*
k Malcolm Reid to Scott, telegram, June 5? 191**» R.G.76, File 8795**3» Vol.
3 The Times, June 6, 191***
6 Scott to Cory, June 9$ 191**»R»G.76, File S793**5» Vol. 3*
June 8 when the passengers requested food it seemed that Gurdit 
Singh had changed his mind and had decided to be more reasonable 
in his demand.^ /■■■,',,v .
In the meantime the charter money to be paid to the Vancouver
agents of the owners of the Komagata Maru were due, and the balance
of the money owing for the coal had to be paid immediately. Since
Gurdit Singh was unable to meet either obligation he appealed to the
Indian immigrants in British Columbia to help him, They, in turn,
formed a special committee and H. Rahim, one of the Indian immigrant
leaders with socialist sympathies, was elected chairman* ;In order
to raise money to pay for the overdue charter of the Komagata Maru
they held a meeting which vras addressed by II. Rahim,: Bhag Singh,
the local Sikh priest and president of the IShalsa Diwan Society,
and Balwant Singh, another Sikh priest. The speakers condemned
British policy towards Indians, especially their exclusion from the
self-governing colonies. They earnestly appealed for money so that
the boat might be retained and resolved that/the 37& passengers
should be helped in their efforts to get into Canada. H. Rahim spoke
with a good deal of exasperation; about the Vancouver newspapers and
branded them as the ;"dirty lying press of the city’1. He stated that
the Komagata Maru was not chartered by Gurdit Singh but by all her
passengers in cooperation. Therefore, he emphasised that the Indian
immigrants should raise money to help the passengers because they
had used all their money in the additional expense caused by the
2delaying devices of the immigration authorities. At the end of 
the meeting a resolution condemning Canadian injustice was passed 
and copies of the resolution were sent to the Indian National Congress
and the rulers of Patiala end Habhah.. By the second week of June 
Bliag Singh and II., Rahim got the charter of the Komagata Moru 
transferred to them after i^ aying the due charter money.
The other immigrant leader, Dr., Sunder Singh from Victoria,, paid 
a hurried visit to the Canadian capital to appeal to the Dominion 
government to allow the passengers of the Komagata Maru to land.
He was interviewed by Dr., Roche, the Minister of the Interior,, and 
Blair*, a senior official ofthe Dominion Immigration Department, on'
May 29, 191 .^, In addition to his verbal representation, . Dr., Sunder 
Singh presented a two-page memorandum making the point;that the 
Indians on board the Koaiagata Maru had left Hong Kong unaware of the 
Canadian Order in Council debarring artisans and labourers.. He said 
that the Order did not really apply to them in any case, since they 
were mostly ex-servicemen or men of independent means and all were 
British subjects. He further stated that they should be granted bail 
and allowed to join their friends ashore. He deplored the fact that 
Indians as immigrants v/ere discrifeinated against by the Dominion 
government despite their British status and the rights it conferred.
In this way he tried to prove that Indian immigration should be made 
a subject of full enquiry. The purpose of such enquiry should be 
the establishment of the Indians* right to enter and to move about 
in Canada freely.
But Dr. Sunder Bingh did not make a favourable impression on 
either the Minister of the Interior (Dr. Roche) or the Immigration 
Departmental representative (Blair). They found his statements
1 For a full account of the meeting, see llopkinson to Cory, June 1,
191^ * c• o.^ 2/979/23137•
2 Ivorld, May 27* 191^
3 Full text of Dr. Sunder Singh*s Memorandum, May 29* 191^ is available 
in Department of External Affairs, Canada, Documents on Canadian 
External Relations 1909-lB* P« 646.
inexplicit, his manner evasive, and his credentials, as a spokesman 
for the Indians.detained on board the Komagata Maru, at the best very 
dubious. Blair in particular was convinced that Sunder Singh 
represented no one but himself and that his officiousness on > 
behalf of the detenus was a means of regaining favour with those 
religious purists of the Sikh community whom he.had offended by 
shaving off his beard. His first plea was that the dbtenus should 
be admitted to bail because they were put to expense in; staying on 
board .ship5 because they wished to be with their friends ashore; 
and because they deserved better treatment, as British army ex- 
servicemen, than detention.
His second main plea was that in the matter of immigration 
generally, a specific policy should be enunciated in respect of Hindus* 
entry, that might be worked out in some general conference of 
interested parties, and that would replace the unsatisfactory sequence 
of ad-hoc decisions made by the Canadian authorities.
These plans did not impress Blair or Roche. They suspected
that Sunder Singh*s real objective was the Immigration Act itself, >
and that he hoped for some court finding which would declare the
Act to be invalid through.the attack on British subjects; therefore
they could only infer that what Singh ultimately hoped for and was
even then working towards was the freedom for all Hindus to come
1
and go in Canada as they pleased.
Having been unsuccessful with the•Department of the Interior 
at Ottawa, Dr. Sunder Singh approached newspaper men, politicians, 
ministers of various churches and all those to whom he had access 
and who.he.believed might have some influence in forming public
1 Full text of Dr. Roche*s and Blair*s Memorandum, May 29, 191^, 
re conversation with Dr. Sunder Singh is available in Borden 
Papers, Vol. ^ fO. .
opinion for or against the case of Indians in Canada. He toured 
Toronto and Montreal and addressed church groups and the press.
His main appeal was in the name of Christianity for support to 
'fellow .human- beings, and his argument was that Canada needed farmers 
and there were fineSikh farmers present on the Komagata Maru trying 
hard to enter Canada, However Dr. Sunder Singh did not succeed in 
securing any support either from the church or the press in Eastern 
Canada, / ■. '; ■■ . :y ' ■'V- A1/ ' 7 \ - i  v:
The Indian migration question was debated in the Canadian Senate 
on May 26, 191*1 when Senator Casgrain asked what steps had been taken 
with regard to Indians on the Komagata Maru. The senator expressed 
his fears of retaliation in India where the English population was 
only 200,000 arid he felt that when all sorts of people were coming 
to Canada from eastern ports, it was awkward to refuse admission to 
Indians. The leader of the government (Senator Lougheed) replied 
that the government was quite concerned about the situation and the 
subject could not be overlooked.
The subject of Indian immigrationwas discussed on June I in 
the Canadian House of Commons when Oliver (opposition spokesman on 
immigration) stated that Canada was mistress of her own house and 
took her ovm authority and responsibility of deciding viho v/ould be 
admitted to the privileges and rights of citizenship within her 
borders. He blamed the Dominion government for its inability to
' : . . 3
enforce its regulations against Indians at the end of 1913* Dr.
Roche replied that it was the faulty nature of Orders in Council , 
passed by himself (Oliver) which resulted in the Courts* decision
T Debates of the Senate, May 26, 191**, pp. 506-507*
2 Canada, House of Commons Debates, June 1, 191**, P* **562.
against the government.^ He added that the faulty Order in Council
of the late government had since been revised and strengthened. Sir
Wilfrid Laurier (leader of the opposition) replied by suggesting an
entirely different course of action:
The only way in which the difficulty is to be overcome 
1 s is, so far as possible, by diplomacy; the law should
be the last resort to be taken advantage of. We have an
. , arrangement with the Japanese Government that has worked
well. Last year my hon. friend the member for Vancouver 
Stevens^/, suggested: that .we: should have some similar 
arrangement with the Chinese Government. I wish that 
vie had some, arrangement also, wl.th the Government of, 
India. It would be well if the Governments of China 
and India would undertake to do so as has bee?i dpne 
in the case^of Japan; that is,restrict their own 
; . emigration/"
The view was supported: on June 8 by, the Montreal. Star. B u t  before
this on June 6, the opposition spokesman on immigration (Oliver) ,
enquired if the Canadian government was enforcing the Order in Council
passed some time ago, which absolutely^rohibited the entry of even
white people from the Pacific Coast ports of Canada; and if so, there
kshould not. be any delay in deciding the Indians’ case. Dr. Roche
replied that the Order in Council was being enforced against Indians
just as it would be against any other class of people. He added,
however, that the proceedings of the Boards of Enquiry in eqch case
were resulting in long delays about the final decisions. But the
Minister of the Interior (Dr. Roche) could find.no reply v/hen the
opposition spokesman (Oliver) further observed:
I-saw .it mentioned in the papers that while this
vessel /”Komagata Maru 7 was lying at anchor, a 
. shipload of Chinese were admitted into British
1 Canada, House of Commons Debates, June 1, 191^, p.
2 Ibid., p. 4365.
5 Montreal Star, June 8, 191^ 1.
k Canada, House of Commons, Debates, June 6, 191^» p* **995*
Columbia. If this Order in Council is effective 
only against white men and Hindus, and not effective 
against Chinamen, and if it is in accordance with 
the law as it stands, I msh: to repeat the suggestion 
I made before that while the House is in session, 
means should be taken to alter the law so that an anomaly 
shall not be continued/
On the other hand, the Indian press not only justified b,ut
praised Gurdit Singh’s efforts. The Tribune (Lahore) commented:
*•> by undertaking the expensive continuous journey 
^ the Indians^ only sought fair-play even in an 
■ apparently unfair game. To deny fair-play.would
be to further expose the weakness of the British 
■policy/- ■/;,;
The Hindu (Lahore) while writing an editorial on ’’the question; of
the honour of ‘ our Indians inCanada" observed;
It must also be remernbered that it is this humiliating 
treatment accorded to Indians by colonies which is 7 
.largely instrumental in causing unrest in this country/
The punjabee (Lahore) criticised the Canadian claim for excluding
Englishmen as well as Indians. It branded this statement as
hypocritical and observed: ;
.;. no icnglish man has been excluded because he was 
an English man. The fact that Indians:are excluded 
not for the reasons for which English men and other 
Europeans are excluded, but because they are Indians, 
is the crux of the matter.
Comparing the right of admission of the Chinese and Japanese the
Tribune -asked/.-;
... why a faithful, loyal and enterprising body of 
British subjects are restricted and humiliated in the 
; British Empire while aliens enjoy better privileges.-^
The weekly Desabhi-Mani clearly warned Indians that 1 /•
1 Canada, House of Commons, Debates* June 6, 191^,p*
2 Tribune, May 16, 191**.
3 Hindu, June 7> 191** > Punjab Newspaper Report, 191**.
k Punjabee, July 7, 191**, 'Punjab- Newspaper Report, 191**.. 
3 Tribune, June 6, 191**.
The Canadians will not rest satisfied until they do 
all that lies in their power to drive Indians out.^ 
the
The Desh (Lahore) reminded/Indian masses of their duty to protest
against Canadian injustice and oppression and invited them to hold
2public meetings to bring this to the notice of the government. The
Hindu (Lahore) denounced the conduct of the Canadian government as
disgusting and the devices adopted by it to shut out Indians from
Canada as unstatesmanlike and a disgrace to a civilised government.
The Leader observed that the question of rights and status of His
Majesty1s subjects in different parts of the Empire was an Imperial
one which had now assumed a serious aspect. So it supported Gurdit
Singh*s demand, for the appointment of a Royal Commission to settle
the question of Indian migration once and for all in a satisfactory 
if
manner. The weekly Gujrati Punch (Ahmadabad) stated that Indians 
were asked to be proud of the British Empire and to discharge their 
imperial responsibilities but it questioned whether or not the 
Imperial authorities by their present policies would allow Indians to 
exercise their imperial rights and privileges.' However, one weekly 
paper Shifa (Bijnor) took exception to these views. It told the 
Indians they were mistaken in their belief that because they were 
British subjects they had equal rights with Canadians. It added 
that Canada was a self-governing white colony and if was not likely 
that the British government would offend millions of white Canadian
people for the sake of those four hundred Indiens on the Komajgata Maru.
• & ^
1 Desabhi-Mani (Madras), June 2, 1914, Madras Newspaper Beport, 191** •
2 Desh, June 10, 1914, Punjab Newspaper Report, 1914.
3 Hindu, June 29, 191**» Punjab Newspaper Report, 1914.
4 Leader (Allahabad), May 30, 191*** H.P. Newspaper Report, 1914.
5 Gujrati Punch, May 24, 1914, Bombay Newspaper Report, 1914.
6 Majeed Hasan, editor, Shifa (Bijnor), July 3, 191**, U.P. Newspaper 
Report, 1914.
■Similarly the biweekly V/est Coast Spectator (Calicut) thought that
the Imperial government could hot take any action against Canada
in favour of Indians because “blood is thicker than water". It
further put this question to Indians:
... is it not time for us to consider whether it 
is not derogatory to our self-respect to thrust 
ourselves oh a country which has no kindly feelings 
tovmrds us and to whom our presence is as unwelcome 
as that of a wild beast.^
The Indu Prakash (Bombay), commented:
The name of Mr. Gurdit Singh will have to be bracketed 
with that of Mr. Gandhi when the history of the 
struggle of British Indian citizens to secure from 
the Colonies a recognition of their elementary rights 
of British citizenship comes to be written.^
It further remarked that Gurdit Singh had imposed on India a deep
debt of gratitude by putting British Indian citizenship before
civilization and justice.^ The daily Hindu (Madras) remarked that
the Komagata Maru incident had brought into prominence the intense
racial prejudice and hatred entertained by British Columbians.
The monthly magazine, Indian Emigrant % refuted the Canadian fear
of riot or bloodshed in case the Indians were allowed to land in
British Columbia. Such action, it maintained, could not take place
unless the stage was purposely set for those demonstrations. It
further remarked that if there were any disturbance the police could
cope with it as usual.
These editorial comments, together with the news of the incident 
itself, instigated a wave of public protests throughout the Punjab
1 Utest Coast Spectator, June 17, 1914, Madras Newspaper Report, 1914.
^ Indu Prakash, June 2, 1914, Bombay Newspaper Report, 1914.
3 Ibid. ' ; ; V ■ .
4 Hindu, June 10, 1914, Madras ilewspaper Report, 1914.
5 Indian Emigrant (Madras), August 1914* p. 25*
in the; summer of 1914• Citizens of Lahore'held a public meeting
and registered their strong opposition to the Canadian government’s
*1
refusal to admit the Komagata Ifaru passengers. Oh June 13, 1914,4.
another public meeting was held at Tarn Taran (a Sikh holy -place, in .
Amritsar district) to sympathise with Gurdit Singh and his passengers,
andthe Indian government was requested to press the Dominion
government to allow admission to those unfortunate mdn confined
aboard ship in Vancouver harbour. ■, Similar public meetings
expressing sympathy with the Komaagata Maru passengers and indignation
against the Canadian government * s refusal to allow them to land were.
held at Sorgodh®, Faruka, Bhnnu*: Peshawar; Gundaspur, Ambala and
Delhi in June and July; and the Viceroy of India was requested to
endorse the Oause of these men. The meetings were large and charged
with emotion. People of all pjpliticsl viev/s forgot their particular
interests.and more and more become united to voice a common and deeply
x
felt grievance against white supremacy and discrimination.
The Indian immigrant community were equally active. Their monthly 
paper, The Hindustanee, carried a lengthy editorial -.welcoming Gurdit 
Singh and his passengers on board the Komagata Maru and deplored-, .the 
attitude of the Canadian immigration authorities. The paper also 
publisher3 a lengthy article • (supposed to have been sent by a law 
firm in Lastern Canada to James Kdward Bird, the counsel for Indians 
on ”re Exclusion of Ilihdoos"). The writer tried to justify the Indian 
'Immigration'on .legal, social, economic and ethical bases.
1 Chairman, public Meeting of Citizens of Lahore to Private Secretexy- 
to 11.E. the Viceroy, telegram, June 9» 1914, C«0.42/983/2?o93«
2 Chairman, Public Meeting at Tarn Taran to H.E. the Viceroy, telegram, 
June 13, 1914, C.0.42/983/37636.
3 Details of these public meetings, their nature, resolutions with the 
reports of the Government of the Punjab and Government of India are 
available in P.R.O. 0.0.42/983/23337; 27893i 31402; 32242; 40133*
4 Hindustanee (Vancouver), June 1914, p. 2.
. The London branch of the'All India Moslem League took up the 
matter vjith the Colonial Office in London. It warned that the 
illiberal treatment of Indians aboard the Komagata Maru would give 
rise to an intense, feeling of indignation against Canada, and 
Indians v;ould blame the Imperial government for failing to protect 
t h e m m  the colonies under the British flag.
Clearly the issues arising from this situation weie of vital 
concern to Britain’s continued presence and wellbeing in India yet 
the Indian government maintained its old policy ©f inaction and 
indifference. When the Komagata Maru .was', still on her way to Canada 
official opinion seemed to prevail in Simla that the Indians were 
deliberately courting trouble and should not have left Hong Kong in 
•view of the restrictive Canadian immigration policies. At this 
time the Government of India, through its gazette notification, issued 
instructions to all provincial and local governments to warn all
intending immigrants to Canada about restrictive measures and the
■ ’ — . . . : Ly
possible risks involved in any efforts to land on Canadian soil.
Although the Viceroy of India (Xk>rd Hardinge) could sympathize
with the pligh^bf Gurdit Singh and his passengers,nevertheless he
expressed his reluctance to be of any assistance to theau On the
one hand he accepted the absolute right of the self-governing
colonies over their immigration policy which aimed at the exclusion
of Indians. Yet on the other hand he found it difficult to reconcile
these principles with the position of Indian subjects of the British
j London All-India Moslem .League to Colonial Office, June 19, 191^, 
-■':;;c.o.: 886/7../
2 Simla was the summer capital of India during that period.
3 Tribune, April 29, 191^«
Gazette of India, May 9, 191V, File 1799, L/P & J/6/1310.
3 Province, June 2, 191**. /
Empire. Indians claimed a right to be let in; Canada claimed the
right to keep them out. Such strongly opposing views must of
necessity lead to conflict; and Lord Hardinge expressed his fear
that serious trouble might erupt as a result.of the Komagata Maru 
1affair. Even among those educated Indians who had no desire to
emigrate to self-governing colonies the feeling was .'that of strong
resentment towards restrictions put on their less educated
countrymen, which they interpreted as an indication of an Indian*s
• 2position of inequality, with other subjects of the Crown. Lord
Hardinge observed these attitudes, and on July 9 informed the Secretary
of State for India (Lord Crewe) that this issue had caused a good
deal of agitation in India. In his urgent telegraphic correspondence
the Viceroy expressed his concern about possible repercussions
connected with this event:
... thore is no doubt a very strong desire among 
less educated people, more especially of the Pirn jab, 
to have the right of emigration to Canada and its 
refusal must produce bitter feelings among the Sikhs 
and other martial races of that great Province . ...^
The efforts of Indians to migrate to Canada continued to have a
hostile reception in British Columbia. In March 1914, the Saturday
Bms>t published pictures of some northern Indians, principally.the
labouring classes, goat-herds, tea pickers, curio-sellers, shoe
makers, coolie women and children, grain merchants and even the Indian
Goddess Siva. The headlines accompanying'these pictures posed this
question to the Canadian public: "Do we need them in British Columbia?"
This seemed to express the mood of the public on the Canadian pacific
1 Hardinge to Crewe, June 3* 1914, Hardinge Papers 120.
2 Hardinge to Crewe, June 11, 1914, Hardinge Papers 120.
3 Hardinge to Crewe, July 9» 1914, Hardinge Papers 120.
4 Hardinge to Crewe, telegram, June 12, 1914, Hardinge Papers 98.
9 Saturday Sunset, March l4, 1914.
Coast which was becoming increasingly more bitter against Indian 
Immigration. Speaking of the Komagata Maru’s adventure a Canadian 
who had lived in India remarked that if the ship and her passengers 
were sent back from whence they came, the result of such an action 
vrould have great effect in checking further immigration efforts on
the part of Indians. In this way the failure of this scheme would
■■■■ ''2 '
serve as a blessing in disguise* The British Columbian premier,
Sir Richard McBride, also favoured such action and he was quoted as
insisting on Canada’s right to exclude Indians. He expressed his 
desire to strengthen the hands of the Dominion government in its 
efforts to oppose further Asiatic immigration. The Victoria Times 
expressed its opposition to Indianimmigration for economic reasons 
and warned that the presence of Indians in large numbers would 
create a disturbance of a most dangerous character. Thus when 
the provincial premier (McBride) demanded that policy be set for
the complete exclusion of Asiatics, he had the unanimous support of
the provincial legislature. One could indeed observe that the
people of British Columbia presented an absolutely united front
' 7 : ■
against the landing of Indians.'
While the passengers of the ill~fated Komagata Maru remaindd
calm and continued their determined and systematic efforts to break
down the existing immigration laws the hostility of Canadians against
the Indians continued to rise and the Indians’ cause seemed more and
more hopeless. The Dominion government stated that it had no
1 Sir Cecil Spring Bice, British Ambassador at Washington (D.C.) to
Borden, February 2, 191^* Borden Papers, .Vol.’ 32.
2 Quoted in World, May 27* 191^*
3 Hews Advertiser, May 28, 191**.
4 The Times, May 23* 191**«
3 Victoria Times, May 23* 191***
6 The Times, May 23, 191**»
intention of permitting violation of its own Orders in Council by 
Gurdit Singh,- and the newspapers of British Columbia were flooded
with letters protesting against the admission of the Komagata Maru
. ... -2 3
passengers. The Sun summed up the prevailing mood of fear on the
Canadian Pacific Coast in a front page cartoon:
Oriental Labor: If you don’t let me ashore Ifll
refuse to take anything to eat.
White Labor: And if we let you ashore, I won’t be
able to get anything to eat anyway.
A doctor from Moose Jaw (Dr, H,G* Sutherland) suggested that
the immigration officers at Vancouver might be able to solve the
question# He was quoted as saying:
In investigation of the hookworm question it was 
found that 60 to 80 per cent of the total population 
of India showed infection with the worm .... Investigation 
at the port of San Francisco showed that 10,777 out of 
22,555 Oriental immigrants were harbouring this infection. 
If this ship-load of Hindus showed as widespread 
infection as it is quite evident from the experience of 
other nations, then they could be turned back as 
undesirable without further question.
Such widespread adverse publicity which reflected the Canadian
people’s angry attitude towards immigrating Asians made it practically
impossible for any Canadian government to relax restrictions concerning
the admission of Komagata Maru Indians. Even the Indians’ demand for
the appointment of a Koyal Commission to review the whole question
5
was totally unacceptable to the Dominion government. It was simple 
and natural enough that British subjects from India should have 
equal rights and privileges with other British subjects in Canada.
1 World, May 27* 191^*
2 The Times, May 29, 191**»
3 Sun, June 5, 191^*
k Ibid.V May 29, 191^; and Daily News-Advertiser, May 29* 191^*
5 Gurati, June 16, 191^* Bombay Newspaper Eeport, 1915* a«d The
Times, May 28, 191^*
But the problem was that no pressure from London or Delhi could wisely
be exerted upon the Dominion government to enforce these rights. As
long as there had been no crucial incident to deal with, all governments
had been able to make pretence that the question of rights was being
adequately dealt with. The arrival of the Komagata Maru, however,
brought the whole problem into focus and authorities were faced
with finding a practical solution to a potentially explosive situation.
One the one hand they had to consider the British citizenship of the
Indians and the threat to the Ehipire that their harsh treatment would
cause. On the other hand they could not ignore the prejudice of
Canadians against the Indians and Canada * s insistence that Indians
be kept out. >/hat could be done to solve such an awkward problem?
One writer in The Times advanced the unique argument that:
... it is conceivable that the time has come when 
Great Britain would welcome the annexation of 
Canada to the United States, as this course would
enable Great Britain to save the fall of India,
and the loss of Canada would be immaterial considering 
the great benefits of preserving the Empire.1
Though such a preposterous proposition couldnot be worth considering
by the Dominion or Imperial governments, nonetheless it showed what
a complicated and serious situation the Komagata Maru v/ith her 376
Indian passengers had created.
The Vancouver Sun blamed the Canadian administration for the
entire immigration crisis. It deplored the ambiguity of the Orders
in Council and particularly the way in which the continuous passage
and artisans and labourers clauses were applied to Indians. In its
editorial under the caption, "AN ASTONISHING POSITION”, it stated:
Everybody knows that this order in council is intended 
for exclusion, only of the Hindus and everybody must
1 The Times, May 29, 191^•
recognise it is a cheap shoddy attempt in an undignified 
way to accomplish an end which the government should have
the courage and vigor^to secure openly and by a frank and
unmistakable statute.
But The Times, Morning Post and other leading journals in Britain
asserted that the matter of emigration and immigration from and into
the self-governing colonies rested with the Dominions affected, who
were fully entitled to act under the supreme law of self-preservation
2 ' ■to keep their lands white men's countries.
The editor of The World (Louis D. Taylor) wrote a front page 
editorial under the caption: ‘‘Shall the Camels Head be allowed in 
the Tentn. He stated that the admission of three or four hundred
Indians yearly would do nothing to relieve the problem of over­
population in India and he went on to ask why British Columbia was 
asked to bear a part of the burden of the British Empire and why it 
should be saddled with Indians when their presence was bound to 
create an ugly situation on the Pacific Coast without making any 
difference to India.
The Hews-Advertiser (Vancouver), backing the anti-Indian standpoint 
suggested that if the immigration regulations were not adequate, the
Canadian government should lose no time in amending them suitably
A
so that Indian immigration could be effectively stopped. The Times 
commented:
Free peoples have a right to say whom they will admit 
into their country, just as free men have a right to 
say whom they v/ill admit into their house.5
1 Sun, May 27, 191^»
2 Windermere, special London Correspondent, Province and Montreal Star,
Province, June 2, 191^*
3 World, June 20, 191^.
k- Daily News-Advertiser, June 20, 191^*
5 The Times, June 191^.
The Winnipeg Free press also opposed the entry of Indians from the
Komagata Maru and stated they were
*.v a non-fusing human material in this country 
and they are not assimilable and therefore not 
■■'.wanted.
The Montreal Mail observed that if an honest effort was being made 
to provide an entrance for Indians who wished to come to Canada, the
attempt to force in a group of two hundred at one time was no way
2 ■ '■■■ - . ■ ' - 
to accomplish the desired end. The Ottawa Journal expressed strong
fears about the consequences of allowing the Komagata Maru passengers
to enter* l^ile backing the Canadian government’s policy of Indian
exclusion, its editorial under the caption ‘’Supply Greater than
Demand”, explained:
But with three hundred millions and more constituting 
the available visible supply the transportation 
companies eager for the passage fee to ferry them 
across the Pacific and with employers in Canada
willing to make use of them for services which most
men think should be performed by whites, the government 
: is justified in,taking extreme measures to exclude
this small lot.
Thus the newspapers throughout the Dominion gave their unanimous 
support to the government’s refusal to allow the entry of the Komagata 
Maru passengers. It was the general opinion of the press that the 
Indians had deliberately challenged the authority of Canada and therefore, 
it was urged that Canada should exercise full control over its 
immigration and should protect Western Canada from this peaceful 
Asiatic invasion. \
The labour organisations and local authorities in British Columbia
1 Cited in the Tribune (Lahore), June 29, 191^*
2 Cited in the Saturday Sunset (Vancouver), June 13, 191^.
bombarded the Dominion government with strong resolutions against 
Indian immigration, The Board of Trade in Vancouver held a meeting 
which was addressed by Malcolm Reid, the Dominion Immigration Agent 
in Vancouver, He outlined the various steps which his department 
had taken to stop the entry of Indians on the Komagata Maru. 
Subsequently the Board passed a resolution appreciating the steps 
already taken by the local immigration officials in retarding the
proposed entry of the Indians. It strongly urged the Dominion
■'" '1 . 
government to take every possible means of preventing their landing.
The Trade and Labor Council at New Westminster held a very spirited
discussion opposing Indian immigration and a mass mseting of residents
2of New Westminster was held to voice the protests. The Mayor of 
Vancouver (T.S. Baxter) telegraphed Borden, the Prime Minister of 
Canada, that
... this council desires to place itsdf on record 
as unalterably opposed to the admission of Hindus 
and other Asiatic races into the country.*^
The Ratepayers* Association of Vancouver and the South Vancouver Board
of Trade went on reeord as appreciating the work of H.H. Stevens, the
Member of the Canadian House of Commons, in opposing the Indians*
Aj.
immigration into Canada. The South Vancouver Conservative Association
informed the Canadian Prime Minister that it commended the government's
action in connection with the Indians. It further stated:
It was unanimously agreed that Hindoo immigration 
would work not alone to the disadvantage of British 
Columbia but to Canada as a whole.5
 ^ Province, May 27, 191^, and Daily News-Advertiser, May 28, 191** •
2 New Westminster News, June 25, 191^*
5 Baxter to Borden, telegram, June 30, 191**, Borden Papers Vol. kO,
k Ratepayers’ Association, Ward 7 to Borden, July 2, 191**, and South
Vancouver Board of Trade to Borden, July 6, 191**» Borden Papers Vol. **0.
5 McGibbon-Hodgson, Secretary, South Vancouver Conservative Association 
to Borden, July 8 , 191**, Borden Papers, Vol. **0.
The Vancouver County Orange Lodge No, 1, representing twenty-six
primary lodges and 15,000 voters in Vancouver District, commended
the action of the immigration officials and the Dominion government
in their dealing with the Komagata Maru passengers, and the premier
of British Columbia, Sir Richard McBride, strongly favoured the
exclusion of Indians on religious grounds, ighile opposing the Indian
immigration he wrote to Malcolm Reid:
Canada is a Christian Government and no one is wanted 
in the country except for temporary purposes, who is 
not likely to amalgamate and settle down as a God­
fearing and law-abiding citizen,^
The Dominion administration did not intend to allow the Indians
to land. It had enacted various regulations one after another to
guard against any possible attempt by Indians to force their entry.
But the Indians were British subjects, so their entry had to be very
carefully banned. Mention of such terms as "Indian", "Sikhs", "Hindu"
or any reference to race or nationality was avoided in the wording
of the regulations. Instead the law required that any applicant for
3
admission had to have 0200 in his possession upon landing in Canada,
and a further condition was that all immigrants must have come to
Canada by continuous journey and on through tickets from the country
if
of their birth or citizenship. Since there was no steamship line 
between India and Canada these regulations could serve the purpose 
of the Canadian government in their wish'to exclude Indians. There 
was also a third regulation which prohibited the landing of artisans, 
skilled and unskilled labourers through the **5 ports of British
1 D.L.Dence, County-Secretary, Loyal Orange Lodge No. 1 to Borden, 
July 6 , 191**, Borden Papers, Vol. **0.
2 McBride to Malcolm Reid, June 1, 191**, R.G.76, File 536999, Vol. 6,
3 P.C.2**, January 7, 191***
** P.C.23, January 7, 191**.
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Columbia. In spite of these rulings, however, the Dominion government 
could expect appeals to the Courts against its decisions to exclude 
immigrants whom it did not wish to admit. It was to prevent .such 
'an occurrence that the Canadian government had also inserted, in the
Immigration Act of 1910* the clause which took from the Courts the
v : : ; v  . ■ ' ■ ■ ■ ■ ■  - :'■■■■ - 2
right to interfere with the decisions of immigration authorities.
vThe only recourse allowed by the Immigration-Act of 1910 was that
the aggrieved person could appeal to the Minister in charge of the
Department. It was hoped that the Immigration Act, reinforced with
these three Orders in Council, should prove an invincible fort if any
undesirable immigrant entered into a litigious battle with the
Department of Immigration, But according to English law there was
another possibility open to the injured party. This was a writ of
habeas corpus, an old proceeding which has as its object the
protection of the liberty of the subject. To obtain this writ an
application is made to a judge of a superior court. If the judge
Is shown proper cause, he orders the applicant to be brought before
him. Then the applicant or his counsel is heard and if the applicant
can show that his detention is illegal the judge issues the writ,
and he is freed. But if the applicatio$6f writ is refused by one
judge, the applicant may apply to each judge on the bench one after
another. If any one judge on the bench issues a writ the applicant
is freed in spite of the fact that a similar request might have
been turned down by other judges. In a case where the writ was
granted the Crown could not appeal to the Court of Appeal because
there*was no appeal fr£m the decision of a Supreme Court justice
1 P.C.897,March 31» 191^.
2 Immigration Act, 1910, sect. 23*
granting a writ of habeas corpus, although there was an appeal from
an order refusing it. A court itfould not waste its time in hearing
a case where its action was to end. in futility. In immigration
cases, if a writ was granted, the applicant was free, and there was
no authority to,rearrest him should the Court of Appeal set aside
the decision of the judge in the court appealed from. Habeas corpus
is a civiib remedy, even if the alleged wrongful detention arises out
of criminal proceedings or other matters which are peculiarly within
the jurisdiction of the Dominion parliament.
But as I have mentioned in Chapter Seven, there was already one
example when thirty-nine Indians had applied to Justice Murphy of
the Supreme Court of British Columbia for a writ of habeas corpus
claiming that they were illegally detained. When they were refused
the writ on the grounds that the Justice had no jurisdiction under
section 23 of the Immigration Act, 1910, they applied to Chief Justice
Hunter who held that he was not debarred by section 23 from hearing
and deciding the matter. He also held that both the Orders in 
2
Council passed in 1910 were ultra vires, that is they were not 
strictly complying with the language of the section of the Immigration 
Act under which they were purported to be made. Therefore he granted 
the writ. There was no appeal against the Chief Justice*s decision 
and the thirty-nine Indians gained admission into Canada, Because 
of this embarrassing situation the Canadian government had Redrawn 
the Orders in Council^ to meet the criticism of the Chief Justice 
and had also passed another Order in Council prohibiting the entry
1 R. v. Yuen Yick Jun, 5^* 19^0, British Columbia Reports, p. 5^1*
2 As mentioned in Chapter 7*
3 Ibid.
of artisans, labourers, skilled and unskilled workers at that 
specified period of time through the forty-three ports of British 
Columbia.
At this time the passengers of the Komagata Maru presented ..two. 
important and serious points of consideration for the Canadian 
goveriunent. The first was that they were British subjects and they 
were therefore entitled to enter Canada if the lav/ permitted them 
to do so.- Secondly, they could apply for the writ of habeas corpus 
and in this regard the previous year’s case of the thirty-nine Indians 
still haunted the Dominion administration as a, point of danger. 
Canadian authorities were obliged to act cautiously. The legal 
experts of the Department of the Interior discussed the matter 
with James Edward Bird, the counsel for the Komafeata Maru passengers, 
and hoped for a quick and favourable solution to the problem. Their 
proposition to him was that one of his clients was to be designated 
as a test case and brought before the Board of Enquiry of the 
Immigration Department for examination arid hearing. If on such 
hearing the Board of Inquiry ordered the designated passenger to 
bedeported, JamesBird should apply to a judge of the Supreme Court 
for a writ of habeas corpus. He should then allow it to be dismissed 
without argument. After this he should appeal to the Court of Appeal; 
and the whole matter would be argued and settled in that Court. In
their proposals the legal experts of the Immigration Department 
carefully reduced the chances of writ application to the minimum 
extent by limiting the appeal to onlyoone court. Hov/ever the 
Komagata Maru passengers did not accept the Immigration Department’s 
proposal and following this the Canadian government allowed very
1 Bobie E. Reid, Agent of the Minister of Justice, to Scott, July 27, 
191^, R.G.76, File 8795^5, Vol. 3.;
2 Sun, May 29, 191^1 and Daily News-Advertiser, May 29, 191*K
little communication between the Komagata Maru passengers and their 
counsel. Even as late as June '.23*' James' Bird - wired '-to -.Borden: "Was 
refused right to go on board Komagata .Maru this morning to take 
instructions " The Immigration Board of Inquiry continued their 
examination but did not give any decision at the end of each case ■ 
so that the Indians were prevented from approaching the court to 
make an appeal. In the:meantime the;passengers remained imprisoned 
on board the Komagata Maru in the middle of the harbour and v/ere on 
very short rations. 'The situation was growing more tense each day.
On June 19, James Bird made an application to the Supreme Court 
for a writ'' of mandamus calling on immigration officials (comprising 
the Board of Inquiry) to come to court to show cause why they did
p ■
not give decision. He drew attention to section 33 sub-section k
of t\ie Immigration Act, 1910, which stated that immediately at the
conclusion of the Board of Inquiry,, the inquirers should either
admit;the.applicant or reject him for deportation. At this stage
there was a feeling that once the Indians got their case before the
court some-'flaw would be found in the regulations which might allow
their entry and the Immigration Agent (Malcolm Reid) expressed his
dpubts that his department could maintain its position in the legal
battle against the Indians. He told':the Province:
All I &no*r is that once these Indians get their cases 
before the courts no man can tell how the matter will 
end ... it will mean an interminable fight in courts 
with the issue in doubt for a long time, and the Hindus 
will beat the regulations and get in.^
But the immigration officials were at fault in their failure to hand
1 Bird to Borden, telegram, June 23, 191^, Borden Papers, Vol. *f0.
2 Province, June 20, 191^.
3 Daily News-Advertiser, June 20, 191*K
4 Province, June 20, 191^*
down decisions and under these circumstances, they were required to 
ansv/er the writ in the Supreme Court, in order to delay the matter, 
Malcolm Heid and his Assistant Immigration Agent (Howard) spent the 
day in hiding and in this way managed to evade being served with the 
court notice, The result was that the case had to be adjourned 
for another day.
Meanvrhile H.H. Stevens, M.P., v/arned.the Canadian government
at Ottawa; that if Indians were allowed to land there would be riots
■ . 2 ■■■ ' : ' ; -■
in Vancouver*. ; He tried to get some Japanese boats to force the.
Komagata Maru well out of the three mile limit so that the Canadian
courts should not have any territorial jurisdiction for their case.
:\\’Bevsaidi: :
: I am trying to get the government to strengthen
Malcolm Reid*s hand in getting them out before 
the courts have time to deal with them.2
The Daily News-Advertiser commented in an editorial that for the
Canadian government, success of Indians in law courts would mean
... abandonment of right to exclude, restrict, 
control or regulate immigration from India or, 
that matter, from other countries; and v/ould 
be an invitation to another and another similar 
expedition. -
These statements aroused the Indian community in Vancouver and they ■ 
held a mass meeting at the Dominion Hall where James Edward Bird, 
counsel on behalf of Indians, addressed an audience of about 325 people 
He protested against the treatment of those on board the Komagata Maru 
and stated that the Komagata Maru passengers had not come to Canada 
in opposition to the terms of the immigration act but indeed wished 
to enter Canada by perfectly legal means. The Canadian government,
1 Province, June 20, 191^.
2 Ibid., June 22, 191^-»
3 Ibid.
k Daily News-Advertiser, June 20, 191^*
however, was attempting to send them back without a fair hearing.
The meeting was addressed by three other socialists from British
Columbia and; by leading Indian immigrants. At the end of the meeting
a resolution deploring the high-handed attitude and harsh treatment
1meted out by the immigration authorities was passed. As one could
expect, the Indians* protests found their usual prominence in press
reports in the Punjab. The Tribune! (Lahore) published a telegram
sent by Umrao Singh on behalf of the protest meeting to the Khalsa
Akhbar (Lyallpur), which said:
Komagata Maru passengers unlawfully imprisoned on board, 
provisions, water, legal advisers, friends prevented.
Mass meeting protest such brutal unlawful treatment. 
Hindustanis can never forget, nor forgive; give wide 
publicity.^
To counter the public meeting of the Indians, H.H. Stevens, M.P.
and the Mayor of Vancouver (Baxter) called their own public meeting
on June 23 again at Dominion Hall, Vancouver. The hall was cro\\rded
with people and there was an overflow in the streets as well. The
principal speaker was H.H. Stevens, and Ralph Smith, ex-M.P. and
Alderman V/oodside also addressed the gathering. Stevens related the
history of Oriental immigration in Canada and mentioned the orders
in council passed from time to time to deal with it. He expressed
his strong fear that to allow an increasing number of Indian immigrants
to enter Canada would result in Asiatics taking over the country and
3destroying economic security. Consequently the meeting passed a 
resolution saying that the influx of Asiatics was detrimental and 
hurtful to the best interests of the Dominion from the standpoint of 
citizenship, public morals and labour conditions. The meeting strongly
1 Sun, June 22, 1914.
2 Tribune, June 26, 1914.
3 Full text of the proceedings of the meeting is available in 15*page 
letter of Hopkinson to Cory, June 24, 1914, Borden Papers, Vol. 40.
urged upon the Canadian government the necessity of supporting the 
efforts of the immigration authorities who had undertaken immediate 
steps for the rejection and deportation of the immigrants aboard the 
steamer Komagata Maru. The meeting further requested the Canadian
government to enact stringent legislation whereby such immigration
■ • - o  ■ '■ ■■>■■■• . " i  : -
in the future would be entirely restricted.
The Dominion government, however, was still unable to make up
its mind about its complicated immigration problem and the Canadian
Prime Minister wired to MalcolmReid:
You should take no step which in any way admits the 
jurisdiction of the Court to interfere, but if the 
immigrants initiate proceedings, it is important to 
secure a hearing before the court which will give a  ^
reasonable consideration to the Act and regulations.
By June 25, the Komagata Maru passengers were being threatened with
forcible deportation without being allowed a hearing in the courts. ^
They were left with-,no water supply on the vessel, with the result
that they wired to the Governor General of Canada:
Many requests to Immigration Department for water, 
but useless. Better order to shoot than this 
miserable death.^
And at the same time the local Member of Parliament (H.H. Stevens)
hurriedly negotiated with the Canadian Pacific Railway to deport the
Indians to some other steamship instead of the Komagata Maru* But
the Canadian Pacific Railway refused to do so.
The Dominion government was now being faced with the Mandamus
writ but it was doubtful .of its success if the writ proceedings were
started in the usual way. As a compromise therefore, a test case, as
1 Malcolm Reid to Scott, telegram, June 23, 1914, File 3601 L/P & J/6/1325*
2 Borden to Malcolm Reid, telegram, June 25, 1914, Borden Papers, Vol. 40,
5 Passengers, Komagata Maru to Governor General, Canada, telegram,
June 25, 191 ¥r R.G.7» G.21, File 332, Vol. 205.
4 Daily Haws-Advertiser, June 26, X9l4. .
suggested by the Dominion legal experts earlier in the end of May, 
v/as agreed upon. It was a tactical victory for the Canadian government 
because James Edward Bird, counsel for the Indians, agreed to argue 
the whole question in one final court which was, of course, the Court 
of Appeal, Canada. A test case of Munshi Singh was selected and the 
hearing v/as to go forward.
It was alleged by the immigration authorities and confirmed by 
the Board of Inquiry which enquired into the matter, that the petitioner 
Muhshi Singh was a person of Asiatic race who did not have the sum of 
200 dollars as laid down in the Order in Council and that he belonged 
to a class of immigrants prohibited by Section 38(G) and (3) of the 
Immigration Act, Furthermore he had come to Canada otherwise than by 
a continuous journey from the country of origin, thus violating 
Section 58(a) of the Act and the Governor General’s Order (P.C.23) 
dated 8th January, 191**. It appeared that he boarded his ship at Hong 
Kong. The Board of Enquiry served him with a deportation order.
Since Munshi Singh was chosen as. a test case, his counsel, James
Edward Bird, made an application to Justice Murphy for;m writ of 
habeas corpus, but no evidence was given or argument made thereon. 
Justice Murphy dismissed the application, but reminded the petitioner
that he had the right of taking the matter before the Court of Appeal
. . '"'v  ' 3  ■ ' "■■■
which was in session at that time, v
: The case came before the Court of Appeal on June 29* 191*** On
behalf of the appellant Barristers Cassidy and Bird appeared and the
Immigration Department was represented by Barristers Ritchie and Ladner.
1 P.C.2^, January 7, 191**•
2 P.C.897, March 31, 191**-
3 E.B. Robertson, Assistant Superintendent of Immigration to Doherty, 
July 30, 191**, R.G.76, File 8795**5, Vol. 3*
b Robie L. Reid, Agent to Minister of Justice, to Scott, July 27* 191**»
R.G.76, File 8795**5, Vol. 5.
On behalf of the petitioner (Munshi Singh) the following arguments 
were raised;
(a) The constitutionality of the Immigration Act was challenged 
because the Parliament of Canada was net competent to order the 
deportation of British subjects but had such power only with regard
to aliens. Such a law providing for detention and deportation of an 
immigrant was an interference with ’Civil rights within the Province’, 
which all immigrants possessed as soon as they entered into the 
provincial waters.
(b) Not only had the petitioner been rejected as an immigrant 
but had also been imprisoned in the skip in which he arrived. This 
was illegal since he had not committed any offence.
(c) The Orders in Council issued by the Governor General under
Sections 37 and 38 of the Immigration Act were in excess of the powers
conferred on him by those sections. The Governor General could not
pick out and discriminate against a particular race:
Nothing had occasioned so much international jealousy, 
friction and ill-feeling, as laws discriminating against  ^
a particular race or nation in the matter of immigration.
(d) The manner in which.the Board of Enquiry ascertained that 
the petitioner was an unskilled labourer in the face of his denial 
and assertion that he was a farmer, did not conform to principles of 
’’Natural Justice”.
(e) Notwithstanding Section 23 of the Immigration Act, the Court
2of Appeal must review the decision of the Board of Enquiry.
. (f) The expression ’Asiatic Pace' was too indefinite and it
could be said that the petitioner belonged to the Caucasian race to 
which Europeans generally belonged.
1 Re Munshi Singh, British Columbia Reports XX, 191** t p. 231.
2 Under Section 23 of the Immigration Act 1910, no court could review 
the decision of the Board of Enquiry.
The bench of six judges in the Court of Appeal rejected all the 
arguments and confirmed the order of deportation passed by the Board 
of Enquiry. The Coiirt held that the Parliament of Canada was clothed 
with sovereign power in matters relating to immigration into any part 
of the Dominion. The right of the Dominion parliament to legislate 
regarding what classes of immigrants should not enter Canada carried 
with it the right and power to impose all things necessary to fulfil 
the prohibition or expulsion of such Immigrants. Any entrenchment 
into provincial jurisdiction affecting civil rights, was also permissible. 
Secondly the Court.of Appeal held that the manifest intention of 
the framer-s of the Act meant discrimination in the matter of monetary 
tests according to race, occupation or destination of immigrants. That 
the policy under, which the monetary test v/as .'regulated - was not a matter ; 
with which the courts had a right to deal, and that P.C.2A (of January 7, 
191*0 was intra vires.
Thirdly, the Court held that the meaning attached by the Parliament 
of Canada to the term ’’native citizen” did not Contemplate that a 
British subject born in one part of the King’s possessions was to 
be considered a native citizen of every other part, but rather that 
the expression ’’country of .which he is native” was/used in a geographical 
.and not in a racial or national sense. The court held that P.C.23 (of 
January 7, 191*0 was intra vires and Its entrenchment debarred Munshi 
Singh from legal right of entry into Canada.
Fourthly the Court of Appeal held that P.C.897 (of March 31» 191**) 
was intra vires; that the Board of Enquiry acted within its jurisdiction; 
that the onus of proof of occupation rested upon the immigrant; that 
he failed to convince the Board of the correctness of his contention; 
that subject to an appeal to the Minister of the Interior, the decision 
of the Board of Enquiry,was final, and as the decision v/as not impeached
on the ground of fraud, the Court of Appeal had no right to review the
evidence, nor did have the jurisdiction to investigate the correctness
of the decision. While taking this attitude the Court nevertheless
expressed the opinion that the Board of Enquiry appeared to have ample
reason for reaching the conclusion that Munshi Singh would, if allowed
to land, be an unskilled labourer in Canada,
Fifthly, the Court of Appeal held that section 23 of the
Immigration Act of 1910 was within the power of the Canadian government
to enact, and that no court could interfere with the decision of a
Board of Enquiry, unless it had acted under Orders in Council which
were not in accordance with the powers given by the Immigration Act
of 1910* In this case it was held that the Orders in Council under
which the Board had acted were within the powers given by the Act,
and so the Court of Appeal had no jurisdiction to interfere,
1The writ of habeas corpus was refused.
During this crisis period in July the Reuter’s correspondent
for India (Edward J. Buck) toured Canada and met and talked with
various persons about the Komagata Maru adventure. He summed up
his observation in an urgent cable to Hardinge:
Carefully felt pulse, Toronto, Winnipeg, Komagata 
Maru question tour through Canada, press public 
adamant matter, Vancouver citizens threaten violence 
if Hindus land. Visited ship, conversed Gurdit Singh.
Suggest best solution, arrange immediate return ship ^
India, Patience Vancouver City unlikely last indefinitely.
On July 6, 191^1 the decision of the Court of Appeal was announced.
The court decided that the immigration authorities were perfectly
justified in deporting the one man, Munshi Singh, who was brought
3before it as a sample of the whole party aboard the Komagata Maru.
2 See Re Munshi Singh, British Columbia Reports XX, 191^» pp» 2^3-292.
2 Cited by Malcolm Reid to Scott, July 7, 191^, R.G.76, File 8?95^»
Vol. 3? and Ilopkinson to Cory, July 7» 191^, C.0.**2/980/28325.
3 Province, July 71 191^*
Following this favourable decision the immigration officia&s 
decided to examine all the other passengers on the vessel. They 
went on board the ship on July 10, 191^* and explained the matter to 
Gurdit Singh and his passengers that the Canadian government wished 
to give each an opportunity of being heard. However, the authorities 
found the passengers restife and the situation looked very serious 
because they had not had any food or water for at least two days.
At that time complicated negotiations were going on among the various 
interested parties - GUrdit Singh, the owners, H. Rahim and Bhag Singh 
and the immigration officials ~ to fix the responsibility for feeding 
the passengers. Row observing the situation at first hand the 
immigration authorities provided.the passengers with food and water 
but only enough for the next ...36 hours. But the question of who was 
to assume responsibility to supply food and water to the passengers 
was by no means settled and seemed to shift among the various parties 
with no one wishing to take on the obligation, The responsibility 
for the ship was also difficult to decide. While the Komagata Maru 
had been lying at Vancouver, Gurdit Singh assigned the charter to 
H. Rahim and Bhag Singh who represented the Hindu Committee ashore.
The assignment took place because Gurdit Singh was unable to pay
/ 14,000 as a condition of the charter obligation. On his appeal
. ■ . - ■■ ■ 3
this money was subscribed by the local Indian immigrants.
When the passengers were rejected for admission into Canada, the
solicitors for the owners of the vessel claimed that the responsibility
for deportation of the rejected Indians did not rest upon the owners
' . .'
of the ship, but upon the charterers. The ship, her captain, and
1 Hopkinson to Cory, July 10, 191^, File 3601 L/P & J/6/1323.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid..July 8, 191^t File 3601, X/p & J/6/1325.
k Tupper, Lecal Counsel of Komagata Maru Owners, to Borden, telegram, 
July l4; cited by Scott to Malcolm Reid, telegram, July l*f, 191^»
0.0.^2/980/28333-
the crew, they said, were all under the charge of the charterers.
But Gurdit Singh refused to have anything to do with either provisioning
the ship or deporting the passengers. And the new assignees of the
charter, H. Rahim and Bhag Singh, claimed that they had not brought
these passengers to British Columbia and therefore were not obliged
to deport them. H. Rahim and Bhag Singh demanded over and over
again that the immigration authorities remove these passengers from
the vessel and deport them or do as they pleased with them, so long
as they gave over the use of the ship to the assignees of the charter.
However, the immigration authorities refused such demands and under
Section 44 of the Immigration Act, 1910, demanded that the captain
of the vessel take the deported passengers to the parts from whence
he had brought them. But the captain declined to do so because there
1were no provisions for such a long voyage. Thus the position was
that the charterers were either unable or unwilling to furnish any
2
provisions and the owners disclaimed any responsibility. Since 
Singh had no property in Canada it was a difficult matter for the 
Canadian government to try to force him to assume responsibility 
for expenses incurred in connection with the deportation of these
3
rejected persons.^ At the same time the Dominion authorities did 
not wish to establish a precedent for paying the expenses of 
deportation for all those intending immigrants who had been rejected.
Such an action would be likely to encourage other charterers to 
engage in similar expectations. The Canadian Prime Minister (Sir 
Robert Borden) saw the political difficulties in trying to force 
the charterers to take the passengers back to Asia. But he could
1 Roble L. Reid to Scott, July 27, 1914, K.G.76, File 879545, Vol. 5*
2. Borden to High Commissioner for Canada in London, July 17, 191^,
Documents on External Affairs 1909-18, p. 649.
3 Robertson, Assistant Supt. Immigration to Doherty, Minister of
Justice, July 30, 1914, R.G.76, File 8795^5, Vol. 5.
4 Governor General, Canada to Secretary of State for Colonies, telegram,
July 18, 1914, C.O. 886/7.
also foresee that provisioning the Komagata Maru for the return 
voyage would relieve the Canadian government from the dangerous 
situation that the ship’s presence provoked. Such a gesture on 
the part of the government might reduce the chances of political 
exploitation by agitators in India and in this way it would prove 
to be very helpful for the governments of Great Britain and India. 
Therefore the Immigration Agent at Vancouver (Malcolm Reid) v;as 
authorised to incur the necessary expense to furnish supplies of a 
food to be used on the return journey,with the provision that'the 
Komagata Maru should agree to sail with all rejected passengers 
on board.
In spite of the rejection of their appeal by the Canadian Court
of Appeal, the Komagata Maru passengers continued their quest to
enter Canada on the grounds that they were British subjects and
farmers of India not labourers. They urgently wrote-to the Governor
General of Canada requesting him to allow their landing and grant
them a tract of land in Alberta. They offered a further condition
that if any of their;number was to fail to cultivate the land, the
Canadian government would have the right to deport that person.
At the same time Gurdit Singh himself, in an effort to save face
for his own reputation, appeared to be suggesting a threatening
compromise to the Canadian Governor General. His telegram stated:
Returning passengers will-be cause of bad impression 
to native Indian armies. Better bestow some tracts 
of land in any part of Canada for their cultivation 
to save India from troubles.
1 Scott to Malcolm Reid, telegram, July 14, 1914, File 36OT, L/P & J/6/1325
2 Borden to Perley (High Commissioner for Canada in London), July 17,
1914, File 3601, L/P & J/6/I325.
3 Passengers, Komagata Maru to Governor General, Canada, telegram,
July 8, 1914, R.G.7, G.21, File 332v Vol. 205.
4 Gurdit Singh to Governor General, Canada, telegram, July 8 , 1914, 
R.G.7,G.21, File 332, Vol. 205.
Through all these efforts the passengers were insisting that they
could prove and establish their status as farmers if the Dominion
government were ready to give them a chance and Gurdit Singh was
determined to advance his own schemes by advocating the greater danger
to the Empire forces* The Department of the Interior, however,
continued to oppose the request of the Komagata Maru passengers and
justified its restrictive immigration by stating that
... the Government has made certain restrictive 
immigration regulations, under the authority granted 
by Parliament, and if the passengers of the Komagata
Maru are unable to comply with these regulations,
their admission to Canada would be illegal*^
Concerning the subject of setting aside tracts of land for the
passengers of the Komagata Maru, the Governor General of Canada v/as
advised to express his reluctance. It was pointed out that such
practice had been discontinued some years ago because by experience
2it was found to be ’inadvisable’. However, Gurdit Singh and his 
passengers continued to try to prove that their exclusion from British 
Columbia on account of their being branded as labourers was unreasonable 
and wrong.
While this matter of granting tracts of land to the Komagata Maru 
passengers was a subject of official procedure whose end was lost 
sight of in the maze of discussion and correspondence within the 
various departments of the Dominion government at Ottawa, the 
passengers became bitterly disappointed and filled with sorrow. They 
were resentful and bitter because of their unfair treatment, and their 
protests, grievances and pitiful conditions were again expressed in 
their urgent wire to the Governor General of Canada:
1 Deputy. Minister of the Interior to Under Secretary of State for External 
Affairs, July 16, 1914, K.G.7, G.21, File 332, Vol. 205.
2 Under Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor General’s 
Secretary, July 17, 191^, R.G.7, G.21, File 332, Vol. 205.
Sent many telegrams, answered matter under consideration, 
afterwards no final definite answer, being shut in 
ship from four months^ becoming sick, no good food,
.water and exercise, dying, decide immediately. We, : 
ignorant, either you don’t answer decision or immigration 
not tell us.
But the Canadian government was still trying to implement the court's 
order of their deportation. On July 18 the passengers made another 
telegraphic appeal to the Governor General to grant their landing 
and this telegram presented a good argument for their case* The 
passengers pleaded for mercy, they repeated their right as British 
subjects to enter Canada, and they stated that the continuous passage 
journey was meaningless for a chartered ship. If the law was such 
that they were to be kept out of Canada they asked why the Hong Kong 
authorities had not stopped them from leaving for Canada. They insisted 
again that they were farmers and if given an opportunity to cultivate ; 
in Canada, they would prove it. Finally they expressed their inability 
to bear the rigours of a return journey to India which meant imprisonment 
for another four months aboard ship.
In the meantime Indian immigrant leaders on the Pacific Coast, 
faced with the failure of all their attempts to secure admission for 
their countrymen, tried unsuccessfully to purchase revolvers at
different shops at Victoria and Vancouver. An enquiry foijthe purchase
3 . if -
of a bomb was also made. On July 1? four Sikhs - Harnara Singh, Bhag _
Singh, Balwant Singh and Mewa Singh - crossed the border into the
State of Washington and met Tarak Nath Das at Suma where they bought
some revolvers and ammunition. Mewa Singh returned to Canada but
1 Passengers Komagata Maru to Governor General, Canada, telegram,
July 13, 191^, B.G.7, G.21, File 332, Vol. 205.
2 Malcolm Reid to Robertson, July 20, 191^, C. 0.^2/980/28333.
3 Ieemonger and Slattery, An Account of the Ghadr Conspiracy, 1913-15» P*39
■k Bhag-Singh was also one of the new charterers of the Komagata Maru.
5 Tarak Hath Das was dismissed from his job as interpreter in the U.S. 
immigration office at Vancouver due to his anti-British activities 
in 1908. See Chapter 2.
was arrested and found to have two automatic pistols and ^00 rounds
' . 1 of ammunition on his person. When they received this information
the U.S. authorities arrested the other three Sikhs who were still
in U.S. territory. Each Sikh was found to be armed with automatic
' 2pistols and ammunition. Subsequently Mewa Singh gave a statement 
to the effect that the object of the party in purchasing revolvers 
was to smuggle them on board the Komagata Maru. Tarak Nath Das had 
gone to Suraa with the deliberate intention of buying arms for the 
Komagata Maru passengers. In a letter Tarak Nath Das had described 
these Sikhs as his best friends and true leaders of the Hindus.^
But the authorities seized all the pistols and the attempts to arm
the Komagata Maru passengers failed*
The immigration officials in Vancouver/realising the possible
complications if the Komagata Maru stayed on, went on board in the
company of C. Johnson, agent for the Japanese shipowners. They
4notified Captain Yamamoto to sail at once with his passengers, but 
the captain refused to depart claiming that he v/as prevented by the
5
passengers from moving the boat. . The immigration officials pointed 
out to him if he had control over the ship he was liable to a penalty 
not exceeding five hundred dollars in respect of each passenger on 
board for failure to depart and that, if he did not have control of 
his ship, he was in duty bound to call upon the civil authorities 
to assist him in procuring such control of his ship as would enable 
him to obey the orders of the immigration authorities. Under these 
circumstances the captain formally requested the civil authorities
1 Hopkinson to Samuel Backus, Commissioner, U.S. Immigration, San 
Francisco, July 20, 1914, C.0.42/980/29650.
2 Daily News-Advertiser, July 21, 1914 and Khushwant Singh, The Sikhs,p. 128,
3 Scott to Cory, March 20, 1919, R*G.76, File 536999, Vol. 11.
4 Robie L. Reid, "The Inside Story of the Komagata Maru", B.C.Historical 
£|udrierlyJanuary 1941, p. 15*
5 Isemonger and Slattery, An Account of the Ghadr Conspiracy 1913-13, P*39*
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to help him obtain control of the boat.
In response to the captain’s appeal the police and immigration
authorities chartered a tug, the Sea Lion, and planned to restore
control to the captain at midnight on July 18, 191^. The police
chief at Vancouver, MalcolnMcLennan, accompanied by 125 police officers,
f^O special immigration officers, legal adviser Ladner and Member of
Parliament H.H..Stevens, participated in the operation* Before
taking any&ction Hopkinson, the interpreter and immigration inspector,
went to the Komagata Maru and tried to explain to the passengers
that in preventing the captain of the ship from sailing they had
committed a criminal offence. But the passengers refused to hand
over control of the boat without the written permission ofH. Rahim 
x
and Bhag Singh.^ Thus Hopkinson was unsuccessful in his last-minute
>  4 ■ 1
effort to avert the crisis. As the tug, Sea Lion, came near the
Komagata Maru, the matter:reached its serious climax. Indian
passengers started to hurl down coal, iron bars, pieces of machinery,
hatchets and clubs on the officers in the Sea Lion. The officials
on the sea tug used cold water to hold back the specifically ■
aggressive crowd. In the confrontation all the windows of the 
n
tug were broken and several officials were injured. The Dominion
government while giving the details of the event to the, press remarked?
Some shots were fired by the Hindus, but the officers, 
although armed in their anxiety to prevent bloodshed 
if possible, did not return the fire....
1 RobieL. Reid to Scott, July 27, 191^, R.G.76, File 8795^5» Vol. 5; 
Robertson, press statement, July 20, 191^» D.0.42/980/28553v
2 Malcolm Reid to Robertson, telegram, July 19, 1$0A, C.0.^2/980/28333•
5 Malcolm, Reid to Scott, telegram, July 19, 191^, File 3601, L/P 8< J/6/l325
k Hopkinson to Wallinger, July 20, 191^, C. 0.^2/980/29650.
5 Malcolm Reid to Scott, telegram, July 19* 191^, File 36OI ,L/P & J/6/1325
6 Hopkinson to Wallinger, telegram, July 19, 0.0.^2/980/29650.
7 Robertson to Doherty, July 30, 191^, R.G.76, File 8795^5, Vol. 5*
/ The boarding party_/ retired and returned to the 
shore with their twenty injured among whom was the^ 
captain of the tug suffering from two broken ribs.
Hopkinson telegraphed to the India Office that '’Komagata Maru Hindus
and Canadian Police and Immigration Officers came to blows at one 
2thirty a.m.” Malcolm Reid urged the Dominion government to take firm
action immediately for he feared that when these facts became known
to the public there was the possibility of an anti-Oriental riot*
In his telegraphic message to Ottawa he described the situation: :
The men aboard undoubtedly in desperate and fanatical 
condition. Utterly impossible to reason with them or 
to handle in ordinary manner.: The peculiar situation 
of this riot occurring on board a ship anchored in the 
stream makes ordinary police method useless as police 
and guards do not wish to use fire arms to retaliate 
and can do no effective service without.^
Ii.H. Stevens informed the Canadian Prime Minister, Borden, that
Indians on the Komagata Maru were desperate revolutionaries determined 
**to defy the law. He urgently requested the Dominion government to
take a strong stand and authorize a naval boat, the Rainbow, to take
5
charge of the situation.
The police and immigration officials attempted to take possession
of the Komagata Maru but failed because the deck of the Sea Lion v/as
15 feet lower than the deck of the Komataga Maru and this gave the
6
Indians a tremendous advantage. The only chance the police had was' 
to use their rifles, but though McLennan, the police chief, was 
wounded, he would not permit his men to use the guns. Besides, the
1 Robertson, press statement, July 20, 2)91**, C.O.**2/980/28353•
2 Hopkinson to Wallinger, telegram, July 19, 191**, C.O.**2/980/29650.
3 Malcolm Reid to Robertson, telegram, July 19,191**, C.O.**2/980/28333*
** Stevens confirmed his views in this regard in an interview, August 2**,
1972, with the author.
5 H.H. Stevens to Borden, telegram, July 18, 191**, File 3601, L/F & J/6/1325*
6 Robie L. Reid, "The Inside Story of the Komagata Maru”. B.C. Historical
Quarterly, 19^1, p. 16.
Imperial government foreseeing the complications of the situation
and the sudden turn it might take, had already emphasised to the
Governor General of Canada that:
Possibility of rioting iJiich would necessitate use of
; force on board Komagata Maru mentioned by press
telegrams. While vessel is in British waters of course 
very desirable to avoid use of force which would have 
extremely bad effect in the Punjab.^
But the Indian passengers had a different interpretation of the event.
Many felt, no doubt, that they could boast about their success and
this idea was reflected even forty years later in the words of one
Sikh writer when he observed; '"The police were beaten back by unarmed,
t.- 2 • ■ ’■ '
semistarved Sikhs.”
Gurdit Singh and his passengers continued their telegraphic,
protests and requests to the Dominion government now complaining
about police brutality. Regarding the attempts made by the police
the passengers’ telegram to the Canadian Governor General read:
Last night Immigration attacked steamer with four 
hundred policemen, many Hindus are wounded severely, 
none hears, hungry since three days, order for 
provision otherwise great trouble. '''■■wire results 
soon, your silence proves that you wish us to die, 
ready to die if not arranged by appointing Commission 
to investigate matters^ take statement in steamer, 
yesterday appealed by telegram but no information as _ 
yet, Immigration forces to return but wait your answer.
The next day, they wired the Minister of the Interior:
Many telegrams to Governor General. He answers 
transferred to you for consideration. No consideration 
as yet, police attacks daily duly armed. No provisions, 
immigration returning forcibly without your decision.
If not decided within two days all passengers will be 
killed by police and volunteers, and you are responsible 
for so many lives. Will not return forcibly, prefer 
death to cruelty. VJhat would be the use of consideration 
after death.
1 Harcourt to Governor General, Canada, telegram June 2*f, 191**, R.G.7* G.21, 
File 332, Vol. 205.
2 Khushwant Singh, The Sikhs, p. 128.
3 Passengers, Komagata Maru to Governor General Canada, telegram, July 19, 
191^, R.G.?, G.21, File 332* Vol. 205.
k Passengers, to Minister of the Interior, telegram, July 20, 191^, File
3601, L/P & J/6/1325.
The Canadian Prime Minister,' Sir Robert Borden, came to know
about the violent action of the Indians aboard the Komagata Maru on
"I
Sunday morning, July 19, 191** and he immediately requested Martin
Burrell, the Canadian Minister of Agriculture, who was at Grand Forks
in British Columbia to proceed to Vancouver and to make sure that
the Komagata Maru should depart with the least possible delay and
2without any; further violence. At the same time the Canadian Prime 
Minister communicated with the naval authorities and arranged to
place the naval boat, Rainbow, at the disposal of the immigration
. ** authorities at Vancouver. So by July 20, before the arrival of
Burrell in Vancouver, the Rainbow, under the command of Admiral Hose,
had already made her way to within a short distance from the Komagata
3Maru in the Burrard Inlet. The Dominion government issued specific
instructions to deal'with the situation:
Naval Service authorities are being instructed to 
have Rainbow cooperate in securing landing on Komagata 
Maru. Suggest that high pressure'stream of water 
from fire engine placed upon large boat available might 
be useful in keeping back resisting the police and 
officers desiring to reach decks of the Komagata Maru.
Violent actions of Hindus last night amply justify 
hand-cuffing full number if control of ship and passengers 
cannot otherwise be secured and maintained ....
It is desired that no unnecessary violence shall be used 
but that law shall without fail be effectively enforced.... 
Consult legal advisers as to taking proceedings ... 
against master and assignees of Charter ...
The Canadian government instructed the Vancouver military officials
to supply the commander of the Rainbow with all the assistance he;.
1 Borden to Governor General Canada, July 21, 191**, C.O. **2/980/28333.
2 Borden to Burrell, telegram, July 19, 191**, File 3601, L/P & J/6/1323*
3 Borden to Hazen, telegram, July 19, 191**, C.O. **2/980/28333*
** Borden to Burrell, telegram, July 20, 191**,File 3601, L/P & J/6/1325*
'5 Psiiy News-Advertiser, July 21, 191**.
6 Robertson to Malcolm Reid, telegram, July 20, 191**, C.O.**2/980/28333*
'I
might need for securing control of the Koraagata Maru, Fearful
that violence might break out in the city itself, the Mayor of
Vancouver (T.S. Baxter) went a step further and called in the army
to maintain lav/ and order in Vancouver. The Dominion government
3
was rather surprised and expressed its concern about this extreme
measure by the civic chief especially since it was under constant
4
pressure from the British government to keep the incident from 
becoming violent. But the mayor was anxious to justify his summons 
to the army and used the pretext of the possibility of riots in the
5
city. Regardless of this, however, the Governor General of Canada
assured the Secretary of State for the Colonies:
It is the intention of th§ Government ... to carry 
out enforcement of law* Authorities fully recognizant 
of situation and no unnecessary force will be used.
The Indian immigrants still continued their telegraphic complaints
against the.immigration officials at Vancouver and made urgent appeals
7
to the Dominion government to grant them permission to land. The
8
campaign against Indians also continued in the press. The situation 
needed urgent and immediate action. Therefore the immigration officials 
in Vancouver requested the Minister of the Interior to rush the final 
answer to the telegraphic appeals of the Indians against the deportation
1 Robertson to Malcolm Reid, telegram, July 20, 1914» C.0.42/980/28355*
2 Mayor of Vancouver to District Commanding Officer, Vancouver, July 20, 
1914, R.G.76, File 879545, Vol. 5.
3 Scott to Malcolm Reid, telegram, July 21, 1914, R.G.76, File 879545, Vol
4 Secretary of State for Colonies to Governor General, Canada, telegram,
July 20, 1914, File 3601, L/P & J/6/I325.
5 Malcold Reid to Scott, telegram, July 21, 1914, R.G.76, File 879545, Vol
6 Governor General, Canada, to Secretary of State for Colonies, telegram,
July 22, 1914, C.O. 886/7.
7 Balwant Singh and others to Governor General, Canada, telegram, July 20, 
1914, R.G.7, G.21, File 352, Vol. 205.
^ Pally Rews-Advertiser, July 21, 1914.
1
order. The immigration officials had delayed their reply because 
they wanted to eliminate any possible excuse or justification 
which could be put forward by the Indians for their non-compliance 
with the deportation order. At this time, however, the Dominion 
government not only turned down the Indians * appeal but also demanded 
immediate compliance with the deportation order. The Government of 
Canada, however, expressed its vdllingness to furnish provisions 
for the return journey. The authorities also hinted that they were
"* panxious to avoid the use of force in that situation.
The immigration officials, H.H. Stevens, M.P., the Vancouver
police chief, and Commander Hose held a conference aboard the Rainbow
and decided to deliver a final ultimatum to the passengers of the
Komagata Maru. Hopkinson (interpreter and immigration inspector)
was chosen to carry out this plan. The ultimatum urged that the
passengers submit to the low peacefully and restore the command of
the ship to the captain. It further stated that their case was
exhaustively and ably argued in the courts and they had been lav/fully
ordered to be deported. The ultimatum also contained a severe warning
to the Indians for their unlawful behaviour and it reminded them that
if they continued their reluctance, steps would have to be taken to 
.4
enforce the -.law. While all these threats, warnings and allegations 
were being exchanged between officials and passengers, Martin Burrell, 
Minister of Agriculture in the Borden cabinet, was sent to make his 
assessment of the situation. He reached Vancouver on the afternoon
1 MalcoinRdid to Doherty, telegram, July 20, 1914, R.G.76, File 879543, 
Vol. 5.
2 Minister of the Interior to passengers, Komagata Maru, telegram,
July 21, 1914, E.G.76, File 879545, Vol. 3*
3 Malcolm Reid to Scott, telegram, July 21, 1914, R.G.76, File 873545* 
Vol. 5.
4 Ultimatum was read by Hopkinson to Passengers, Komagata Maru, July 21,
1914, R.G.76, File 879545, Vol. 5.
1of July 21, 1914, an(* after a hurried investigation, he came to 
the conclusion that the principal difficulty in getting the Komagata
Maru and her passengers to sail was the fact that their fellow
2 3countrymen who were residents of Canada had subscribed certain
monies which they feared were not likely to be refunded* Burrell,
as a member of the Dominion government and as a special representative
of the Prime Minister of Canada, was in a better position to make a
positive decision on a course of action regarding this matter than
any of the officials of Vancouver and he held a conference with
k '■
MacNeill, the counsel for the Indians, to try to arrange a settlement*
He repeated the Dominion government's previous offer to provision the
ship for the return voyage and he gave assurances to MacNeill that
if the passengers would at once restore the control of the boat to
the captain and leave the port he would recommend to the government
that the financial claims of the local Indians be thoroughly looked
into by an impartial commissioner and that full and sympathetic
5
consideration would be given to those who deserved it. Burrell 
made this offer to MacNeill in a formal letter which proved to be 
a turning point in the solution of the immediate crisis and the focal 
point of later controversy after the Komagata Maru had sailed away.
The terms of the Minister of Agriculture's offer were these;
1 Robie L* Reid, Agent of Minister of Justice, ' The Inside Story of the 
Komagata MaruM, B.C. Historical Quarterly, January 1941, p* 19*
2 Gurdit Singh had assigned his charter to H* Rahim and Bhag Singh, who 
represented the Hindu Committee ashore. This transfer took place
on the understanding that the sum of $14,000 would be paid by these 
men to fulfil the charter obligations and, they had the control of 
the ship till September 27, 1914. This money was subscribed by the 
Indian community in Vancouver* See Hopkinson to Cory, July 8, 1914,
File 3601, L/P & J/6/1329.
3 Scott to Winter Joiner, April 23, 1915, R*G*?6, File 879543, Vol. 5*
4 Eric Morse, "Some Aspects of the Komagata Maru?,t The Canadian Historical 
Association', .19591 106.
5 Burrell to Borden, telegram, July 21, 1914, File 3^01, D/P & J/6/1325*
I understand from you that one of the difficulties 
in the way of the Komagata Maru at once leaving this 
port is that the assignees of the charter and others 
believe they are entitled to a repayment of the money 
; advanced by them in good faith to the owners in the
belief that they 'would be repaid by the value of the 
cargoes. As a member of the Government, I shall wire 
to the Prime Minister asking that these claims should 
be thoroughly looked into by an impartial Commissioner, 
and will urge that full and sympathetic consideration 
be given to those who deserve generous treatment. I 
must point out, however, that this is conditional on 
the passengers now on the Komagata Maru adopting a 
peaceable attitude refraining from violence and conforming 
to the law by giving to the captain control of his ship 
immediately, and agreeing to peaceably return to the port 
whence they came. May I add that it is necessary that 
a decision should be reached at once.
These terms were readily accepted by the Indians on the coast 
and at once they went to the Komagata Maru to persuade the passengers 
to allow the captain to prepare for his departure. They also agreed 
to permit the provisions to be loaded in the ship. This sudden 
change in position revealed the unmistakoable fact that the passengers 
had been under the influence of the Indians on shore. The passengers 
were also afraid that even if they reached India, H, Rahim and others 
would demand from them the money they paid as an instalment of the 
charter. Therefore, once the Minister of Agriculture gave assurance 
to the local Indians that they would beJreimbursed, the root cause 
Of the dissension was eliminated and the passengers gave in. Burrell*
compromising attitude and his importance as a cabinet minister
,V:; ^
changed the scene. The show of force by the immigration authorities, 
the anti-Indian attitude of the press which reflected the hostile 
public mood, and the financial involvement of local Indians in the
1 Martin Burrell to MacNeill, Ju?Ly 21, 1914, Borden Papers, Vol. 40.
2 Hopkinson to Cory, July 25, 1914, 0,0.42/980/32971.
3 Passengers, Komagata Maru to Tupper, Counsel for owner of Komagata 
Maru, July 21, 191'*, H.G.76, File 8795^5, Vol. 5.
•4 . Malcolm Reid to Borden, July 22, 1911*, Borden Papers, Vol. kO.
enterprise had created the deadlock. Burrell explained this in
his letter to Borden:
It may seem that I went a little far in concessions; 
and indeed I fear that Stevens and Immigration people 
may have felt, that I was advising, and giving way 
unncessarily ..• I was, however, so profoundly 
convinced of tremendous gravity of using force, thet 
I felt that you would wish me to go very far before 
running the risk. In a confidential talk with Commander 
Hose, he frankly stated to me, that if he had to board 
the vessel and forcibly take control, he would not be 
surprised if one hundred lives were lost. And as in 
addition to the Hindus, there would probably have been 
Japanese sailors killed the complications would have 
. been endless.
Facing this possibility, I felt that you would justify 
me in not quibbling at a few thousand dollars v/orth of 
provisions more or less, or in writing the enclosed 
letter which indeed was the turning point in securing 
peaceable control of the ship. I gathered that the 
viewsof those in charge v;hen I got there \-irere not 
specially sympathetic towards payment of any claims, 
but again I say that the point might well be stretched 
and deserving and moral claims be well considered, 
rather than have run the appalling.risk of converting 
the Komagata Maru into a shambles.
1'he public impression was that the Indians resisted the law so
long as they knew that force would not be used, but as soon as the
show of force m  the form of the arrival of the Rainbow, was introduced,
the situation immediately changed. Explaining- this point the Province
commented; ■
fhe Asiatic is a diplomat of the first order. He 
loves a parley and a bargain. He will play that game 
with the greatest good nature until his opponent shows 
that he has come to his limit and then he will tamely 
surrender,c ■.
Similarly H.H. Stevens was quite convinced that a ’’display of force” 
brought the Indians to their senses and without it they would not 
have agreed to leave. But if the control of the Komataga Maru had 
to be taken by force there was every possibility of bloodshed not
1 Burrell to Borden, July 25, 191^, Borden Papers, Vol. kO,
2 Province, July 22, 191^.
5 Stevens to Borden, telegram, July 21, 191^, File 3601, L/P >  J/6/1325
only of Indians but also of Japanese. Such a serious incident could 
rock the British Empire and have serious repercussions On vital 
Anglo-Japanese relations as well. Up to this point the attitude of
the immigration authorities had beenLnot nto admit any negotiation
■ ' . V  -  1 ' '
or settlement on any terras”, and under these circumstances and
without Burrell’s intervention no peaceable settlement would have
been possible.
After the settlement the work of provisioning the ship for her 
voyage was carried on with all possible speed. H. Rahim, as a 
charterer of the boat, formally authorised Captain Yamamoto to get 
up steam at once in preparation to leave Vancouver Harbour. ■ The
immigration authorities allowed Indians on shore to meet their
V ; ■ ■ if . ■ /' .
friends aboard the vessel. The ship was v/ell provisioned for the
journey to India, and she left Vancouver on July 23, 191*+, at
6 ■-■■■5 a.m., the Rainbow accompanying her for a short distance. The 
people of Vancouver were happily surprised that the Komagata Maru 
had quietly disappeared from their shores and the Governor General 
of Canada was satisfied that the difficult situation was handled
g
without resort to violence.
In fulfilling Burrell’s promise, the Canadian government 
appointed IhC. Clogstoun of Victoria, who had served for many years 
in the Indian Civil Service, to investigate and report on the whole
1 MacNeill to Borden, July 22, 191*+, Borden Papers, Vol. *+0.
2 Ibid. ..
3 H. Rahim to Yamamoto, Captain, Komagata Maru, July 21, 191*+; cited 
by Hopkinson to Cory, C.O. *+2/980/32971.
k Hopkinson to Cory, July 25, 191*+, C.O. 42/980/32971.
5 Komagata Maru Committee of Enquiry Report t pp. 13-1*+*
6 Robertson to Doherty, July 30$ 191*+, R.G.7&, File 8795*+5, Vol. 5*
7 Province, July 23, 191*+/
8 Governor General, Canada to Secretary of State for Colonies, telegram, 
July 22, 191*+, C.O. 886/7.
A  '. ’ 'matter. The Special Commissioner (Clogstoun) examined the situation
met the various people involved and on November 4, 1914, sent his
first 32-page report of his findings to the Dominion government. He
was of the opinion that the main motive for the contributions of money
that the Indian community had made to; protect Gurdit Singh’s charter
rights was not madd for the purpose of realizing any economic gain
from the sale of the ship’s cargo but rather to assist their countrymen
on board the Komagata Maru to evade Canadian immigration regulations.
The investigation showed that the coal that gurdit Singh hoped to
sell was of poor quality and that the small quantity that was on the
ship was used for the voyage back to India. If, therefore, the Indian
community had received any promise of repayment in the form of receipts
or securities from the Komagata Maru Committee in Vancouver headed
by II. Rahim and Sohan Lai and others the matter was a simple and
2reasonable business transaction. Compensation to the subscriber, it
was concluded, was only possible through the Komagata ?4aru Committee?
But the Special Commissioner seemed determined to discredit these
Indian leaders as he observed while writing to Martin Burrell:
The committee are a mixed lot of ruffians - Rahim a 
pseudo Mohammadan and Sohan Lai one of the meanest 
types ... always seditious. Both probably would be 
in jail if in India .... They have been making their 
living and demoralizing the general body of the Indian 
immigrants; to give them anything directly would 
establish a dangerous precedent ....
The general body however were to some extent 
deceived and in my recommendation I suggested a means 
of helping them against those who have been robbing 
them for years while also demoralizing them. It seemed 
wise to make them work out their own salvation to some 
extent and if possible encourage a split between them 
and the worse half.
The Special Commissioner justifiably recommended, therefore, that the 
contributors to the charter fund should be induced to Initiate legal
1 P.O. 2432, September 26, 1914.
2 Clogstoun Report, November 4, 1914, Borden Papers, Vol. 40.
3 H.C. Clogstoun to Burrell, February 13, 1913, Borden Papers, Vol. 40.
proceedings against their own leading and active members of the
Komagata Maru Committee bn shore. He thought that in this way the
anti-government elements would be condemned, and the united hostility
against the Dominion government would automatically subside. With
regard to Burrell’s written assurances of compensation for losses,
Clogstoun put forward the recommendation that the Indians’ motives
were sinister and foul and since there was no reliable account of
the financial transactions, therefore no payment should be made. He
stressed that the Canadian government should be firm and should not
1
entertain the idea of any concession even by implication.
For the Indian immigrant community, however, there was a
prevailing feeling that the ©oney was actually their due from the
Dominion government and the Komagata Maru Committee was the only
?agency through which such compensation could be made to them. " In 
the meantime Martin Burrell had sent a carefully worded communique 
to the Daily News-Advertiser which stressed the tentative nature of 
his previous year’s promise at the time of the departure of the 
Komagata Maru. Special Commissioner Clogstoun was reappointed to 
implement the decision of the Canadian government on his earlier 
report and to give the Dominion authorities the current appraisal 
of the Indian immigrants' situation. However, the Dominion government 
had decided that it would not make any repayment but would assist 
those who desired to sue the Komagata Maru Committee. So Clogstoun’s 
job was to help the plaintiffs with legal expenses if they wanted 
to sue the Komagata Maru Committee for the recovery of their
1 H.C. Clogstoun, Report, November 4, 1914, Borden Papers, Vol. 40.
2 H.C. Glogstoun to Roche, November 1915» File 3601, L/P & J/6/1325*
3 Daily News-Advertiser, June 15, 1915.
4 P.C. 1263, June 2, 1915-
subscription.
, During this time some Indians who had been inspired, by the
recommendations of the Canadian authorities had already entered into
litigation with the Komagata Maru Committee for the recovery of their
subscription and successfully won their cases. But unfortunately
for them the actual recovery of the money could not be made possible
and the result of the action was that the leading Indians were
discredited. In one of these cases the, Indians frankly admitted
that practically all the money subscribed had either been given or
lent to help their countrymen overcome the immigration restrictions.
So Clogstoun was happy to observe in his second reports
So far as suits go, the net result of my endeavours 
to carry out the instructions of the Government is 
small, nevertheless Sikhs are realising that they 
will not be compensated for conspiring to defeat 
orders of Government, that they have been misled by 
those forming the Komagata Maru Committee, and they 
must work out their own salvation in part, if not 
altogether.
His observation was that the Indian community was now split and
their solicitor James Edward Bird was also condemned by them. He
"/V  ^ .
recommended strict control over Indian immigration and said no
compensation should be paid to them for their loss of money in
the Komagata Maru affair. The immigration officials, in their
5 .
evidence, quoted examples of the Indians1 wild behaviour and so 
Clogstoun found another cause for Indian exclusion. Concerning 
the admission of wives and families, the Special Commissioner stated:
1 India Office, Minute by Seton, Secretary, March 21, 1916, File 1217*
V P  & j/6/1325.
2 H.C. Clogstoun, Heport II, November 1915* p* 5* File 3^01,
L/F Sc J/6/1325.
3 Ibid. ;
^ Ihid., p. 9«
5 Harry L. Good, Immigration Inspector, Nanaimo to Clogstoun, August 15* 
1915* File 3601, L/P & J/6/I323.
In a conversation lately with these people I was 
given two answers to the question - Why do you not 
bring your wives and families? These were ~
”Sahib we only come to make money: What should we 
do witbth^m?” Another said - "It'would be a great 
expense.”
Clogstoun further recommended strict control and vigilance over them
because some of them were inclined to Seditious activities. He was
of the opinion that
Under reasonable control the native of India is 
amenable and capable of much good. In its absence 
he is as troublesome as an undisciplined child, 
with the capacity for mischief of a man.
To guarantee this control, therefore, the Special Commissioner
recommended the appointment of an official on special duty with
headquarters at Vancouver, but who should be independent of the
immigration department. Clogstoun did not think that efforts of
3
Canadian sympathisers of Indians would pose much of a problem.
4’ ■
Of course, Dr. K.J. Grant and John Knox Wright* (missionaries) had 
made representation to him for the granting of compensation to Indians 
for their financial losses and also for permission for Indian wives 
and families to enter Canada. But Clogstoun’s answer was in the 
negative.’
During the Komagata Maru crisis the Canadian Immigration Department 
had received assistance in their enquiries from a small number of 
Indians loyal to Canada and one of them was Bela Singh who was 
employed as an interpreter. The failure of the Komagata Maru
1 H.C. Clogstoun, Report II, p. 9♦ File 3601, L/P & J/6/1325*
■ 2 Ibid. ' ’
3 Ibid. J.
V  K#j* Grant and John Knox Wright; to Clogstoun, September 21, 1915»
File 3^01, L/P& J/6/1325.
5 Scott to Cory, March 20, 19191 R*G*76» File 3^999* Vol. 11.
enterprise had embittered a number of Indians and their frustration 
■was directed not only against the Canadian immigration officials but 
also against their own countrymen who collaborated with the Dominion 
government. So Bela Singh was assaulted and another loyal Sikh, 
Karnam Singh, disappeared on August 17, 190*!-. After two weeks he 
was found dead. Then another loyal Sikh, Arjan Singh, a friend of 
Earnam Singh, was also shot dead on September 3% 191**, by Ram Singh, 
a member of the Sikh TemjiLe Committee in Vancouver. And on September
3* in a. battle between Sikh rival factions, a Sikh priest, Bhag Singh,
.. 2 ■
was killed by Bela Singh, This case came before the court on 
October 21 and Inspector Hopkinson was a witness for the defence 
of Bela Singh. But as Hopkinson was about to enter the court house, 
Mewa Singh shot him dead,- As mentioned earlier Mewa Singh was one 
of the members of the party arrested while trying to smuggle arras 
from the U.S., during the Komagata Maru crisis. Afterwards he had 
apparently become a personal friend of Hopkinson and was not expected 
to commit such an offence. But he was influenced by the local Sikh 
Temple Committee. When he was arrested he said that he had killed 
Hopkinson in revenge for the profanation of the Sikh temple by the
murder of Bhag Singh, which he alleged was instigated by Malcolm Reid
. -5 - ■■■.'■- ■
and Hopkinson. The murder of Hopkinson alarmed I-I.H. Stevens, M.P.,
who informed Canadian Prime Minister Borden that the situation was
1 Scott to Cory, March 20, 1919* R.G.76, File 536999, Vol. 11.
2 Province, September 6 , 1915*
3 Province, October 22, 191^.
k Malcolm Reid to Scott, October 23, 191^, C.O. *f2/981/43730.
5 Scott to Cory, March 20, 1919 >R.G. 76, File 536999, Vol. 11.
serious and called for drastic action. He lamented the government’s
past leniency in the affair which he said had resulted in the fatal
shootings. He therdbre requested:
-'Woul'd urge that local officers be instructed to 
arrest and deport every Hindu known to be 
connected with recent meeting Sikh temple where 
murder was committed also connection with other 
questionable section. Threats to assassinate . 
all connected with government have been made ....
But the Canadian government’s answer was that such a course was not
permitted under Canadian lav;. The government stated that the whole
matter was to be dealt with by the provincial police of British
Columbia since the matter did not warrant intervention by immigration
officials. The government further pointed out that it was necessary
to avoid any possible suggestion that any action by the immigration
2officials was inspired by a general animosity towards Indians.
The matter of dealing with the Indians and specifically meting out 
punishment for wrongdoers had become very delicate. Nevertheless when 
the case of Hopkinson's death came to trial it was decided by the local
court in Vancouver and Mewa Singh was sentenced to death. This sentence
3 : ■
was carried out on January 11, 1915*
The whole unfortunate Komagata Maru affair and its serious 
aftermath seems to have been precipitated by the unscrupulous conduct 
of a man who thought he saw an opportunity to make easy money. This 
man, Gurdit Singh, hid his mercenary aims under the cloak of religious 
principles. His arrival, stay and sermon in the Sikh temple at Hong 
Kong were only incidental events. He was a Sikh from Amritsar district 
and was quite familiar with Sikh holy places which made it easy for
1 Stevens to Borden, telegram, October 21, 191^» File 53&999» Vol.
2 Doherty, Minister of Justice to Minister of the Interior, October 22, 
191^, R*G.76lf File 936999, Voih. 9*
3 Province, January 11, 1915*
him to pose as a great Sikh preacher. The sight of over one hundred
simple people in the tfemple with the desire and money to emigrate
to Canada offered him an excellent opportunity to exploit them for
his gain.: His alleged reasons, however, for undertaking such a
project were stated in his advertisement:
.. • when I went to Hong Kong for some business 
in the temple, there were some people waiting 
to go to Vancouver,whom I was unable to face, 
as they were so poor and downcast. 'It is the
work of tyranny and oppression, that year after
year men have to live in Hong Kong on their money 
enduring great pain and distress. This state of 
affairs made me mad. I could not remain. Anyway 
I decided that the^e men would be taken wherever 
they wanted to go.
Similarly he told the Colonial Secretary in Hong Kong that he was
motivated solely by a desire to assist his fellow countrymen and
co-religionists and that if they were refused entrance to Canada
2
it-was his intention to fight the case in the courts. But by the
time he reached Vancouver his pronouncements were more directed
against the British government in India and his tone fas threatening
to them also. He was quoted as saying:
The main object of our coming is to let the 
British Government know how they can maintain 
their rule In India, as the Indian Government 
is in danger nowadays,^
But the real incentive of his project was the easy and quick economic
gains he hoped to make. According to Dr. RaghunathSingh, medical
officer of the Komagata Maru, Gurdit Singh said on several occasions
that he Intended to become a millionaire within six months and it
was towards this goal that he worked with great zeal. He was an
1 Translation of an advertisement (poster) which was hung up in the 
Sikh Temple in Vancouver, C.O. ^2/979/19808.
2 Colonial Secretary, Hong Kong to Colonial Office, April 1^, 191^1 
R.G.76, File 8795^5, Vol. 1.
5 The Times, May 25i 191**«
^ Dr. Haghunath Singh, Statement, Exhibit 107, File 5028, L/P 8s <1/6/1538.
opportunist who wanted to make money by whatever means presented
themselves whether fair or foul. This was the observation of a
judge when Gurdit Singh was involved in a civil suit in 1913?
My main ground for decision in this suit was that 
on the whole case I considered the plaintiff 
/ Gurdit Singh_/ ... is entirely unworthy of 
credence ....The plaintiff admitted numerous 
transactions involving trickery and deceit ....
£ The^/ Plaintiff has been guilty of every deceit 
and:impropriety in this matter .... 1
But Gurdit Singh easily hid his economic scheme from the passengers
and led them to believe they were engaged in a Sikh religious cause
or a cause of great importance to the Indian nation. The name "Guru
Nanak" for his steamship company was meant to appeal to the religious
Sikhs and for the same reason he had especially chosen Sikh temples
for the conduct of affairs for this expedition. The ship set out
with the Sikh slogan of salutation, Sat Sri /deal, and regular Sikh
sermons were held on the vessel for the passengers, 300 of whom were
Sikhs. The Sikh sermon was a religious prayer, but Gurdit Singh
made it also serve.to establish him as a great Sikh religious leader
and a pious and sincere man. The various methods he used to collect
money fr^m the passengers while on the vessel, however, reflect his
real purpose which was to gain money.
During this time the political situation in the world was
overshadowed bith the clouds of the First World War. Since Gurdit
Singh obtained the charter for the Komagata Maru through a German
agent, A. Bune, the expedition at one time was thought to be a
German plot against Britain. There were no grounds for this suspicion.
The charter arrangement was finished as a commercial deal only
1 Civil Suit No. 170-13, Exhibit 53, File 5028, L/P &
2 Guru Nanak was the founder of Sikh religion and he was fhe first 
■' Guru.
v 1
without any link with the German government and A. Bune was. paid.' 
his commission for arranging the deal.
In British Columbia there had been groining resentment in the 
Indian community towards restrictive Canadian immigration measures 
which effectively barred their countrymen. The settled Indians 
were also unhappy about restrictions which-denied admission to their 
wives and families. It was for these reasons that they tried to 
; assist Gurdit Singh. But in addition to this there was a small 
merchant class of Indians in '-Vancouver.:who. foresaw large economic 
gains for themselves if the immigration project should increase the 
size of their community. So naturally they encouraged the scheme. 
Similarly the Sikh temple, being the centre of meetings of migrant 
Indians in Canada, could expect better prospects of membership, 
attendance and money subscriptions. When the Sikh clergymen could 
also foresee the importance of their own office being enhanced by ; 
the rising number of new arrivals from India, they, too, ghve their 
support to the project.
At the same time an unhappy section of Indian students in North 
America tried to make the implication of the Komagata Maru affair 
a national cause, and the aggrieved Indian migrants were exposed to 
the anti-British propaganda carried out by some Indians in Canada, 
and the United States and finally the socialist element on the 
Pacific Coast encouraged it because they believed it to be a good 
way to create trouble for the British, Canadian and Indian governments 
The entire incident could have been stopped at its starting 
point had the Canadian government been prompt to state its immigration
1 ; Governor General, Canada, to Viceroy of India, telegram, December i
15, 191**» Borden Papers, Vol. *f1.
2 Komagata Maru Committee of Enquiry, Report, p. 11.
policy clearly to the Colonial Secretary in Hong Kong but in spite
of urgent and repeated telegraphic messages the bureaucratic process
in the Dominion administration at Ottawa resulted in nothing but
delay and indecision. When at last the reply was sent the Komagata
Maru had left Hong Kong. The Canadian immigration policy with regard
to Indians was a complete ban on their entry, but this was not
specifically mentioned in any rule, regulation, order in council or
lav;. The. regulations were moulded in a complicated fashion to achieve
vagueness without actually admitting complete exclusion of Indians
as a policy. Yet in spite of these legal safeguards the Dominion
officials were not sure whether their laws would sustain the test of
litigation if challenged in courts of law and the legal experts and
immigration officials were faced with the solution of this delicate
matter. For this reason the immigration authorities used various
delaying devices and attempted to maintain secrecy about the findings
of their board of enquiry. The long stay of the boat with her
passengers on board in the quarantine station with little food, water
and exercise facilities forced the Indians to agree to a test case
proposal which the government wished. The sensational atmosphere
created by politicians complicated the situation further until both
sides became so confused and emotional that no fair or logical action
could be expected to emerge. This biased and unreasonable attitude
was evident even in the pronouncements of judges of the Court of
Appeal in the Indians’ test case:
... the Asiatic races ... who become immigrants 
are ... undesirables in Canada where a very different 
civilisation exists. The laws of this country are 
unsuited to them and their ways and ideas may be a menace 
to the wellbeing of the Canadian people .... The 
Parliament of Canada - the nation’s parliament - may 
be well said to be safeguarding the people of Canada 
from an influx which it is no chimera to conjure up 
might annihilate the nation and change its whole
potential complexity, introduce Oriental ways as 
against European ways, eastern civilization for 
western civilization and all the dire results that 
would naturally flow therefrom .... In their own 
interests, their xu'oper place of residence is within 
the confines of their respective countries in the 
continent of Asia, not in Canada, where their customs 
are; not in vogue and their adhesion to them here 
only gives rise to disturbances destructive to the 
wellbeing of the society and ©gainst,.the maintenance 
of peace, order and good government.
The government’s policy consisted of nothing but delay, evasion and
double dealing and by the time the decision of the court was announced
the passengers were in a fanatical state of mind. The unsuccessful
midnight attempt by. the authorities to force the Komagata Maru to
depart was rather an ill-judged method of implementation of genuine
court decision and the show of force in the form of the Rainbow was
found not to be the remedy. But the arrival of Martin Burrell in
the afternoon of July 21, his diplomatic skill, his position as a
member and representative of the Canadian cabinet took the heat out
of the situation, and the Komagata Maru departed without any serious
incident.
The Dominion government had always expressed its deep concern 
about the use of force because of possible political and other 
consequences in the broader context of the British Bnpire and this 
position was laiown to Gurdit Singh and his passengers. It was in 
this hypocritical and diplomatic drama that the police, navy and 
immigration authorities of Canada were required to play their serious 
and highly dangerous role.
After the departure of the Komagata Maru from Vancouver the 
report and recommendations of Special Commissioner II.C. Clogstoun
1 Justice MePhillips, British Columbia Reports, Vol. XX, 1913-1**, 
pp. 290-291.
were simply a negation of the promise given to the Indian migrants 
in British Columbia by Bprrell. The way in which dissension, litigation 
and factional conflict were created among Indians with the aid of the 
administration was a sad reflection of racism prevailing on the 
Pacific Coast. The death of Inspector Hopkinson and quite a few 
Indian immigrants was the direct repercussion of the Komagata Maru 
'affair.,. : '-- vf ■
No doubt, the whole project was ill-conceived, unfortunate and 
most certainly fraudulent, for which only Gurdit Singh was responsible. 
But the high-handed and childish tactics of the Dominion administration 
cannot be justified. The government's reluctance to honour the 
promise of Martin Burrell to refund the contributions of common 
Indians, their lame pretexts of excuse while at the same time 
encouraging litigation among Indians at the government’s expense of 
#3i000 were equally unfortunate exhibitions of the reactionary spirit 
of that age.
CHAPTER 9
The return of the Komagata Maru. Gurdit Singh’s approach to 
the British consulates in the Far East for aid. Arrival in 
Calcutta. Emergency War Regulations in force. Special train 
arrangements for the returnees to be taken to the Punjab and 
subsequent refusal by Gurdit Singh. Budge Budge riots. Loss 
of life. The Komagata Maru Committee of Enquiry and its findings. 
Return Home Movement among Immigrants. Discovery of anti-British 
movements among Sikhs and Muslims in the Punjab. Alarm and 
Panic in the Punjab government. Outbreak of violence. Passing 
of Defence of India Act. Suppression of anti-British Movement. 
Complete reversal of immigration attempts. No more organised 
attempt by Indians to force their entry into Canada,
On July 23'at 5 the Komagata Maru v/lth her passengers
left Vancouver and the Dominion government was relieved because it
had got rid of these immigrants without the use of force and without
any other serious incident. The Canadian authorities congratulated
themselves on their show of generosity and compassion in furnishing
the provisions for the ship’s return journey. This gesture was a
vital tactical manoeuvre aimed at enhancing the government’s image
of fairness and benevolence as well as placating the Indians on
board the Komagata Maru. Unfortunately, however, it did not have
any beneficial effect on the passengers with regard to their feelings
toi^ ards the Canadian government. Any idea of the gesture being
interpreted as the government’s magnanimity was quashed by the Indian
leader, Gurdit Singh, who said that the granting of provisions was
*
the result of the Indians’ threatening behaviour. To this false 
impression of their own position and what they felt were their rightful 
demands, was now added the realization of their present desperate 
condition. The majority of them had forfeited all their possessions 
and had joined the expedition in the first place believing that 
admission to Canada was ceftain. Now, after suffering the hardships 
of nearly four months’ detention in unhealthy, boring and often 
deprived conditions aboard the Komagata Maru. the Indians were forced 
to return to India. The sacrifice had been in vain. Someone should 
be blamed and Gurdit Singh saw to it that the bitter feelings against 
Canada were given an opportunity to magnify. Besides it suited 
Gurdit Singh’s purpose to fan those sparks of disaffection among
1 Komagata Maru Committee of Enquiry, Report, p*
the Indians against the Dominion in order to distract attention from 
his own misdeeds and the resulting failure of his immigration plan. 
Therefore, dailylectures against the British and Canadian governments
were a popular routine in the boat and generally these were combined
■■■■■■ d
with Sikh sermons. As a result of this propaganda the majority of
the passengers sympathised with Gurdit Singh and regarded him as
the brave and heroic leader of Indians against the tyranny of
British administration.
Other complications were soon added to the Indians* frustration.
The Government of Hong Kong did not want any trouble with the arrival
of these passengers who had been rejected from Canada and therefore
it warned that there was’ no employment for them and they should not
2even call at Hong Kong. When the Komagata Maru reached Yokohama
the Colonial Secretary of Hong Kong further threatened Gurdit Singh
that in case his passengers attempted to land there, the local Vagrancy
3Ordinance would be used against them. Gurdit Singh then approached
He British Consul at Yokohama stating that the passengers were willing
to go to any port of India provided they were supplied with the necessary
2}-
provisions of food. But the British Consul declined this request.
As the Komagata Maru proceeded on her way she anchored at Kobe and 
here the coal merchants who had supplied the coal to Gurdit Singh 
at Moji on the;outward journey demanded eight thousand dollars still 
due for the coal,^ Gurdit Singh visited the British consulate at 
Kobe and explained his plight. He made it clear that the boat could
1 Slocock, Officer on Special Duty, C.I.D., Memorandum, Nov. 3* 191**, 
Exhibit 100, p.208, L/P & J/6/1338.
2 Governor, Hong Kong to Colonial Office, July 25, 191**, File 39**9,
L/P & J/6/1325; and Harcourt to Viceroy of India, telegram, July 29* 
191**, C.O. 129/**17/27979.
5 Komagata Maru, Committee of Enquiry, Report, p. 15.
k Ibid.
5 British Consul General, Kobe to Govt, of India, September 2, 191**,
Home proceedings 113A, November 191*** Vol. 9**61.
not proceed until the bill for the coal was paid and that he himself 
was absolutely penniless and unable to pay for it* The supply of 
provisions on board had been exhausted, he said, and there was no
'I
means of purchasing more provisions for the remainder of the voyage.
The British consulate building at Kobe was almost besieged by more
than one hundred Komagata Maru passengers and the Consul General was
2 '
intimidated by their threatened violence. The ship remained at Kobe
while negotiations icith regard to those matters were proceeding and
while telegraphic communications were being exchanged with the
Government of India, At last the Indian government conceded and
if ■ ,
agreed to bear the expenditure of 19»000 yen. The British Consul
tfeneral at Kobe was able to pay the coal bill of 8000 yen and also
5 -v ■„ ' .. .
paid 9000 yen in cash for buying provisions for the Komagata Maru
passengers. The ship was now able to continue on her way, but before
leaving, Gurdit Singh decided to take two new Indian passengers -
Jawahir Mai and Narain Das - on the boat in spite of the opposition
of the British consular authorities at Kobe. He also sent two men
with money to Shanghai and Hong Kong in order to organise agitation
- ■ ■ ' £ 
against the British authorities in India. .
The boat left Kobe on September 3, 191** and when she arrived
in Singapore Gurdit Singh made fresh demands for money from the British
authorities there. Not only were these demands denied but no passenger
1 Komagata Maru, Committee of Enquiry, Report, pp. 16-17*
2 Daljit Singh, ’‘History of the Voyage of the Komagata Maru”, Manuscript, 
Exhibit 5**» File 5028, L/P & J/6/1338.
3 Consul General, Kobe to Govt, of India, telegrams August 28 and 30, 191**» 
Home proceedings 213A and 21 *+A, September 19lA, Vol. 9A6O.
k Govt, of India to Consul General, Kobe, telegram, August y[% 191**,
Home Proceedings 215A, September 191**, Vol. 9b60,
5 Amir Muhammad Khan, Receipt on behalf of Gurdit Singh, Exhibit A8 ,
File 5°28, L/P 8c J/6/1338.
6 Isemonger and Slattery (of the Punjab Police), An Account of the 
Ghadr Conspiracy, p. **0.
7 Ibid.
. ■ 1was allowed, off the boat at Singapore and the Komagata Maru continued 
on her way to India. But before leaving Singapore Gurdit Singh managed 
to send telegrams to the Editor of the Bengalee in Calcutta intimating 
the probable time of the arrival of the Komagata Maru in Calcutta 011 
September 28, and requesting that arrangements be made for a deputation 
on the subject of grievances of the Komagata Maru passengers. His idea 
was to stage a large demonstration against the British at the time of
their arrival in Calcutta. Unfortunately for Gurdit Singh's plan these
"'r' ■ ■ " 
telegrams were intercepted by the police in India and nothing came of
the projected demonstration. In the Punjab where nearly all the
passengers belonged, the developments of the Komagata Maru affair
were closely watched by the provincial government. The Punjab Lieutenant
Governor, Sir Michael O'Dwyer, stated that although everything was
peaceful in the province he would not ignore the arrival of a large
number of, emigrants returning from beyond the seas. Therefore, he
requested the Government of India to take measures under which all
emigrants should be required to give to the authorities an account
of themselves and their antecedents. Those who were able to give a
satisfactory account of themselves were allowed to proceed to their
destination. The lieutenant governor further suggested that the local
authorities should be given full particulars of each emigrant in case
some further surveillance was necessary. If there was any suspicion
surrounding the investigated party then the movements of such emigrants
were to be restricted. However, the Indian government pointed out
that any special indication or reference to the returning emigrants
would excite undesirqble comments; and for this reason it desired
1 Komagata Maru, Committee of Enquiry, Report, p. 17«
2 Govt, of Bengal to Govt, of India, telegram, September 22, 191^»
Home Proceedings 98A, Hovember 191^» vol. 9^61.
that all such references should be avoided. The Government of the 
Punjab, however, anticipated trouble and they wished to take immediate
and efficient steps to deal with the expected unpleasant serious and
. ■ i . ■
possibly dangerous situation.
During this time, on August 4, 191**, the First V/orId War had
p
broken out. ' The Government of India, however, was mindful of the 
expected arrival of the Komagata Maru with her three hundred and more 
discontented passengers, who harboured bitter grievances and who had 
been indoctrinated with anti-government feelings. At that time it 
seemed wise to heed the Punjab government's advice and subsequently 
the Indian Government decided to arm itself with extra powers. It 
was decided to issue an ordinance on the subject providing control 
of all persons entering India. The urgency of the matter would not 
permit the delay of waiting for a meeting of the Legislative Council 
of India for general legislation.^ Immediately, on September 5* 191V  
the Government of India took powers under an ordinance known as the 
Ingress into India Ordinance to provide for the control of persons 
entering India, whether by sea or land, in order to protect the state 
from any prejudicial threats and designs to its safety, interests or 
tranquillity. Under this ordinance, power was given to the Governor 
General in Council in the interests of the state to regulate and 
restrict the entry of any persons whether by land or by sea into India; 
and at the same time the Government of India was armed fully to
If ■ ■
restrict the liberty of such persons within India itself. On 
September 12 powers under this ordinance were delegated to all the
1 Punjab Govt, to Govt, of India, August 25» 191*** Home Proceedings 212A 
September 191**» Vol. 9**&0.
2 Edward Grey to German Ambassador, August **, 191**. British Documents 
on the Origins of the War, Vol. XI, p. 530*
3 Govt, of India: Home Department to Legislative Department, September k 
191**» Home Proceedings, 218a, September 191*** Vol. 9**60«
*f Gazette of India Extraordinary, September 12, 191**.
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local governments.: In an urgent confidential letter the Government
of India instructed the local governments that:
Arrangements should at once be made at all the ports of 
ordinary entry from abroad for all vessels, which are 
likely to carry undesirables to be met on arrival.
In this way Indian authorities were well equipped with sufficient legal
powers to deal with the emergency which could be expected on the arrival
of the Komagata Maru. The Government of India had also been informed
by the British government th&t Komagata Maru passengers were going to
induce military desertions in the Punjabi regiments stationed in the:
Far East. In order to investigate these reports and also to attempt
to establish good relations-with the Komagata Maru passengers the
Indian authorities proposed to send its officers to Singapore. The
idea was to meet the Komagata Maru and to return with her to India.
During the return journey the officers hoped to ease the strained
relations developing between these passengers and the British government
but owing to the sudden change in the scheduled departure of the
Komagata Maru from Singapore the plans could not be put into operation.
The concern about the expected docking continued to grow and a special
meeting of senior officials of the Punjab government and the Government
of India was held at Simla where the Komagata Maru issue was discussed,
and a line of action was decided. The official view was that most of
the passengers on the Komagata Maru had been deprived of their savings
by Gurdit Singh and he had'thrown the entire blame for the failure of
his venture on the shoulders of the Government of India and its policy
1 Calcutta Gazette Extraordinary, September 16, 191^.
2 Govt, of India to all Local Govts, in India, September 11, 191^»
Home Proceedings 220A, September 191^» Vol. 9*+60.
3 Viceroy of India to Secretary of State for India, telegram, October 2 
19lk, Home Proceedings 105A, November 191^» Vol. 9^61.
4 D. Petrie (Criminal Investigation Department), Note on Budge Budge 
Eiot, Exhibit 116, File 5028, L/P & J/6/1338.
of inaction with regard to the welfare and rights of Indians in the 
British Itepird. Because of these observations and in the knowledge 
that the whole shipload of emigrants were without any money and had 
been confined in the boat for the past five months the Indian government 
expected that these passengers would constitute a serious danger to 
public peace and tranquillity if they were allowed to land and disperse 
without some means of aid. The Indian government, therefore, considered 
it not only politic but in fact inevitable to offer assistance to the 
returning Komagata Maru passengers as evidence of the governments
1 ' r..-. :
goodwill. The Government of India then made use of the Ingress into 
India Ordinance and arranged to provide special trains for the 
passengers of the Komagata Maru to go to their homes in the Punjab.
Only their leaders were to be arrested and taken to Ludhiana. The
x
Punjab police especially requested the detention of Gurdit Singh 
and to carry out this line of action the Punjab government dispatched 
R. Humphreys, a senior and experienced .district magistrate, as its 
representative with four experienced Sikh police office© and D. Petrie, 
an official of the Criminal Investigation Department to meet the 
Komagata Maru as soon as she arrived in Calcutta harbour. The Bengal 
government was represented by Sir William Duke, Member of the Executive 
Council of Bengal with Cummings the Provincial Chief Secretary, Donald 
the District Magistrate 2k Parganas, Frederick Halliday the Police 
Commissioner in Calcutta, Eastwood the Superintendent of Police in 
Calcutta, and a number of other officials. The Punjab government had
1 Hardinge to Crewe, telegram, October 2, 191^, Hardinge Papers 93*
2 R. Humphreys, Deputy Commissioner, Report to Punjab govt. Exhibit 20, 
v m
3 Superintendent Police, Amritsar to Police Commissioner Calcutta, 
telegram, September 17, 191^» File 5028, L/P & J/6/1338.
k R. Humphreys, Report to Punjab govt., Exhibit 20, File 5028,
L/P & J/6A538.
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sent a twenty-frve~man police contingent to help in the arrangements.
The authorities, decided that the boat should dock at Budge Budge
because this port had a landing stage alongside which a sea-going
steamer could moor and also because this landing side was only 200
yards from the railway station. The alternative port, Diamond Harbour,
had no landing stage and the railway station was some distance away. ;
The most important factor for the authorities was to avoid a demonstration
against the government. It was also noted that Diamond Harbour .-was.
near the Sikh temple at Howrah and if the komagata Maru passengers
2
were to land in the vicinity of Howrah some excitement would be 
expected which might lead to violence.
When the Komagata Haru reached Kalpi, seven miles from Diamond 
Harbour, government officials went down the river Hughli and met the 
passengers. They explained to the emigrants that they had been 
authorised by the Punjab government to take them home to the Punjab 
and for this.purpose free special trains were being provided. The 
officials expressed their sympathy with the emigrants for their troubles. 
They also explained to them that under the new lav/ (recently enacted) 
their luggage was to bebexamined before they could leave the boat.
Gurdit Singh, however, did not want to submit to such examination and 
he asked the reasons for their delay and detention and demanded the 
immediate appointment of a commission of enquiry to investigate the v 
whole question. The Punjab government’s representative (P. Humphreys) 
replied that the appointment of such a commission of enquiry was futile 
and but of the question in Calcutta but that the necessary enquiry would 
be held later in the Punjab. The preliminary search of luggage was
1 Komagata Maru, Committee of Enquiry, Report,, p. 18.
2 Bengal govt, to Govt, of India, October 12, 1914, File 5028,
L/2 & J/6/153&.
5 R* Humphreys to Punjab govt., Report, Exhibit 20, File 5028,
L/F & J/6/Z538.
continued and went on well for two days during which time the authorities
'I
could not discover any arms on the ship. But officials noticed that 
the passengers were in an ugly mood and they were surprised to find
the absence of traditional submissive and respectful behaviour..which
■■■■■'•■ ■ 2 ■■■■■
was common among Punjabis. It was-thought that the long and unsuccessful 
voyage combined with anti-government preachings might be responsible : 
for this aggressive attitude among the passengers. It was evident 
that there was severe resentment when the emigrants were asked to land 
at Budge Budge since Howrah was their declared and desired destination; 
and furthermore there was a rumour that Budge Budge was not the right 
station for trains to the Punjab. As suspicions and speculations grew 
Gurdit Singh added to the unrest by his unrelentingly uncooperative 
attitude. The authorities, meanwhile, lost no time in completing the 
arrangements for special trains to transport the Komagata Maru 
passengers away from this area. On September 29* 1914* the emigrants 
were told to disembark and get into the special trains going to the 
J^mjab, But Gurdit Singh told Humphreys (Punjab governments 
representative) in a loud voice that if they (the emigrants) had done 
anything wrong, a judge should be sent for to take statements after 
which the government could shoot them or do what it chose. His
passengers would prefer dying together, he mentioned. These dramatic
• ■ v ; ■ ■ ■" 4 ■
pronouncements of Gurdit Singh resulted in a complete deadlock .between--
passengers and authorities. The only dissenters were 17 Muslims from
Shahpur district and 42 Sikhs led by Bhan Singh who gladly landed
1 D. Petrie, Note on the Budge Budge Riot, Exhibit 116, File 5028, 
h/P & J/6/1358.
2 Slocock, Memorandum on the Voyage of the Komagata Maru, Exhibit 100, 
File 5028, L/P & J/6/1358.
3 R« Humphreys to Punjab govt. Report, Exhibit 20, File 5028,
4 D. Petrie, Mote on the Budge Budge Riot, Exhibit 116, File 5028,
L/P & 1/6/1338.
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and got on the train for the Punjab*
The next point of contention ■■was that the passengers wanted to
land only after their religious book the Granth Sahib * had been taken 
2ashore. After long arguments and repeated warnings the holy book
•5
was taken ashore and the passengers began to land. The authorities
hoped that all threat of violence was over, but they did not realise
the full extent of Gurdit Singh*s scheming.
Gurdit Singh had purchased two boxes of pistols from Japan while 
it
on the return journey and even on the outward journey there were four
. . 5
or five pistols on the boat although these were carefully hidden.
After the preliminary search was over and the passengers had reached
; 6 
Calcutta, Gurdit Singh secretly distributed these pistols to his friends.
Some of the men were nov/ armed and a dangerous situation was becoming
explosive. All the incidents that were incriminating to Gurdit Singh
were turned, by that wily fellow, upon the government as he seized
every opportunity not only to cover his own guilt but also to arouse
hatred toward the British government in India. One more.example of
his.cunning is offered as evidence during the search of the cabins
of Gurdit Singh and his secretaries. The official found some money
and quite a few papers relating to the voyage. These were sealed and
it was pointed out that all the papers .would be investigated, at a
later date. Gurdit Singh, of course, owed money to most of the
passengers and they demanded it back as they were to leave the boat,
1 Bhan Singh, Statement, Exhibit 28, File 5028, L/P & J/6/133&*
2 Bengal govt, to Govt, of India, Oct. 12, 191^, File 5028, L/P & j/6/1338.
3 Jawahir llal, Evidence, pp. 9 M 7 ,  File 5028, L/P & J/6/I338.
k Yamamoto, Captain, Komagata Marut and Sadda Singh, Passenger, Extracts 
from statements, C. 0. 42/990/1563^
5 Ibid. /
6 Ibid. ■
;7 KomaSa^a Maru, Committee of Enquiry, Report, p. 29.
but he replied that there was some difficulty since all books and 
papers had been taken away by the government. He therefore requested 
every passenger to follow him to the Sikh temple at Howrah where he 
intended to deposit the Granth Sahib. He declared that he would ask 
each claimant on his faith in the Sikh temple before the Sikh holy book 
about his demand and then he would refund the money. The passengers, 
who by this time would likely have boarded the trains and been 
dispersed, were thus manoeuvred towards a mass meeting.
The men wanted their money. They were tired from their journey 
and angry at their treatment. It was under these adverse psychological 
conditions that the passengers landed at Budge Budge. After landing 
they marched slowly in procession beating drums and singing Sikh hymns 
and soon reached the railway crossing only a few yards outside the
•■.'■• -'--I ■-> ■ p
station." There again long arguments were exchanged between Gurdit 
Singh and the officials, and when finally the men stood up, instead of 
going to Budge Budge Kailway Station, they started to walk on Calcutta 
Road.r At this point the District Magistrate of 24 Barganas (Donald) 
requested help from the army but the procession had advanced about 
four or five miles before the army contingent (all Europeans) reached 
the spot. The processionvas first halted and later forced to march
' ' 4
back to Budge Budge Railway Station although some passengers tried 
'-.unsuccessfully to drift into nearby shops along the t/ay. Again the 
railway crossing near the railway.station” was the stopping point.
Donald tried to explain the arrangements that had been made for the 
men and called to Gurdit Singh who refused to come forward. Deciding
1 Hand Singh, statement, Exhibit 25, File 5028* L/P & J/6/1333.
2 R„ Humphreys, Report to Punjab govt., Exhibit 20, File 5028,
'■l/p; &- J/6/1338.
3 Bengal govt, to Govt, of India. Oct. 2, 1914, File 5028,
h/P & J/S/133&*
4 Viceroy of India to Secretary of State for India, telegram, Oct. 1, 
1914, Home Proceedings 104A, November 1914, Vol. 9461.
that Gurdit Singh, as spokesman and trouble-maker, should openly 
negotiate with officials and thereby avoid any incident, Eastwood, 
Superintendent of Calcutta Police, went into the crowd of emigrants 
to bring Gurdit Singh out, but the emigrants surrounded him and a
v 'j
revolver shot was fired* In return Frederick Halliday ordered the
p
police and the army to fire also. The emigrants made two more 
rushes but they could not withstand the army’s fire and therefore 
were forced to disperse. The result of this riot was that 19 
emigrants, one European police official (Superintendent Eastwood),
two Indian police officials, one railway official (Lomax) and two local
■'■■'■''it
spectators were killed while 35 were injured. The injured included 
two senior police officials, Frederick Halliday, Petrie and the
k
Punjab government’s representative, Humphreys.*' The position of
the emigrants was that 62 were sent to the Punjab by train, 211 were
arrested, 20 were killed and 28 (including Gurdit Singh) remained 
6at large. At the suggestion of the Punjab government the arrested
7
emigrants were xnterned at Alipore central jail in Calcutta.f
The loss of life was deplored by the government. Lord Hardinge 
(Viceroy of India) believed that the uprising was the result of Gurdit 
Singh’s attempt to organise a demonstration against the government in
g ’:
Calcutta. Newspapers in Calcutta, however, did not take much notice
1 Komagata Maru, Committee of Enquiry, Report, p. 20.
2 General Officer Commanding Presidency Brigade to Govt, of India, 
telegram, Sept. 30, 1914, Home Proceedings 112A, Nov. 1914, Vol. 9461.
3 L.Petrie, Note on Budge Budge Riot, Exhibit 116, File 3028,
L/P & J/6/I338.
4 Bengal govt, to Govt, of India, Oct. 12, 1914, File 3028, L/P & J/6/1358
3 Viceroy of India to Secretary of State for India, telegram, Oct. 1, 1914 
Home Proceedings 104a , November 1914, Vol. 9461.
6 Komagata Maru, Committee of Enquiry, Report, Appendix IV, p. 5*
7 Bengal govt.to Govt, of India, Oct. 8, 1914, Home Proceedings 129A, 
November 1914, Vol. 9461.
8 Hardinge to Crewe, telegram, Oct. 2, 1914, Hardinge Papers 98.
of the Budge Budge riot. Because of local holidays there were no papers 
published on that day, Only one paper, the Bengalee, argued that if
the passengers had been allowed to land and consult their friends in
-j
Calcutta this riot would have been avoided. However the Pioneer Maxi
(Allahabad), an English owned daily, strongly condemned the Komagata
Maru passengers and judged that from observations of the behaviour in
India the Canadian government was -justified in refusing their admission
to Canada. Deploring their attack on civil and military officials the :
paper further stated:
This is the reward that Government gets for bringing 
this batch of anarchists home at public expense. It is 
to be hoped that no time will be lost in expatriating 
the whole gang again to the Andamans or elsewhere.
This is not the time when a batch of fanatics infected
with nihilist doctrines can be allowed to go at large
about the villages spreading poison among the untravelled 
natives.*2
In England the Budge Budge riot was not reported in the press but 
the Secretary of State for India (Lord Crewe) expressed his anger about 
the affair especially with the manner in which the police handled the 
matter:
Here was a large body of men who had been through an 
extraordinary and hostile experience among the white 
races of the Empire; there were indications that some 
of them were of rather desperate or at any rate 
turbulent character, the bulk being probably dupes 
for a few unscrupulous exploiters. It might be assumed 
that arriving in this way they would be thoroughly 
sullen or suspicious and frightened - both of them 
dangerous states of mind for an Indian crowd, It 
looks to me therefore that the absence ”of the smallest 
suspicion” that some of them might be armed and violent 
fwas. rather stupid and conventional on the part of the 
police, Tjfeose Punjabis had been about the world, and 
it was not to be supposed that they would pursue the 
conduct of simple cultivators .... I confess, therefore, _ 
to being not over well satisfied with the proceedings ....
1 Bengal govt, to Govt, of India, Oct. 12, 191^, Home Proceedings, 138a , 
November 191^» Vol. 9^61.
2 Pioneer Mail, Oct. 2, 191*K
3 Crewe to Charmichael, Governor Bengal, Oct. 9* 191** * Crewe Papers C.61.
The Viceroy of India too passed a share of the blame to the police and
the Bengal governmentj
There was great bungling in my opinion on the part of
the Bengal Government, since every Sikh ought to have
been searched for firearms before being allowed to 
leave the ship. As it is, we all know, that over 100 
revolvers were bought by passengers between Vancouver, 
and Calcutta, 1
The Viceroy of India and the Secretary of State for India both agreed
that the major blunder in the matter was committed by the Government
: 2 ' : ' ' :- of Bengal, ..
But the Bengal government did not wish to assume guilt and expressed 
its naSve view about this fatal event. It pointed out that its action 
was taken with the full concurrence of the Punjab government and 
arrangements had been made for the prompt and direct return of the 
emigrants. The Bengal government's press communique pointed out that 
though it knew that the emigrants had suffered and were politically 
discontented nonetheless no one had the slightest suspicion that the 
passengers were armed for this desperate and unprovoked attack on 
British officers,^
In a detailed report the Bengal government explained that government 
officials had put forth their best efforts to get the passengers off the 
boat without incident. The officials displayed good intentions and 
behaved with kindness and sympathy towards the emigrants some of whom, 
however, were deluded fools. The officials always showed maximum 
patience rather than creating a situation that invited retaliation. 
Furthermore, the Bengal authorities suspected that misunderstandings 
and rumours about the existence of some sinister motive on the part
1 Hardinge to Crewe, Oct. 8 , 191^,-'Crewe Papers G19 ** C22.
2 Crewe to Hardinge, Nov. h% 191^, Hardinge Papers 120.
3 Govt, of Bengal, press Communique, Sept. 30* 191^* Home proceedings
10^ A, November 191^, Vol. 9^61.
of the government to choose Budge Budge especially for their landing 
were the cause of emigrants’ misgivings. The Bengal government also 
observed that the calling out of Gurdit Singh by Donald was 
interpreted as a sign of his possible arrest and this action
"I
immediately sparked the pent-up feelings of the passengers.
The view of the police was that the confrontation was inevitable 
and there had been no way to prevent the passengers from carrying arms. 
In his report Petrie stated that the search aboard ship was ineffective 
because the passengers were easily able to transfer pistols to other 
kits already searched or hide them on their own person. To demand 
complete disrobing or the removal of turbans and the taking down of 
hair would have invoked great personal indignity and added to the 
ill-feeling already present. The Sikh’s Granth Sahib also afforded 
every facility for the concealment of weapons and it would have been 
an extremely delicate matter to dismantle and search it. It was 
Petrie’s opinion that the passengers had been organized by Gurdit 
Singh and were eager to follow his direction. Gurdit Singh’s
deliberate resolve to pursue his own way in defiance of authority
2 '■■ ■■certainly had to lead to violence sooner or later.
fqvernment/representative, R. Humphreys, also agreed with the
police report about the incident and his conclusion ;was:
Reviewing the v/hole case now it seems certain 
that though Government interfered in the matter 
with the most benevolent and generous motives 
(that is apart from the political motive which 
rendered it absolutely necessary to interfere 
to prevent a dangerous agitation), the interference 
*?as bound, in the end to end in trouble . ...^
1 Bengal govt, to Govt, of India, Oct. 12, 191^, File 5028, L/P & J/6/1338.
2 D. Petrie, Note on the Budge Budge Riot, Oct. 8 , 191^* Exhibit 116,
File 5028, L/P & J/6/1338.
3 H« Humphreys, Report to Punjab Govt., Oct. 6 , 191^, Exhibit 20,
File 5028, L/P & J/6A338.
The Sikh and Punjabi communities in Calcutta held a public
meeting on October 8, 1914 and passed resolutions appreciating the
magnanimous and generous offer of the government to the emigrants
and strongly condemned the riotous action of some of the emigrants.
The resolution further stated that
. . . they ^ ""sikh and Punjabi communities in Calcutta^? 
and their brothers ... are still loyal and faithful*” 
subjects of the British Crown and are always ready 
to shed their best blood for the honour and prestige 
of the British Flag under which they are enjoying 
peace and contentment.
Only Gurdit Singh, who had managed to escape arrest, expressed 
his strong reaction against the authorities and continued to remain 
adamant in his feelings of hostility. Condemning the government for 
mishandling the whole affairj he wrote to Lord Carmichael, Governor 
of Bengal:
Thanks to that inane policy that could not suffer 
the already outraged immigrant passengers of the 
Komagata Maru be landed free at Calcutta, as free men 
to go at their convenience, after a little rest on first 
setting their foot even in their own mother country; 
that policy must see that these innocent men on whose 
clan rest the foundation props of your British rule, 
the men, many of whom carried war medals from you, 
must be treated like political suspects and criminals, 
must be under military guard and sent home by 
compulsion; and if they want a day’s tarrying at 
Calcutta, the military must fire and subdue these 
tar their dead and wounded and fugitives to comply 
with Ordinance V; what brutal carnage was committed 
by Sirs Duke, Donald and Halliday and what inhuman 
stjipid brutality is still hunting the fugitives.
In spite of the Sikh Sabha expressions of fidelity 
you have set a mighty revulsion of sentiments and 
feelings which cannot find expression in words, 
the grief being too deep for words or noisy 
outbursts on public platform. The white washing 
process by organising Sikh Sabhas through slavishly- 
minded Sikhs v/ould not palliate the guilt that the 
above policy fastens upon British domination with 
brutal fury. Upon the children of the soil what
1 Sikh Meeting, resolutions 2 and 3, Oct. 8, 1914, Horae Proceedings, 
138a, November 1914, Vol. 9^61.
incalculable wrongs are not being practised by the 
civilian craze for display of power and by their 
nonsensical zid /"obstinationy to comply with so 
called laws and sections; Cawnpur, Ajodhya and lately 
this Budge Budge affairs show to the popular view 
with fierce search-light glare that the British rule 
without popular control in its laws and methods of 
administration with Houses of Commons as you have 
cannot be tolerated any longer. Your Civilian rule 
with stupid C,I.Ds and blunt police, is a curse and 
is doomed,**
The Budge Budge riots did create a sense of fear among the wealthy
2
business community of Calcutta and because of this the European 
population was rounded up and strongly guarded.^ The Viceroy of India 
(Lord Hardinge) and Governor of Bengal (Lord Carmichael) were very 
concerned and were contemplating a course of action to alleviate
Zf
the strained situation* Realidng the enormous importance of the 
case and its relation to the Indian Empire the Government of India 
told the Bengal government not to take any step without their prior 
consultation and suggested the appointment of a committee of enquiry^ 
for the whole matter. In his private letter to Carmichael, the Viceroy 
of India stated that Indian public opinion would be satisfied by such 
an enquiry. The Viceroy, however, was not in favour of the prosecution
g ■
of this large number of accused persons because the government doubted
■ • .7
if any conviction was possible under such circumstances and the
resulting publicity could only aggravate the whole situation.
Explaining his difficulties in the confused and riotous Budge Budge
incident, the Viceroy wrote to the Governor of Bengal:
1 Gurdit Singh to Carmichael, Oct. 10, 1914, Hardinge Papers 88*
2 Bengal govt, to Govt, of India, Oct. 12, 1914, Home Proceedings 138A, 
November 1914, Vol. 9461.
3 Bengal govt, to Govt, of India, telegram, Sept. 30, 1914, Home 
proceedings 101A, November 1914, Vol. 9461.
4 Hardinge to Carmichael, telegram, Oct. 5, 1914, Hardinge Papers 88.
5 Govt, of India to Bengal govt, telegram, October 7, 192>4» Home 
Proceedings, 123A, November 1914, Vol. 9461.
6 Hardinge to Carmichael, telegram Oct. 7, 1914, Hardinge Papers 88.
7 Hardinge to Valentine Chirol, Oct. 15» 1914, Hardinge Papers 93*
We shall never be able to get convictions against 
individual Sikhs for murder and armed attack upon 
the police, since it would be impossible to prove 
their identity /
But at the same time the Budge Budge incident was an all-absorbing
topic of interest in the Punjab and the Viceroy was bombarded with
telegrams and letters in this regard. So Hardinge decided to appoint
the Committee of Enquiry to be composed of William Vincent as Chairman
with H• Walmsley as representative of the Bengal government, P. J. Fagan
as representative of the Punjab government and Bijoy Chand Mahtab and
Daljit Singh as public members.-^ He was satisfied that the Indian
public had much confidence in Vincent and after talking to him the
Viceroy decided to give freedom of action to the Committee of Enquiry.
The real purpose of the government for the appointment of such a
Committee of Enquiry was to convince the Indian public that everything
5 . ' ■
possible v;as being done for the emigrants and that the government was 
being fair and benevolent in their handling of the situation. The 
Viceroy hoped that when the findings of this mixed Committee of Enquiry 
proved that the emigrants’ attack upon the police was unprovoked, 
the Sikhs would turn against Gurdit Singh^ and in this way his dangerous 
sedition would be brought to an end. The Secretary of State for India 
(Lord Crewe) considered such an enquiry as reasonable expediency.
The idea of holding ”an enquiry into the Komagata Maru heroes” in 
order to deflate that hero status he considered to be ”an excellent
1 Hardinge to Carmichael, Oct. 15, 1914, Hardinge Papers 88.
2 Ibid.
3 Govt, of India to Bengal govt. Oct. 15, 1914, Komagata Maru 
Committee of Enquiry Report, p. 3 * ;
4 Hardinge to Carmichael, Oct. 15, 1914, Hardinge Papers 88.
5 Hardinge to Crewe, Oct. 15, 1914, Crevie Papers C19-G22.
6 Hardinge to Carmichael, Oct. 15, 1914, Hardinge Papers 88.
7 Crewe to Carmichael, Nov. 5, 1914, Crewe Papers c6l.
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one”. Thus all parties in power agreed on what they considered a
sensible course of action.
The Viceroy was interested to get the investigation completed
as soon as possible because the Bengal government was anxious to be
relieved of its share of the responsibility. As far as Hardinge v/as
concerned the matter was settled, for he had already formed somewhat
nafve conclusions about the outcome of the entire investigation. In
his private letter to Sir Valentine Chirol he stated:
Consequently at the conclusion of the enquiry I 
shall probably send them all back to the Punjab 
and have them kept under surveillance for some 
time* In the meantime they are enjoying the 
delights of a Bengal prison, and this, together 
vilth the fact that 16 of them were shot down by 
troops will be sufficient lesson to them. 2
Similarly in another letter Hardinge told Crewe that:
My idea is at the conclusion of the enquiry, to 
bring all the Sikhs to the Punjab and put them 
under surveillance. At present moment they are 
all in prison in Calcutta, and they will remain 
there for at least another month until the 
conclusion of the enquiry. This together with 
the fact that 16 of them were shot down will be 
sufficient punishment for thera,^
In dealing with Gurdit Singh, however, the Viceroy seemed determined
to:take strong action as he indicated to Carmichael:
... when we have caught Gurdit Singh I think 
there are several charges upon which we could safely 
take action against him ... ,4
And again the Viceroy exhibited his naSvety about the nature of the
entire affair. He thought that after the enquiry when
... the drastic and unprovoked nature of attack
upon the police is proved, and Gurdit Singh’s
methods are known, there will.be a strong feeling 
among the Sikhs against this scoundrel.5
1 Crewe to Hardinge, Nov. 5, 1914, Hardinge Papers 120.
2 Hardinge to Valentine Chirol, Oct. 15, 1914, Hardinge Papers 95*
3 Hardinge to Crewe, Oct. 13* 1914, Crewe Papers C19-C22.
4 Hardinge to Carmichael, Oct, 13, 1914, Hardinge Papers 88.
3 :' Ibid. ■
The Committee of Enquiry began its work in October 1914 and held its . 
Meetings at Calcutta, Budge Budge and Jullunder. It had 27 sittings 
and examined 201 witnesses. The Committee also paid a visit to the 
steamship Komagata Maru and the actual scene of occurrence of the 
incident near Budge Budge Station, After going through the brief 
history of the Komagata Maru project the Committee of Enquiry came 
to the conclusion that the action of the Bengal government was justified 
and the provision of special trains was equally desirable for the safe 
home journey of the emigrants* It was concluded that in the light of 
their activities in Vancouver and in the Far East, the emigrants might
p
be a danger to the peace,if allowed to linger at large in Calcutta.
The Governments of India and Bengal believed that there were two 
factions on the boat and therefore the authorities hoped to find a 
considerable number of people on their side. Unfortunately they were 
mistaken. By the time the ship reached Calcutta, Gurdit Singh had 
managed to establish his leadership among the emigrants by pointing 
out his success in extracting large amounts of provisions from the 
Canadian government and money from the British Consul at KobeV His 
promise to get a similar compensation from the British Government in 
India plus his daily preaching in the Sikh temple on the boat against 
the Government had made the emigrants very bitter against the government, 
and that feeling still remained. The Committee’s investigation 
revealed the importance of this fact. They were also critical of 
the inadequate search 6f the ship and blamed the authorities in 
charge of the operation at Calcutta for their confused arrangements
3
in this regard. The Committee also strongly criticised the way in
 ^ Komagata Maru Committee of Enquiry, Report, p. 4.
2 Ibid., p. 24.
which the migrants’ firearms remained undetected. But what they
had yet to consider was the underlying conditions that made Gurdit
Singh’s propaganda acceptable to these men. The frustrating :
dehumanizing and filthy conditions in which the emigrants were
literally imprisoned for five months together with Gurdit Singh’s
anti-government lectures which were liberallysprinkled with socialist
ideas and then the advent of the German war had.made the passengers feel
desperate. Any small gesture of the police contingent using their
conventionally rough method of dealing with such situations created
further misunderstanding among the emigrants. Gurdit Singh merely
used each discordant situation for his own advantage. At the end
he was anxious to get to Calcutta to pose as a martyr and to inaugurate
a full-scale agitation against the British government based on the
■ ^
voyage of the Komagata Maru and his interpretation of the discrimination 
against Indians by the British government.
Summing up the circumstances which led to the unfortunate result 
of loss of human life the Komagafca Maru Committee observed that the 
Sikhs were by nature a courageous but excitable people who had been 
subjected to extremely trying conditions. These people believed they 
had been duped by the authorities and looked upon Gurdit Singh as 
their leader, spokesman and saviour. Th^r trusted no one else and witiiout 
him they saw no hope of being compensated for their losses. They would, 
therefore, incur any personal risk to protect him from arrest. At the 
time of the outbreak the men were hot, tired, confused and frightened. 
Their unsympathetic treatment by the European police had increased 
their resentment and the advance of Superintendent Eastwood towards 
Gurdit Singh was interpreted by the emigrants as a direct threat to
Committee of Enquiry, Report, p. 28,
the only person -who cared about their welfare. When a single shot 
was fired by some misehevious adherent of Gurdit Singh those who 
possessed firearms were ready enough to follow the example.
However, according to the findings of the Committee of Enquiry, 
Gurdit Singh was a scheming fellow who showed great ingenuity in 
using every action of the government to create Msunderstandings which 
would lead to his advantage. He lied to the jDassengers constantly, 
keeping them in a state of dependence and confusion. He told them 
they were not being sent to the Punjab at all because trains did not 
go directly from Budge Budge to the punjab but rather started from 
the Howrah side of the Hughli* This was true in the ordinary course 
of events but special arrangements had been made for the transport of 
these emigrants. Since no one had thought to inform them, however, 
their suspicions of the governments intentions were understandable. 
Gurdit Singh also owed money to several passengers on account of the 
advances made to him at Moji. It is doubtful that he intended to 
honour these debts, but to the emigrants he outlined a plap to pay 
them in the Sikh temple at Howrah and therefore the men did not wish 
to leave him until they had received their share. To other emigrants 
he promised that if they accompanied him to Calcutta he would bring 
a suit against the government to secure for them compensation against 
the government for their losses. It is obvious that Gurdit Singh 
wanted to keep the men together as a potentially violent force that 
he could use to threaten the authorities and further his own malicious 
schemes. The Committee of Enquiry believed that the majority of • 
passengers would have made no attempt to force their way to Calcutta
1 Komagata Maru Committee of Enquiry, Heport, p. 28.
2 Ibid., p. P9.
and would have gone quietly back to the Punjab had it not been for
'j
the influence of this man.
Sympathising with the ignorant people who suffered the most in
this drama full of economic and political exploitation, the Committee
v/ent on to declare:
At the same time we think that t h e y t h e  Komagata Haru 
passengers^? n^e in many ways much to be pitied. They 
had waited*~many months at various ports in the East with 
the intention of proceeding to Canada, a land represented 
to them as flowing with milk and honey, and when they 
did start on this voyage, they were fully impressed with 
the idea that they would be allowed to land on arrival 
without: objection. They suffered considei*able hardships 
on the voyage out, and those v/ho had any money with them 
were made to subscribe considerable sums over and above 
their fares for this venture. On arrival at Vancouver they 
were refused admission and waited there for a period of two 
months, making fruitless efforts to secure permission to 
land. During this period they suffered great hardships, 
and were for a time in actual vjant of food. Finally they 
were directed to return, having spent about a lakh and a 
half of rupees on the voyage.- Throughout the voyage they 
were subjected to seditious influences, particularly at 
Vancouver and on the return journey, and in the circumstances 
were peculiarly susceptible to the advice of disaffected 
and seditious leaders. Their discontent was accentuated 
by the fact that they were refused admission to Hong Kong 
where many of them had lived before, and because they 
were hot allowed to land at Singapore. Finally, when 
they arrived in the Hughli, their resentment was aggravated 
by prolonged seaches of their luggage, and by the fact 
that they were denied access to Calcutta, where they 
hoped to obtain some compensation for the losses which 
they had suffered. The ship was taken to Budge Budge, 
a place with which they were not familiar, and they were 
suddenly directed to proceed from there direct to the 
Punjab.
It was this unfortunate combination of circumstances which had led to 
the emigrants* rebellious actions. The Committee felt that the men 
were unwitting victims of forces they could neither understand nor 
control.
The Government of the Punjab was satisfied with the findings of
1 Komagata Maru Committee of Enquiry, Report, p.29«
2 Ibid., p. 30*
the Komagata Maru Committee of Enquiry. Appreciating the report, the 
government commented that they were now furnished with a full account 
of the ill-fated enterprise in which several hundred unfortunate 
Punjabis were duped by the misrepresentations of Gurdit Singh and 
his friends. The Government also acknowledged that the report 
uncovered the schemes of Gurdit Singh and rightly showed how he 
shifted the onus of blame for the failure of his adventure by 
sidetracking the real issues end exciting the feelings of his dupes 
against the Government of India. Such findings seemed to exonerate 
the Indian government and the Punjab government believed that the 
whole affair would be an instructive lesson for those who might 
contemplate similar emigration activities in the future. In this 
way (according to the Punjab government) the report would assist 
the administration.
Yet this favourable conclusion was not so widely accepted as
the government hoped. In spite of the imposition of emergency regulations
in India which discouraged criticism of the government there was a
very cautious but critical reaction in the Punjab press. The Tribune
(Lahore) accepted the fact that the men v/ere in an ugly mood when
they arrived in India and had no cause to'love the Indian government.
However, the paper posed this question;
... was there anything serious in the conduct of the 
majority of the passengers during the return voyage 
of the Komagata Maru from Vancouver? .... Beyond this 
justifiable irritation, was there anything in the 
conduct of even those ignorant men to support the 
application to them wholesale of the provisions of 
the Ingress into India Ordinance?
The paper further commented that the government was probably justified
in their desire to arrest Gurdit Singh and his thirteen friends for
1 Punjab govt, to Govt, of India, Dec. 3*11 191^* Home Proceedings §A, 
March 1915* Vol. 6.
their undesirable activities, but their action against other passengers
was not warranted. The paper added:
To justify the resort to the War Ordinance to the 
whole passengers, we have not been able to find 
anything either in the circumstances connected 
with the voyage to British Columbia or in the 
return journey to India.
In conclusion, the Tribune expressed its unhappiness about the manner
in .which the returning emigrants were received.
The Punjabes (Bahore) observed that secretive enquiries and ready
made conclusions about the Komagata Maru affair would not be accepted by
the public. The paper criticized the Komagata Maru Committee of
Enquiry for adopting a cautious tone when relating their investigation
into the actions of the officials involved. The Sher-i-Punjab
(Lahore) regretted every aspect of the Budge Budge Riot, whether the
fault was on the part of the officials or the returning emigrants.
It advanced the opinion that the
...Government should deal generously with the 
rioters, pardoning and releasing all of them who 
were under arrest and proclaiming a general amnesty 
for the rest. Such treatment will prove more 
impressive .-than the severe punishment that can be 
■'■Inflicted*
However* before the report had been published 91 detainees had been 
released at the beginning of December 191**. During all this time 
the Punjab government conducted thorough enquiries about the detained 
persons, and as a result of the findings Daljit Singh and Fagan, the 
two important members of the Komafeata Maru Committee of Enquiry 
cautioned Sir Michael O'Dwyer, the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, 
not to release any more prisoners until the whole situation was 
properly evaluated. Therefore, the Bengal government had to Keep the
1 Tribune, Jan. 20, 1915.
2 Punjabee, Jan. 23* 1915» Punjab Newspaper Report 1915*
3 Sher-i-Punjab% Jan. l8t 1915? Punjab-Newspaper Report 1915*
^ Bengal govt, to District Magistrate 2^ Farganas, Dec. 1, 191**. Home 
Proceedings 39A, March 1913* Vol. 6.
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remaining 120 passengers in its prisons for the next two months.
The Bengal government was not very happy about the delay and Lord 
Carmichael, Governor of Bengal, wrote to the Secretary of State for 
India on December 17, 191*+» regretting that nothing further had been 
done with the Komagata Maru prisoners, most of whom were still in 
prison and arousing comment in Calcutta by their long internment. 
Because of this the Punjab government felt obliged to take prompt 
action in the matter. It v/as amid these various criticisms and 
observations that the Komagata Maru Committee of Enquiry report was 
published in January 1915- And the Government of India at this 
time declared its intention not to institute any further prosecutions 
in respect of the findings revealed by the report. By the middle 
of February the remaining 120 detenus were dealt with as followst 
85 were sent to the Punjab under police supervision; two were sent 
to Poona jail; one died; one was admitted to hospital at Calcutta; 
twenty-two were sent to Ludhiana jail for further investigation,
■ if
and nine were still detained in Calcutta.
In the early part of the present century a.significant number of 
Indians from the educated classes had found their way to Europe and 
North America for the purpose of higher learning and had also founded 
various Indian societies in Europe and in America, especially along 
the Pacific Coast. Their main centres were in London, Paris, Geneva,
5
Berlin and several large cities in North America. In all of these 
Indian communities, Indians aired their grievances against the British
1 Sir Michael O' Dwyer to Hardinge, Dec. 6, 191*+, Hardinge Papers 88,
2 Lord Carmichael of Stirling, A Memoir, p. 202.
3 Govt, of India, Home Department Resolution 132, Jan. 8>3, 1915,
File 5028, L/P & J/6/I338.
k Bengal govt, to Govt, of India, Feb. 15, 1915, Horne Proceedings 78A 
V March 1915, Vol. 6 .
5 Sir Reginald Craddock, The Dilemma in India, p. 155*
in newsletters and pamphlets addressed to their Indian brothers.
By 191** this anti-British movement had gained some strength, especially 
on the Pacific Coast of Worth America, and the British government 
expressed its displeasure to the U.S. government for permitting such 
anti-British activities. However, the U.S. administration under 
Woodrow Wilson was reluctant to take any action concerning this 
matter. And the British government, as advised by its ambassador in 
the U.S., felt obliged to direct the Government of India tih be more
. ;;; ' ■ ’ ■ ■'; •' -i
cautious about which Indians they allowed to leave for the U.S. At
that time this anti-British movement was led by Hardayal and such
v;as the strength of this movement that even before the start of the
Komagata Maru affair, the sentiment on the Pacific Coast, so far as
the Indians in the U.S. and Canada were concerned, was quite anti-
British. The Director of Criminal Intelligence for the Government
of India summed up the activities of these groups with these words:
... San Francisco is at present the headquarters of 
a gang of highly dangerous conspirators headed by 
Har Dayal. They have attracted to the State university 
of Berkeley some 50 Indian students over whom Har Dayal 
exercises a sinister influence. They are stirring up
1 Spring-Pice, British Ambassador in U.S. to Grey, Feb. 9, 191^ .,/ 
Despatch 39t F.O. 371/2132.
Z Lala Hardayal was born in l88A, educated at St. Stephens College, 
Delhi, and then Government College in Lahore. He came to Oxford 
in 1903 for higher education, but left for India in 1907 as he 
became interested in working against the British government. He 
surrendered his scholarship because he disapproved of the English 
system of education. After returning to India he began to publicly 
voice his anti-British sentiments with the hope of bringing the 
British government to an end. He advocated a general boycott 
combined with passive revolution. In 1911 he reached California 
and the next year he became a lecturer in Stanford University at 
Palo Alto but by September 1912 he resigned his post to take up 
revolutionary work. He went on lecture tours along the Pacific 
Coast and by the middle of June 1913 he a result of aroused feeling 
among the Indians, the Pacific Coast Hindustan Association was  ^
formed. It was not long until other Indian groups on the Pacific 
Coast joined Hardayal1s organisation. See Isemonger and Slattery,
An Account of Ghadr Conspiracy, pp. 1-3, and v/.D* Scott, Wote on 
Hindjt Revolutionary Movement in Canada, R.G. 76, File 536999, Vol. 11
disloyalty among the Indian settlers in the Western 
States of America, and, with the help of Sikh leaders, 
are utilizing the grievances of Sikhs in Canada for 
disloyal ends. They publish a weekly paper which 
preaches the doctrines of rebellion and assassination 
to every Indian in America and have enlisted the aid 
of agitators all over the world with the object of 
flooding India with copies disguised as private letters.
As a result of their propaganda, disloyalty and hatred 
of the British rule are widespread among Indian settlers 
in America. To what extent the spirit of disaffection 
has been or will be communicated to the Sikhs in India 
through returned settlers, private correspondence or 
^seditious newspapers, cannot yetybe estimated, but the 
gravity of the situation and the necessity for adopting 
measures to put an end to the pernicious activities of 
Har Dayal and his associates cannot be denied."*
Indian immigrants, of course, were unhappy with the restrictive 
immigration regulations of the Canadian government and it was natural 
that anti-British agitators had found some sympathisers among them.
The agitators managed to get access to the Sikh temples in British 
Columbia and some cooperative understanding was reached with the Sikhs 
but the main body of immigrants was not very active in this anti-British 
movement* However, the arrival of the Komagata Maru at Vancouver, 
the litigation proceedings, the hostile press statements of local 
politicians and the sensational atmosphere of the whole affair increased 
the popularity of the revolutionary movement among the majority of 
Indian immigrants in Canada. As the First World War broke out an 
urgent appeal was launched by the agitators to Indian immigrants 
to go home to engage themselves into all-out attempts to overthrow 
the British rule in India.
1 Director of Criminal Intelligence, Report, March 3* 191^, R.G.7, G21, 
File' 332, Vol. 205-
2 This anti-British movement is termed as Ghador Revolutionary Movement 
For details see Giles T. Brown, "The Hindu Conspiracy 191^-1917M» 
Pacific Historical Review XVII (19^8), pp. 299-3*10; Don K. Dignan, 
nThe Hindu Conspiracy in Anglo-American Relations During World Mar I" 
ibid., XL, pp. 57-76; Mark Naidis, “propaganda of the Ghadr Party1’, 
ibid., XX, pp. 251-26O.
3 Sir Reginald Craddock, op.cit., p. 156. (Craddock was Member of 
Viceroy’s Council and was in charge of Home Department, Government 
of India.) -y
As Gurdit Singh’s attempts to land his passengers in Canada
failed he was not slow to use this readily available antagonistic
force against the governments of Great Britain, India and Canada.
The cbctrines of this anti-British revolutionary policy were conveyed
in daily lectures and poetry recitals. Even anti-British songs
mixed with religious sentiments 'Were undertaken as a regular programme
when the boat was on her way back to India.
The outcome of this propaganda was the creation of a very difficult
and dangerous situation which resulted in loss of life and,the Komagata
Maru affair was a rude shock not only to the Bengal government but
also to the governments of the Punjab and India as ..well. The Komagata
Maru incident was easily distorted by agitators in the Punjab and by
Ghadr agents abroad into an unjustifiable attack by merciless government
on faultless Sikhs. Bands of Indian emigrants started to return to
India and the Budge Budge incident was presented by tjre anti-British
elements as an extra stimulus for seditious designs against the 
2British rule.
Anti-British movements in Bengal and in the south of India had 
been going on for several decades and the leaders of such movements 
had attracted support on the bases of local, religious and political 
factors. Various attempts on the lives of European officials were 
made. Similarly attempts to destroy government property were also 
made. Nevertheless, with yigilant and prompt government action, the 
British administration continued without much interruption. -
The situation in the Punjab v/as another matter, however, for this 
region had its own peculiar problem. The population of the province
1 Slocock, op.cit.
2 Sir Michael 0*Dwyer, India As I Knew It, p. 19^ »
3 Cd. 9190, Sedition Committee RepoF£,pp. 21-*f0.
was diversified with 55 per cent Muslim, 35 per cent Hindu and 11 per
cent Sikh; Yet in spite of representing less than one per cent of the
total population of India the Sikhs of this area supplied a large
number of soldiers for the British army, and the Punjab Muslims
had an equal reputation for their army service for the British Grown.
Besides this the province was noted for its agricultural output and
in the beginning of the twentieth century an elaborate system of
irrigation was completed by the Punjab and Indian governments. Yet
even this quiet, loyal and progressive province had its own anti-British
agitation as early as 190?. The result of this agitation was the arrest
and deportation of Lajpat Rai and Ajit Singh but this sentence was
later rescinded and they were released. However, this anti-government
movement continued during the years 190B to 1912 and an attempt was even
x
made on the life of the Viceroy (Hardinge). It was during this period 
that some educated persons like Hardayal found their way out of India 
and started movements against the British rule in India.; As mentioned 
earlier, the movements had their main centres of activity on the 
Pacific Coast of Horth America though a part of the campaign was 
carried on in the Far East and Europe as well. Some of the important 
leaders in these campaigns were Punjabis, so. it was not difficult for 
them to find sympathisers among Indian immigrants in Canada. Thus 
as soon as the Komagata Maru had left Hong Kong on her initial voyage 
to Vancouver the Director of Intelligence for the Government of India 
had expressed his grave concern about the Punjabis and Sikhs on the 
Pacific Coast. In his confidential report to the Indian government 
he stated:"
1 C d .  9190, Sedition Committee Report, p. 60.
2 As mentioned in Chapter 2.
3 Cd. 9190 Sedition Gommittee Report, p. 61.
I look upon the rabid discontent among the Sikhs and 
other Punjabis on the Pacific Coast as one of the worst 
; features in the j^esent political situation in India.
: In consultation v/ith the Army authorities, the Punjab
Government and the Government of India in the Home and 
■•• Commerce'.'and' Industry Departments, I am .considering 
the question of deputing officers to that part of the
world tosee if any thing could be done to bring
those Sikhs and other Punjabis into a more reasonable
state of raind.^
Within-.the Punjab strong agitation against the government appeared 
among the Sikhs in 1913* It had long been the nabit of Sikhs to carry
a long knife, almost like a long sv/ord, as one of the emblems of their
■ ■ ■ 2
creed. The Punjab government proposed to limit the size of this sword 
and a Nihang was arrested at Amritsar for possessing a kirpan so long 
as to be a formidable weapon. This sparked Sikh agitation, for the 
Sikhs interpreted the action as undue interference in their religion
if ■
by the government. But there v/as further action that increased the 
enmity of the Sikhs. Early in 1914, in Delhi, the matter of the 
boundary wall of a Sikh temple X/kikahgunj, had to be settled by the 
local authority. This too, was construed as government interference 
in Sikh religious matters and the incident was used by Harchand Singh,
a man with strong Sikh ideas, as the basis for renewed agitation
against the government. Harchand Singh’s complaints Influenced other
Sikh, orders such as Akali, Kuka and Nihang and he even started a
■/ ■ ■ ' ■:■■'■ ' 5 ' ■
newspaper, the Khalsa Akhbar in order to carry on his agitation.
These circumstances had already created unrest among the Sikhs when
1 Director of Criminal Intelligence, Govt, of India, Report, May 11,
1911!-, R.G.7, G21, File 332, Vol. 20$.
2 This wearing of a sword is quite common among the Sikhs in the Punjab
■ They call it kirpan.
3 Nihang: a member of Sikh order known for their orthodox devotion 
to Sikh religion. '
4 Isepionger and Slattery, op.cit., p. 87.
5 Harchand Singh was an associate of Ajit Singh who was arrested In 
1907; and Gurdit Singh tried to send him a telegram while the 
Komagata Maru was at Singapore in order to arrange an anti-government 
demonstration for the reception of Gurdit Singh and his passengers. 
See Isemonger and Slattery, op.cit., pp. 87-88.
the Komagata Karu arrived in India. The Sikhs in the Punjab were
restive and as far as the Muslims were concerned the situation was
equally unsatisfactory. The reversal of the Partition of Bengal
in 1911 had annoyed them. Great Britain had shown indifference in
the war between Turkey and Italy and the Indian Muslims became angry
when the British government took a hostile attitude towards Turkey 
2in the Balkan war. The subsequent speech by the British Prime
Minister (Asquith) in November 1912 was Interpreted as showing.
British animosity against Turkey and against Islam, . and these strong
views were publicized through the Urdu daily, the Zamindar (Lahore)
• 2*
edited by Zafar Ali Khan, Punjabi Muslims felt a deep cultural 
allegiance with Turkey and to express their loyalty, they launched a 
campaign to collect subscriptions for Turkish aid. A considerable sum 
of money was raised and it was taken to Turkey by Zafar Ali Khan. As 
a return gesture the Turks sent a special carpet for the historical 
mosque (Badshahi Mosque) in Lahore. After the declaration of the 
First World War by Great Britain against Germany and Turkey, the Punjabi
Muslims were again unhappy and soon preachings of jehad (holy v/ar)
. ■ 7
against the British government were echoed in many parts of the Punjab. 
About fifteen Muslim students disappeared from the colleges of Jahore
1 Sir Reginald Craddock, op.cit., p. 152.
2 Cd. 9190 Sedition Committee Report, p. 61.
3 Sir Michael 0*Dwyer, op.cit., p. 172.
k Ibid.
3 Cd. 9190 Sedition Committee Report, p. 62.
6 India Office, Memorandum, War with Turkey, May 25, 1916, Austen 
Chamberlain Papers AC 21/6/18-29B.
7 H. Wheeler (Criminal Investigation Department) to Hardinge, March 10, 
1915i Hardinge Papers 121.
and made their way to join a pro-Turkey campaign in Afghanistan and
the Middle Bast.T
It was this involvement of political circumstances that made
the outbreak of war so unsettling to the loyalties of the Punjabis.
Both Sikhs and Muslims became suspicious of the motives of the
authorities and began to doubt every government action, interpreting each
new order as a threat against their security. Since most of the men
aboard the Komsgata Maru were Punjabi Sikhs, the Budge Budge incident
was bound to have a further detrimental influence on Anglo-Indiah
relations in the Punjab and the affair became a serious matter for the
British government. At the same time the outbreak of the World War
presented the government with another major problem. Traditionally
Muslims and Sikhs from the Punjab supplied a large number of soldiers
to the Indian army. They were good fighters and were valued and needed
by the British especially in time of war. Their loyalty to the Empire
was therefore most desirable. However, the returning emigrants from
Canada began to inform their Punjabi brothers about the unequal treatment
that was meted out to them in Canada. They gave accounts of their
sufferings and also expressed new ideas of socialism and anti-imperial
feelings acquired on account of their unsuccessful voyage to the
Pacific Coast. The men who returned on the Komagata Maru were of low
social status and tales of their harsh treatment did not, therefore,
have an immediately visible effect on the entire population of the
Punjab, but their complaints of discrimination did create anti-British
feelings among a section of the Punjab masses and seemed to have gained
2
some sympathy among the Punjabi soldiers. To add tb this general
1 For detailed study about the Muslim Pro-Turkey Campaign, see F.C. 
Robinson, "The Politics of U.p. Muslims 1906-22", Ph.D. Thesis, 
University of Cambridge, 1970.
2 Isemonger and Slattery, op.cit., pp. 88-89.
discontent, food prices had greatly increased with the beginning of 
the War and this present and real hardship was experienced in the 
entire province. The Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, while writing 
to the Viceroy, observed that high prices were the main source of 
discontent which united all classes and provided the frame of mind 
favourable for the agitators and sedition-mongers to work upon.
The Government of India was still occupied with its investigations 
into the Kornagata Maru affair when another ship, the Tosa Maru, was 
reported to be on her way from North America to Calcutta. The Tosa 
Maru was expected to arrive in Calcutta on October 29 and the Commissioner
of Police Rangoon (Burma) described the passengers ’’ripe for mischief”
■'v 3
as they openly declared their intention of causing trouble in India.
The Government of Bengal was again caught in an unhappy and unavoidable
situation and it appealed to the Government of the Punjab for some
means to ease the mounting tension:
There are two alternatives, first, to confine them 
under the Ordinance in jail in Calcutta, no other 
form of restraint being locally possible, second to 
send them by train direct to the Punjab under escort. 
Government of Bengal consider it grave embarrassment 
to have confined in jail so large a number without 
definite evidence. Would Government of the Punjab 
be prepared to receive the whole number?^
When the Tosa Maru reached Calcutta on October 29. the Bengal
government gathered for the occasion 800 police constables of the
Calcutta Police, 50 Calcutta Armed Police * 25 European Armed police ,
a Company of the Royal Fusiliers and a Military Police Company of
Gurkhas. To prevent any kind of incident the passengers were divided
1 G+Dwyer to Hardinge, Dec. 6 , 191^, Hardinge Papers 88.
2 Colonial Secretary, Hong Kong to Govt, of India, Oct. 6 , 191^»
Home Proceedings 155A, December 19lA, Vol. 9^61.
5 Bengal govt, to Govt, of India, telegram, Oct. 2?, 191^, Home 
Proceedings 156A, December 19l4, Vol. 9^61.
M Ibid.
“J
into smallgroups. All the arrangements for the dispersal of these
men were methodically made and the Bengal government issued a detailed
■■ 2 notification outlining every minute circumstance of the plan. The
Punjab Police for their part deputed one of their sub-inspectors to 
go on the boat in the guise of a doctor and the passengers were to 
be divided into three categories, (a) those who were to be sent to 
the Punjab under escort under the Ingress into India Ordinance; (b) 
those who were not permitted to stay in Calcutta which included those 
who appeared to be undesirable, even though enough proof for the 
justification of their arrest was not available; (c) those who were
to be set free because they were believed to be harmless.^ The;;
Funjab Police especially instructed officials dealing with the arrivals 
to inform the government about the temper and intention of the emigrants, 
Most of the passengers revealed violent seditious attitudes and hurled 
abuses on the British officials. Raja Daljit Singh, one of the members 
of the Komagata Maru Committee of Enquiry, was present at the scene 
and the passengers shouted abuses at him, because of his pro-government 
position.
To preserve the peace, therefore, Sir Michael OfDwyer, Lieutenant- 
Governor of the Punjab, ordered that all 173 passengers be brought to 
the Punjab in groups and be immediately interned in central jails at
Montgomery and Multan. Seventy-three of these men, however, were 
released on security and out of this group six were executed later 
because of their involvement in murderous outrages and another six
1 Bengal govt, to Govt, of India, Nov. 16, 191^, Home Proceedings 159A, 
December 191^, Vol. 9^61.
2 Bengal Govt. Order No. 10002P, Oct. 29, 191**, Home Proceedings 159A,
: December 191^, Vol. 9^1.
5 Isemonger and Slattery, op.cit., pp. 61-62.
k 0*Dwyer, op.cit., p. 195 •
5 Iseraonger and Slattery, op.cit., p. 62.
6 0 *Dwyer, op.cit., p. 195*
were convicted for conspiratory activities. But as the majority of 
^ie Tosa Maru passengers were interned immediately the development of 
another potentially dangerous situation was avoided.
Another ship, the Mashima Maru, made her way from North America 
and reached Colombo on October 25, 191^ with a number of returning 
emigrants. By the end of November the returned emigrants began to 
wander about like sheep without a shepherds They were unorganised 
yet shared the same deep animosity against the British government in 
India and their seditious activities around the country were undermining 
the authorities. At this time a serious attempt was made to start a 
rebellion. Near Lahore a group of returned emigrants tried to persuade 
some members of the 23rd Cavalry at Mian Mir (Lahore Cantonment) to 
mutiny, but they did not succeed. Because of all this unrest the 
Punjab government prescribed strong methods for dealing with returning 
emigrants under the Ingress into India Ordinance. The returned 
passengers were watched and warned to report at specific periods at 
a Central Enquiry Office at Ludhiana. As an extra precaution the 
antecedents of each emigrant were thoroughly investigated by government; 
officials and the man*s movements abroad and his attitude to British 
rule were also taken into consideration. Vjhen the Central Office at 
Ludhiana had compiled all this information it would decide the man’s 
fate. The officials would recommend internment if they considered 
the man dangerous or if he were considered only moderately dangerous 
he would be restricted to his native village. If a man was found to 
be free from alignment with seditious activists he would be sent home 
with a warning. Thorough enquiries were made about these men in
1 Cd. 9190, Sedition Committee Report, p. 63.
2 Isemonger and Slattery, op.cit., p. 58»
3 James Campbell Ker, Political Trouble in India, p. ;368. 
b 0’Dwyer, op.cit., p. 196.
Canada, Hong Kong and the United States of America. Lists of all" new
arrivals with particulars about where they had come from; and the
reasons for their return to India were also made and immediately sent
to the Punjab government. Only after this close scrutiny revealed
their conduct to be satisfactory were the returning emigrants allowed
to go home. No returning emigrants could escape inspection, not even
those who embarked from boats docking at the southern ports of India.
For these the Madras government made out public notices in Urdu and
English saying that every person whose domicile was in the Punjab
or the North Western Frontier province and who entered by any of the
ports in the Madras Presidency, should, unless exempted.by a police
officer of the rank not below that of a Deputy Superintendent of
Police, report himself to the District Superintendent of Police at
2Ludhiana within six days of his arrival at such port.
Yet in spite of all these felaborate precautions and strong 
security measures many of the returned emigrants managed to reach 
their native villages. During the autumn of 1$0A the Punjab government 
reported to the Indian government that the activities of the returned 
emigrants had, more than anything else, engaged official attention.
The majority of these emigrants were found to have returned expecting 
to find India in a state of acute unrest and they hoped to convert this 
unrest into revolution.x In a private letter, the Lieutenant-Governor 
of the Punjab wrote to the Viceroy of India describing the Sikh trouble 
that was created by the returning emigrants:
1 Isemonger and Slattery, op.cit., p. 6b.
2 Govt, of Madras, Public Notice, Dec. J1, 191^» Home proceedings 296A,
April 1915i Vol. 7.
3 Cd.9‘190, Sedition Committee Report, p. 6 ;^ and India Office Memorandum 
on the Internal Situation of India consequent on the War, June JO, 1915% 
Austen Chamberlain Papers AC 21/6/1-17*
The present temper and attitude of the Sikhs are 
somewhat.of a mystery. They are a very divided community, 
and no general statement will apply to all sections. There 
is however, little doubt that the pernicious propaganda 
carried on for some years from Canada, California and the 
Far East by revolutionary societies abroad hoe affected 
no ssall number of them. The recent return of several 
hundred disaffected or openly seditious Sikhs who had for 
years been in those places and under the most dangerous 
'influences hoe aggravated such sullen or hostile feeling 
' aa already existed.- Most of. these emigrants have 
.returned with the avowed intention of creating a 
revolution In the Jlinjab, which they expected to find 
■in a state of open or" suppressed mutiny* Several .of them 
' have arms (swords and pistols) and' moneyt - those who
have not hope to secure the© by creating' disorder.'"-' From . 
the paper we have seized and the,statements made by those '
' -whom. W  have - arrested it appears" that their programme: is -
. "(a) to rush police stations and secure .arms?-. .
(b) to rush tahsils and secure arms:and money;
<c) to rush jails and secure the release of their 
- - friends, whom-we have interned and of other ,
adherents;
(d) to murder officials and stir up hostility all 
round against Government.
fe’e have already hod clear evidence of their.determination 
to carry out their programme*^
The Lieutenant Governor also quoted instances of a large number of 
'criminal seditious and anti-government activities carried out by these . 
returned emigrants during the last month®.
<&*• December 19, the llinjab government .-addressed the Government of
. India again to convey to them' .the. increasing dangerous situation in the
Punjab. .- They pointed out. ’the existence of: -
... definite-'attempts to foment a revolution ...
, -which have been and are being made;by returned 
emigrants ... who during absence from India have 
■ ' made no secret of the,.fact that they are- turning- 
at this juncture with the object of subverting the 
'existing Government
1 OUiwyer to Hardinge, Dec. 6, 191**, Hardinge Papers 88.
2 Ibid.
3;'Punjab-govt, to Govt.- of India, Dec. 19, 191 ,^ Home Proceedings 386A, 
..'•■April 1915* Vol. ?.
and security in the districts the Punjab government quoted instances
of several violent crimes committed by the returned emigrants and
their local adherents. The list included the murder of police officials
and rural notables. Also cited were attacks on railway stations/
robbery of mail bags and attempts to derail trains. The Punjab
government presented a strong case to the Government of India and
impressed upon them the need for immediate changes in the procedure
dealing with such crimes. Justifying such extraordinary proposals
Sir Michael -0*Dwyer wrote in his memoir that;
•.. it is most undesirable at the present time to 
allow trials of these revolutionaries, or other 
sedition-raongers to be protracted by the ingenuity 
of Counsel and drawn.out to inordinate lengths by 
the committal and ajjpeal procedure which criminal 
laiif provides. At the same time I submitted the 
draft of an Ordinance for speeding up the procedure 
in such cases.^
The new proposals of the Punjab government, therefore, included the 
elimination of committal procedure in the case of such offences of 
political and quasi-political nature, the elimination of appeal in . 
such cases, the taking of securities from persons believed to be 
involved in seditious activities and prompt punishment of village 
officers and the fining of villagers colluding with or harbouring 
revolutionary criminals.^
It must be noted, however, that these proposals of the Punjab 
government for dealing with this revolutionary situation were not 
acceptable to Viceroy Hardinge who still believed that the matter 
could be effectively sorted out under the existing legal procedure.
Yet neither Hardinge nor Lord Crewe were unaware of the potential
3 Punjab govt, to Govt, of India, Dec, 191^, Home proceedings 386A,
: April'151 Vol. 7.
2 0*Dwyer, op.cit., p. 199*
■3: Ibid.
k Govt, of India to Punjab govt., Jan. 22, 1915* Home Proceedings 388A, 
April 1915, Vol. 7.
danger in the Punjab. In his private correspondence the Secretary
of State for India told the Viceroy that:
One cannot pretend that Sikh feeling is likely to be 
satisfactory, so long as a witch's cauldron keeps on 
brewing in America and even when there is no absolute 
disaffection among them, there seems to exists wide­
spread sulky dissatisfaction. There have been various 
stories of grumbling and discontent at the front, 
confined to Sikhs and similar echoes from some of the 
hospitals,^
The activities of anti-British elements in the Punjab accelerated
at the beginning of 1915« The returning emigrants and revolutionaries 
drew recruits from lawless elements in the rural population. The result
was that village officials and notables were terrorised and even loyal
people were affected by threats and propaganda. Under the instigation
of the revolutionaries and in alliance with the local elements of
disorder many outrages were soon committed all over the province of
the Punjab. These outrages included murders, gang dacoities and
robberies, a common feature of which was the reckless use of arms and
explosives. Throughout this period persistent efforts were made to
tamper with the troops throughout the cantonments of Northern India,
while at the same time attacks on arsenals and outbreaks were also
planned. At that time the revolutionary leaders - Rash Behari from
Bengal and Ganesh Pingle from Bombay - appeared on the scene and
if
established their centre at Amritsar, They began vigorous direction 
of local revolutionary activities. All this upheaval was to culminate 
in a general rising planned for February 21, 1915* for which bombs 
were prepared, arms and flags were made ready and a declaration of 
war drawn up, However, the authorities were on the alert and the
1 Crewe to Hardinge, Jan. 1, 1915i Crewe Papers C19-C22.
2 0*Dwyer, op.cit., p. 200.
3 Isemonger and Slattery, op.cit., pp. 90-91. 
h O'Dwyer, op.cit., p. 202.
conspirators, suspicious of discovery, endeavoured to push forward 
their scheme for February 19 and they also moved their centre to 
Lahore. But on that day their headquarters in Lahore were raided. 
Thirteen of the most dangerous revolutionaries Were captured with all 
the paraphernalia of the conspiracy,armsf bombs, bomb-making materials, 
revolutionary literature and four rebel flags. The timely action by 
the government on February 19 foiled the plans for a general rising 
that night . ; The cantonments at Sialkot, Ferozepur and /Rawalpindi 
were accordingly alerted and due to their prompt precautionary measures, 
the projected scheme of general rising in the Punjab was foiled.
As an added precaution the military authorities carried out thorough 
investigations of the Sikh soldiers suspected of being involved and 
these actions resulted in court martials and transfers. The Punjab, 
Police continued its search, and by February 2*f, 1915» five more
bombs were discovered. By this time the police had detailed information
■. ■ rj
from the confession of the accused and further arrests followed.
The Punjab government had attempted to meet all of these serious 
situations with the ordinary resources and normal powers it had as a 
provincial government but these appeared to be insufficient. Therefore, 
the Punjab government again approached the Government of India in 
continuation of tMr letter of the past December. This time an 
account of the dacoities and violent crimes which had been committed 
by the returned emigrants and their followers was also furnished.
There were 45 cases in all during that five month period. The Punjab 
government opce more asked for extra-ordinary legislation. They warned 
that the situation had developed in a dangerous manner and the rural 
population had been adversely affected by the campaign of violence 
and sedition by the revolutionary group and the lav/less section of
1 Q'Dwyer, op.cit., pp. 202-203.
the people who had also joined these activities. Furthermore, the 
Punjab government stated that all-out efforts were being made to 
stem the tide of unrest and it proposed that alarmist reports be 
checked and restrictions be imposed on movement with internment if 
necessary in the case of suspicious persons. The government also
stressed the importance of prompt punishment for offenders caught
. 1 ;
in the act of committing crimes of violence.
Conditions in the Punjab were growing more and more unsettled but
it was difficult to convey the full extent of this unrest to the
2
authorities. However, in frequent letters to the Government of India 
the Punjab government continued to report further criminal activities 
of the returned emigrants in order to impress upon the Indian government 
the urgency and seriousness of the situation in that province.
Meanwhile Sir Michael 0*Dwyer called a sjjecial meeting of the Sikh
Advisory Committee on February 27 at Government House in Lahore. All 
the leading Sikhs of the districts to which the emigrants mainly 
belonged were invited and these Sirdars (Sikh chiefs) pleaded the 
immediate internment of all returned emigrants who were either actually 
or potentially dangerous. But the Lieutenant Governor pointed out the 
difficulty in such a step which involved internment of.thousands* 
Nevertheless it was seen that the Pun jab government * s action of 
internment and restriction had the approval of the Sikh leaders. The 
Sirdars advocated that the delay in dealing with crimes committed by 
the revolutionaries had a detrimental effect on the rest of the population 
and they requested that the lengthy routine procedure normally used
1 Punjab govt, to Govt, of India, Feb. 25, 1915, Home Proceedings j$9A, 
April 1915, Vol. 7*
2 Punjab govt, to Govt, of India, Feb. 25, 1915? March 5, 1915, and 
March 15, 1915, Home Proceedings 390A, 39^A and 392A, April 1915,
Vol. 7.
in.'the'.courts' should be substituted,; with - speedy and 'summary trials.
Aft© this conference the Punjab government established Sikh Advisory 
Committees in all districts to help district officers in dealing with 
returned emigrants. Explaining these*, measures to Hardinge and 
requesting more power to deal with the situation -.0 *Dwyer stated in 
his private letter; :
I would not ask for such a special measure if I 
were not convinced that the emergency demands it. Last 
week I had; a confidential discuss!on with some of 
the leading Sikhs of the province — three Members 
of the provincial Couhcil and the two leading religious 
leaders - in regard to the action to be taken against 
the revolutionary emigrants, ana one of the first 
suggestions-offered - and by a leading pleaderwhom 
the others supported -was that the ordinary legal 
procedure with its delays and subtleties was quite 
unsuitable at this crisis, and:that a more summary 
and simple system should be substituted for it.
The promulgation of an.Ordinance ... so far from 
indicating that Government is alarmed will, I believe, 
show that Government is prepared to use every legitimate 
weapon to maintain the public peace, and will be welcomed 
by the law-abiding, while it will strike fear into the 
lawless and turbulent classes.
Our Police and Magistrates are doing all that is 
.possible under the ordinary law; so far owing partly to 
good luck, partly to good information and timely 
dispositions we have been on the whole fairly successful 
in dealing vdth a critical situation. But this recent 
and unexpected outbreak in the Mahomedan districts of 
the west, coupled with the revolutionary movement in 
the centre of the province, shows how small is our 
margin ox safety and how necessary it is to strengthen 
our hands by every legitimate means.^
0 *Dwyer made his suggestions and waited.for the government's 
decision. But while the government deliberated something had to be 
done to keep the peace in the Punjab. Within the province itself 
the Punjab government took the maximum strict measures undersection 5 
of the Foreigners Ordinance and under the provisions of the Ingress
1 Isemonger and Slattery, op.cit.y pp. 65-66; and 0*Dwyer, op.cit., 
.pp. 204-205. .
2 01Dwyer to Hardinge, March 7» 1915* Hardinge Papers 89.
into India Ordinance, 1914. In an extraordinary Gazette the Punjab
government announced;
Vvhenever the local Government directs or has directed 
... that (a) the movement of any person shall be 
restricted to any specified place or area; such person 
shall unless the District Magistrate otherwise directs 
enter into a bond, for such amount or with such
number of sureties as shall be fixed by the District
Magistrate, that he will remain within the said limits 
in accordance with the order of restriction.
The District Magistrate can require him to give a 
bond. 1
Then to reinforce the written requests and to appraise the Indian
government about the dangerous and serious situation in the Punjab,
the Lieutenant Governor paid a visit to Delhi in the middle of March
and had long interviews with the Viceroy (Hardinge) and the Horae Member,
Sir Reginald Craddock. 0*Dwyer urged the Government of India to pass
2some emrgency regulations to deal with the Punjab situation. As 
well as this the Home Department (Government of India) submitted a 
detailed memorandum to the Viceroy outlining the evidence of a conspiracy 
against British rule in India. . The memorandum enumerated the various 
attempts of the revolutionaries, returned emigrants and anti-British 
Muslims to foster anti-British sentiment in India.
Finally on March 18, 1915 the Government of India found it necessary 
to pass Act V of 1915* Defence of India Act to provide for special 
measures to secure public safety and the defence of India and for the 
more speedy trials of certain offences. The statement of Objects and 
Reasons for this act provided special measures for the existence of war 
and prevailing lawlessness which needed quick action. The new act 
empowered the government to prevent communication among enemies and
1 /"“Punjab 7 Government Gazette Extra-Ordinary, Lahore, March 15, 1915*
2 0 1Dwyer, op.cit., p. 210.
3 E*'. Wheeler to Hardinge, March 10,1915* Hardinge Papers 121.
to stop.the spread of false reports. The government was also empowered 
to ensure the safety of the armed force© and their success; to protect 
. water, and gas' supplies and property and to prohibit the possession of - 
explosives. The act gave the powers to search, arrest ami to control 
: the movements of persons whose actions were reasonably suspected to be 
'prejudicial-to public safety by removing the© or keeping there in specific 
areas. , The act also permitted the trial of■certain- offences in '. 
notified' areas..before a specially- constituted tribunal -whose decision 
. was to be final and conclusive; and no order'of confirmation -was to be
<1
necessary in the case. of any .-sentence passed by such a tribunal. .
In a'personal telegram to'Lord Crewe, Hardinge stated clearly -that 
-:;he had'-'to act .even in anticipation-'of the-approval of the Indian .office ." 
In London-primarily.because of the serious situation in the Punjab which 
could not bo allowed to get out of hand. The main causes of concern 
(as the Viceroy pointed out) were those concerted effort© of returned 
emigrants, revolutionaries, and Muslim© to commit crime and tamper 
with troops, the intriguing links between the Pun jab.-and Bengal ©nti~- :- 
government,forces, and the prevailing spirit of lawlessness throughout 
' the - Punjab.^ Hardinge pointed :out that:It.was' the' Punjab situation: 
that, forced him to-pass the Defence of-'India Act* Furthermore, the' 
...Viceroy stated that-a large number of arrests had already been made'"
; as a result .of violence in this province and he ©Iso- states thrt 
during his discussion with 0*Dwyer, he was informed that even tne
Punjab Chief Court Judge© thought that the matter was beyond the
% • - 
scope of ordinary'law."
1 The detail© of the Defence of India Act are available in the Punjab 
Record, 1915, Part II. ■
2. Hardinge to Crewe, telegram," March 13*1915,•Home proceedings 393A, ■ 
April 1915# Vol. 7*
3 -.'Hardinge -to Crewe, March 2 %  ,19V>* Homo. Proceeding© 501 A, April 1915, 
Vol.'?.
The serious and explosive situation created by the returning
emigrants can be judged from another urgent telegraphic request from
the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India. He stated:
With reference to the internal situation here it 
would be most useful to us to receive any information 
procurable as to the numbers, political attachments, 
intentions as regards the return to India of Indian 
emigrants still in Canada, U.S.A, Japan, Chino, Straits 
Settlements. We should be grateful if such particulars 
as can be readily obtained, could be collected and 
telegraphed to us with the concurrence of the Foreign 
and Colonial Offices. 1
By undertaking such effective precautions and with the use of the
Defence of India Act the Punjab Lieutenant Governor was pleased to
2
report within two weeks that there was a marked improvement. Even
the Governor of Bengal (Lord Carmichael) thought that the Defence of
India Act had settled a good many problems of sedition in his province
and he was pleased to report to the Secretary of State (Lord Crewe)
on March 25, 1915 that:
The new Act should help us to deal?with our most 
dangerous people in any emergency.
By early April, when Sir Reginald Craddock, Home Member of Viceroy* 
Council, visited Rawalpindi (Punjab), he was satisfied to report to 
Hardinge:
I went down to see the jail this morning with 0*Dwyer 
and we talked to some of the interned Sikhs; they are 
about a dozen there, four or five of them are decidedly
unpleasant customers .... Some of them have considerable
sums of money, and nearly all of them admit having landed 
property in Canada. It is remarkable how, according to 
their own accounts, they were suddenly seized with the 
desire to visit their wives and families. I think 
0 *Dwyer has done extraordinarily well in these matters.
The dacoity epidemic in the Western Punjab has^come to
a standstill for the time being at all events.
1 Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, telegram, March 24, 1915»
Hose Proceedings, .21.7A, April 1915, Vol. 7*
2 0 *Dwyer, op.cit., p. 210.
3 Lord Carmichael, A Memoir, p. 206.
4 Craddock to Hardinge, April 6 , 1915, Hardinge papers 89.
The Viceroy was also satisfied about the improvement in the situation
as he wrote to Austen Chamberlain, the new Secretary of State for India,
on May,27» 1915?
If you were to ask my opinion of the general situation 
in the Country I would say it is distinctly reassuring.
There have been serious troubles in the Punjab and I 
have no hesitation in saying that in February and March 
the situation was distinctly critical. 1
Under the Defence of India Act, special tribunals were appointed
and they tried nine groups of conspirators in Lahore. In the first
three major cases 61, 74 and 17 accused persons were tried, out of
whom 36 were ordered to be hanged, 77 were sentenced to life
imprisonment, 13 were given imprisonment for different lengths of time,
and 24 were acquitted. In this way, in all, 175 accused persons
were tried. Many of those who were hanged, transported or imprisoned
3
were prominent members of the Ghadr movement from the Pacific Coast.
By November 1915 the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab was pleased to
report to the Viceroy:
Over 6 ,OOQdmigrants returned to the Punjab ... since 
the war began* It is believed that at least half of 
these were more or less deeply involved in the revolutionary
movement. They probably found an equal number of adherents
In men who had returned from abroad earlier or whom they 
succeeded in infecting with their views. I take it that 
early this year there were from 6,000 to 10,000 men in 
the Punjab who given the arms, the direction and the 
opportunity, were ready to raise the standard of 
revolution. The internment of several of their leaders, 
scared some, the betrayal of the conspiracy by various 
informers frightened others. The hostility of the people 
as a body and the alertness of the police kept many 
others quiet, pending further developments. Finally 
the exposure of the various plots in the conspiracy 
trial made those who had not yet Compromised themselves 
by any overt acts careful to avoid risks.
1 Hardinge to Austen Chamberlain, May 27, 1915, Austen Chamberlain 
papers, AC 21/6/1-17*
2 James Campbell Ker, op.cit., .p. ',365. -r
3 New York Sun, May 14, 1916.
4 O’Bwyer to Hardinge, Nov. 8, 1915, Hardinge papers 90.
The situation in the Punjab was met with great firmness by 
the Punjab government under Sir Michael .0*Dwyer, and the passing of. 
the Defence of India Act enabled the conspirators to be effectively 
dealt with. These men were exceedingly dangerous for the government 
at such an inflammable and critical time. They desired to overthrow 
the government but they did not have any long-sighted aim in front 
of them. After the new security measures were instituted the trouble 
created by the returned emigrants began to wane and the country was
'I
more orderly by the middle of 1915* After this restrictions on
those who were confined to their villages were gradually removed and
2
by 1919 all of them were lifted.
The unsuccessful attempt of the Komagata Maru to land her 
passengers at Vancouver marked the climax of the complicated problem 
of Indian immigration into Canada. Most of the passengers were ignorant 
rural people from the Punjab who were induced to spend all their money 
in order to undertake the voyage and when the attempt failed Gurdit 
Singh found a readily available answer for the problems that were 
really his fault. He put the entire blame on British rule in India, 
and held the British government responsible for all ills, problems 
and troubles of these Indians. V*hen the ship was finally ordered back 
to India anti*-*British socialists on the Pacific Coast, Indian students 
and agitators in America v/ere able to create a receptive mood for their 
seditious ideas among the Komagata Maru passengers. The entire journey 
from Vancouver to Calcutta was taken up with lectures, hymns, and 
propaganda against British rule and the Sikh temple in the boat was 
available to carry on this programme. The passengers, already 
disillusioned and bitter, were easily indoctrinated with a desire for
revenge against the actions of what they believed to be a callous and 
prejudicial government.
The Government of India and the provincial governments in the 
Punjab and Bengal were very much concerned about repercussions .that 
would be expected from men who had been subjected to such trying 
eircufastances. The return of this adventurous lot to India, therefore, 
could not be treated as an insignificant event. The long intelligence 
report I'eceived by the government emphasised the danger surrounding 
the affair and because of this, elaborate arrangements v/ere made for 
the passengers’ reception. But the passengers were deliberately misled: 
and therefore, misinterpreted the action of the government, Gurdit 
Singh, eager to cover his crimes, used every move of the government to 
save himself. The various pretexts of going to the Sikh temple at 
Howrah, the arrangement of a big demonstration and the incitement 
of the passengers to behave insolently towards British officers 
suited his purpose while theoconfusion leading to riot solved his 
problem and allowed him to escape. For the government’s part the 
detailed programme of deputing a large number of officials for the 
reception of the Komagata Maru passengers and their efforts to search 
the baggage do seem efficient. But as the dramatic events unfolded 
British officials showed themselves not prepared to deal with the 
smuggling of pistols arid the sudden eruption of trouble. The violent 
outcome of this returned voyage revealed that the British did not fully 
understand the seriousness of anti-British feeling in India and the 
action of the British administration was unfortunately based on panic, 
miscalculation and inefficiency. The post-riot enquiries and government 
actions did not solve any part of the real problem. The Budge Budge 
riot should not have been allowed t o happen for it was used by agitators
and revolutionaries abroad as an example of British prejudice and 
brutality. No-one any longer wished to subject himself to such 
degrading treatment. As a result of this the trend to emigrate to 
British colonies was reversed and a large number of Indians began 
to return home. Such action was a great boost for the further 
endeavours of the revolutionaries. In the various provinces within 
India there were latent factors against the British administration 
that needed only slight new pressure to be activated. The anti­
partition of Bengal agitation did not completely subside in 1911
'I
and a section of Bengalees still continued their hostile attitude.
The Muslims too, were unhappy over cancellation of the partition of 
Bengal and also over the anti-Turkish attitude of the British government. 
The Punjab, in fact, had been brewing with trouble since the turn of the 
century over such incidents as the Colonisation Bill, the arrests of 
lajput Rai and Ajit Singh, the Sikh agitation about the size of their 
kirpsans (swords) and the Rikahgunj temple incident. The feeling against 
the government was strong but the accusation of discrimination was the 
fiacal point of all those various grievances and the Budge Budge 
incident was, therefore, the catalytic agent which erupted these forces 
like a volcano. As the anti-government elements became more active 
they made attempts to disrupt the government by blowing up trains .and 
bridges and attacking government stores, treasuries and even ammunition 
depots. Besides, serious attempts were made on the lives of British 
officials.and Indians loyal to the Crown. Finally the revolutionaries 
drew up a programme for a general uprising to be initiated/a particular 
day and in these disruptive activities they were encouraged and aided
1 Craddock, op.cit., p. 1^ 7* Partition of Bengal was annulled in 1911.
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by the German and Turkish governments. Because of the seriousness 
of these activities the Governments of the Punjab and Bengal became 
not only alarmed but panic-stricken and pressed for emergency 
regulations which could easily be instituted on the pretext of war 
conditions in 191^-1915* At the same time the local press was gagged 
under the same excuse. But in spite of all these measures the 
agitation which began with the return of the Komagata Maru continued 
for one year and the Punjab government had to suspend even the ordinary 
course of justice during the time and was forced to resort to passing 
the Defence of India Act of 1915» under which a large number of 
agitators were tried and condemned by special tribunals who had full 
and final powers.
The building of such awesome governmental powers, however, was
surely hasty and premature. Even taking into consideration the
seriousness of the situation and the desire of the government to
maintain order one views with §Tafm a procedure that was so tyrannical,
arbitrary and from which there was no possible appeal. Concerning the
trials for political and suspected political offences one wonders what
harm could have resulted from allowing appeals to be made to the
higher courts if one had grounds to challenge the decision of such
2tribunals. The Calcutta Weekly pointed out that such appeals would 
have served to satisfy the accused and the public that either justice 
had been done or injustice remedied. The journal further commented 
that it could never be wise to shake the confidence of the people in 
the proper administration of justice. But the short-sighted policy 
of the government dealt with the immediate situation and steadfastly
1 Cd. 9^90, Sedition Committee Report, p. 67.
2 The Calcutta Weekly Notes, March 29, 1915, Vol. 19.
ignored basic grievances that continued to smoulder for many years.
For the time being the local agitation came to a halt because its
leaders were divided and jealous of one another and their plans were
constantly miscarried when their plots were given away or they were
careless. A good many of these men were interned in their villages
but typically the British officials considered them so inferior as
not to pose any threat. This attitude is reflected in the words of
Craddock (Horae Member of the Viceroy's Council):
. ,1 their ^/"revolutionariesJ  ideas were vague 
chaotic and there was not a man among them capable 
of leading more than an undisdplined rabble. They 
were a source of danger rather for the mischief 
they could do. among ignorant and fanatical men than 
for any final results they sought to achieve.
Yet cooperation in some form among anti-British elements continued and
later on, at the end of the war a more united and stronger agitation
movement emerged.
With the failure of the Komagata Maru enterprise and the subsequent
adverse publicity the trend to emigrate to Canada was reversed and the
propaganda spread by the revolutionaries had the effect of steering
2
emigrated Indians home to raise the standard of revolt against the 
British rule in India. In order to achieve their objective the 
revolutionaries advised the Indians in North America how they should 
conduct themselves when they returned to India. They were instructed 
to win over Indian troops and massacre all loyal subjects and officials. 
Further helpful revolutionary activities included the setting up of a 
revolutionary flag, breaking open jails, looting treasuries, winning 
over youthful sympathies, distributing seditious literature, consorting
1 Craddock, op.cit., p. 152.
2 Second Supplementary Lahore Conspiracy Case, Judgment, 1917* p* 23-
with foreign enemy powers, commissioning dacoities, procuring arms,
manufacturing bombs, founding and maintaining secret societies, looting
police stations, destroying railways and telegraphs and propagandizing
villagers. Revolutionary forces in North America capitalized on
the unsuccessful return of the Komagata Maru and their interpretation
of governmental prejudice and wrong treatment that they fed to the
ignorant immigrants instilled a desire for redress. To attack the
problem at its source they were eager to return to India. The Director
of Intelligence, Government of India, reported in November 191^:
In the end of August one gentleman wrote from 
Victoria B.C. to the Secretary for War that a 
friend of the writer who was an estate agent broker 
had received instructions from a Sikh to sell two 
lots of property at half their value. The Sikh said 
that he wanted the money, to send Indians home; in 
two months’ time there would hardly be an Indian 
left in America. He v/ould not disclose the reasons 
of the exodus but hinted that it was unfriendly to 
the British Government.^
Thus in the end the Komagata Maru affair resulted in terrible
; rioting and anti-government activities in India and Canada. While
deciding the Second Supplementary Conspiracy Case, the special tribunal
observed in their conclusion:
We have no doubt that there was an active sedition in 
Canada as there was in the States, that the incident 
of; the Komagata Maru inflamed still further those who 
were already ripe for mischief, and that the outbreak 
of war was seized upon as an opportunity for putting 
into operation the expected Ghadr conspiracyt that 
many Indians left Canada arrayed for war, and prepared 
to carry their intentions of waging war into effect by 
any and every means, and that having arrived in India, ,
many of them put their intentions into active operations.
The Indian Immigration question was thus subordinated to the anti-British
campaign whose doctrine was, return home and fight the British rule in
1 Isemonger and Slattery, op.cit., p. 2^.
2 Ibid., p. *?2.
$ Second Supplementary Lahore Conspiracy Case Judgment 1917» P* 32.
India. No further attempts by Indians to force their way into Canada
received any public notice. But the incident was not forgotten and
for the British Empire as a whole the consequences were serious and
startling. The unfortunate outcome for the ignorant passengers was
loss of money, imprisonment, shock, disillusionment, bewilderment and
in certain cases, even death, injury and lifelong misery in grinding
poverty. For the British administration the outcome was more far-
reaching. At the same time it was a startling thing for they learned
to their dismay that Sikhs and Muslims in the Punjab with long pro-
British martial traditions, could sever what the British thought
were unbreakable ties and unite among themselves and readily incite
other seditious elements in India against the British rule. The
beginning of the First World War at that time further complicated
the matter as The Times rightly observed twenty-six years later when
Sir Michael 0'Dwyer was shot dead:
At the outset of the last war, O'Dwyer was confronted 
by the return to India of a number of Sikhs who imbibed 
in Canada revolutionary doctrines from Indian extremists 
whom the German Foreign Office was taking under its 
. wings. ^
The end result of the Komagata Maru affair thus reversed the 
trend of Indian immigration and instead of Indians coming to Canada 
they returned to their homeland. Before the Komagata Maru affair 
the strain was felt by the Canadian government who appealed to the 
Government of India to adopt some restrictive measures to keep Indians 
out of Canada} but after the Komagata Maru affair when the population 
of Indians in Canada quickly and steadily declined it was the Indian 
government and the Government of the Punjab who were concerned with
1 The Times, March 1^ , 19^0.
these Indian migrants who returned from Canada, China, Japan and 
Malaya indoctrinated \*ith socialistic and revolutionary ideas and 
desiring to overthrow the Imperial government in India.
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The general policies dealing with emigration and immigration 
of Indians up to 191^ were totally inadequate and in most respects 
untruthful and unrealistic. The Indian government, not wishing to 
create any further internal problems by imposing what would be 
considered unfair restrictions upon Indians,with regard to their 
free movement within the Bnpire, maintained the principle of open 
emigration of the Indian population; and Canada and the other 
Dominions adopted various indirect but nevertheless effective ways 
Of keeping them out. Because of the reasons outlined in previous 
chapters the Indian government.was not ready to depart from its 
policy even though the Dominion urgently requested that they do 
so. This whole question of Indian migration within the British 
Empire had been the topic of prolonged discussion at Whitehall 
but no satisfactory settlement could be reached. The status of 
Indians as British subjects and their right to enter the self- 
governing Dominions were difficult questions to resolvev since 
the Indians claimed these rights of citizenship but were always 
strongly opposed by the white population. No positive government 
stands were taken and no reciprocal policies or guidelines for 
action were set up. The Indians continued to have freedom to 
leave India, and Canada continued to restrict their entry. The 
antagonism that was engendered fermented locally and v/as finally 
brought to a climax with the arrival of the Komagata Maru at the 
Pacific Coast in the summer of 191^. This particular event brought 
the whole migration issue into the open when it appeared on the 
front page of newspapers in many parts of the British Empire.
1 Hardinge, Summary of the Administration of Lord Hardinge, p. *t1, 
Hardinge Papers.
Reaction to Canada’s restrictive immigration policies was especially 
strong in the Punjab. Protest meetings were held and resolutions 
were adopted in favour of the free admission of Indians into Canada. 
It v/as not difficult for the Indian government to realize that on 
thenquestion of free movement within the Empire all Indians were 
united."*
Under these circumstances, the Secretary of State (Lord Crewe)
and the Viceroy (Lord Hardinge) were convinced that some positive
change was necessary in the emigration policy of the Indian
government, and the Secretary of State expressed his desire to
start negotiations through the Colonial Office* Continuously mindful
of public opinion, however, he also asked for Hardinge’s estimate
2of the possible reaction in India. The Viceroy ruled that educated
Indians did not favour that Indians should force themselves upon
countries where they were not welcome and where they could not easily
be assimilated. But at the same time the Viceroy knew that there was
a strong feeling among less educated classes, especially the Sikhs,
3m  favour of unrestricted migration.
The Sikhs as a religious group were a very important element 
for the British government in India and the government had no wish 
to offend them. In its civil aspect the Sikh religion inculcated 
unquestioning loyalty to authority and in its military aspect it 
looked upon self-sacrifice as the highest form of heroism. As far 
back as 1911 the Commander-in-Chief of the British army in India 
had been concerned about any occurrence that might place the Sikhs
1 Punjab govt, to Govt, of India, June 25, 191**, Govt, of India to 
India Office, Sept. 3. 191**; July 23, 191**, July 30, 191*+, and
Sept. 10, 191**, C.O. **2/985/27893 and 31 **02.
2 Crewe to Hardinge, telegram, June 9, 191**, Crewe Papers 1/17(2).
3 Hardinge to Crewe, telegram, June 12, 191**, Hardinge Papers 98 and
Hardinge to Crewe, June 3, 191*+, Hardinge Papers 120.
in danger of losing the distinctive character and loyalty which 
the British military service had been careful to preserve by 
encouraging the survival of the purity of their Sikh religion. He 
wrote that ’’first, fanatical Christian missionaries interfered with 
the life of the people and insulted their holy teachings. Secondly, 
other Indian religions exerted counter pressures on these simple, 
truthful, and totally unworldly Sikhs. Thirdly in Amritsar, the 
headquarters of the Sikh religion, Hindus had become more commercially 
successful and because of this the Sikhs sought marriage among them 
and were influenced by their materialstic preaching.” Realising that 
the Sikh community was in danger of being submerged into the Hindu 
majority. General Greagh (Comraander-in-Chief of Indian array) had 
pointed out that there were 35,000 Sikh soldiers, all of whom were 
reliable fighters and loyal to the British Empire and if the Indian 
government wished them to remain that way it had to keep orthodox 
Sikhism alive and check the spread of anti-government propaganda 
initiated by aggressive and powerful elements of Christianity,
Islam and Hinduism. The maintenance of the Sikh religion, therefore,
-'j
had become a vitally important part of British policy. But by 191*+ 
the Indian migration question into Canada with its associated 
controversial problems threatened to damage the loyalty of Sikhs, 
especially the Sikh soldier class. It was because of this threat 
that the Indian government felt an urgent need to off-set anti- 
British feelings among the Sikhs and by the middle of 191*+ the 
Viceroy of India felt the necessity of some definite action to 
eliminate the irritation caused by this migration question. In a
1 General Greagh*s seven-page Memorandum on the importance of Sikhs 
for the British rule in India and his special stress on their 
services in the British army and the policy of the Government of 
India is available in Hardinge papers, 50.
telegram to the Secretary of State for India, Hardinge suggested
that some system of reciprocity, such as a passport system, might
*1
put Indians and the Colonists in a position of equality. Explaining
his proposals further the Viceroy sent another telegram to Crewe
the next day which read:
lam inclined to think that the only remedy lies 
in some arrangement by which immigration Into Canada 
is restricted to a certain number annually and 
giving equality of treatment to Canadians visiting 
India and to Indians visiting Canada, which though 
of no real advantage to intending emigrants, would 
at least conciliate Indian amour propre. This
would of course, involve a change in our policy which
has hitherto been to refuse to associate ourselves 
in any way with the restriction of emigration to 
the self-governing Colonies. 2
While the Viceroy was suggesting that these changes in the emigration
policy of the Indian government were now necessary because the
Komagata ^aru affair had focused public attention on the plight
of Indian immigrants during June 191*+i at that time Henri Bourassa,
the well-known French Canadian political leader in Canada, happened
to be in London. On his request, the India Office arranged his
meeting with three Indian National Congress leaders, Sarnia, Sarnath
and Sinha, and from their discussion the same points emerged that
the Vicetoy had pointed out in his telegrams. All agreed that the
need for immediate action was urgent but the India Office, the
Government of India and the Congress leaders were each afraid to
initiate that action. Sir Theodore Morison while writing about the
meeting and its outcome observed:
I pointed out to the Indians that the Government 
of India could not be expected to advocate such a 
course as this, unless it was demanded by leaders
1 Hardinge to Crewe, telegram, June 11, 191*+, Hardinge Papers, 98.
2 Hardinge to Crewe, telegram, June 12, Hardinge Papers, 98.
of public opinion in India, as it would expose them 
to the reproach of surrendering the rights of their 
subjects. In reply the Congress delegates said 
that they were prepared to accept this solution without 
complaint, but dared not advocate it, because it would 
expose them to the attack of the extremists. This 
I fear, is an impotent conclusion which is of very 
little help but I thought it my duty to let you know 
of this talk upon the subject which must be causing 
a great deal of anxiety.”*
The Viceroy knew, of course, that the publicity associated with the
Komagata Maru affair would provoke the anger of Indians and arouse
renewed hostility against the British. He decided, therefore, to
devise a new arrangement with Canada on the lines of the Japanese
agreement, and whatever terms were to be concluded by Canada would
be reciprocally conceded by India to Canada. In his private letters
to Chirol, Hardinge explained the reasons for this scheme:
This would not have the slightest effect upon.
Canadians who want to come to India but it would 
be balm to the wounded amour propre of the Indians, 
who in reality feel the sentimental side of the ' 
question. 2
However, the migration of Indians to the self-governing Dominions
was a problem that found ho easy solution. The Secretary of State
for India, Lord Crewe, had been Secretary of State for the Colonies
before he took over the India Office and he fully appreciated the
great difficulties that the problem entailed. His own views on the/
matter coincided with those of Hardinge and he sent the following
letter of encouragement to the Viceroy:
I shall look out with keen interest for your
Colonial immigration proposals .... I often
used to think that though the racial problem
in its imperial aspect is in one sense insoluble
yet something might be done on reciprocity principles,...
Indian sentiments seem to be curiously open to formal
recognition of this sort, and it might be possible to
devise some modus which would not have the opposite
1 Sir Theodore Morison, Member of Council of Secretary of State 
for India to Hardinge, July 2, 191*+, Hardinge Papers 93.
2 Hardinge to Chirol, June 30* 191*+, Hardinge Papers 95*
defect of rubbing up Colonial v a n i t y  which in 
its way is not less thorny.”*
Such schemes, however, were only Under correspondence between 
the Viceroy and the India Office while the very real problem that 
the Komagata Maru affair had provoked was about to land the emigrants 
with the returning ship right in India. The declaration of the First 
World War became a further complication in this already difficult 
problem, Hardinge who was, as X have said, aware of all the 
implications of this issue, hoped that a change in the policy of 
the Indian government would improve the general atmosphere in India, 
England and the Dominions. Accordingly the Viceroy outlined his 
proposals in his famous speech in the opening session of the 
Legislative,Council at Simla. The Viceroy dealt with the emigration 
question as a whole by stating that it was being commonly asserted 
- whether on historical, legal or constitutional grounds - that 
the full rights of citizenship of the British Empire include the 
right to settle in any part of that Empire irrespective of the 
existence of local legislation. But to such a doctrine there 
existed a political impediment of an almost insuperable character.
The self-governing Dominions were empowered to manage their 
internal affairs as might seem best to them and control of immigration 
was primarily an internal question, for each self-governing unit 
was expected to know best from what material it desired to provide 
itself with its future citizens. Thus the right of free movement 
within the Empire was conditional upon the exercise of local 
legislatures and their undoubted powers. The principle of free 
migration was indeed the principle for which the Government of India
1 Crewe to Hardinge, July 3P» 191*+» Hardinge Papers 120.
2 Hardinge to Crewe, Sept. 9*191*+? Crewe papers C19-C22.
had long and consistently contended, but the course of events had
made it more and more clear that there was no hope of its adoption.
On the other hand, reviewing the whole situation and policy of
the past years, the obvious conclusion was that the result of this
attitude on the part of the Government of India had been to force
the Dominions to undertake more and more drastic legislation and
then to produce the .Komagata Maru situation in Canada, which had
brought the problem to an. acute stage. After outlining the
difficulties of the problem, the Viceroy observed that the time
had come to make a change and to consider whether, if the Government
of India could not get what it wanted, some alternative was not
feasible to relieve at least the present situation which was
unsatisfactory from the viewpoint both of Indian and Dominion
interest. He believed that such an alternative could be found.
VJhen the Viceroy touched on the Komagata Maru incident he pointed
out that the expedition was carried out without the approval of
the Government of India and the organisers knew that entry into
Canada would be refused. However, the Viceroy reminded his listeners
that the Indian government used its influence and pressed the
Canadian government to use no force in the implementation of its
deportation order. Furthermore, he registered his appreciation to
the Canadian government for the generous supply of provisions they
provided for the return journey of the Komagata Maru. Be continued
by summarizing the situation from the British Indian point of view:
I think I have shown clearly that we have drifted into 
a position of isolation and it is evident that, if 
we are to secure for pur Indian fellovz-subjects any 
of the advantages that are now denied, we must 
substitute for this a policy of co-operation. This 
can, in my opinion, be achieved only by negotiation 
with the Colonies on a basis of complete reciprocity. 
Taking Canada for instance, we know that a certain
number of Japanese are admitted annually on a passport - 
system. Surely India may claim at least most-favoured­
nation treatment in any negotiations that are opened, 
and secure equally favourable terms for Indians. It 
should not be difficult to limit by agreement the 
number of passports to be issued which, while providing 
very fully for temporary residence, as in the case of 
students, tourists and the like, would at the same time 
strictly limit the right to settle permanently in the 
country. Those attempting to secure admission without 
such permits or passports would be rejected at the 
port of entry after ample warning in the country of 
origin that such rejection would be inevitable.
The new proposals involved reciprocal arrangements with the 
other Dominions and since it would be necessary to consult those 
Dominions the Viceroy proceeded to outline the conditions that had 
a bearing on this point. He suggested that negotiations be opened 
with the Dominions, and explained further that:
Clearly no reciprocal arrangements for controlling 
emigration at both ends can be outlined or considered 
in'detail without full discussion with the Colonial 
Governments concerned, and it would''obviously'be 
undesirable to commence negotiations with the Colonies 
unless there was a reasonable prospect of some practical 
outcome of the discussions. If this alternative 
policy commends itself to the people of India, it 
would be futile to consider any other line of action 
until it has been tried and has failed. But"with the 
knowledge in our possession that the Colonies have on 
various occasions shown themselves alive to the necessity 
of giving such consideration as is possible to the 
wishes of the Government of India, .laam full of 
confidence that they would be willing to go to some 
length in giving facilities to a moderate number 
of Indian immigrants, while obtaining through such 
a compromise certain restrictions in India on free 
^emigration to the Colonies. This is the policy : 
which the Government of India v;ould advocate at the 
present time - a policy based on a scheme of complete 
reciprocity- and It is for the consideration of the 
Honourable Members and of the Indian public that I have 
developed our views here to-day. If these views meet 
with general approval, the Government of India are 
ready to recommend them to the Secretary of State, 
with a view to opening negotiations with the Colonies 
concerned. I appeal to the Indian public to view 
this question in:no narrow light. India has her rights, 
but equally have the Colonies. Should it be decided 
to negotiate with the Colonial Governments, I am confident
that, they, with their strong Imperial instincts, will
meet us in no mean or niggardly spirit, provided that
we on our side show our readiness to meet them .half-way*
The fact that in a few weeks* time our splendid Indian 
soldiers may be fighting side by side and shoulder to 
shoulder with our Colonial fellow-subjects against the 
common enemy is a guarantee of fair and generous ^
treatment on both sides in a controversy of this nature.
The Viceroy had carefully timed the delivery of this speech so 
that it should take some of the heat out of the Komagata Maru affair 
and help to minimise the expected demonstrations on her arrival in 
India. He believed that it was a suitable time to announce this 
change in the emigration policy and he knew that the India Office 
in London was already trying to open negotiations with the Colonial 
Office in this regard. Hardinge had always tried to identify 
himself with the Indian people and their sentiments and had consequently
enjoyed their gratitude, respect and appreciation. In fact this
x — -
attitude had been called his secret of true statesmanship. But
this announcement by the Indian government of their intended departure
from the emigration policy of the past did not immediately achieve 
the desired result, and the Komagata Maru affair ended in riots and 
served as the starting point for trouble all over the Punjab. The 
immigration trend was reversed, as i hove pointed out in the previous 
chapter, and more and more Indian migrants began to return home. At 
this time the demand for Indian immigration into the Dominions lost 
its urgency.
By the end of 191^, the Komagata Maru Committee of Enquiry 
found that there was unanimous and strong public feeling in favour 
of adopting retaliatory measures against Canada. However, the 
Government of India 'in' consultation with the Lieutenant-Governor
1 The full text of the speech of Viceroy Hardinge was reported in 
the Gazette of India, Sept. 19i 191^» PP« 963-993.
2 Hardinge to Crewe, Sept* 9» 191^ +? Crewe Papers C19-C22.
3 Indian Emigrant, September 191^» p* 33»
of the Punjab (Sir Michael O'Dwyer•),. whose province was chiefly 
interested in the matter, came to the conclusion that instead of 
adopting retaliatory measures - which would give only sentimental 
satisfaction and be in no way beneficial to the migrants - it 
should press for the admiss.ioip6f family members and a further 
small number of Indians every year into the Dominion of Canada. In 
order to create favourable public opinion for this idea Daljit Singh, 
member of the Viceroy’s Council, offered to move a resolution.
But due to the emergency created by the First World v/ar, the matter 
was postponed. -
The grievances of Indians, of course,; were not forgotten and 
problems about the disabilities of Indian Immigrants' were again 
brought to public attention by the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines 
Protection Society in London. This society submitted a long statement 
of the Indians’ complaints to the India Cffice and Colonial Office.
The main points of contention included the harsh immigration 
regulations applied to Indian migrants to Canada and the denial of 
permission to allow the entry of wives and. children of Indians
already settled in Canada. The society substantiated its appeal
'. . x
with examples verified by its Vancouvcr leiresentative.
■ . k . . "■
Austen Chamberlain, who was now Secretary of State, was
sympathetic to the charges made by the society, particularly the
point made about the refusal of permission for wives.and. children
to join their husbands;in Canada. The separation of families was •
indeed a serious issue and the India Office pointed out to the
1 India Office (undated) minute by Daljit Singh, Member, Council of 
Secretary of State for India, File 3277, L/P & J/6/1393»
'2 Indian Emigrant, October 1919»pp* 63-67.
3 Secretary, Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society to Lord 
Crewe, May 8, 1913, C.O. 886/7.
Austen Chamberlain became Secretary of State for India on May 27, 
1913* Hardinge Papers 121.
Colonial Office that only the outbreak of war stopped severe agitation
in India. It seemed evident that ajter the war the issue would again 
become a focal point of public attention in India and in order to 
prevent further serious demonstration some way should be sought to 
solve this problem.
However, the Colonial Office considered itself powerless to
act effectively in this matter and pointed outr
The determination of public opinion in Western Canada 
not to tolerate an influx of Asiatics is the ultimate 
cause of the existing restrictions, rather than any 
special preference on the part of the Canadian 
Government, for the methods in force, and any •
proposals made, if they are to have any chance of 
success, must, v/hatever form they take, supply a 
check on emigration as effective in fact as that 
which Is now in force. It v/ill be necessary, for 
instance, to satisfy the. Canadian Government that 
any modification of the existing ’'continuous journey11 
clause in the immigration lav; in favour of. British 
Indians would not result in a large influx of 
Indians into Canada.
At that time the Canadian Prime Minister (Sir Robert Borden) was to
be in London for consultation, and on the suggestion of Bonar Law
(Secretary'of State for Colonies) the Secretary of State for India
’ • ■ ■ ■ x
(Austen Chamberlain) decided to see him. Austen Chamberlain discussed
the matter with the Dominion prime minister and found hife not wholly
unsympathetic to the plight of Indians but at the same time faced
with tremendous difficulties in Canada. Chamberlain outlined his
views of the meeting in a private letter to the Viceroy of India
which stated in part:
Ho doubt economic competition is at the root of 
the Canadian objection to unrestricted immigration, 
but this feeling is strengthened by other considerations 
which you can picture to yourself. It is so strong In 
British Columbia that Borden told me that any attempt
1 India Office to Colonial Office, July 13, 1915, C.O. 42/990/32078.
2 Colonial Office to India Office, July 23, 1915, C.O. 886/7-
3 Colonial Office minute by Bonar Lav;, July 19, 1915, C.O. 42/990/32078.
to ride roughshod over public opinion in the province 
would menace Canadian unity and might lead to a 
separation movement in British Columbia.^
The Secretary of State for India also discussed v/ith Borden
Canada's refusal to admit Indian wives and children as well as the
harsh treatment of Indian immigrants which he considered more severe
than the treatment meted out to the Japanese. Borden replied that
Japan controlled and restricted her emigration;to Canada whereas
India had steadfastly refused the imposition of such restrictions.
Since this Canadian-Japanese policy seemed to work satisfactorily,
Chamberlain was convinced that a settlement patterned on such a
model would be possible for India as -well* V/ith this idea in mind
the India Office started preparation of a detailed memorandum on
the subject.
In the meantime, during June 1915* Chamberlain received from
Martin Burrell (Canadian Minister) an extract from a local newspaper
in Canada which had commented on the discriminatory report of 
- Zf ■
Clogstoun and declared in favourcdf generous treatment for Indians.
The assessment by the Secretary of the political department of the ..
India Office was that because of the treatment of Indians in Canada 
and the attitude towards minority groups by Canadians, once loyal 
Sikhs who gave allegiance to the crown when in India had become 
disloyal since emigrating to British Columbia.
Austen Chamberlain was concerned about the situation and he 
did not hesitate to inform Burrell about the strong feelings of 
all Indians with regard to the emigration problem. He pointed out
1 Austen Chamberlain to Hardinge, August 13, 1915, Hardinge Papers 121.
2 Ibid.
3 Burrell to Austen Chamberlain, June 21, 1915, File 3277, L/P & J/6/1395 
k See Chapter 8.
5 India Office Minute by Seton, Secretary political Department, July 9, 
1915, File 3277V L/P & J/6/13^.
the dangers inherent in such severe restrictive immigration policies 
and enquired of Burrell whether or not it would be possible for 
the Canadian government to make a concession on two points - the 
refusal to allow the wives and families of Indian immigrants to 
enter Canada and the more favoured treatment of Japanese immigrants. 
However, no concessions were forthcoming from Burrell who simply 
repeated Clogstoun’s report that Indians were a seditious lot and 
were only staying temporarily in Canada. Though the letter from.
Burrell was Vnot encouraging" the view in the India Office was 
that when the Dominion government saw the detailed report it might
■ 4
decide to grant some concessions.
Consequently the India Office went ahead with its plans and 
prepared a comprehensive memorandum on Indian immigration into 
Canada. The history of Indian immigration, the policies of the 
governments of Canada and India, various restrictive measures of 
the Dominion government, and various attempts on the part of Indians 
to force their entry were outlined in detail. The position of 
Indians in comparison to other Asians, Japanese and Chinese, v/as 
also stated. The memorandum stressed the seriousness of the 
emigration question and its impact on the British Empire in India.
Of particular importance was the information concerning the Punjabi 
Sikhs. The Punjab was described as the chief recruitment ground 
for the Indian army and the services of the Punjabi Sikh soldiers 
were,vital for the British Empire. Since most Indians who tried 
to emigrate to Canada were Punjabi Sikhs their grievances were
1 Austen Chamberlain to Burrell, July 7, 1915, File 3277, L/P■& J/6/1395*
2 Burrell to Austen Chamberlain, Aug. 17, 1915, File 3277, L/P & J/6/1395.
3 India Office Minute by Austen Chamberlain, Sept. 2, 1915, File 3277,
L/P £. J/6/1395.
^ India Office Minute by Holderness, permanent Under Secretary, File 3277, 
L/F & J/6/1395-
used as propaganda weapons against the British rule by agitators 
in India, with the result that loyal service of Sikh soldiers was 
undermined. The position of Canada with regard to this immigration 
question was different from that of South Africa which did have 
an Indian immigration problem but there the migrants were mostly 
non-Punjabi indentured labourers. The seriousness of the problem 
in Canada was that it involved Sikhs whose treatment in North 
America had a direct repercussion on the political situation of the 
British in India, The fact that Indians as a whole had grievances 
against the Dominion agsa whole was practically the only point on 
which the loyal leaders of Indian opinion and the martial races 
of Northern India could agree with disloyal agitators and lawyers 
and clerks who edited the vernacular press. The memorandum contained 
a note of deep appreciation for the participation of Indian soldiers 
in the First World War and commended their services as the force 
that fought by the side of forces from the self-governing Dominions. 
But it warned that after the war India would demand equality of 
status among the self-governing Dominions and at that time also 
strong emphasis would be placed on the equality of Indians as migrants 
in any of the Dominions. The India Office believed that this would 
be the inevitable conclusion of rising Indian demands and suggested 
that Canada should therefore act before this happened and allow 
Indians already in Canada to bring their wives and children and 
abandon the policy of total Indian exclusion to permit a small 
number of new Indian immigrants to enter Canada each year. For its 
part the Indian government would cooperate in the issuing of necessary
1 For Indian immigration into South Africa, see P.D. Pillay, "The 
Imperial government and British Indians in the Transvaal", Ph.D. 
thesis, University of London, 1967.
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documents. The Secretary of State for India strongly favoured
. . .  2  
a change in the Indian government’s ptolicy of non-possumus and
all the members of his council approved the new approach as outlined
-. 3
in the memorandum.
Austen Chamberlain, while sending the memorandum to Sir Robert
Borden, further stressed the serious nature of the problem:
I know how difficult a problem it is for you and 
I do not think it reasonable to expect, or to ask 
that you should allow unrestricted Indian immigration.
But you will pardon me for saying that the absolute
bar placed upon the entry of Indian settlers into
Canada at the present time, and still more the 
refusal to permit the wives and minor children of 
those who are already there to join them, do seriously 
add to the difficulty of the problems of Indian 
Government. As pointed out in the memorandum, this 
specially affects the Sikhs from whom many of our best 
soldiers are drawn and on whom, from the Mutiny onwards, 
we have been accustomed to rely with confidence for 
wholehearted support of the British Raj. For the first 
time in their history there has now been serious 
discontent among them and this has been largely due to, 
or at least made possible by, the exploitation of their 
grievances in this matter.U
At the same time Chamberlain informed Hardinge that if Canada were
to accept the suggestion made in the India Office Memorandum, the
India Office would ask for the active cooperation of the Indian
5
government in the application of the new regulations of Canada. Since
Lord Hardinge had made a similar suggestion a year ago and there was
no criticism of it he believed that the Indian public would accept
6any arrangement v/hich was just and fair. But at the same time the. 
Viceroy was mindful of all the difficulties of the Indian migration
1 The India Office Memorandum, August 26, 1915, is available in Hardinge 
Papers as an enclosure to Austen Chamberlain to Hardinge, Sept. 10,
1915* Hardinge Papers 121.
2 India Office Minute by Austen Chamberlain, Sept. 8, 1915* File 3277,
L/P & J/6/1395.
3 India Office Minute by Holderness, Sept. 8, 1915, File 3277, L/P & J/6/1395-
k Secretary of State for India to prime Minister of Canada, Sept. 10,
1915i Documents on Canadian External Relations 1900-18, p. 659*
3 Austen Chamberlain to Hardinge, Sept. 9* 1915, Hardinge Papers 121.
6 Hardgjnge to Austen Chamberlain, Oct. 15, 19151 Hardinge Papers 121.
question and he endeavoured to convince Indians that it was futile
to believe that Canada and other Dominions would open their gates
wide for Indian free entry. In his view there had to be restrictions,
and it was necessary for Indians to realize that only on that basis
1
could negotiations be opened.
However, the Viceroy was more emphatic about permission of
entry for Wives and children of Indian immigrants who,were already
in Canada. He urged Chamberlain that:
As regards the other suggestion that the Canadian 
Government should remove the grievances regarding 
family separation 5 I need ■■only say that this has 
been more than once urged upon them without success, 
but that if the present moment seems to you 
propitious for representation, on this point, you 
will earn the hearty gratitude of India if you 
succeed in securing a favourable reply. 2
In the meantime, the First World War created a new situation 
for Indians, In battle in Asia and Europe Indian troops were positioned 
side by side with soldiers from Britain and the self-governing 
Dominions. This close comradeship created a feeling of equality 
among Indians with the Dominions, India provided men and money for 
the war and the country was brought more closely than ever before 
into contact with other nations. Inevitably these new feelings 
and experiences resulted in a great rush of national consciousness 
which had been growing slowly in India for some years before the War.
A new sense of amour propre was awakened in many Indians and their 
growing desire for autonomy expressed itself specifically in a cry 
for better treatment of Indians abroad. It is no wonder that by 
September 1915 the Viceroy was concerned about the "Questions likely 
to arise at the end of the War". He therefore sought the opinion
1 Hardinge to Sir R.M. Ferguson, Governor General of Australia,
,.1915'V Hardinge Papers 121.
2 Hardinge to Austen Chamberlain, Oct. 15, 1915, Hardinge Papers 121.
of the provincial governors in India regarding these important
issues and their priorities. Sir Michael O’Dwyer emphatically
stated that the political discontent arising out of the inferior
position of India vis-a-vis the self-governing Dominions was self-
evident. Indian emigration to the Dominions was the most pressing
and at the same time the most unsatisfactorily handled great question
of,the day. He further stated that this question served as a
platform on which all shades of Indian opinion Was completely united,
for all factions - pro- and anti-British - seemed to join against
a common antagonist. T‘he Lieutenant Governor quoted instances that
showed how seditious activities were initiated by agitators like
Hardayal, Ram Chandra and others simply by their portrayal of the
harsh and arbitrary conditions to which Indian migrants were subjected
in Canada. Sir Michael O’Dwyer observed:
The question is more a sentimental than an economic 
one. And I believe that Indian public opinion 
would welcome a settlement on the same lines as that 
between Canada and Japan by which a limited number 
of Japanese are admitted to Canada under certificates 
from their own Government. One of the incidents 
most galling to Indian emigrants to Canada is to 
find themselves in a British Colony at a disadvantage 
with other Orientals - Japanese and Chinese - and 
much capital has been made out of this unequal 
treatment by the revolutionary leaders."*
British supremacy in India was threatened and Hardinge submitted 
a comprehensive plan about the measures that should be adopted and 
especially the boons the British government should consider to bestow 
on Indians in order to maintain its rule in India. While advocating 
a greater share for Indians in the administrative set-up of the 
British Einpire, the Viceroy urged Imperial authorities to remove 
racial disparities between Indians and Europeans and between treatment
1 Sir Michael 0’Dwyer to Hardinge, Sept1 13, 1915» Hardinge Papers 116.
of Indians and other Asiatics in the British colonies. Hardinge
further pointed out that public opinion in India was becoming
extremely^sensitive about the position of inequality in.which Indians
found themselves. For both the Viceroy and the Secretary of State
for India the question of Indian migration within the British Empire
assumed the greatest priority;.
This issue was also enthusiastically debated by the main political
parties in India; the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League.
When Hardinge had made his speech in Council; in September 191^» the
Indian National Congress in its annual session held at Madras passed
the resolution expressing the profound gratitude of.the people of
India for the sympathetic manner in which he had handled the question
of Indian emigration. The resolution further stated:
... while welcoming His Excellency's suggestion of 
reciprocity as the underlying basis of negotiations 
with the Colonies, this Congress desires to 
record its conviction that any policy to be effective 
and acceptable to the people of India must proceed on 
the basis that the Government of India should possess 
' a n d  exercise the same power of dealing with the Colonies 
as they possess in regard to India.^
Speeches pertaining to this resolution cried out for the rights
of Indians and stressed that India should have an absolute equality
of status with self-governing Dominions in;this regard. Various
speakers emphasised that if Canada said that Indians could only go
direct from, India to Canada when there was no direct steamer from
India to North America, India should say that no Canadian should
3
come to India except by a direct line of steamers from Canada.^
The Congress delegates deplored the fact that non-British Asians
1 Hardinge, Memorandum: "Questions likely to arise at the end of War", 
pp. 22-27, Austen Chamberlain Papers AC 22/2.
2 Report of the Indian National Congress 19l4, p. 89.
- Chinese and Japanese - had not to face the same problems as Indians 
had in Canada and special emphasis was given to the fact that Indian 
migrants settled in Canada were not allowed to bring their wives and 
children. As one means of protest against this unfair treatment, 
therefore, the meeting was unanimously of the opinion that retaliatory 
restrictions should be imposed on all colonials wifehing to visit India.
In 1915 a representation of the views about the position of 
Indians in Canada was forwarded to the Government of India on behalf 
of the Provincial Congress Committee of the United Provinces by Dr. / 
Satish Chandra Banerji. He observed that nowhere within the Empire 
were Indians accorded the rights that were due. to them as British 
citizens and in making his proposals for dealing with the situation 
in Canada he hoped that the same solution would apply equally to 
all other parts of the British Empire where the problem might exist.
It was quite evident that by their own unaided efforts Indians had 
not been able to secure an amelioration of the conditions of their 
fellows in Canada and quite naturally they turned to the Government 
of India for help in this regard. Indians looked upon the Government 
of India as their own government identified with their own interests. 
Their trust and respect had been strengthened by the support emigrants 
had received in their efforts to secure their rights in the colonies 
and by government intervention to prevent the use of armed force 
against the passengers of the Komagata Maru. But Indians also felt 
that the colonies had been influenced in their conduct by the idea 
that the Government of India, being subordinate to the Government 
of Great Britain, had no power to protect the interests of Indians 
or to obtain for them a recognition of their just rights as fellow- 
citizens of the Empire, It was true that India liras a dependency whose
1 Report of the Indian National Congress 191^, pp* 83-89.
affairs were managed in accordance with the wishes of Great Britain, 
yet at the same time if public opinion was strong enough, the desires 
of the people must be considered and new policies must accordingly 
be enacted. Until 191^15 the Indian public was largely ignorant 
of the humiliations Indians were subjected to outside their own 
country, but as they became aware of the treatment of their, fellows 
abroad their loud protests could no longer be ignored, and Lord 
Hardinge recognized the necessity of pressing for ajjust solution.
• Indians, it seemed, desired to migrate and they felt they could 
adjust to any new surroundings. Banerji stressed thef fact that 
Indians in Canada adapted themselves well'-.to' their new environments, 
and posed no economic, moral or personal threat to Canadians. At the 
same time he outlined the valuable military service Indians had 
contributed to the preservation of the Empire and observed that 
since Indians in Canada were mostly from this military group, every 
well-wisher of the Empire should consider it his duty to deal with 
them in such a manner as to strengthen arid not weaken these ties.
In the opinion of Dr. Banerji the attitude of the Dominion had 
been short-sighted and the impact of its conduct had influenced 
other countries (such as the United1 States of America and Portuguese 
East Africa) to adopt the same restrictive policy toward Indian 
immigrants. Formally England might have protested against such 
legislation but having possibly permitted racial discrimination in 
her own colonies she could hardly object to it in other countries. 
Until a few years ago Indians had been the outcasts of the Empire, 
but by 1915, according to Dr. Banerji, they had become outcasts of 
the world. Therefore, to prevent any more serious repercussions Dr. 
Banerji suggested that immediate relief be given to Indian immigrants
in Canada by permitting their wives and children to join them and 
by allowing all subjects of the Crown full freedom to establish 
themselves in any part of the Empire as their European counterparts 
were able to do. Although he did not believe that the colonies v/ould 
agree to this, he hoped that during wartime when both Indian and 
colonial troops fought a common enemy in defence of a common cause 
the comradeship in the battlefield would inspire the colonies with a 
higher feeling towards and a more just appreciation of the qualities 
of their fellow subjects, if, however, the colonies refused to 
accept Indians on the basis of equal rights, Dr. Banerji said that 
corresponding tests and restrictions should be placed on colonial 
immigrants into India. Reciprocal imposition of disabilities v/ould 
give satisfaction to the Indian public and would dispel the false idea 
that India was powerless to act in the interests of her countrymen.
Such action, he felt, would allay discontent in India and provide
'■ ; i  ■" ■ . -
a lasting solution of the vexed problem of Indian emigration.
’-Meanwhile when the Indian National Congress met in December 1915
M.K. Gandhi moved: the resolution:
The Congress regrets that the existing lav/s affecting 
Indians in South Africa and Canada have not, in spite 
of the liberal and imperialistic declarationsof 
Colonial Statesmen, been justly and equitably 
administered and this Congress trusts that the Self- 
governing Colonies will extend to the Indian emigrants 
equal rights with European emigrants and that the 
• Imperial Government will use all possible means to 
secure the rights which have been hitherto unjustly 
withheld from them, thus causing widespread dissatisfaction 
and discontent.^
In Canada, the Indian immigrant leader, Dr. Sunder Singh, again 
made appeals for better treatment for Indians, and in April 1915 he
3 . ■
paid a visit to Toronto for this purpose. By that time Canadian
1 The full text of Dr. Banerji*s representation is available in Canada 
and India, July 1915i PP* 2-5*
2 Report of the Indian National Congress 1915» PP» 62-68.
5 Globe, April 8 , 1915» \
and Indian troops were fighting side by side in Europe against Germany
and a spirit of comradeship was created among them in the supreme
' 'l ■" ■ :■ ■
hourscof conflict. Because of this Dr. Sunder Singh believed the
time was right to bring to the attention of Canadian people the
extent of their discrimination against Indians. He said that the
complete exclusion of Indians from Canada was a stigma not put on
Chinese, Japanese or negroes and his views were reflected even in
an editorial of the Globe, which; commented:
... bona fide merchants and students from India 
should be freely admitted as those of any other 
Oriental country ...some sort of agreement such 
as is now operating between Canada and Japan might 
be entered ... by which the amour propre of the 
natives of India might be saved.... Our position is 
not logical and the Indian is quick in detecting 
the flav/ in our reasoning. We admit the Chinese 
because he is a profitable source of revenue. We 
admit the Jap because he insists upon admission 
as an ally of Britain and as a sign and token of 
racial equality. We reject the Sikh ... because 
he is not in a position to enforce respect. This 
is as dangerous as unfair. It is against such 
discrimination that the Hindus protest rather than 
against Canada’s unalterable resolution to prevent 
racial fusion on the Pacific slope.^
The change in the attitude of the Canadian press was also exhibited
in the editorials of the Toronto Star of May15 and June 18, 1915.
The paper observed:
We are quite sure that intelligent Indians do not 
want wages lowered or the standard of living reduced.
Let Canadians and Indians get together, talk the 
matter over, and try to come to an understanding....
It would be quite possible to make some arrangement 
that would prevent the flooding of the labor market 
in British Columbia,without hurting the feelings of 
our Indian friends.
Similarly the impact of the spontaneous loyalty of India and the
bravery of her sons in European battlefields was echoed in the Montreal
Witness which urged the Dominion to be more considerate towards
1 Toronto Star, May 15, 1915•
2 Globe, April 8, 1915*
onto Star, June 18, 1915*
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Indians.
Under Dr. Sunder Singh's direction a Canada-India Committee
was founded in Toronto in April 1915* ‘ The- Committee's objectives
were to promote a wide appreciation of Canada's relations with
India and to secure an equitable adjustment of Indian migrants.
This could be achieved by educating both Canadians and Indians
and thus removing existing prejudices. The Committee also planned
to develop, a series of practical campaigns to remove certain
prejudices felt towards Indian migrants in Canada.^
In July 1915, tinder the auspices of the Canada-India Committee,
the first edition of the Canada and India was published. It was
described as a "Journal of Information on Conciliation" and its
purpose was primarily educational. It was intended to help Canadians
learn more about India and Indians in the hope that more knowledge
about Indian customs and beliefs would help break down existing 
'it ■prejudices held towards Indian people in Canada.
The Ganada-India Committee was very active in Toronto during 
1915~l6* Many parlour and public meetings were held and one of the 
largest gatherings was addressed by Dr* Sunder Singh in February 1916 
in the Central Technical Auditorium. Members of the Canada-India 
Committee spoke at universities, religious orders and secular 
societies. Every effort was made to explain the situation of the 
Indian in Canada.
During 1915 and early 1916 the Canada-India Committee campaigned
1 Montreal Witness, June 22, 1913.
2 Canada and India, Vol. II, Ho. k (19l6), p. 31*
3 Ibid., Vol.7Iy No. 2 (1915) / P* 12.
V This journal ran irregularly, two numbers coming out in 1915 and
five in 1916. publication then appears to have stopped. The 
only complete set is available at the University of Toronto Library.
5 Canada and Endia, Vol.II, Mo. k (1916), p. 31*
.for membership; by 1916, the Committee was converted into, the Canada
India League with membership fees of one dollar. In spite of
vigorous campaign activities, however, the League had not more than
100 paid members in all. The new Lesgue had similar declared objectives
as the Canada-India Committee, that is, its main objective was to
improve relations between Canadians and Indians. The scope of its
activities was extensive: it distributed literature ana sought
assistance from public bodies and religious organisations and it tried
to win over the press. . One advantage was that the League had its :
office in Toronto and it was, therefore, away from British Columbia
where Indian immigrants usually resided and where the stress of
Indian immigration was most keenly felt. The League busied itself
with voluminous letter-writing, the passing of innumerable resolutions
and the sending of petitions and deputations to Ottawa. However,
they were completely ineffective in Ottawa and the Dominion government
2
did not make any changes in its policy.
Thus the Canada-India Committee and its off-shoot, the Canada 
India League, kept the cause of Indians in Canada constantly before 
the public., Canada’s first consideration at that time.was'the part 
Canada was required to play in the First World War, and Canadians 
were preoccupied with their efforts to carry it on successfully.
The part,played by Indian troops alongside their Canadian comrades, 
therefore, provided a very useful lever for the Canada-India League 
and it made full use of it. But the impact of the activities of 
the League was limited to Ontario and particularly to Toronto.
The efforts of the League to influence the Dominion authorities 
at Ottawa and thus alleviate the hostility against Indian migrants
1 Canada and India, Vol. .II, Ho. 4 (I916), pp. 31-32.
2 Scott to Eoche, ,April 20, 1917, R.G.76, File 536999$ Vol. 10.
on the Pacific Coast of Canada were not successful* Dr. Sunder Singh
was the predominant figure in all these attempts to promote the
Indian cause In Canada and in spite of his failure in past
representations to Ottawa he still remained an important factor in
Indian immigration issues.
Meanwhile the philanthropic Committee, a voluntary society
working to help the less fortunate people of Canada in their social,
economic and other problems, took up the Indian immigration question
with the Canadian government. This Committee made representation
to the Dominion authorities at Ottawa and after deploring the severe
restrictions imposed on the entry of Indian women to join their
husbands, expressed surprise at the existence of such a deplorable
situation. It observed that only three Indian women were allowed to
enter Canada and this permission was gained after litigation. The
Committee’s representation to the Dominion government was simple
and emphatic:
... we see no reason why, if the matter of 
continuous passage has been difficult, Hindoos 
wives and children in India and transportation 
companies may not be assured of an entrance in 
Canada befitting a civilised people and as loyal 
subjects of the British Bnpire.^
At this time the Presbyterian Church in Canada petitioned for the
2 ■ '■ ■ ' - . '■ 
admission of Indian women and children. However, the Superintendent
of Immigration (W.D. Scott) would not vary his pdlicy and :tried to
convince the churchmen that Canadian immigration regulations were
impartial and presented no discrimination against Indians. To the
Presbyterian Church Committee he said:
... there is not now and never has been any 
legislation which applied specifically and
1 Superintendent, Philanthropic Committee to Under Secretary of State 
for External Affairs, Dec. 31» 1915. R.G.?6 , File 536999. Vol. 9-
2 Rev. Robert Campbell, Assistant Secretary, Presbyterian Church, to 
W.D. Scott, Sept. 19, 1917, R.G.76, File 536999. Vol. 10.
only to East Indians, nor yet that there is 
any distinction in existing,-regulations-"as 
applied to women and hot to men.^
But the churchmen were not satisfied with this reply and sought to
remind the authorities that Indians resident in Canada were deprived
of their rights as husbands. They emphasized that the government
which kept man and wife apart caused bitterness among Indians in
British Columbia and disloyalty among Sikhs in India. Their further
representation put a straight question to the Superintendent of
Immigration in the Canadian government at Ottawa; ;
Is it not a fact that the same regulation as 
to the continuous journey is applied to women 
as to men, and that this has the effect of 
shutting out wives and children of men already
here?2
In another representation the churchmen warned that such policy of
complete exclusion of Indians from Canada had
. stirred up the worse elements in the make 
up of these men, and furnished inflammable material 
along with other incidents of aggravating nature 
for political agitation, which has turned a large 
number of them into pro-German sympathisers and 
affected very seriously conditions not only here, 
but also in India. It has also placed a premium on 
immorality, rendering these men who have no form of 
home life the easy prey to the intrigues of - low • 
class women that infest our cities, and which now 
form the chief menace to our work. Canada has 
suffered morally, and the British nationhas suffered 
politically and will suffer still more in the days 
that are to come on account of it. Our Church work™ 
has also suffered seriously both here and in India.
The Immigration Superintendent (Scott) could hardly justify Canadian
immigration regulations in the face of such direct charges. His
reaction, however, was to view the admittance of vdves of Indians
in Canada as a dangerous precedent. He did not wish to establish
1 Scott to Rev. A.E. Armstrong, General Secretary, Presbyterian Church, 
Sept. 25, 1917, R.G.76, File 536999, Vol. 10.
2 Sev. H.P, Mackay, Secretary, Presbyterian Church Canada, to W.D. Scott, 
Oct. 2, 1917, K.G.76, File 536999, Vol. 10.
a general principle that when married/were admitted legally 
into Canada, their wives ought also to he admitted. He, therefore, 
again stressed the need of the continuous passage regulation as the 
basis for the immigration policy. Scott further believed that if this 
grievance of stopping Indian wives from coming to Canada v;as removed, 
agitators against British rule would find Some other cause bn-which 
to base their complaint.
In the Punjab at that time, the Lieutenant Governor, Sir Michael 
0*Dwyer, made a spontaneous suggestion to the Government of India 
that i^e Maharaja of Patiala (Sikh ruler of. the largest state In 
the Punjab) should pay a visit to British Columbia and the United
States of America to counteract the perverse ideas circulated by
\ 2 ' '
the Indian agitators on the Pacific Coast. The Punjab government
proposed that the Maharaja should be accompanied by Sik|i preachers,
some religious musicians, some well-known philanthropic leaders
of the Sikh community, and a person, well acquainted with Sikh
service for the Indian government. The purpose of such visit would
be to explain to the Sikhs in Canada and the U.S.A* that they
should not be misled by insidious teachings of Indians of other
races who had no regard for the Sikh religion. The Lieutenant
Governor also stressed the need of immediately introducing some
type of arrangement in the emigration policy from India to Canada.
He believed that although such an arrangement might not satisfy
the abstract demands of Indians who insisted,on equal citizenship
status with Europeans, at least it would be a positive step in the
direction of removing those discrimination grievances which served
to unite all Indians in their opposition to the British government
1 Scott to Mackay, Oct. 1917, P.G.76, File 536999, Vol. 10.
2 Punjab govt, to Govt, of India, Oct. 5,1916, File 562, L/P.-&,J/6/1^ 75..
in India. The India Office attached special importance to Sir
1
Michael 0*Dwyer’s opinion but had certain reservations:
Quite frankly, I do not think that any old- 
fashioned Sikh gentleman would visit British 
Columbia without acquiring a lively detestation 
for the manner and conditions of the country.^
Nevertheless the India Office and the Colonial Office pressed the
Canadian government for an immediate arrangement for the visit.
But in Vancouver the Immigration Agent (Malcolm Reid) was not in
favour of the visit at all. His observation was that there were only
1000 to 1200 Indians in Canada and he insisted that there was
absolutely no unrest among them. The Dominion government accepted
his assessment of the situation and since they seemed satisfied
that no problem existed they declared that the proposed visit would
serve no useful purpose and efforts to arrange it were therefore
c g
quite futile. The scheme was subsequently dropped; however,
Judging from the amount of interest the whole idea generated, one
could see the importance attached to it by the Punjab;-government,
the Government of India and the India Office in London. Only the
immigration officials in Canada remained indifferent.
Because of the lack of specific action in Ottawa to deal with
the question of Indian immigration that was vitally important to
British interests in India Austen Chamberlain, in consultation
with the Secretary of State for the Colonies (Bonar Law), decided
to raise the matter in the forthcoming Imperial Conference. He
1 India Office, Minute by Dunlop Smith, Political Secretary, Dec. 21,
1916, File 362, L/P & J/6/1V75*
2 India Office Minute by Seton, Secretary, Public and Judicial,
Dec. 21, 1916, File 362, L/P & J/6/1^73.
3 Secretary of State for the Colonies to Governor General of Canada, 
telegram, Jan. 16, 1917, CO. **2/100^ /2071.
k Scott to Dy. Minister, Jan. 20, 19171 R*G.76, File 33&999, Vol. 10.
3 Governor General, Canada to Secretary of State for Colonies, telegram, 
Jan 21, 192)7, C.O. h2/100b/207'\.
3 Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, telegram, Jan. y\% 1917,
File 362, L/P & J/6/1^73.
thought that in this way he might be successful in securing a
solution of the problem through personal communication. Sir Robert
Borden, in his turn, consulted with concerned officials in the
Department of External Affairs and W.D, Scott, Superintendent of
Immigration, was called upon to give his opinion as chief of the
department concerned. He had seen the crises created by Justice
Hunter's decision in 1913 and the Komagata Haru affair in 1911*
and because of these events his views were not sympathetic to the
adoption of any leniency in Canada's immigration policy as it
affected Indians. But even in 1913 Scott had expressed his strong
misgivings about liberal immigration policies and he quoted
examples of serious problems of bad race relations and ghetto
concentrations in various communities in the United States of America.
Scott insisted that if Canada was to maintain its harmonious
population relationships within the country a highly restrictive
immigration policy was more important for its defence than the
maintenance of an army. He was strongly opposed to undesirable
immigrants whom he described as
... those who will not assimilate with the 
Canadian people or whose presence will tend 
to bring about a deterioration from a political, 
moral, social or economic point of view.5
Superintendent Scott further believed that the problem of Indian
immigration into Canada was indeed solving itself because many
Indians had succumbed to consumption while otheis either went to
the United States or returned to India where they could find a warmer
climate. According to his calculations, therefore, the number of
1 Austen Chamberlain to Hardinge, Jan. 26, 1916, Hardinge Papers 122,
2 Joseph Popel Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, Memorandum, 
Jan. 22, 1916; and Borden to Roche, June 2, 1916, Documents on ffiaiiadian 
External Relations, 1909*18, pp. 667-669.
3 W.D. Scott, "Immigration and ‘population", Canada and Its Provinces:
A History of the Canadian People and Their Institutions, Toronto,
191%, pp. 517-591. ■ "
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Indians in Canada was steadily waning each year and the only 
concession he was prepared to recommend was that Indians who were
legally resident in Canada and who were in a position to receive
and care for their families should be permitted to bring their wives 
and minor children* With resspect to general policies on immigration 
Scott suggested that the Dominion government should promise to 
consider only a.very/small number of Indians for admission to Canada 
"each year but for the.time being even a small.number■could, not actually 
b© admitted :since the ..employment and economic .situation in British ■ 
Columbia would not permit any immigration into that province. The 
immigration chief justified his viewpoint by referring to the expected
: 2 ■
severe economic condition-at the end of .the-.war. - ■ '
The I'Time Minister (Sir Robert Borden) also sought the opinion 
of the provincial government of British Columbia. . Sir Richard 
McBride (premier'of'British Columbia) appreciated the attitude of 
the Government of India --in the past and he also realised the
importance of the services of Indians in the defence efforts of the
British Bspire. But at the same time he expressed his fear of an 
Indian take-over in bis province if unrestricted immigration of 
Indians was allowed. He compared the small population of British 
Columbia with over three hundred million people of India, thousands 
of whom might wish to emigrate. He expressed his v/illingneos to 
accept students, merchants and travellers as non-immigrant and 
temporary visitors but he maintained that only a small number of 
labouring class immigrants should bellowed entrance on a permanent
1. -Scott to Joseph';Fopet Under secretary of State for External Affairs, 
Jan. 7,1916, H.a.76, File 53^999, Vol. 9.
2 Ibid.
basis. He further suggested that a reciprocal arrangement should 
be negotiated which would mean that only such number of Indians 
should be allowed in Canada as the number of Canadians going to 
: India. \  .
After hearing these opinions, Sir Robert Borden asked Dr. Roche, 
the Minister of the Interior, to examine the whole question thoroughly. 
Meanwhile this issue of migration of Indians within the British 
Empire, had its bearing not only on Canada, but also on other 
Dominions. By chance at that time Lionel George Curtis^ happened 
to be in Canada and he was already knovm for his deep interests in 
the British Empire through his writings, speeches and publications. 
Curtis had also founded a quarterly journal, the Round Table, to 
advocate the federation of the self-governing Dominions of the
British Empire and Dr. Roche decided that a man of such experience
' . . 5  ■
should be consulted on the problem of Indian migration. Roche
made arrangements for Curtis to call on Borden in Ottawa and discuss
■ g v
the Indian migration issue with the Canadian government. In his
V  Sir 3&chard McBride to Borden, Jan. 29, 1915$ Borden Papers, Vol. **0
2 Borden to Roche, June 2, 1916, Documents on Canadian External
Relations, p. 669.
3 Curtis had worked in South Africa for ten years from 1899 to 1909. 
After the South African War.in 1902 he was appointed as town.
clerk for the city of Johannesburg and the next year he went
to Pretoria to take up his appointment as assistant colonial 
secretary of the Transvaal. In 1903 the Governor of the 
Transvaal (Lord Selbourne) asked Curtis to head the team engaged 
in preparing a formal memorandum showing the imperative need 
for unity of the South African colonies. In this'way, the scheme 
for integrating the former South African colonies into one self- 
governing Union of South Africa was drafted by Curtis and it 
was ultimately implemented in 1909. The question of Indians and 
coloured people in the South African colonies did exist but the 
formation of the Union and the granting of self-governing status 
provided the unchallenged constitutional authority of the new 
government with the power to adopt the policy of apartheid which 
also relieved the British Government of its responsibilities for 
looking after Indians and coloured people in South Africa.
4 See Lionel Curtis, The Commonwealth of Nations, and The Problem 
Of The Commonwealth.
5 Roche to Curtis, June 5« 1916, Chelmsford Papers MSS E-264/17*
6 Curtis to Chelmsford, Nov.. 2, 1916, Chelmsford Papers MSS E-264/17*
book, The Problems of the Commonwealtht Curtis argued against the 
principle of free migration within the Commonwealth on the grounds 
that the inhabitants of Asia and Africa, although in theory entitled 
as British citizens to enter England, would in practice avoid doing 
so, because of its climate and congestion, and, if permitted to 
migrate freely would choose instead to settle in the more spacious 
territories of Australia, South Africa and Western Canada. Secondly 
since non-European races comprised six-sevenths of the Commonwealth's 
total population, free settlement by them in these Dominions would 
mean that the white pioneers would be heavily outnumbered and less 
capable,; burdened with such a large majority of politically immature 
subjects, of exercising their fundamental responsibility of self- 
government. Substantiating his fears for the future, Curtis pointed 
out that being content with'lower wages than those needed to maintain 
a European standard of living the non-Europeans (freely admitted to 
white Dominions) would tend to monopolize manual labour, and in 
return restrict Europeans to the narrow spheres of administration 
and management. White immigration would diminish, coloured immigration 
would increase, and all hope of a wider dissemination of the highest 
cultural and political values would be defeated.
Clearly one could see that Curtis* South African background 
had disposed him to certain definite ideas about white supremacy 
in the British Empire. As far back as 1908 Curtis had revealed
A
his racial bias and in a private letter to Amery he gave his 
opinion of Mackenzie King’s report on Indian immigration. Pie 
declared that the hypocrisy of excluding Asiatics from freedom to 
colonize whatever countries they chose within the Empire on the
1 A Conservative party member, and later Secretary of State for 
- India. '
grounds that they would not be able to adjust themselves to new 
climates should be abandoned and English people should instead base 
their objections to Asiatic immigration on the real issues of racial 
discrimination. Curtis expressed his fear that just as rabbits may 
propagate more quickly and easily than sheep and cattle in a vacant 
country such as Australia so a lower civilization might take root 
more quickly in a new country than a higher one if one was to give 
free play to the movement of Asiatic populations before white 
civilization had established a firm hold. The lower race, he 
maintained, would overrun Canada, Australia and South Africa and 
the lower wages paid to Asiatic factory workers in these countries 
would make it difficult for a competing lAiite industry to have a 
chance at all. Curtis reasoned that what the white population must 
prevent was the threat of Asiatics Indianizing the vacant portions 
of the British Empire. Asiatics therefore should be taught by the 
Imperial government to think that their future v/as in Asia. Such 
colonies as had no Asiatics, he said, had no trouble, but those 
that imposed no restrictions and only extreme qualifications found 
themselves confronted with a large number of brown competitors. In 
his opinion such an undesirable situation was bound to continue 
until exclusion of Asiatics was based on the true ground of race and 
not on bogus grounds of property or education. He declared that 
distinction by race was natural and fundamental and should be upheld 
even though the lav; chose to ignore it."* By 1916 Curtis had fully 
formulated his views on Asiatic immigration and his observations 
of the British colonial situation were put into a letter to the 
Minister of the Interior, W.J, Roche. He acknowledged the existing
1 Curtis to L.S. Amery, July 20, 1908, King Papers, Vol. 7*
Asiatic immigration practice in Canada and found the government 
guided by two different principles. The treaty arrangements between 
Canada and Japan allowed 400 Japanese to enter Canada each year 
while, the Chinese were allowed to enter subject to a head tax of 
$ 300• The majority of these immigrants had themselves smuggled 
into the United States, but about 30*000 remained in British Columbia. 
These 30,000, he believed, would cause great trouble i*/hen Asiatic 
labour came in competition with European labour because Canadian 
provinces would devise laws to penalise the Asiatics and the 
Dominion government would then be confronted with the problem of 
whether or not those laws ought to be sanctioned. These Japanese 
and Chinese Immigrants had been allowed to dribble into the country 
because Canadians desired them for domestic service and also because 
the government profited from the immigration head tax. Indians, on 
the other hand, although they were British subjects, possessed 
manners and customs which were more objectionable to Europeans, and 
towards their entry, therefore, the Canadian government applied the 
principle of total exclusion. But Curtis suggested that the real 
objection to Asiatic colonization was what should be considered.
This was that any establishment of an Asiatic community in the 
heart of a European community was productive of social, moral and 
political evils. The two races could not be assimilated, he said, 
and any attempt to intermarry would produce a hybrid race unacceptable 
to both Europeans as v/ell as Indians. Furthermore he stated that 
Asiatics multiplied more quickly than Europeans and actually checked 
the increase of the European population by monopolizing the field 
of unskilled labour. Europeans by association quickly found such 
unskilled labour degrading. So in order to develop the country 
the government would be forced to allow more Asiatics to enter
the country or be satisfied to leave the country at a standstill.
The policy of dribble therefore was merely postponing the day when 
some definite stand would have to be taken against the evil of any 
further Asiatic colonization. He asserted that Canada should not 
pay any heed to the Government of India’s sentimental proposal to 
allow Indians to enter Canada on the same basis as the Japanese. 
Since the Canadian government did not wish to claim for Canadians 
the right to colonize India, Japan or China he saw no reason why 
Canada should be expected to give these rights to Asiatics to 
come to Canada. Although he did not object to the exchange of 
visitors, students, religious men, professors or business agents 
on a temporary basis, he stipulated that each should have a passport 
which Could be revoked if he tried to remain permanently In the 
country. He said that those Indians already in Canada must be 
accepted as a permanent part of the population and should be put 
on the same footing as the whites. They should be allowed to bring 
one wife to Canada but‘further colonization of British Indians 
should be prohibited at the same time renouncing any claim to 
the right of Canadians to permanent colonization in India. The 
machinery of passports was very important, he said. Canadians ; 
desiring to visit India should first obtain a passport in Canada 
and for that purpose the Indian government should have in Canada 
its own admissions officer whose signature would guarantee admission 
into India for the purpose specified on the passport. In this v/ay 
no Canadian visitor to India who held a passport would be turned 
back at an Indian port. The same principle would be applied to 
Indians and if Canadian or Indian visitors violated the conditions 
of their entry the passport would be revoked and the visitor
ordered to leave the country. Curtis believed such an arrangement
would offer a permanent and comprehensive basis for the whole
Asiatic immigration problem in Canada. He said the Indian government
and even the Japanese government could not claim rights in Canada
which the Canadian government did not claim for Canadians in India
or Japan. These proceedings assumed international importance when
he considered that a further consequence of this settlement might
be the influencing of the United States of America to follow such
reciprocal principles and thus improve the relations between
America and Japan.
After giving his views to the Canadian government Curtis .
made his way to Australia and New Zealand inhere he met government
leaders and made similar observations about their Indian migration
questions* By November 1916 Curtis reached India and told Lord
Chelmsford (Viceroy of India) about his dialogue with Australian
2and New Zealand government leaders on this question. Chelmsford 
found the views of Curtis and the result of his tour through Canada, 
New Zealand and Australia ’’extremely interesting” and exactly in 
line with his own ideas on the subject. The Secretary ox State 
for India (Austen Chamberlain) also agreed with the views of Curtis 
and Chelmsford. However, the basis of his observations seemed 
different. To him the Dominions desired only to protect their 
social and economic conditions and the racial question was of 
secondary importance. And for Indians, Chamberlain thought the 
question primarily involved a feeling of self-respect and had little
1 Full text of Lionel Curtis* .letter-to Dr. W.J. Roche, June 19* 1916, 
is available in Borden Papers Vol. A1.
2 Curtis to Chelmsford, Nov. 2, 1916, Chelmsford Papers MSS. Eur. E.
26V17- . . . .
3 Chelmsford to Chamberlain, Nov. 2, 1916, Chelmsford papers MSS.
Eur. E. 26V2.
to do with economic gain.
However, during the course of the war the importance of India 
had increased and, as Hardinge had suggested earlier, a change in
administration, higher .jobs for Indians, promotion of democratic 
institutions in India and also representation of India in the 
Imperial Conference - had already been taken. But the question 
of migration of Indians to all Dominions in general and Canada in 
particular still occupied the attention of the India Office, the 
Colonial Office, and the Viceroy of India. The Imperial War 
Conference was to be held in London in the spring of 1917 and the 
India Office in consultation with the Colonial Office had already 
decided to bring this question before the Conference members. It 
submitted a memorandum on the subject. I., th meeting /After 
describing the various devices by which Indians were excluded from 
entry into the self-governing Dominions the India Office especially 
made the point about the complete ban on the entry of wives and 
children of Indians who were already in Canada. The memorandum 
continued that a great deal of capital had been made of this grievance 
in India, although it was improbable that a dozen or so Sikhs of 
labouring classes would rush to bring their wives. This issue had 
rather become a focal point of political propaganda and a ready-made
1 Chamberlain to Chelmsford, Feb. 7, 1917t Chelmsford Papers MSS.
Eur. E. 26V2.
policy towards Indians was absolutely essential. India thus became 
a pivotal factor in the foreign policy of Britain during this 
period. change in the status of India as part of the British
Empire had already been discussed at Whitehall and several 
 practical steps - the association of Indians with the Imperial
2 Ibid.
weapon to be used by anti-British agitators in India. When Canada 
allowed the Chinese and Japanese to bring their wives, the memorandum 
questioned the imequal nature of treatment of Indians with non- 
British Asians. In order to redress these grievances, the India 
Office note stressed that it should be recognised that these matters 
were of sentimental nature as Indians regarded themselves as British 
subjects and at the same time were unable to understand why they 
were excluded from the Dominions. They were proud of their British 
Indian nationality, of their ancient civilization, and of the great 
intellectual traditions which they had inherited. They had made 
sacrifices for the British Empire and had proved their loyalty, 
courage and fortitude and they asked that this should be recognized.
In this way the question of Indian migration into the Dominions was 
full of sentiment and imagination. The note further added that if 
the Dominion were to make concessions which wouldmeet the feelings 
of this order, they would find that India would not be unreasonable 
on material points. Keeping these principles in mind the India 
Office suggested that:
(1) As regards Indians already permanently settled 
in the Dominions they should be allowed to bring in 
wives (subject to the rule of monogamy) and minor 
children, and in other respects should not be less 
privileged than Japanese settled immigrants.
(2) Future admission of Indians for labour or 
settlement should, if possible, be regulated on lines 
similar to, and not less favourable than those governing 
the admission of any other Asiatic race.
(3) If this is not possible, there might be reciprocal 
treatment in India and each Dominion of immigration for 
purposes of labour or permanent settlement. If a 
Dominion is determined to exclude these two classes of 
immigration from India, India should be free to do the 
same as regards that Dominion. It would be clearly 
recognized that the exclusion in either case was not 
motivated by prejudices of race, but was the outcome of 
different economic conditions.
(k) Along with such exclusion reciprocal arrangements 
would be made for granting full facilities for the 
admission of -tourists, students, and the like, and for 
business visits entailing temporary residence, so long 
as this residence was.not for labour purposes or for 
permanent settlement.
The Imperial V/ar Conference was held in April 1917 and India
was represented by Austen Chamberlain, Secretary of State for India;
Sir James Heston, Governor of the United Provinces; the Maharaja of
Bikaner and Sir Satyendra Sinha, a well-known member of the Indian
National Congress. The question of migration of Indians was to be
discussed bn April 27, 1917* In order to avoid adverse publicity
and possibly awkward press comments and their repercutsion in India
and the Dominions* an informal discussion betv/een members of the
Conference was held on April lo, 1917* The case of India was put
forward moderately and fairly but very ably by Sinha. Speaking
about his proposals Sir Robert Borden expressed frankly the
difficulties of the Dominion government and pointed out that it
was futile for him to take a stand which was not supported by public
opinion in Canada. He further suggested that • the- Indian '-.representative
should prepare a draft resolution and submit it to the Dominion
representatives before formal discussion could take place. As a
result of this informal and secret discussion Sinha agreed to propose s
... that in the matter of immigration due regard 
should be had on the one hand to the desire of 
India for complete citizenship in the Empire and 
on the other hand to the difficulties of the self- 
governing Dominions and that the conditions of 
future emigration and immigration between India and 
the Dominions should be regulated on the bsds of 
reciprocity. Second, that visits between India and 
the Dominions for purposes of travel, education, 
business or otherwise than for permanent settlement 
should be free subject only to passport or such other
1 Full text of the India Office proposal March 22, 1917, is available in 
Cd. 8366 Proceedings of Imperial War Conference 1917»p- 162.
2 Borden to Blount, Private Secretary to Canadian Prime Minister, telegram, 
April 19, 1917, Borden Papers, Vol. *f0.
similar system as may be agreed upon betv/een the 
Dominions concerned. Third, v^ hile the right of each 
country to regulate its own immigration is recognized 
and while India makes no claim for unrestricted . 
emigration to the self-governing Dominions yet a 
strictly limited number of Indians annually should 
be allowed to settle permanently in any of these 
■Dominions, The number in each case should be 
determined by agreement between the Dominions concerned 
on the one hand and the Secretary of State for India 
on the other but provision should be made that India 
shall not be placed in this respect in a worse 
position than the most favoured Asiatic nations 
. which are not-subject to the British Grown. Fourth; 
that Indians residing or settled in the Dominion 
shall receive just and equitable treatment, shall 
not be subjected by reason of their nationality to 
any legal disabilities and expense, .... £^and^/ shall 
have the right to bring in each individual cases 
wife and minor child if any.^
However, as these proposals were thoroughly discussed in secret
session prior to public hearing a slightly different understanding
seemed to have been reached and when the question was formally placed
before the Imperial War Conference on A^ril 27, the Secretary for
State for India, Austen Chamberlain, said:
Mr. Chairman, ray colleagues and I recognize the 
strong feeling that there is in the Dominions 
that bhpy \d.sh to preserve the homogeneous nature 
. o f  their population and the special civilisation 
which they have striven to cultivate, and I 
desire to make it clear that we neither claim 
>';'nor .-expect - any.' thing like' an unrestricted -right,. 
of emigration and settlement in the Dominions.
V/hat we particularly ask is that in the first pi >ce ;
British Asiatics, that is, Asiatics of British 
nationality, should at least not be less favourably 
treated than other Asiatics. In the second place, 
we should ask that the freeest facilities possible 
be given to educated Indians for travel, study, 
or for visits, as apart from settlement, in the 
Dominions for any purposes. Lastly, we would ask 
that a kindly and sympathetic consideration should 
be given to those Indians who have algeady been 
permitted to settle in the Dominions.
Sir Robert Borden praised Sinha and Austen Chamberlain for their
1 Borden to Blount, Private Secretary to Canadian JPrime Minister,
telegram* April 19, 1917* Borden Papers, Vol. 40.
2 Cd. 8566, Proceedings of the Imperial War Conference, 1917, PP« 117-118.
understanding representation^of the problem and he explained the
Dominions’ case in these words;'
it is manifest that public opinion in all 
the Dominions of the Empire must be taken into 
account, because it would be idle for any 
Government to undertake what public opinion 
would not in the end sanction or sustain.
I am happy indeed to agree to the resolution 
which Mr. Chamberlain has moved, and to say also 
that the considerations he has mentioned and 
those which are set forth in the Memorandum 
alluded to in the Resolution, wiibl be taken 
into account, .We shall do our best to arrive 
at a fair understanding with regard to those 
matters and I have a somewhat confident hoper <|
that a clear understanding will be reached.
After further discussion the resolution was put forward and was
accepted unanimously# The resolutioi^tated:
That the Imperial War Conference, having 
examined the Memorandum on the position of,
Indians in the Self-Governing Dominions 
presented by the Indian representatives to 
the Conference, accepts the principle of 
reciprocity of treatment between India and 
the Dominions, and recommends the Memorandum 
to the favourable consideration of the 
Governments concerned.^
The Secretary of State for India (Austen Chamberlain) was pleased
with the Resolution of Reciprocity of Treatment between India and the
Self-Governing Dominions and he informed Chelmsford that;
The Dominions have recognised.the principle of 
equality and independence of status.... They 
have recommended to the favourable consideration 
? of their Governments the Memorandum in which.we '•
asked for the adoption of three principles - 
First that British Asiatics should not be worse 
treated than alien Asiatics in the matter of 
settlement; Secondly that facilities for travel 
and study as apart from students should be 
accorded to educate Indians; and Thirdly, that 
sympathetic treatment should be meted out to 
those■Indians'who' had already been permitted to 
settle. We on our side, have freely abandoned 
the idea of any unregulated or general settlement 
of Indians in the Self-Governing Dominions, and
1 C d .  8386, Proceedings of the Imperial V/ar Conference, 1917i. PP* 117-118.
have recognized the determination and the right 
of the Dominions to protect the homogeneity of 
their population ana the essential^unity of the 
civilisation they are building up.
This resolution was passed by the Imperial War Conference in
1917 and immediately became the target for criticism by the opposition
party in the Canadian parliament. The main bases of the attack on
the Dominion government were that a part of Canadian sovereignty
had been given away Uhen the Canadian representatives in the Conference
had Undertaken to change the Dominion immigration policy with regard
to Indians. The opposition spokesman on immigration affairs, Eudolphe
Lemieux, voicing his apprehensions about the resolution referred to
his recent visit to South Africa where;
... they/.HindusJ7 had practically obtained 
control of all small trades in all these cities, 
towns and villages. I found Hindus sv/arxning 
throughout every part of South Africa, Now if 
you go to Cape Town, Johannesburg or Durban, 
you find as many mosques as you find Christian 
churches,,.. Any man who has been to South Africa 
or any minister of the Crownin South Africa will 
tell you that a danger in that country today is 
the presence in such large numbers of Hindus.^
Drawing a parallel with his own observations in South Africa and
a possible future in Canada, Leraieux deplored the Canadian government's
stand in the Imperial War Conference and his conclusions were;
... the policy is today to pave the way for 
Hindu immigration into British Columbia.....
The Hindus are going to come in, they are 
going to bring their wives with them and the 
white labourer will be at the mercy of our new 
fellow British citizens of that vast country 
of India.<
However, Dr. Roche's (Minister of the Interior) reply was that no
1 Austen Chamberlain to Chelmsford, May 15, 1917* Austen Chamberlain 
Papers AC1.
2 Canada, House of Gommons Debates, May 25, 1917, p*17&3*
such promise leading to changes in the immigration policy was made 
in the Conference. Brushing aside the misgivings of the opposition 
spokesman, the minister stated that Lemieux had formulated a policy 
for himself from the newspaper record and furthermore Dr.'Roche 
stated that the proposals made by the-ImperialWar Conference were 
not laid down as a policy nor were they acted upon by any government 
Indeed they were formulated to be a point of reference which 
respective governments might consider* Robert Rogers, former 
Minister of the Interior, supported Dr. Roche on this point. He
assured the opposition spokesman that no such rights had been given
■ 2 '
away and there was never even any thought of doing so. Robert
Rogers was appreciative of the war offorts of India but at the same
time he explained that Canada would maintain her rights. Explaining
the Canadian commitment Rogers further pointed out that at the
Imperial War Conference the Canadian delegates had said that
favourable consideration would certainly be given to the request
of Indian representatives, who wanted some remedy for Indian
grievances. Dispelling any chance of change in the Canadian
immigration policy Rogers remarked:
We said that we' would give favourable consideration 
to the requests they made, but we assured them that 
we had not any hope that those representations 
would meet with any success in the way of a change 
in the policy that Canada had adopted in the past ^ 
with respect to immigration from the Indian Empire.
It was quite clear that Canada felt in no way bound by the 
resolution of the Imperial War Conference, and no change in the 
immigration policy was contemplated.
1 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, May 1917* p* 1764.
However, on August 7, 1917, the Secretary of State for the
Colonies addressed the Self-Governing Dominions in a formal despatch,
in which he enclosed the India Office memorandum and copies of the
discussion of the Imperial V/ar Conference 1917, and invited
comments from each Dominion. The Government of Canada expressed
its willingness to allow Indian migrants legally and permanently ;
settled in Canada to bring in their wives and children and it also
accepted that Indians belonging to non-immigrant classes would
be treated in the same way as non-immigrant classes from any other
country. Furthermore, their entry into Canada would not be subjected
to unnecessary delays or difficulties. But so far as the future
immigration of labouring classes from India was concerned, the
Dominion government put off the matter by stating:
... in view of the changing economic conditions 
in Canada, particularly in the Province of British
Columbia, where alone East Indians have settled,
and in view, moreover, of the problem which Canada 
must face at the close of the War ia absorbing 
into self-sustaining occupations discharged returned 
soldiers and munition workers thrown out of 
employment the questionoof further immigration 
of East Indians of the labouring class be not dealt 
with at present but be allowed to remain in abeyance 
until at least eighteen months after the war.^
At this time the Canadian government also recognised the right and
freedom of India to impose restrictions against Canada similar to
those which Canada had adopted with regard to India but was anxious
to make clear that exclusion in either case was not governed by
prejudice of race but was instead the outcome of different social
and economic conditions. The Canadian government further suggested
that some of the grievances of Indians would be effectively remedied
1 Secretary of State for Colonies to Governor General Canada, 
August. 7.1 1917, C.O, 886/8.
2 Minister of Immigration and Colonisation to Governor General of
Canada, Nov. 27, 1917, R.G.76, File 936999, Vol. 10.
if the Dominion government should have its representative resident 
in India. The duties of this Canadian official would be to clarify 
any misunderstandings and facilitate the movement of those persons
' i
who might desire to travel from India: to Canada.
After so much deliberation on the part of both India and Canada
the question of migration of Indians within the British Snpire
remained unsolved and the only action that had been taken was
the passing of a resolution in the Imperial WarConference and
the inviting of views from the Dominion government. No positive
remedy had even been initiated and Sir James Meston (Governor of
the United Provinces)* who attended the Imperial War Conference
of 1917* expressed his anxiety about this state of inaction. He
believed that Indian people, at that particular time, were willing
to find common terms for settlement of the immigration In Canada.
In his personal note to Holderness (permanent Under-Secretary of
the India Office) he observed that
We are approaching a season at which every effort 
will be made to remove old grievances and the 
; bitterness about emigration is one of those which.
ought-to present no grave difficulty at the present 
' "time.. . .
Meston emphasized that since there was then no particular agitation
about the subject of emigration in India, the time was most suitable
to bring about a favourable and peaceful settlement of the whole
problem. He therefore suggested
... that a Bill be drafted ... prescribing the 
conditions of immigration from the Colonies Into 
India, and that the draft be shown to the colonial 
representatives at the coming Conference. If the 
draft is one to which they are prepared to acquiesce, 
it would give them an opportunity of initiating a
1 Minister of Immigration and Colonization to Governor General of 
Canada, Nov. 27, 1917, R.G.76, File 536999, Vol. 10.
2 James Meston to Sir T.W. Holderness, Permanent JJnder-Secretary of 
State for India, May 3, 1918, File 3**79, L/P ■&■ J/6/1^ 9'8. /
similar legislation in their own dominions dealing 
©ith the Indian immigration on parallel lines, and ' 
we should thus be in sight of an all round solution.
If positive action was not taken immediately he expressed himself
as being "very nervous” about the revival of the old excitement
in India. Acting on Meston’s advice the Secretary of State for
India urgently requested the Viceroy of India to institute the
passing of a bill to restrict immigration into India from Canada
and South Africa.
In the meantime Lionel Curtis continued his effort to bring 
the resolution of 1917 on the subject of Indian migration to a 
practical arrangement. In a detailed memorandum addressed to 
Montagu, Secretary of State for India, he explained his proposals 
and their bearing on the relations also of Australia with China 
and Japan:
... The Bill in question should, I think, in the 
preamble make it clear that in future the Indian 
Government will not accord rights of permanent settlement 
in India to any European, who has not already acquired 
a footing there, from any country which does not 
permit the permanent settlement of Indians, This 
puts everything on a footing once for all of absolute 
legal equality. It is no argument against this course 
that Indian Nationalists will at once raise their 
demands on the ground that the Dominions are empty 
countries and India is a full one. The poison of 
a real grievance is drawn the moment we affirm the 
principle that India, like every other country in 
the British Commonwealth, is entitled to control 
the composition of its own population, and that 
until Indians can do this for themselves, we, as 
trustees, will do it for them.
I would further draw your attention to Mr. Hughes* 
attitude on the subject. Herein lies the key to our 
growing difficulties with China and Japan. If, 
without reference to them, we establish this 
principle inside the British Commonwealth they 
in future negotiations can then make no complaint 
if we ask for the recognition of the same principle 
by foreign countries. We have no justification In
1 James Meston to Sir T. W. Holderness, Permanent Under-Secretary of 
State for India, May 3» 1918, File 3**79, L/P & J/6/lk98.
2 Secretary of State for India to Viceroy of India, telegram, May 23, 
1918, File 3**79, L/P & J/6/2A 98.
. asking the right of permanent settlement for 
Europeans in China and Japan, and if we say so we are 
then fully entitled to deny permanent settlement to 
them throughout our Dominions, including India. We 
do want facilities for visit and terminable residence, 
and there is no earthly reason why similar facilities 
should not be granted to them in Australia. Hughes 
sees that Australia cannot permanently deny the claim 
of a .great commercial corporation in Japan to have 
agents resident in Australia, provided they cannot 
procure domicile thereby? which can be secured if the 
passj)ort is revocable at any time when the holder 
may endeavour to secure permanent domicile. In plain 
words, time expired men must retire to their own 
countries and not settle in Australia. I believe 
your Office has the matter in hand already, but I 
venture to bring it to your notice because it is 
now a question of days before the Imperial Conference 
meets, and a hitCh at this juncture would be calamitous. 
Believe me, there is no difficulty in carrying this 
matter through to a final solution at this juncture 
which cannot be overcome by a man like yourself, 
resolved that nothing should.stand in the way of 
removing a crying injustice.
The Imperial War Conference was held in July 1918. In the 
light of the previous year’s Resolution of Reciprocity of Treatment 
Between India and the Self-Governing Dominions, and keeping in view 
the suggestions of Curtis, the India,Office circulated a new 
memorandum on the subject by Sir S.P. Sinha. It was almost a
repetition of the previous year’s note which the India Office had
circulated on Emigration from India. The new note confirming the
Resolution on Reciprocity stated:
Finally, as regards the question of future emigration 
of Indians to the Colonies for purposes of settlement, 
there is no change from the position which was taken up 
last year, that in this matter the Indian British 
subjects have a right to expect that they should not 
receive a less favourable treatment than other Asiatic 
people who are not subjects of the British Empire. But 
this question is not of any immediate urgency for India, 
and might well wait future discussion.
On our side we are being pressed to give practical 
effect to the resolution of last year’s Conference, and
1 Curtis to Montagu, Secretary of State for India, June 1918, 
File 3**79, L/P 8: J/6/1498.
vie have in draft a Bill empowering the Governor-General 
of India in Council to make rules for the purpose of 
securing that persons domiciled in other parts of the 
British Empire should have the same rights and,privileges 
as regards entry into, and residence, in British India, 
as are accorded by the law and administration of such 
other parts of the Bnpire to persons domiciled in India. 
But it should be made perfectly clear that it is in no 
spirit of retaliation that recourse will be had, if 
necessary, to this legislation, but simply for the 
attainment of an equality of status between different 
subjects of His Majesty in matters of immigration 
and Allied subjects. :
... A most excellent start was made last year and 
the impression created in India was most favourable.
It would be a thousand pities if steps were not now 
taken to give effect and tangible shape to the good 
understanding and mutual comprehension attained last 
year. It is also obvious that these important questions 
should be settled not in any petty: huckstering spirit 
of reciprocity only, far less of militant animosity and 
retaliation, but on those broad principles of justice 
and equality which are now more than ever the guiding 
principles of the British Empire, and which must be 
the foundations of the mighty Empire round the shores 
of the Pacific and the Indian Ocean which are slowly 
but surely rising before one’s eyes.^
• The proceedings for the Conference were similar to those in
1917 and here again before the formal discussion tookplace an informal
meeting was held at the India Office and it was there that the
formal resolutions were agreed upon. Therefore when Sinha introduced
the resolution on July 2k, 1918 it was unanimously accepted by all
the delegates. This resolution stated:
The Imperial War Conference is of opinion that 
effect should now be given to the principle of 
reciprocity approved by Resolution 3CXII. of the 
Imperial War Conference, 1917* In pursuance of that 
Resolution it is agreed that:-
1. It is an inherent function of the Governments 
of the several communities of the British Commonwealth, 
including India, that each should enjoy complete control 
of the composition of its own population by means of 
restriction on immigration from any of the other 
communities.
2. British citizens domiciled in any British 
country, including India, should be admitted into 
any other British country for visits, for the purpose
1 Cd. 9177* Proceedings of the Imperial War Conference 1918, p. 2k8.
of pleasure or commerce, including temporary residence 
for the purpose of education. The conditions of such 
visits should be regulated on the principle of 
reciprocity, as follows:-
(a) The right of the Government of India is recognised 
to enact laws which shall have the effect of 
subjecting British citizens domiciled in any 
other British country to the same conditions in 
visiting India as those imposed on Indians 
desiringto visit such country.
(b) Such right of visit or temporary residence shall, 
in each individual case, be embodied in a 
passport or written permit issued by the country 
of domicile and subject to vise there by an 
officer appointed by, and acting on behalf of, 
the country to be visited, if such country so 
desires.v .
(c) Such right shall not extend to a visit or 
temporary residence for labour purposes or to
: permanent.settlement.
3* Indians already permanently domiciled in the 
other British countries should be allowed to bring in their 
wives and minor children on condition (a) that not more 
than one wife and her children shall be admitted for each 
such Indian, and (b) that each individual so admitted 
shall be certified by the Government of India as being 
the lawful wife or child of such Indian.
k. The Conference recommends the other questions 
covered by the memoranda presented this year and last 
year to the Conference by the representatives of India, 
in so far as not dealt with in the foregoing paragraphs 
of this Resolution, to the various Governments concerned 
with' a view to early consideration.^
The Prime Minister of Canada, Sir Robert Borden, was immensely
satisfied with this resolution because Canada had secured the formal
and public acquiescence of the British Government and the Government
of India to the Canadian viewpoint that Canada should have absolute
control of the composition of its population. He informed the
government about the resolution and stated that temporary visitors
from India would be henceforth excluded from permanent settlement
in Canada. Canada had achieved its aim, Borden believed, without
wounding the self-esteem of India and in this v/ay that established
the foundations for good will in the future. He informed the
1 Cd. 9177 Proceedings of the Imperial V/ar Conference, 1918, p. 195«
Dominion government that Canada agreed to the admission of wives 
and children,of permanently settled Indians because of the loyalty 
and devotion of Indians to the Empire and their excellent service 
in the war. Twenty years later, in 1938, Sir Robert Borden recalled 
with pride the achievement for Canadian Immigration made by the 
Imperial War Conferences of 191? and 1918* He believed that the 
work of the Imperial Conferences was an impressive achievement in 
immigration control, and he thought that it had only been through -
his personal efforts that the principle of reciprocal regulation 
of immigration between India and. the Dominions had been established.
In 1918 It had been Sir Robert Borden who insisted on that important 
clause of the resolution which accepted that the Governments of 
India and Canada were entitled to have complete control over the
composition of their own population by restrictions, if necessary,
' 2 - of migration from any other part of the Empire. Only the principle
of granting permission to settled Indians to bring in their families
was a departure from the settled policy of total Indian exclusion
and Sir Robert Borden mentioned that Canada accepted this change
in its immigration policy because of humane consideration for the
needs of family life and because of the splendid devotion and loyalty
of India during the War.^
The Resolution of the Imperial War Conference was commented
upon by newspapers across Canada and that part of the Resolution
which permitted Indian visitors to Canada for the sake of education,
pleasure or trade found particular approval. However, there was
1 Borden to Prime Minister Ottawa, telegram, July 27, 1918, Borden 
papers, Vol. kQ.
2 Henry Borden, Robert Laird Borden: his memoirs (Toronto, 1938), p. 830.
3 Ibidv , p. 831. ’
k Vancouver World, July 30, 1918;Sun, July 30, 1918.
some objection to the clause which .allowed the settled Indians
immigrants to bring in their families. The Vancouver Sun said that
... the clause permitting those now here to bring 
over their wives and families ... means a Hindu 
. population born in this country. To permit this, :
is to abandon the hope that within a generation
there would be no more Hindus in the province.
The Vaneouver ' WorId expressed satisfaction over the arrangements
agreed in the Imperial War Conference and hoped that in future it
would go some way towards the prevention of:misunderstandings which
could be exploited by Germany in the past. The Calgary Herald
commended the Resolution by stating that?
There is nothing to which objection could be 
taken in any of these recommendations..^ '
Viewed from the standpoint, of common decency 
and public morals, this proposal seems to be all 
right. Affecting as it does only those men who 
are already permanently located in the country, 
it keeps the door sufficiently closed to prevent 
any wholesale arrival of undesirables in the 
future, while at the same time it provides 
safeguards against the unfortunate mixing of 
races, which is always a source of danger where 
men of the East find themselves, as it were, 
marooned in a foreign land, and with no females 
of their own race to mate with.
The Globe (Toronto) expressed relief that the Indian delegate to
the Imperial War Conference had assented to the proposal to prohibit
the emigration of labourers from India to Canada. However, its
further observations were more critical!
The racial and economic arguments against building 
up an Indian colony in British Columbia by family 
life have weighed strongly with many Canadians in 
other Provinces. Perhaps the absolute assurance 
that no more Hindu laborers will be admitted will 
reconcile British Columbians to the War Conference 
plan, though it tends to perpetuate an insoluble 
element in the Province....
An agreement by consent with India will remove
1 Sun» July 30* 191B.
2 Vancouver V/orld, July 30* 1918.
3 Calgary Herald, July 31* 19l8.
a source of friction which has embarrassed the 
Councils of the Bnpire for years. Other Asiatic 
immigration is already under control. Canada must 
remain a white man’s country, and it is reassuring 
to know that the leading nations concede the point.
The Moose Jaw Times praised the efforts of Prime Minister Borden
and Immigration Minister, J.A. Calder for establishing for Canada: :
the right to refuse the migration of Indians; This worth-while :
policy v/as seen to be Canada’s protection against undesirable aliens;
kfth a strict imderstanding of this arrangement v 
there should be ho repetition ofthe disagreeable 
incidents such as occur'red at Vancouver some years 
■ ago* ' ; It ./"the Resolution^ will also make the 
possibility of a misunderstanding arising between 
India and Canada more remote, and work for the 
general Welfare of the empire.. Canada’s 
representatives ... insisted that Canada was going 
to be a white man’s country. Premier Borden and 
Hon. J.A. Calder both stood out for keeping Canada 
for the white man.^
The;Brantford Courier predicted that the solution (as suggested by
the Imperial War Conference) would be regarded by most people of
. *5
the Pacific Province as fair and satisfactory. The Edmonton Journal
commented that a possible source of great trouble had been removed
by the new immigration policy decision and praised J.A. Calder for
effecting the new arrangement under which each Dominion had been
given the absolute right to control the composition of its population.
The paper was also most pleased that India had abandoned its claim
to free migration of Indians vdthin the British Empire.
If the newspapers echoed the sentiments of Canadian citizens, 
then it seemed that Canadians were happy to have accomplished their 
aims in keeping Indians but of the;country. The only.newspaper to 
condemn the injustice of the whole scheme was the Calgary Canadian:v :
1 Globe, August 1918.
2 Moose Jaw Times, August 1^ , 1918.
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Somebody appears to have thrown a monkey wrench 
into the machinery of the Tory Imperialists.
Immigration from India to Canada has been ordered 
stopped, and it is a queer kind of Imperialism 
that can prevail when a British citizen frorn one 
part of the Empire is not permitted to leave his 
own land and settle ini another part of the Empire 
which is also British.^
Another note of total condemnation was sounded by the Edmonton
Bulletin but this time the criticism was in respect of the laxity
of the Resolution towards Indians. According to this newspaper, the
whole arrangement under which Indian immigrants were going to be
allowed to bring their families to Canada was deplorable. The paper.
argued on the same lines as Curtis had done in his correspondence
with the British and Canadian governments and after comparing the
enormous population of India confined within a small space with
the small population of Canada spread over a large area the paper
observed that more and more natives of India found conditions in
Canada most favourable for the development of their business success
and social satisfaction. If such immigration were permitted to
continue, the news article stated, then in a matter of years western
ideals would be replaced by Indian civilization and governmental
affairs might very easily be dominated by Indian instead of western
principles. The paper mentioned that Canada had no wish to interfere
with the state of affairs of Hindus in India, even though certain
conditions in that country seemed objectionable to Canadians. One
fact was because of these different ideas and practices that Indians
were not welcome in Canada, for if Canada should be overrun by
Indians.then the foundation principle of western civilization
that the majority of the people shall rule, would ensure not a
progressive western civilization but a predominantly eastern one
1 Calgary Ganadian, August lA, 1918.
founded bn the tradition of untold centuries. Because of the climate
and economic conditions of India, Canadians could not adapt themselves
to a life in that country as easily as Indians could adjust to
life in Canada; therefore any advancement of the ideas of agreed
exchange of migrants was ridiculous. Besides, the article continued,
the British Empire depended upon the British race and the British
overseas Dominions were a means of strengthening and expanding that V'
race. Canada, Australia and New Zealand therefore, must be maintained
as white men’s countries, for if Asiatics were allowed to migrate
at will India could spare enough people to swamp the white races in
these Dominions without even knowing they had gone. The argument
continued that each country had a right to maintain its own culture
and branded as ambitious treachery, those actions of Lloyd George
and Borden which pretended that the interests of the Empire demanded
the sacrifice of British to Indian civilization in Canada.
While Canada had reservations about the outcome of the Resolution
the:siiew proposal was warmly received by the Government of India, and 
‘ - press -:
the only/comment, was in the Bombay Chronicle which called attention
to the fact that permission had been granted to Indians to bring their
' ? .■ ; v ■ 
wives and children to Canada.
Meanwhi&e Curtis continued his activity to see that the Resolution
of the Imperial War Conference was fully implemented. At that time
representatives from the Dominions and India had gone to Paris to
attend the Paris Peace Conference after the end of the First World War
and Curtis suggested that a committee should be convened in Paris
under the chairmanship of the representative from India to make all
1 Edmonton Bulletin, August 2, 1918.
^ Bombay Chronicle, August 14, 1918.
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the necessary arrangements. He offered his services to any 
committee and suggested that since the ImperialWar Conference of 
1918 had accepted reciprocity of treatment as the basis of migration 
within the Ih'it.ish lifflxjire this resolution should be put into practice 
immediately. Once this resolution had been adopted, Japan could no 
longer claim the right of free migration into Dominions as other 
European nations did. Instead the arrangement agreed upon with 
India could be used as a good example of Dominion autonomy within
the Empire, and Japan could be told that every Dominion was free
; \ 2 / : ;
to control the composition of its population. But the Colonial
Office did not agree to use this Reciprocity arrangement as an
3example for negotiating with Japan. Furthermore the Indian 
representative, Sir S.P. Sinha, refused to act as Curtis wished.
The task to guide the new resolution through parliament was
4finally entrusted to Borden's Immigration Minister Calder. No 
new legislative act was needed and the Canadian government issued 
an Order in Council^ on March 26, 1919 formally approving the 
Resolution passed by the Imperial W ar Conference. The question 
of Indian immigration into Canada seemed to be settled at last,
During the First World War there was a strong wave of anti- 
British agitation, especially in the Punjab, and it was intensified 
by the bitter feelings of Indian migrants who returned to India 
and told of the maltreatment or unequal treatment meted out to 
Indians in Canada. Such tales of Canadian discrimination were
1 Foreign Office to India Office, Dec. 30, 1918, File 3^79, L/P & J/6/1^98
2 Curtis to Foreign Office, Dec. 19, 1918, File 3**79, 1/P & J/6/1498,
3 Colonial Office to India Office, Jan. 23, 1919, File 3^79, D/P 8c J/6/1^98
4 Borden to Calder, telegram, March 23, 1919, K$76, File 338999, Vol. 11.
3 India Office Minute by Sinha, March 16, 1919, File 3**79, L/P & J/6/1498. 
6 P.O. 641, March 26, 1919.
effective weapons for anti-British agitators and even the .Germans 
tried to capitalise on the Indian treatment in their propaganda 
campaign against the British Qnpire. During the course of the war, 
however, the realistic demands for loyal manpower created a new outlook 
among British authorities in relation to the Dominions and India.
India had provided splendid troops to fight for the preservation of the 
Empire. It seemed grossly unfair that Indians who were British, 
subjects should be required to die for the E-npire if necessary but 
should, at the same tinie, be denied the right to settle in British 
Dominions and Colonies. The whole question of India as a member . 
of the British Empire had to be rev> owed and various suggestions 
were considered by the British government. One method of appeasement 
was to offer more high positions for Indians in British service and 
increased association with the British government in India. A 
scheme of reform was also advanced whereby India’s position within 
the Empire would be enhanced in order to satisfy Indian opinion and 
India’s participation in the peace agreement was also suggested.
The first step in this new advancement for India’s progress was 
India’s membership in the Imperial Conference but there the question 
of Indian migration posed an almost insurmountable difficulty. The 
India Office favoured an immigration agreement for India and Canada 
similar to that in operation between Canada and Japan. This seemed 
a sensible plan and one.which would have given Indians some chance 
to settle in Canada. However, the emotionalism generated by the 
whole question created the same sentimental and sensational atmosphere 
that surrounded the Komagata Maru affair of 191^, and instead of
1 Hardinge, Memorandum: Questions likely to arise at the end of 
the War* Hardinge Papers 116.
negotiating for actual improvement in the immigration act Indians 
sentimentally were willing to accept a placebo In the form of 
retaliatory measures of exclusion for Canadians corning to India.
This did nothing to alleviate the real problem of discrimination 
against Indians within the Empire and the basic policy of complete 
exclusion of Indians from settlement in Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand remained very touch in force. The Resolution of Reciprocity 
gave this policy a cloak of diplomacy and consoled the Indians 
with the deception that they still maintained their pride and 
freedom by this restrictive action against Canadians. The only 
concession gained from this elaborate diplomatic charade was the 
admission of families of Indians already settled in Canada. The 
Colonies considered Indians to be undesirable candidates to populate 
countries they felt should be kept for white men, and no matter how 
government policies tried to disguise this attitude the inevitable 
outcome was that Indians were not allowed to emigrate to Canada.
This policy of Indian exclusion had the tacit approval of the 
British government, and the Dominions and India were given the 
power of complete control over their own immigration and emigration 
of population. This principle of autonomy relieved the Imperial 
authorities of the responsibility to act as guardians of the rights 
of Indians as British subjects. Lionel Curtis firmly believed in 
racial inequality and his picture of an Asiatic culture drowning 
western civilization in the Dominions greatly influenced the thinking 
of policy makers. His philosophies about racism and his prophefcles 
about a possibly aborted progressive development of a British Empire 
composed of British people made the unequal treatment of Indians 
within the Empire seem to be a correct, logical and constitutional
step in '-'controlling a. threatened Asiatic takeover.
In the Canadian Pacific province of British Columbia the question 
of Asiatic immigration was used as a propaganda .weapon for election 
purposes. The Dominion .'government at.-. Ottawa could not risk losing 
votes by offering humane treatment to Indian migrants when political 
leaders in Vancouver said that Indian immigrants wore the. cause of 
serious labour problems. At the same time this Asiatic, immigration 
problem became a forraidabie weapo^for Indian agitators to use against 
British rule. The Indian political scene was troubled by anti-British 
agitation 011 various issues, and although the emigration question 
provided substantial’propaganda material for these factions for a 
while; the waryears altered this situation and Indians:were more 
amenable to a reasonable settlement. This was an opportune time 
to discuss and negotiate a far-sighted Emigration policy. Instead, 
the demand for retaliatory measures created during the Komagata- Maru 
crisis,was skilfully revived by the Dominion political loaders 
and became the basis of a hew arrangement. The subtle exclusion 
of Indians became a settled policy, and Lionel Curtis had furnished 
the academic, practical and philosophical justification for such 
exclusion. However, Imperial and Dominion leaders could ill-afford 
to declare explicitly the full extent of such discrimination, and 
the oblique ways of political expediency.superseded the visionary 
action responsible statesmen should have provided. Instead of 
laying the ground for the controlled movement of people to.develop 
a new land, a feeling of difference and suspicion was allowed to 
harden into racism. Curtis wished to keep white'men’s lands for 
white men, but one wonders ho\if he intended to justify his position 
to humanity in general and to Canadian Indians in particular, whose
lands the white man had usurped.
In India demands continued to increase for a better status 
of India as part of the British Empire as well as for a better 
position of Indians as British subjects. The self-governing Dominions 
had increased their freedom and independence but the movement of 
India towards;more responsible government presented difficulties 
for the British government who were anxious to maintain their 
sovereignty in that country. By not pressing for the Indian cause 
in immigration the British government seemed to approve schemes by 
which Indians would be compelled to remain in India. The large 
population congested in the sub-continent and the lack of opportunity 
there for any kind of economic advancement made ambitious and active 
men restless. They were anxious to test their skills in fields of 
trade and labour in new lands where they could better their lot. 
Lucrative job prospects in the Dominions and opportunities for 
business served as a great pull factor towards the new'countries.
At the same time bad economic conditions in India could push many 
Indians out of the country if there v/as an outlet. Dominion labour 
forces feared the competition from so many foreign labourers who 
would probably work for reduced wages. They did not want an Indian 
takeover, and the complex situation which had been created in South 
Africa was constantly used as an excuse for more restrictive 
immigration lav/s in the Dominions. The concession of granting 
permission to Indian visitors, students, business agents and 
professors and the admission of Indian families of settled immigrants 
was made more for removing the propaganda weapon of Indian agitators 
than from any humanitarian or pro-Indian sentiments. The inferior 
status of Indians as British subjects still remained the same,
though their exclusion was constitutionally established by this 
reciprocal arrangement«
■As a byproduct of this arrangement the Indian government devised 
an elaborate system for dealing with the documentation of Indians 
desiring to leave India. The Indian government had been caused much 
trouble during 19l4~15 by returning migrants *?ho harboured all sorts 
of anti-government feelings. -Under the new arrangements, therefore, 
proper travelling documents were issued only after thorough and 
lengthy police investigation to screen all anti-government suspects. 
Later on this bureaucratic and lengthy method became a normal routine 
applicable to every Indian. The British rule ended in 19 7^% but 
this intricate process \d.th all its unnecessary formalities outlived 
its utility and still survives in the South Asian sub-continent.
The shifting of responsibility of various subjects, including 
migration, from Whitehall to the Dominion capitals and Delhi was 
a very astute move on the part of the British government, and it 
served to sidetrack; for the moment at any rate, this sensitive 
and inflammable issue of racial equality. On the surface at least 
it appeared that Imperial authorities were granting more, not less 
constitutional responsibilities to India. But In reality the : 
Resolution of Reciprocity of Treatment meant the total exclusion 
Of Indians, as J.A. Calder, Canadian Minister of Immigration 
explained:
That resolution affirms the principle that each 
self-governing nation of the Empire should have 
complete autonomy in the matter of admitting or 
excluding immigrants, even though they come from 
some other part of the Empire. Thus Canada could . 
exclude Hindus and India could exclude Canadians.
All the great States of the Empire concurred in 
the resolution, including India.^
1 Quoted in the Toronto Star, July,31 » 1918.
In this way the Canadian continuous passage regulation, that 
discriminatory measure aimed at stopping Indians’ entry into the 
Dominion, was replaced by this constitutionally accepted though 
equally effective exclusion measure. And'what is even more remarkable 
is that it was duly endorsed by the Indian government.
The deliberations in the Imperial War Conference, the press 
comments and most other discussion on the migration question about.
Indians suowed the staunch belief among Imperial and Dominion statesmen : 
in the supremacy of Europeans and the monopoly of. white settlement 
in the Dominions} and any possibility of sharing these areas, even 
on a very small scale,.seemed to pose a threat to these beliefs.
The World War brought the peoples of the British Empire together 
to fight against a common enemy; but even at the end of the war, 
the Empire was far from being united and the unrest that arose 
from this'short-sighted diplomacy was to contribute eventually to 
the loss of British supremacy in India, and to the disruption of 
the Bnpire.
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The question of further immigration of Indians into Canada 
was settled in the Imperial War Conference. When Resolution No. XXI 
established the principle of Reciprocity of Treatment of Indians 
this meant, as I have pointed out in the previous chapter, the 
virtual exclusion of new Indian immigrants. However, there were two 
important facets of the Indian immigration issue that remained to be 
settled: the permission for Indian wives and children to join their
husbands and fathers who had migrated to Canada in the past and the
granting of full rights of Citizenship to Indians already domiciled 
in Canada. The Governments of India and Canada devised an elaborate 
migration procedure for dealing with the application of such wives
'I ' - ' >■"
and children, but the problem of Indians in Canada who wished to 
become Canadian citizens was more difficult to solve.
The British North America Act gave the provinces restricted
. 2 ‘ ' power of legislation with regard to aliens; therdbre, if any
province wanted to impose any statutory discrimination on any
group of aliens, it could legally do so. Often this discrimination
was imposed on racial grounds. Aliens from Europe were allowed to
attain full citizenship under the Naturalization Law after a five
years' residence in Canada and in the case of British subjects only
one year's residence was necessary. Yet Indians, in spite of their
status as British subjects by birth, were denied this privilege
of becoming citizens. No matter whether the duration of their
j India Office to Colonial Office, August 11, 1919; Secretary of 
State for Colonies to Governor General, Canada, Sept. 19♦ 1919» 
Governor General, Canada to Secretary of State for Colonies, 
Feb. 14, 1922; Colonial Office to India Office, March 13, 1922, 
and India Office to Colonial office, July 22, 1922, C.O. 886/9.
2 British North America Act, 186?» sec. 91* No-23.
residence had been'one year-.'or. live years, 'Indiana wore -.not allowed-, 
to become .Canadian citizens.' In this matter of citizenship.they 
were considered in terms of _ the same general exclusion* laws os that’ 
under which Orientals - Chinese,' Japanese end-Indians - were debarred • 
■from- franchise■ in..British .Columbia. -According to the electoral 
‘procedure, only, those persons could’vote’who'were .oh.the provincial 
voters* list, ••' However, - since ■ Indians were excluded from' the provincial 
voters’ register, . they were-automatically debarred'.from "federal voting. 
This disbility debarred them not only from voting in .provincial,
■federal or municipal--elections but' also from - serving on-juries, Vy • ■
becoming legal practitioners'■■■and:, pharmacists, or .'from, working as
- ^  - P - ■-. I--''' '
contractors under the public works department of the .government." -
' This disability was'-strongly -.resented by Indian© and when-the
Imperial .Conference met in 1921, the Indian representativev Srinivasa
Ssstri, put forward the Indian cose in these words:
&e.-have already ... agreed to a subtraction from 
the integrity, of the rights of the compromise of 
■191% to which my predecessor Lord Sinha was-a party,’
•that each Dominion and self-governing part of the 
'Empire"should'be'free to regulate■the composition 
of it©, population"by suitable immigration lows....'
■ but w©'-plead -on behalf- of those who are already. fully 
domiciled in the various.self-governing Dominions' 
according to the -,-laws which-those Dominions are governed
1''- H.F.-Angus,.-HThe Legal Status in British. Columbia of Residents of 
Oriental Pace andtheir..Descendants*1 in Norman Mackenzie's The Legal. 
Status of Aliens in Pacific Countries,.Institute"of Pacific Relations, 
Honolulu, 1937, pp. 77-88.
2 P.O. 111, Jan* 7, 1918; and Report of the Royal Commission on 
. . Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Book XV, p. 59*
'3. Srinivasa ;.kiotri wan n man of varied experience and extensive 
. V acccsapliohment.. lie was a Tellowaf Madras University; ,a member of 
the Madras Legislative Council; a member of-the British Privy 
Council and the Viceroy’s Legislative Council; Lender in the Upper 
'...House; Representative of .India at the League of Nations at Geneva,
.and'the Washington Conference of 1921-22.
- to these people there is no reason whatever to deny 
the full right 6f citizenships it is for this that we 
plead; where they are lav/fully settled, they must be 
admitted into the general body of citizenship and no 
deduction must be made from the rights that other 
British subjects enjoy. It is my unfortunate part 
to have drawn prominent attention to what we^consider 
a great defect in the present arrangements.
After lengthy discussion the Imperial Conference of 1921 finally 
agreed to pass Resolution IX on the Position of British Indians in 
the Empire;
The Conference while reaffirming the Resolution of 
the Imperial War Conference of 1918, that each 
community of the British Commonwealth should enjoy 
complete control of the composition of its own 
population by means of restriction on immigration 
from any of the other communities, recognizes that 
there is an incongruity between the position of 
India as an equal member of the British Bupire and 
the existence of disabilities upon British Indians 
lawfully domiciled in some parts of the Empire.
The Conference accordingly is of the opinion that 
in the interests of the solidarity of the British 
Commonwealth, it is desirable that the rights of ^ 
such Indians to citizenship should be recognized.
All the delegates from the Dominions (including Canadian Prime Minister
Meighn) agreed to this resolution v/ith the exception of Smuts, the
South African delegate.
The British and Indian governments requested SSastrf to visit 
Australia, New Zealand and Canada to confer with the governments 
of those Dominions. His mission was to facilitate the removal of 
the disabilities imposed on Indians settled in the Dominions.
Sastri started his tour of Australia and New Zealand in June 1922.
After addressing public meetings and speaking with the leaders of
•z
those governments he reached Victoria (B.C.) on August 13* He 
immediately conferred with the British Columbian Lieutenant Governor
1 Cmd. 1474, Proceedings of Imperial Conference 1921, p. 3^ *
2 Ibid,, p.8.
3 Canadian Annual Review, 1922, pp. 197-203.
and provincial premier about citizenship rights. Later, in his full
schedule of public addresses, he pointed out the disadvantages
Indians in British Columbia suffered because they were denied
citizenship in the country in which they chose to live. However,
at the time of Sastri*s most ardent efforts on behalf of Indians
living in Canada, there were already important changes in federal
government personnel. These changes affected the outcome of
Sastri’s mission and voided the promises the previous government
had made about Ihdian citizenship. By 1922 Conservative Prime
Minister Meighn had resigned, and in his place the Liberal Prime
Minister, Mackenzie King, was in office. Sastri discussed the
naturalization problem with the new government leader and Prime
Minister Mackenzie King assured Sastri that:
... at the earliest favourable moment, the government 
will be pleased to invite the consideration of 
parliament to your request that natives of India 
resident in Canada be granted a Dominion parliamentary 
franchise on terras and conditions identical with those 
which govern the exercise of that right by Canadian 
citizens generally.
The subject is necessarily one which parliament 
alone can determine. It will be submitted to parliament 
for consideration when the franchise lav/ is under 
revision.^
But before parliament would make a decision on the matter, Sastri * s 
many speeches sparked a controversy in the Canadian press who 
expressed their concern about the question of franchise for Indians; 
The Ottawa Journal found Sastri*s requests entirely justifiable and 
commented: :
Mr. Srinivasa Sastri v/ho comes from India to ask 
us that 1100 British Indians domiciled in Canada 
be given full rights to British citizenship, to 
wit, the franchise, has an impregnable case. "We 
do not ask," he says, "that you surrender the right 
to exclude us. Y/hat we say is that if you admit us, 
then you should admit us, on terms of equality."
There is no answer to this.^
1 Mackenzie King to Sastri, Sept. 5, 1922, quoted in Proceedings of the 
Imperial Conference 1923, Cmd. 1988, p.105*
2 Ottawa Journal quoted in Manitoba Free Press, Sept. 12, 1922.
Sastri’s plea for the admission of resident Indians to franchise was
founded upon the premise that Indians were British subjects. He
argued that such citizenship would help to strengthen Indian bonds
with the Empire and would not do any harm to the Canadian public.
Besides, the Canadian Prime Minister (Meighn) had promised this
citizenship in the Imperial Conference of 1921. But these pleas
were strongly opposed by J.S. Ewart, in his letter to the Ottawa
Citizen. He quoted the South African example of exclusion of
Indians and pointed out that such exclusion from franchise did not
mean inferiority. It was his opinion, therefore, that the Indians’
feeling of sensitivity and their loss of faith in the British Bnpire
because of denial of citizenship rights were unwarranted. Ewart
further stressed that:
Experience places beyond controversy that entrance 
by; members of an unassimilable race is followed by
assertions of rights, that one concession is apt to
be followed by another; and that bestowal of the 
vote hardens and makes more strident the assertion on 
the one hand and on the other confuses electionP
contests with racial questions.
Reinforcing his argument against Sastri, Ewart alleged that Indians 
in Canada were practising polygamy and (because of such vast difference 
in their social customs) could not fit into the Canadian system of 
government. The question of whether Indians should or should not be
1 John Skirving Ewart was a renowned lawyer and influential writer.
He had been practising at Winnipeg from 1882 to 190*f when he 
moved to Ottqwa to join Ewart, Scott, Kelley and Kelley, Barristers 
and Solicitors of Metcalfe Street, Ottawa. In Ottawa his 
practice was confined to the Supreme Court and the Privy Council.
He was the author of a large number of books on legal subjects
and he was also the chief Canadian Counsel of North Atlantic 
Fisheries Arbitration at the Hague in 1910. lie criticised Lord 
Grey for his pro-Imperial position. It was Ewart who issued the 
Kingdom Papers advocating Canadian sovereignty. See Who is Who 
in Canada, 1927-28, p. 102*f.
2 Manitoba Free Press, Sept. 11, 1922 published a leading article on 
’’Hindus in Canada: Opinions For and Against the Franchise to Those 
in the Country”. It quoted extracts from the Ottawa newspapers.
granted citizenship rights was now publicly debated and Meighn’s
former promise to the Indians at the Imperial Conference of 1921
■ - V " /  ' '' 1
no longer carried any weight. The argument for and against Indian
" 2 ■' 'rights continued and R.E. Gosnell, who supported .Sastri, observed:
: Mr* Sastri stands on the moral right on what India
understands as the pledge of Eknpire. The East 
Indian mind and temperament are not altogether ours.
The spirit of the Indian people has been wounded by 
what it regards as the implication of inferiority!
If in conclusion, Mr. Ewart could point to any 
economic or social evil that can possibly result 
from what Mr. Sastri asks, there might be force 
in his contention.... The privilege asked, because 
it must be privilege though morally a right, is 
triflingf but it means much. If Mr* I^art cares 
nothing for the Empire as it is, there are a thousand 
to one who d o . v
Unfortunately the result of this tour by Sastri and the controversy
in the press did not remedy the disabilities of Indian residents in
British Columbia, and the Canadian government did not take any action.
However, in June 1923i the question of granting franchise was brought
before the Canadian House of Commons by Samuel 'William Jacobs (Member
of Parliament from Montreal). He made a strong case for enfranchising
the Indians resident in Canada by the following declaration:
The Hindu franchise is of great interest to this 
country. There is no reason in the wide world, 
so far as I can see, why British subjects domiciled 
in Canada should be deprived of the franchise....
In all respects they were quite as capable of 
using the franchise as any person who resides
1 See Manitoba Free Press, Sept. 12, 1922.
2 R.E. Gosnell was. a well-known freelance journalist in Ottawa. He 
served as secretary of the Provincial Bureau of British Columbia
and edited the Year Book of British Columbia (six editions 1897-191*0 • 
He served as Provincial Librarian and also had been the Archivist 
of British Columbia in 1908-1910. Gosnell was editor of The 
Victorian Colonist foff some time, but from 191** to 1930 he became 
a freelance journalist and lived in Ottawa. His famous publications 
included The Story of Confederation (1918) and A History of British 
Columbia (1913)• See0Encyclopedia Canadiana, Vol. A, pV 39^ «,
3 See Manit oba Free Press, Se p t . 12, 1922.
in this country.... The Hindu citizens have a 
bigger claim upon us by reason of the fact that 
that they are part of the British Empire,... The 
question Was urged upon the delegates at the 
Imperial Conference by the Right Honourable Mr.
Sastri who travelled through the country last 
year and made what I consider an irrefutable 
case for his people who are resident here....
Mr. Sastri stated when he was here that he was 
delighted to know at the time that our government 
was going to fall in: with the views of the 
representatives and delegates at the conference, 
but he said he found to his bitter experience 
that the intellectual acceptance of a theory 
sometimes was very far from its practical 
application, and he found, so far as; this 
^government seemed to be concerned,- that there 
was no intention of putting into effect the promise 
given by the then Prime Minister of Canada at 
the conference..., Those of us who listened to 
Sastri ... were very much struck by his argument 
in favour of the inclusion of his countrymen in 
franchise of this country. He pointed out that 
India at the present time was disturbed by sedition.
The Ghandi propaganda was generally accepted 
throughout India, and these people of India were 
making capital out of the fact that the sister 
Commonwealth country wasnnot carrying.but the 
undertaking which had been given to them at the 
Conference..,.'With regard to the dominions 
constituting the British Empire India is treated 
in exactly thesame way as the other Dominions, 
and consequently when we deal with the inhabitants 
of India we have to deal with them in the same way 
as we deal vdth the people of South Africa,
Australia, Hew Zealand ... I should like to learn 
if it is the intention of our Prime Minister 
(Mr. Mackenzie King) and the other delegates who 
attend this conference to carry out the undertakings 
given by our delegate at the last conference, 
whether we intend to embark upon some new policy 
and to deny to those people the^right to which I 
claim they are justly entitled.
But severe opposition to Jacobs came from another Member of Parliament 
■ 2Alan Neill, who had lived in New Zealand and had visited South
Africa. He criticised Jacobs for his desire "to give the right to
vote_7 to people born in India, a heathen and many of them a debased
1 Canada, House of Commons Debates, June 29, 1923, pp»
2 Canadian Parliamentary Guide 1924, p. 1^ 9•
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class of people.” Neill voiced his strong fears about the possible
results if Indians were given the right to. vote in British Columbia
and observedi i
Five thousand voters ^Indians^? in British 
Columbia would have a powerful influence in the 
electorate and on the result of the election.
They would be skilfully handled; they would 
vote in a mass and for one object, and the 
result would be to swing perhaps two or three 
seats,.,. Would it not be a case of those 
'five thousand votes going to the candidate who 
would undertake to let these people bring 
their relations, or their friends? These votes 
would go solidly for a man who would do that or 
the party that would do that.... If we grant it 
to the Hindu how can we deny it to the oriental 
born in British Columbia who speaks the same ; 
tongue as we do? It follows as the night the V
day that if we grant it to Hindus we must grant 
it to other o r i e n t a l s , ^
We know that in the years to come, especially if 
we give these people the vote there will not be 
a white British Columbia but a yellowBritish 
Columbia,5
After expressing these fears of an Oriental takeover, Neill
emphasized the bitter opposition British Columbia felt toward Indian
enfranchisement and stated that the problem
... is not a Dominion matter,.V. It is a British 
Columbian problem for this reasonr the franchise 
invariably originates in the province.... I 
would quote Sir Wilfrid Laurier who in 1917 laid 
down in most emphatic language in paragraph after 
paragraph that the true basis of our Dominion 
franchise under the British North America Act is 
the provincial franchise.... I would ask this J
House therefore, not to force upon us in British 
Columbia a thing v/hich is unconstitutional, and 
is against our customs and bitterly against our 
desires. There is no precedent for it whatever.
Talk about treating a sore spot. Do this and 
you would create a cancer in British Columbia^ 
that we as a nation would never recover from.
1 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, June 29, 1929, p» ^6^5*
2 Ibid., p. k6k6.
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Another member from British Columbia, Thomas George McBride, spoke
for* a section of organised labour:
.We have on the coast of British Columbia,
Chinamen and Japs running our stores. They are 
' running the white people out. We have the Greeks 
there running our hotels and we have Jews running 
our second hand stores and now some people want to 
bring in the Hindus to run our mills. We have had 
enough of that in the past, and if this government 
wants to cast British Columbia adrift let her cast 
it adrift ... before any more orientals come in.
If they do, we white people out on the Pacific 
will prevent any more orientals coming to British 
Columbia, ^
But James Woodsworth, Member of Parliament from Manitoba, questioned
the logic of this opposition to granting the franchise to Indians:
I admit that I do not believe in admitting large 
numbers of these people at the present time because 
we are not in a fit position to take care of them.
I do not believe can have intermingling of these 
races under existing economic conditions; but it is 
one thing to say to the orientals; ”it is hot well 
for you to come in at the present time”, and it is 
quite another thing after-we have allowed them 
to come in and they are citizens with us, ratepayers 
with us and all the rest of it, to deny them the 
fundamental right of citizenship.^
Mackenzie King (Prime Minister of Canada) pointed out that Meighn,
who represented Canada at the Imperial Conference of 1921, might
have agreed to the resolution of the Conference to grant the franchise
to Indians. However, he declared that Meighn’s acceptance of this
k '
resolution was not binding for Canada. Informing the House of
Commons about his own meetings with Sastri on the franchise question
and the policy of the presiding Dominion government, the Prime •.
Minister saidjf
1 T.G. McBride was the proprietor of a large builders’ store. See
the Canadian Parliamentary Guide, 192^, p. 1^ 9*
2 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, June 29, 1929, p. A6*f8.
,I might say that the point on which particular 
emphasis was laid in conversation-with Mr. Sastri 
. -wasthe fact that.our Dominion is a federation of 
provinces, that in distribution of seats in this 
House regard is ...had-to the provinces, each 
province being alloi^ed a certain portion in relation 
. to the others, and that at all times the provinces
of the Dominion have had regard for each other's 
problem, that nothing could be more unfortunate 
than that an effort should be made on the part of 
any province or group of provinces to coerce, so 
to speak, any other province in regard to any 
■ matter which was;'of great concern to it, that the 
federal government could not"afford to ignore the 
px’evailing sentiment in any province. I pointed 
out to Mr. Sastri that when the Dominion franchise 
law would be under review mentioning in that ' 
connection that it would come up for review in all 
probability before any general election \*ras held, 
doubtless it would be referred to a committee of 
the House to consider and that the representations 
which he had made would be presented to the committee, 
but that what was; of most importance was how the 
members from the province of British Columbia 
themselves would view the matter, I said quite 
frankly that if the members from the province of 
British Columbia regardless of political party 
were to be favourable to having the franchise 
granted to the Indians in British Columbia, the 
rest of parliament would fall cordially into harmony 
with their views, that on the other hand if there 
- was ho agreement among the members of the province 
of British Columbia on this question, if it were 
clear to the members of this House that so far as 
British Columbia was concerned instead of being in 
favour of granting the franchise they were all 
pretty much the other way, it was hardly probable 
. that the members of parliament generally would 
seekofco impose any. view upon them which would 
be contrary to their views,. In other words, that 
it was very doubtful how any. situation of unrest 
in one part of the British Empire could be improved  ^
by creating a new condition of unrest in another part.
It is clear that although the question of franchise for Indians
resident in British Columbia was enthusiastically represented in the
Canadian House of Commons the whole discussion was nothing more than
an acs&emic debate. The PrimeeMinister (Mackenzie King) justified
his inability to conform to Mr. Sastri's wishes by referring to the
1 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, June 29* 1923* PP» MS65-4666.
peculiar constitutional nature of Dominion - provincial relations.
-.When the next Imperial Conference was held in 1923 the issue
of disabilities imposed on Indians resident in the Dominions became
a burning question. Lord Peel, Secretary of State for India,
emphasised that a solution to these Indian grievances should be
found because it was essential and imperative for the preservation
of the British Empire. Explaining this point he said;
The Viceroy ^ of India^/, in his private letters, 
is constantly explaining and pressing upon me 
how strongly the feeling of soreness and bitterness 
is growing on this subject, and how, in many ways, 
the task of wisely governing India is made difficult 
by the intensity of feeling,. Therefore, I want to 
.■'.■■'■'■■■'.place this first point before the Conference - the 
remarkable unanimity of feeling on the position of 
Indians in the Dominions....
The reason why thex’e is such unity among our fellow 
subjects of India is this, that they regard the 
disability under which their countrymen labour as 
a brand of social inferiority. That is what cuts 
so deep into the consciousness of Indians.... I 
have no doubt ... in what I arn saying^now, I do 
. voice the general opinion of Indians.
The Secretary of State for India further pointed out that the question
of social status of Indians in the. self-governing Dominions was a
contributory cause, in the formation of the many restive social and
political movements in India disguised under more resounding names.
The Indian representative, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, also put the
case of Indian grievances in very strong and emphatic words:
... so far as this question of Indians overseas is 
concerned, we stand solid and united. We have out 
own domestic quarrels; we have moderates and 
extremists; we have non~cooperators; and we have 
Hindus and Mahomedans. But so far as this question
1 Cmd. 1987, Proceedings of Imperial Conference, 1923* pp* 6?-68.
2 See M.N. Qureshi, The Khilafat movement in India 1919-2V.', Ph.D. 
thesis, University of London, 1973*
3 Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru was an eminent lawyer,a member of the Indian 
National Congress, an expert on Indian Constitutional Reforms, and 
a member of the Viceroy’s Executive Council. See The Times,
Jan. 21, 19^9*
is concerned let me tell you with all the sincerity 
that I am capable of that we stand absolutely 
united.... V/e attach far more importance to the 
honour of our nationals in other parts of the Empire 
than probably you realise.... It is my country £ IndiaJ  
■ which makes the British Empire truly Imperial.
One fifth of the human race with a far more ancient 
civilization than your own ... joins with you in 
acknowledging the suzerainty of our common Throne.
That allegiance with us is a real thing. Shake 
that allegiance, and you shake the foundations of 
the entire fabric with the.consequence which it is 
difficult to overestimate.
Sir Tej made the specific point that on this question of Indian
rights abroad the Indian masses were very sensitive, and the
vernacular papers in India exploited any anti-British sentiments,
expressed or implied by the Dominions, In their propaganda appeals
to Indians. Emphasising the seriousness of the matter Sir Tej
continued:
Any inequality of Indian nationals enters like 
iron into our souls ... it cuts to the quick
our national pride, and consciousness. It
permeates and sours our whole outlook in
regard to Imperial relationship. It derives 
; Impetus from the natural inclination to take
pride in being a member of the biggestCommonwealth 
that the world knows today.
Finally Sir Tej proposed that the se-lf-governing Dominions and the
British government for Colonies and protectorates should agree to
the appointment of committees to confer with a committee appointed
by the Indian government as to the best and quickest means of giving
3effect to the Resolution of the 1921 Conference.
The conference expressed its high appreciation of the able and 
moderate manner in which the Secretary of State for India and the
1 Gmd, 1987, Proceedings of the Imperial Conference, 1923» p* 73*
2 Ibid., p. 7b,
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other Indian delegates had presnnted the Indian case. The
Canadian prime Minister (Mackenzie King) explained that difficulties
in conceding the franchise to Indians generally in British Columbia
were not due to distinction of colour but to economic and comples :
political considerations, and he reiterated what he had already
said to Sastri 021 the occasion of the latter*s visit to Canada in
1922, namely, that the question of vdiether natives of India
resident in Canada should be granted a Dominion Parliamentary
Franchise on terms and conditions identical with those which
governed the exercise of that right by Canadian citizens generally
.'was • necessarily one which Canadian parliament could determine and
that the matter would be submitted to parliament for consideration
2when the Franchise Law carne up for revision. Mackenzie King
3 . ■■/'■v
appreciated Sapru*s views. However, he expressed his fears that
if the Dominion government was to press a decision on British
Columbia such action would be labelled as coercion of the Provincial
government by the Federal government and this would be used as a
■ : : v h
political weapon. Mackenzie King pointed out that the Resolution 
of the Imperial Conference of 1921 v/as not ’’binding*1 on Canada 
but only, as he termed it, a ’’desirable goal”. Sir Tej Bahadur 
Sspru’s angry reply was that delegates of the last Conference sat 
as statesmen and not as lawyers or a court of law.^
Besides Mackenzie King there were still others who raised their 
voices in protest against the Indian delegation’s requests. The
1 Cmd# 1987, Proceedings of the Imperial Conference, 1923, p. 97*
2 Ibid., p. 102.
3' Ibid., p. 103. 
k Ibid., pp. IO2-IO3.
3 Ibid., p. 102.
6 Cmd. 1988, Proceedings of the Imperial Conference, 1923, pp. 113-H 7-
Indian proposals on the question of disabilities of Indians resident
in the Dominions were severely opposed by Smuts, the South African
Prime Minister, He not only opposed them but also condemned the
Resolution of the Conference of 1921 as well as Sastri*s tour of
the Dominions. His memorandum on the subject which he presented
to the Conference created an awkward exchange of words between
Sapru and Smuts. However, the South African viewpoint did not
get them much support in the Conference, and Sapru was successful in
outwitting Smuts,? Yet the differences between India and South
Africa were of such vehemence at that time that they overshadowed
the question of granting the franchise to Indians in Canada at
this Conference, The outcome was that although the proposals of
the Indian delegates were passed in the form of a resolution at
the Conference, the actual position of Indians in the Dominions
did not change. In the next Imperial Conference of 1926, this
issue was mentioned only in the South African context and Canada
was not mentioned at all.
The general pattern of immigration into Canada after the
First World '-'War was one of rapid increase during the years 1920-23t
1926 and 1929 but with the onset of the depression of the 1930*s
5
the inflow of immigrants declined. In August 1930 the Dominion 
government passed an Order in Council restricting immigrant entry 
into Canada to wives and children of heads of families already
1 Mmd. 1988, proceedings of the Imperial Conference, 1923* pp. 113-117*
2 Ibid., pp. 138-1^0.
3 Bee Sir William Keith Hancock, Smuts: The field of force 1919-1930 
(Cambridge University Press, 19^8)? pp.l4l-l49; and K.N. Raina,
Tej Bahadur Sapru; Profiles and Tributes, pp. 202-210.
k Cmd, 2789» Proceedings of Imperial Conference, 1926, Appendices,
pp. 30-31*
3 Canada Year Book 1937-38» p. 6.
established and agriculturists with sufficient money to invest in
'j
farming. During the entire inter-war period 1918-1939 the number
of Indians entering Canada was small - mainly wives and children of
Indians already domiciled in Canada. Since many Indians had returned
to their own country, the size of the Indian population in Canada
at this time had declined from over 500G to just about 1200 people.
During the period between the two world wars, Orientals were
considered a potential danger for Canadian society, especially those
Orientals in British Columbia. The matter was a favourite topic
for discussion in contemporary journals and even pamphlets appeared.
A.H. Erenwick wrote a lengthy article in MacLean’s Magazine under
the caption ’’For East is East”. In this article which bore the
sub-title ”In British Columbia Oriental Penetration”, he branded
Orientals as a ’’menace”. He stated,
That the unobtrusive but effective penetration 
by the Oriental iraces of the commercial, 
industrial and agricultural life of the Dominion 
had developed to the extent of becoming a real 
danger to the welfare of the country is the 
opinion of practically all persons who have the 
opportunity to observe at close range the inroads-
the Asiatics have made in the last decade or two.
Under the other sub-title, ’’British Columbia Bears the Brunt”, the
writer quoted the number of Japanese, Chinese and Indians living
in the province as well as their position in trading and industrial
activities. His conclusions were that the low standard of living
of the average Oriental enabled him to compete unfairly with the
white in commerce and in industry and thus the whites were forced
1 Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Canada, One Hundred Years 1867-1967»
, p. 90.
2 MacLeans Magazine, Jan. 15, 1928.
3 ibid. .
out of business and farming. Frenwick pointed out that,
In agriculture the Oriental works industriously 
and systematically and anyone who observed him 
on the land has nothing but admiration for the 
manner in which he organises his work and the 
intelligence he displays in growing and marketing 
his products. In industrial empl&yment he can 
be almost universally depended tipon to be ’’on 
the job’1 every day and to keep on working. In 
ttrade he gives the most excellent service, 
studying the wants of his customers and filling 
them promptly and courteously.
^hus the Asiatics* low standard of living and the small amount of
wages necessary to meet his needs, combined with his willingness to
work and the good service he gave his employers v/ere interpreted
as a threat to white labour. Commenting on the attitude of the
people in British Columbia towards Asiatics, a well-known missionary,
Dr. S.S. Osterhout, wrote in 1929 that the views expressed in
2
Frenwick*s article represented the thought of the average Westerner.
Another writer, Tom Maclnnes, agreed with Frenwick*s observations
about the traits of Asiatic workers. He found that Orientals did
not shrink from hard work. They would perform menial tasks of
clearing, and would use every labour-saving device including
machinery and team cooperation in order to make a profit. They
were ready to work longer hours and according to him, they were
reliable and dependable workers. These Orientals, he said, had their
own culture and enjoyed living in British Columbia which they found
climatically very suitable. Altogether they possessed superior
qualities for the economic struggle in Canada. Thus Maclnnes concluded:
... it is clear that economically we cannot 
compete with the Oriental in this community, 
industrially, commercially or professionally, 
except v/e handicap him, hamper him, restrict 
him, and as far as possible put him out of the 
industrial and commercial running.^
T MacLeans Magazine, Jan. 15, 1928.
2 S.S. Osterhout, Orientals in Canada, Toronto, 1929, p. 5^*
3 Tom Maclnnes, Oriental Occupation of British Columbia (Vancouver B.C., 
1927), p. 38.
His fears were that Orientals would control the commercial life of 
Vancouver as Jews controlled it in Hew York, and would eventually 
oust Europeans and marry European girls as well.
Suspicion and resentment against Asiatics who were prospering 
in British Columbia continued to grow. Even ;the Legislative 
Assembly of British Columbia prepared e report listing the assets 
and activities of Orientals within the province; It showed the 
number of Japanese , Chinese and Indians , their properties and their
■ 2 - ■ ■
occupations. The depression years of the 1930*s only intensified 
these economyc-based objections to Asiatics. British Columbians 
were against further immigration and their prejudice and bitterness 
were apparent in their daily dealings with all Orientals. They 
tried to hamper their success as much as possible. Since Indians, 
though British subjects, were ineligible to vote, the voters* lists 
were used as the basis of exclusion in other aspects of life as well.
For example, contractors engaged in provincial or municipal public 
works were not allowed to employ those people whose names did not 
appear on these lists. The prejudice of the people continued 
even though the numbers of Indians in the province did not increase 
significantly. For example during the years 1915-1925 the number 
of Indians entering British Columbia v;as only 131* The largest 
number of Indians trying to enter Canada and hoping to settle in 
British Columbia was 210 in 1939 but they were orderdd to be 
deported. However, with the outbreak of the Second World War the
1 Tom Maclnnesj op.cit., pp. 51-52.
2 Province of British Columbia, Report on Oriental Activities Within 
the Province, Victoria, 1927*
3 David C. Corbett, Canada* s Immigration Policy (Toronto, 1957)» P- 5^ *
4 Report on Oriental Activities Within the Province, p. 7*
deportation order could not be carried out. And as the War went 
on with Its horrors it brought about a reversal of public opinion 
in British Columbia by changing the outlook of the world on the 
question of race. At the end of the war, India's new political 
status and her increasing importance in international affairs seemed 
to have some bearing on the Canadian government's policy towards 
Indian immigrants. One instance that indicated this new trend 
in government thinking was the incident of the 210 Indians who 
came to Canada in 1939 and who had been in Canada for eight years 
as temporary residents awaiting the implementation of deportation 
orders. On August 1^f, 19-^ 7, febo Dominion government issued an 
Order in Council by which these Indians were allowed to stay in 
Canada permanently. Such a progressive step was.greeted with
2grateful;enthusiasm by the Indian immigrant community in Canada 
and was the basis for the liberalization of future Canadian immigration 
policy. These new policy views had taken a long time to come about 
and might not have been implemented so soon had it not been for 
the continuous efforts of the Khalsa Diwan Society over a period 
of many years. : \
The Khalsa Diwan Society was the main organization of Indian 
immigrants in Canada. However, after 191^» because of the decrease 
in the number of Indian immigrants, the Society became less active.
The economic depression during the period between the two v/ars was 
responsible for restricting the number of migrants and also for 
the movements of those already settled in Canada to new positions 
where they employed themselves and were not dependant on company ,
1 P.C.3312, August l*k, 19^7-
2 Khalsa Diwan Society to Direftor of Immigration, Sept. 2, 19^7*
File 536999* Vol. 18.
jobs. The result was that Indians went into trucking and farming, 
and some of them set up their own sawmills. But they became more 
isolated from the white community. Since they were mainly a male 
population 'and were not used to social activities as European 
Canadians were, the temple became their principal meeting place, 
both for worship and social exchanges. The temple was the centre 
of their community and the Society they formed there continued to 
be important in spite of the decrease in the number of Indians 
in the population*
By the end of 19^1* the Society renewed its efforts and invited 
H.S.L. Polak, Secretary of Indians Overseas Association in London 
to visit Vancouver. Polak was asked to put their case for the
granting of franchise and he did speak to Mackenzie King, the Canadian
. % .. ■
Prime Minister. But with the serious turn of events in the Second
World War when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor and gained sudden victories
in South East Asia, the question of Indian franchise was considered
in the light of the entire Oriental problem and thus was put into
■ /  2*. ' .. 
cold storage.
At the end of the wnr, the Khalsa Diwan Society invited Dr.
D.P. Pandia*^  to lead the campaign for obtaining franchise rights.
Fandia addressed church organizations and various political and 
social groups and soon found that the new atmosphere of toleration
1 R.C. Lawrence, ’’Market and Capital, A History of the Lumber Industry 
in B.C." (unpublished.M.A. thesis, University of British Columbia,
1951)» PP- 68 and 98.
2 II.S.L. Polak was known for his work; for Indians in South Africa.
See H.S.L. Polak, The South African Indian Question: Studies in 
Conflict and Cooperation (London 19**?); and ’’Indians Overseas:
Their Eights and Their Responsibilities”,Indian Times (Suva, Fiji), 
Sept. 19, 19^5. ,
3 Polak to Mackenzie King, Jan. l*f, 19^2, Report on Dominion Provincial 
and Municipal Franchise for the Hindus, p. 13*
Department of External Affairs to Polak, Feb. 21, 19^2, ibid., p. 16.
3 Dr. D.P. Pandia had been in the American continents before the war and 
had been working for the welfare of Indian migrants. See Report on ... 
Franchise for the Hindus, p. 3»
seemed favourable enough for pursuit of this cause. Professor
Ormsby, in her study of the history of British Columbia, has remarked
about this change of attitude on the part of the white population:
Some of the tolerance of the peoples probably 
sprang from the belief current in 19^5 that the 
forming at San Francisco - so close to home - of 
the Charter of the United Nations would usher in 
the new age of "one world”. The wider experience 
of the war veterans, no doubt contributed to it.^
Pandia was able to put the Indians’ case effectively before the
Government of British Columbia, and at the end of 19^6 an all-party
Election Act Committee composed of seven members, was appointed to
- ■ . p
recommend any necessary change in the Election Act. In September
■ r  '■ . .  3
of that year professor Henry F. Angus^ had pointed out that the
few hundred Indians domiciled in Canada had an international
importance out of all proportion to their s®all number. He reminded
Canadians that India was going to decide shortly whether to remain
in the British Commonwealth or to secede from it. In such decisions
emotions play as strong a part as reason, and therefore he warned
that Canada’s withholding of franchise rights from Indians could
create a very difficult situation, for the British Commonwealth. The
- A''
wisest policy, he advocated, was to extend the franchise to Indians.
Therefore when the Election Act Committee met at Vancouver in
October and November 19^6, it recommended the necessary changes in
5
the Act to extend the franchise to Indians. The provincial premier
1 Margaret A. Ormsby, British Columbia: a History, p. ^92.
2 Report on ... Franchise for Hindus, p. 6.
3 Professor Henry F. Angus is a well-known authority on international
relations and social sciences. He was born in Victoria and lived 
most of his life in Vancouver. During the First World War he was 
in India and it was this stay that gave him first-hand knowledge
of the precarious position of India within the Commonwealth/ 
Information from Interview with Professor Angus, August 1972.
§ Henry F. Angus, "East Indians in Canada", International Journal II, 
19^ 7* pp. 7^-50.
3 Report on ... Franchise for Hindus, p. 6.
(John Hart) informed the Prime Minister of Canada (Mackenzie King) 
that the majority of the provincial Legislative Assembly had approved 
the recommendation of the Election Act Committee* So by April 19^7* 
Indians were given franchise rights in British Columbia and by 
October 19^7 they had voting rights in various towns of British 
Columbia.^
. The Second changed the map of the world and the
European countries in particular saw human, economic, industrial and 
commercial destruction on a large scale* It was in this changed 
situation that Canada realized the necessity of adjusting her 
immigration policy which had formerly been influenced by the economic 
fears and terrors of the great depression and its legacy of 
hopelessness. The influx of immigrants into Canada had fallen 
off sharply during these years. The average yearly immigration 
from all source countries was 15*000 between the years 1931-19^11 
with only 12,000 annually during the war years. At the end of the 
war, in December 19^5, David Caroll (Liberal member of the Canadian 
House of Commons for Spadina) urged the Dominion government to 
begin an immediate study of immigration with a view to the development 
of a short-term and long-term immigration policy more in keeping 
with changed conditions in the world. In reply, the government 
stated that the matter was under consideration./* In April 19^6, 
the Canadian immigration policy was severely criticised in the 
Canadian House of Commons when W.R. Thsbcher, member of parliament 
from Moose Jaw, introduced the motionj
1 Margaret A. Ormsby, op.cit., p. A92.
2 Report on ... Franchise for Hindus, pp. 25-26.,
3 Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Canada, One Hundred Years 1867-1967, 
/ P* 99* . ■-
h Canada, House of Commons, Debates, December 19^5, pp. 3525-3527*
That in the opinion of this house the government 
should give early consideration to the advisability, 
of instituting a reasonable immigration programme, 
planned in accordance with Canada's absorptive 
capacity, its economic needs and possibilities of 
development.^
The member made a strong case for amending the Canadian immigration
policy. He said,
... it is very difficult to justify our present 
immigration policy on purely humanitarian grounds.
The war in Europe resulted in millions of people 
being uprooted and scattered far and wide. Many 
of them cannot return to their old homes and 
most of them are living in abject poverty. There 
is widespread lack of shelter and clothing. Food 
is so scarce that thousands of them are dying of 
malnutrition. Confiscation of property has been 
fairly general throughout European countries.
Certainly racial and religious prejudices prevail 
at every hand. Hundreds of thousands of orphans 
are homeless in Europe.... The vast majority of 
these refugees were active opponents of the fascist 
countries...our immigration policy is contrary 
to the interests of the nation as a whole. No 
thoughtful person can travel across Canada 
without feeling that there is an immense area whose 
economic resources have not yet been properly 
exploited. The general process of settlement has 
been neither complete nor satisfactory. A moderately 
well planned immigration would have^numerous 
advantages for Canadians generally. .
The member made the point that increased immigration would increase
the home market for Canadian goods as well as provide more people
to share the tax burden. A larger population would boost economic
growth, increase skilled manpower and generally help Canada develop
her potentials. He quoted a resolution of the Labour Congress of
Canada which had also made a request for planned immigration in the
post-v/ar period.^ Another member of parliament, D.A. Caroll (Spadina)
supported the motion and added:
1 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, April I9A6 , p. 52k.
Canada’s immigration policy since 191*1 can well 
be called a dog in the manger policy. Here we 
are inhabiting a country whose area is the third 
largest in the world, and we have a population about 
the size of that of Afghanistan. We have here what 
is potentially bne of the richest countries in the 
world; yet we have only scratched the surface of our 
wealth ... we have not permitted people to come here ^
and help us and give this country a fair opportunity.
The Dominion government appointed a Canadian Senate Standing
Committee oh Immigration and Labour to examine the desirability
of admitting immigrants to Canada and to investigate the type of
immigrants who should be preferred for immigration. The Committee
was to look into such matters as the availability of immigrants,
their training and other characteristics, as well as the facilities,
resources and capacity of Canada to absorb, employ and maintain
such immigrants, and the appropriate terms and conditions of
immigrant admission. This Senate Committee started its work in
Hay 19^6 and in its hearings it sought a wide range of official and
voluntary opinions. The findings of this Committee were that Canada
regarded immigration as an important step for her future and
believed that immigrants should be admitted in substantial numbers.
It stressed that Canada needed more people to maintain and improve
her position at home and abroad and that Canada’s ability to support
a substantial increase in population was beyond question. Furthermore,
the Committee urged that Canada should share the programme of helping
refugees and displaced persons. The existing Canadian immigration
3
policy was made the target of criticism and a demand for liberalizing 
the policy was accelerated. By the next year the prime Minister of
1 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, April 19^6, p. 528.
2 Canadian Senate, Standing Committee on Immigration and Labour,
Proceedings, 1946-1953*
3 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, April 19^6, pp. 52*f-5**5»
Canada (Mackenzie King), while resuming the debate on the second 
reading of the bill to amend the Immigration Act, readily agreed 
that:
The policy of the government is to foster the growth 
of the population of Canada by the encouragement 
of immigration....The government’s long term 
programme ... is based on the conviction that 
Canada needs population."*
Yet in spite of this need for changes in the Immigration process
and the expressed desire to increase Canada’s population and help
displaced persons, the Canadian Prime Minis ter liras quite specific
on the terms for the new immigration policy. He insisted on
three points: the right of Canada to select immigrants, the desire
to make no changes in the basic ingredients of the Canadian
population and the need to continue the exclusion of Asians:
With regard to selection of immigrants much has been 
said about discrimination. I wish to make it quite 
clear that Canada is perfectly within her rights in 
selecting the persons whom we regard as desirable 
future citizens. It is not a ’’fundamental human 
right” of any alien to enter Canada. It is a matter 
of domestic policy. Immigration is subject to the 
control of parliament of Canada.,.. There will, I 
am sure, be general agreement in the view that the 
people of Canada do not want as a result of mass 
immigration to make a fundamental alteration in 
the character of our population. Large scale 
immigration from the Orient would change the 
fundamental composition of the Canadian population.
Any considerable Oriental immigration would, 
moreover, be certain to give rise to social and 
economic problems of a character that might lead to 
serious difficulties in the field of international 
relations. The government, therefore, has no thought 
of making any change in immigration regulations which 
would have consequence of the kind ... the government 
has no intention of removing the existing regulations 
respecting Asiatic immigration unless and until 
alternative measures of effective control have been 
worked out.
1 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, May 1, 19**7, PP* 26^5-26^6.
2 Ibid., p. 26^6.
In the light of this policy the Canadian government issued Orders
in Council during the years 19**6 to 19**9 to encourage only
1Europeans to migrate to Canada. This action was interpreted by 
Indians as race prejudice and as seriously damaging to British-India 
relations.
By 19**7 when British authorities were planning to grant
independence to India the question of Indian migration and status
in Canada was an important topic not only for the immigration
authorities but also for the Department of External Affairs. Canada
had not included India and Pakistan in the schedule of the British
Commonwealth of Nations. According to the Canadian Citizenship
Act, Commonwealth meant the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New
Zealand, South Africa, Newfoundland and Ireland.^ In July 19**7,
the Canadian High Commissioner in Delhi, reminding the Dominion
government of the disastrous effect this exclusion could have,
asked the government to amend the schedule and give India and
Pakistan status recognition. Explaining the urgency of such a
step the High Commissioner observed:
India is peculiarly sensitive in regard to the 
status and treatment of Indians abroad.... India 
(Hindustan) will tend before long to break away 
from the Commonwealth...• Our welcome to Indian 
Dominions as fallow members of the Commonwealth 
should be prompt and cordial. One reason for 
this is that, if India should decide to break 
away, her leaders will be on the lookout for 
pretexts upon which to base this action. It 
would be regrettable if any lack of warmth in
1 P.C.16**?, April 29, 19**7; P.C. 173**, May 1, 19**7; P.C.20**7, May 29, 
19**7; P*C.2180, June 6, I9**7; P.C.**61*** Nov. 12, 19**7; P.C.**893,
Dec. 3, 19**7; P.c.**l86, Sept. 16, 19**8; and p.c.5593, Dec. 10, 19**8.
2 India was divided into two separate self-governing.states - India 
and Pakistan - on August 15, 19**7« So in the matter of migration 
studies the term South Asians will be used to mean people of India 
and Pakistan.
3 Under Secretary for External Affairs to Under Secretary for Mines 
and Resources, Aug. 1, 19**7, File 536999, Vol. 18.
the Canadian attitude should serve as one such 
pretext. We should be in a better position 
vis-a-vis India and in the face of world opinion, 
if it was in spite of the cordiality rather than 
because of tepidity, of ourwelcome that India 
severed fraternal relations with, among other 
Commonwealth countries, ourselves,^
The Dominion government, after thorough consideration of the 
proposal, informed the Canadian High Commissioner that. Canada v/ould 
include India and Pakistan in the schedule of Commonwealth countries 
for citizenship purposes, but only when such a request was made by
them. The High Commissioner was further informed that for the time
• p ■ 'being he should not take.any initiative in this regard.
Existing Canadian immigration regulations, as they applied to
Indians, allowed entry only to wives and children under 18 of
Indians who had previously entered Canada legally. Other than
this restricted category, Indians were completely excluded from
Canadian immigration. However, when India was to become an independent
country and Canada was in the position of encouraging immigration
from other countries, the Dominion government had to look for ways
in which it could justify its rejection of Indian immigration.
One possibility that the Canadian authorities considered v/as that of
accepting a small number of Indians as migrants on a token quota
system. But the government was sceptical of the success of such
a venture, and remained indecisive in their communication with
their High Commissioner in Delhi and their Ambassador in Washington:
As regards the .establishment of a token quota for .
Indians, such an arrangement would be a radical 
departure from the past policy of the Canadian;:
Government in immigration matters. I may say for
1 Higli Commissioner for Canada in India to Secretary of State for
External Affairs, July 8, 19**7> File 336999, Vol. 18.
2 L.B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs to High
Commissioner for Canada, Aug. 30, 19**7, and Sept, 6, 19**7» File 
336999, Vol. 18.
3 P.C.2115, Sept. 16, 1930.
your own information that consideration is being 
given to the advisability of introducing a quota 
system in Canada, but as yet the question has not 
been decided. The Canadian Government would, 
however, be prepared at any time to receive 
representations from the Government of India as 
to the possibility of makig some change in the 
present law or regulations affecting immigration 
from India into Canada, with a. view to reaching, 
some arrangement iSore acceptable to the
susceptibilities of the Indian people.^
This proposal of a token quota system for Indians, therefore,
remained in abeyance throughout the winter of 19**7-**8. Meanwhile,
India and Pakistan were occupied v/ith serious communal riots and
were too busy to devote time to Commonwealth status. But by the
spring of 19**8, the Indian Constituent Assembly was occupied with
framing the constitution of India, and the questionopf the future
relationship of India with the Commonwealth again became an
important issue. Interest in the outcome of the situation was
- p
more pronounced and provoked press comments. There were two 
possibilities for Indian relations with the Commonwealth. First 
a majority of the Indian cabinet was in favour of India remaining 
a member of the Commonwealth. Secondly the majority of the Indian 
Constituent Assembly appeared to be in favour of an Indian republic 
unassociated with the Commonwealth. Since the majority of the 
Constituent Assembly was in favour of severing Commonwealth ties, 
the Indian Prime Minister (J.L.Mehru), would not risk his political 
future by favouring any unpopular movement and therefore v/ould lend 
his voice to the majority.^Commenting on the contemporary situation,
1 Department of External Affairs to Canadian Ambassador, Washington, 
June 25, 19**7j and to High Commissioner for Canada, New Delhi,
July 2**, 19**7, File 336999, Vol. 18.
2 Hindustan Times, May 25, 19**8,
3 John D; Kearney, High Commissioner for Canada to Secretary of 
State for External Affairs, May 27, 19**8, File 536999, Vol. 18.
the Canadian High Commissioner at Delhi informed the Dominion
government that:
It would be impossible ... in view of the attitude 
of the majority in the Constituent Assembly, for 
India to continue its dominion status. The best 
that could be hoped for would be membership in the 
Commonwealth as a republic, if this is or were made 
,possible, but there are certain obstacles which 
if not removed, might make even this latter arrangement 
impossible, the chief of which is the immigration 
policy of some of the other Commonwealth nations 
more particularly, Australia and Canada.... If Canada 
could .•• allow ... a "token” number of Indians to 
migrate yearly to Canada, it would not only remove 
the remaining cause of friction . but would deprive 
the anti-commonwealth element in this country (_ IndiaJ7 
of an effective weapon.^
Assessing the advantages of this proposal the Canadian High Commissioner
stated:
It seems to me that In view of the large scale 
program existing for immigration into Canada from 
Great Britain and Europe, to admit one hundred Indian 
nationals per annum would constitute by comparison, a 
drop in the bucket. The following are some of the 
advantages which I believe would ensue:
(a) The chances of India remaining in the Commonwealth 
v/ould be improved.
(b) The last vestigate of what is here regarded 
as an unfair discrimination as between India 
and Canada would be eliminated.
(c) Whether India is ultimately a member of the 
Commonwealth or not, it is important that the 
relationship between India and Canada be as 
cordial as possible,
(d) I believe the Canadian public would welcome 
such a move because they would interpret it for 
what it is, i.e., an inducement to have India 
remain in the Commonwealth and a measure to 
augment international goodwill.
(e) It would be a desirable precedent with regard 
to other Asiatic countries rather than the 
reverse.
The High Commissioner further pointed out that the Indian 
government would accept these plans and he stressed that an Order in
1 John D. Kearney, High Commissioner for Canada to Secretary of State 
for External Affairs, May 27, 19^8, File 536999* Vol. 18.
2 Ibid.
Council be passed immediately on the line?? of his proposals by the 
Indian and Canadian governments* The High Commissioner had already 
discussed these. proposals -with the officials of the Department of 
External Affairs, Government of India, and found them entirely 
agreeable.**
While these proposals were being considered by the Dominion 
government, the. Indian immigrant community was very active. They 
sent Dr. D.P. Pandia to Ottawa to plead their case for the relaxation :: 
of immigration restrictions on Indians* Dr. Pandia met v/ith A.L.
Jolliffe, Director of Immigration and:Dr. ILL. Keenleyside, Deputy 
Minister of Mines and Resources, and' presented to them the;Indians’ 
grievances. The basic complaint was that.Indians belonged to one 
of the Asiatic races whose admission into Canada was restricted to 
wives of landed immigrants and their children who were under 18 
years of age. He pointed out that the Indian population in Canada 
had declined from 5^28 in 1911 to 1^65 in 19*H; that a quarter of 
the Indians in Canada were over 60; and therefore that within the 
next decade there would be a further decrease in the Indian population.
He emphasised the fact that Indians were not detrimental to the ■ 
country. They were established in Canada as successful farmers 
and businessmen. They had contributed to the development of such; 
basic industries in British Columbia as lumbering and agriculture, 
and had supplied skilled labour to these enterprises as well as
1 John D. Kearney, High Commissioner for Canada in India, closely observed 
the attitude of the Indian government and the Indian Constituent Assembly 
towards the future membership of the Commonwealth and the impact of 
exclusion of Indians from Australia and Canada. He personally discussed 
these matters with Saint Laurent, Canadian Minister for External Affairs 
r in Ottawa arid he had a long conversation with Sir Girja Shanker Eajpai, 
Secretary General, Department of External Affairs, Govt, of India. But 
he also registered his concern about the right-wing stand Of Sardar 
I-atel, Indian; Home Minister and Deputy prime Minister. Full details of 
M s  interview with Sir Girja are available in his secret despatch to 
Secretary of State for External Affairs, May 27» 19^» File 5369991 Vol. 18.
investing millions of dollars in their improvement. As a people 
they were reliable, thrifty, hardworking and law-abiding. Besides 
this, Indians were British subjects the same as the other people of 
Canada. Because of all these factors, Dr. Pandia requested the 
Dominion government to consider Indians as being in a preferred 
position with regard to Canadian immigration regulations, and said
they should be given the same privileges as'British subjects were
■ • - ' 1 
accorded in other British Dominions.
But the immigration authorities opposed any change in the
policy and expressed serious fears about any relaxation in
restrictions on Indians. They reminded the Canadian cabinet that
a change in the regulations affecting Indians would require some
revision of the Order in Council (P.C.2115, September 16, 1930) which
applied to other Asiatic races as well. It was likely that similar
2 'requests would be made by other Orientals, especially the Chinese, 
who might also come to Canada in great numbers. Therefore, when the 
Canadian cabinet met in June 19^8 it decided not to revise its 
policy and to give the request of Dr. Pandia further consideration. 
However, the cabinet authorised the Immigration Department to 
consider individual applications for,admission of male fiancees as 
well as relatives of Indian Canadian residents where the applicant 
was in business in Canada and needed the relative to carry on his
3business when no other relative could assume his responsibilities.^
Thus the Canadian government refused to amend its restrictive 
immigration regulations with regard to Asians although it kept the
1 Dr. D.P. Pandia to Dr. H.L. Keenleyside, Deputy Minister of Mines
and Resources, Feb. 27* 19^8, File 536999* Vol. 18,
2 A.L. Jolliffe, Director of Immigration, Memorandum to Cabinet Committee
on Immigration Policy, June 19^8, File 536999* Vol.lfl.
5 Department of Mines and Resources, Cabinet Memorandum on Immigration, 
June 18, 19^8, File 536999, Vol. 18.
proposals of a quota system under consideration. By February 19^9»
discussion on the subject v/as again sparked off in the Indian
parliament, India*s Commerce Minister, who had been informed about
the restrictions imposed on Indian businessmen by the Canadian
government, said:
In Canada, too, the principal disadvantage from 
: which Indian businessmen suffer is lack of their
status there under the immigration rules. Although 
there are no statutory restrictions on the conduct 
of trade by Indians the temporary non-immigrant 
’visa* which is usually granted to them makes it not 
only impossible for them to stay there for any length 
of time, but also, strictly speaking, does not even 
permit them to do any business other than that of a 
transitory nature.^
This statement led to editorials in the Hindustan Times which advised
the Indian government to take retaliatory action against the countries
2 .
imposing special disabilities on Indians. The Indian News Chronicle
summed up the feeling entertained by the majority of Indians on
the subject of the non-status position of Indians in the Dominions:
It is v/ell known that this unfair treatment of 
Indian nationals abroad is largely a legacy of 
British rule, for the British Government paid 
little attention to Indian interests in these 
matters. Indians were in many cases consigned 
to the position of mere ‘'colonials" from British 
possessions and could not therefore, secure the 
full status which foreign nationals were freely 
enjoying in this country. This anomaly has no 
justification whatsoever and can no longer be
tolerated.3
The position of Indians in Canada was clearly stated in the press,; 
but the Indian press reaction against Canada was not very hostile 
because the Indian Minister of Commerce had confirmed that the 
Government of India v/as already in communication with the Government
1 This news was given prominent space on the front page of the 
Hindustan Times, Febl 9» 19^9 and the Indian News Chronitr^e,
2 Hindustan Times, Feb. 10, 19^9-
3 Indian News Chronicle, Feb* 10, 19^9*
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of Canada and both were trying to find some solution to this problem.
On the other side of the world the Indian High Commissioner
in Canada, Sardar Hi S. Malik represented the cases of those Indian
migrants who returned to India prior to 1939 and could not return
again to Canada because of the war. When after an absence of eight
years,they wanted to come back to Canada they were prevented from
doing so. Indian residents whose children were under 18 in 1939
but after the war were too old to be eligible for immigration under
the existing immigration rules of P.C.2115 were similarly barred,
Malik said.^ These were out-of~the-ordinary circumstances and
therefore the Dominion government promised to give such individual
cases of hardship special consideration.
When Sardar Malik returned to India in August 19^9, Canadian
restrictions on permanent migrant rights for Indians was again the
subject of criticism by the press. The newspapers reported that
5
Sardar Malik confirmed Canada*s policy of Indian exclusion. At this
time Dr. D.P. Pandia returned to India and presented his views on
g
Canadian treatment of Indians. Dr. Pandia visited the High Commissioner 
for Canada in Delhi and asked if the Canadian government contemplated 
the establishment of a quota system in the hear future so that at 
least some Indians could migrate to Canada. But Canadian officials 
in Delhi maintained silence on the matter. Only four months before, 
however, the Canadian Deputy Minister (Dr. H.L. Keenleyside) had
1 High Commissioner for Canada to Secretary of State for External 
Affairs, Feb. 12, 19^9, File 536999, Vol. 19.
2 Sardar Malik was the first Indian High Commissioner in Canada after 
Indian independence in 19^7-
3 Jolliffe to Keenleyside, Memorandum, Feb. 10, 19^9, File 536999, Vol. 19*
k Keenleyside to Jolliffe, Memorandum, March 19, 19^9, File 536999, Vol. 19
5 Hindustan Times, August 8, 19 **9«
6 Ibid., August 10, 19^9.
7 High Commissioner for Canada to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 
August 27, 19^9, File 536999; Vol. 19.
stated in his address to the Symposium on Canadian Population and
Immigration held at McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario on
April 21-22, 19^9» that:
It is still the Government’s desire to increase 
the Canadian population by immigration, to grant 
special facilities of admission to certain British 
subjects, to certain French nationals and to United 
States citizens; to restrict Asian immigration to 
very narrow limits, to avoid the charge of racial 
discrimination by the offer of special agreement, 
on ”a basis of complete equality and reciprocity” 
to anydountry that considers itself affronted by 
the Canadian regulations. Coupled with this is a 
firm statement of Canada’s right to select those 
to be admitted, and recognition of a similar right 
in other States.^
This offer of special agreement on a basis of complete equality
and reciprocity with India had been on the table for two years while
the relationship of India with the Commonwealth was being discussed
in the Indian Constituent Assembly. When the Indian Dominion decided
2to become a republic and also to stay in the Commonwealth, the urgency 
of reaching an arrangement between India and Canada should have waned. 
But by 19^9 the world had witnessed the rise of Communist China 
backed by Russia, and the next year the Korean War brought a clash 
between America and North Korea backed by China and Russia. So by 
1951 the basis of Canada’s Far-Eastern policy was the assumption 
that Russia was a danger not only for Europe but also for such 
Asian countries as India and Pakistan. China’s policy of aggressive 
nationalism was also considered menacing to these countries. In
such circumstances the Canadian Secretary of State (L.B, Pearson),
■ ; . 3
stressing the Canadian need for cooperation with India and Pakistan,
1 External Affairs, May 19^9»P» :
2 J.l». Nehru, address to Canadian parliament, Oct. 2*f, 19**9» Keesing’s 
Contemporary Archives, Nov. 26 - Dec. 3, 19^9, P* 10376.
3 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, Feb. 2, 1951, p» 52.
told the Canadian House of Commons on February 2, 1951, that?
Indeed nationalism allied to a restless and insistent 
demand for a better life - is the most important 
political phenomenon in Asia today. Therefore in 
framing our policies we must try to avoid offending 
the legitimate^national and social aspirations of 
Asian peoples.
fhese international problems arising out of the American/Russian 
race for a sphere of influence in Asia may have hastened the 
formalisation of an agreement between Canada and India and Pakistan 
on the migration issue. In any case a formal agreement was signed
.' - v . . 2
in Ottawa between India and Canada on January 26, 1951 by which
Canada offered to accept 150 Indian immigrants under the general
category. A similar agreement was signed in Karachi with the Pakistan
government by which 100 Pakistani immigrants were to be allowed into 
3
Canada annually.
By 1952, the Canadian immigration policy was quite clearly 
defined. Those who were admitted under the first category were 
British subjects from the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand 
and South Africa as well as citizens of the United States, France 
and Ireland, All were to have sufficient means to maintain themselves 
until they could secure employment. Under the second category 
citizens of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, West Germany,Finland, Greece, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden 
and Switzerland would be admitted with the approval of Canadian 
immigration authorities, persons from the Middle East - Egypt,
1 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, Feb. 2, 1951* P* 53*
2 Agreement between Canada and India, Treaty Series No. 1, 1951*
Jan. 26, 1951*
3 Agreement between Canada and Pakistan Treaty Series No, 21,
Oct. 23, 1951* During my interview with the senior immigration 
officials at Ottawa, it was stated that India and Pakistan were 
given token quotas of 150 and 100 persons a year as a gesture 
of good-will for becoming self-governing units of the British 
Commonwealth.
Israel, Lebanon, Turkey - or any country from South or Central America,
would be admitted if they were husband, wife, son, daughter, brother,
or sister of a Canadian citizen or a person legally admitted to Canada
for permanent residence. The resident, however, was required to
apply for such relatives. South Asians - Indians and Pakistanis -
were to be admitted up to the number of the annual quota, 150 and
100 respectively. The category of admission of relatives in the
case of South Asians was restricted to husband, wife or unmarried child
under twenty-one years of age* The Canadian immigration policy as
it was formulated in 1952, showed a definite geographical bias.
Categories of admission were arranged by countries, and preference
was given to certain designated areas. The regulations were intended
to emphasize the fact that Canada wished to attract white immigrants,
particularly from white Commonwealth countries, the United States
and Western Europe. Even the admission of relatives of legal
residents depended on the relatives’ geographical origin. For
preferred countries the term ’’relative” was broadly defined to include
many kin but definition of the term became more restricted when
applied to the South Asian countries of India and Pakistan. The
basic prejudice against coloured immigrants underlying these
regulations clearly reflected the discriminatory feelings which
were prevalent throughout Canada. In reply to a question about ,
racial prejudice in the immigration regulations, the Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration (Walter Harris) bluntly stated that:
... in the light of experience it would be
unrealistic to say that immigrants who have
spent the greater part of their life in tropical -
or sub-tropical countries become really adapted
to the Canadian mode of life which, to no small
extent, is determined by climatic conditions.2
1 P.C.1953-859* May 26, 1953.
2 Quoted in David C# Corbett, Canada’s Immigration Policy: A Critique, 
P* 53*
The Khalsa Diwan Society was concerned about the inferior
position of Canadians of South Asian origin who wished to sponsor
relatives frok their homeland. Acting as spokesman for Canadian
Indians, the Society approached the Dominion government to grant
them the same right to sponsor their overseas relatives as that
enjoyed by other Canadians. The matter reached the Canadian House
of Commons on July 4, 1952. Both Liberal and Conservative members :
from British Columbia spQke in favour of the request of the Khalsa
Diwan Society bjtt the Immigration Minister (Walter Harris) declined
to concede to it* The Canadian governments basic attitudes on
the subject came to the surface in March 1955 when J.W. Pickersgill,
then Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, appeared before the
House of Commons Special Committee on Estimates. In that year the
Committee had examined the whole operation of the Citizenship and
Immigration Department tioroughly. One of the members of the
Committee asked the Minister (Pickersgill) why it was necessary
to maintain a staff of twelve in New Delhi to process so few
immigrants. In reply, the Minister stated:
As a matter of fact, you know as well as I do 
that we do not have an office in Delhi for the 
purpose of getting immigrants, for the sake of 
increasing the population of Canada. We agreed 
upon this quota as a gesture for the improvement 
I of commonwealth relations. And, having done so, 
we have to treat these applicants decently and 
have enough employees there to answer the letters 
and deal with the correspondence and the applications 
which are received.^
This frank admission by the Minister of his government's restrictive 
policy on Indian migration to Canada exhibited the official viewpoint.
1 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, July 4, 1952, pp. A26G-*f263.
2 Canada, House of Commons, Special Committee on Estimates, Minutes 
of Proceedings and Evidence no. 11, March 1^ , 1955* p* 301.
Moreover, the public too seemed to support the government’s position.
One writer, Paul M. Roddick (Executive Officer, Ford Motor Company,
Windsor, Ontario and formerly Current Affairs Adviser, Department
of National Defence), in his article in the International Journal
on ’’Canadian Immigration Policy: The Hard Facts” argued in favour
of the Canadian government’s immigration policy. He observed:
As a matter of policy the Canadian government, 
with apparently the almost complete support of 
the Canadian people, bars or severely limits 
the immigration of Asiatics and Coloured people, 
not on the basis of individual merits but wholly 
on the basis of race. We do so, ... on two 
entirely justifiable grounds, one concerned with 
■economic integration of the immigrant, and the other 
with his social cultjjtral evolution into an indigenous 
Canadian citizen....
Elucidating M s  point the author pointed out:
But with the best will in the world it cannot.be 
said that Canada's experience with the integration 
of Chinese, Indian, Negro and other non-European
immigrants has been a happy one.... The presence
of Chinatowns and similar settlements in Canada 
many generations after the forefathers of their 
present inhabitants came to this country is an 
abiding proof of our limitations and consequently 
of limitations of a non-restrictive immigration 
policy.^
The Liberal party of Canada stayed in power for twelve years
in the post-war period (19^5-1957) and the policy of exclusion of
Asians as declared by Mackenzie King in 19^7 continued throughout
this time. Though this idea of exclusion was less frequently expressed
over the years it no doubt survived in the minds of Canadians and was
an attitude which largely governed the administrative practice of
3the Canadian Immigration Department.
1 Paul M. Roddick, ’’Canadian Immigration Policy: The Hard Facts", 
International Journal, Spring 1956, p. 127*
2 Ibid., p. 128.
3 David C. Corbett, "Immigration and Foreign Policy in Australia 
and Canada", ibid., Spring 1953, pp» 110-123*
In 1957, the Conservative Party, led by John Diefenbaker, came 
into office. Prior to this, however, there had been political crimes 
in Hungary which resulted in a large number of refugees who needed 
some place to live. In November, 1956 the Dominion government had
decided to admit as many Hungarian refugees into Canada as wanted
v E -  . ' *1
to come and for whom transportation facilities could be provided.
At the same time there had been rapid economic development in Canada
in the post-war period and this coincided fedth the effects of a low
birth rate. The result was a need for more people and an increasing
. ■ ' ■ ■ p
liberalisation of immigration regulations. By 1958 the new 
Canadian government saw fit to,revise its agreement with the 
Government of India and increase its yearly quota to 30(r while the 
existing arrangement with the Government of Pakistan was c onfirraed.
The need for an increased population in Canada plus a more moderate 
government attitude were instrumental in producing 'a-more liberal view 
towards immigration origins.
A new awareness of Canada's development potential sprang up 
alongside of her wider acceptance of diversified nationalities and 
cultures. These changes were reflected in government attitudes.
The Conservative Party promised to overhaul the Immigration Act and
■■ ' k- -
apply a vigorous manpower policy in order to populate Canada.
Diefenbaker expressed his devotion to the cause of equal rights
  5
for all regardless of race or creed. In the light of this new 
view Canada's immigration policy was seen to need revision to remove
1 J. Eayrs, Canada in World Affairs, October 1955 to June 1957 (Toronto
■ 1959), p. w .  ~  — — — — —  _ _ _ _ _ _  .
2 Warren E. Kalbach, The Impact of Immigration on Canada's Population, 
Canada^ Bureau ofStatistics, Ottav;a 1970, p. 39 .^ ■: • , . "
5 P*C.I958-7, ’'Immigration Regulations Amended", Canada Gazette, Part II, 
Jan. 8, 1958; Treaty Series 1957 No.11, May 3, 1957*
k Canada Year Book 1957-58, p. 21; Toronto Telegram, April 26, 1957«
5 David C* Corbett, "Canada's Immigration Policy 1957-62". International
Journal, Spring 1963, pp. I66-I80.
' ■ \  '*1 
the stigma of racial discrimination. At that time, although there
was high unemployment among unskilled workers, skilled workers
were in great demand. Besides there was a heavy rush of sponsorship
applications. The revision of the Immigration Act, therefore,
seemed very important and necessary for economic as well as idealistic
reasons and the Immigration Department considered ways to implement
needed changes. By January 1962 the revised regulations were ■
presented to the Canadian House of Commons. According to the
internal memorandum of the Deputy Minister, Hr. Davidson, the main
purpose of this exercise was twofold; to eliminate all discrimination
based on colour, race or creed, and to encourage skilled immigrants.
With these objectives in mind, new immigration regulations were
drafted to control the size and quality of immigration in relation
to Canada's economic needs and interests. Prospective immigrants .
were then to be judged solely on the basis of their education,
training, skills or other special qualifications regardless of their
race, origin or religion. Tabling the new regulations Ellen
Fairclough (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) said:
If a person can qualify on these grounds and has 
sufficient means to establish himself in Canada 
until he finds employment or alternatively is 
coming forward to approved employment or with 
suitable plans for self establishment in Canada 
he or she is admissible subject only to the normal 
requirements of good health, good character and 
so forth. This means that any suitably qualified 
person from any part of the world can be considered 
for immigration to Canada entirely on his own merit 
without regard to his race, colour,.national origin, 
or the country from which he comes.
1 Freda HaV/kins, Canada and immigration: Public Policy and Public Concern,
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., p. 130»
M Canada, House of Commons, Debates, January 1962, p. 9.
Under the new regulations vital changes were made in relation
to independent applicants and these were contained in section 31
which stated:
Landing in Canada is limited to persons.who 
comply with all the requirements respecting 
landing in Canada set out in the Act and these 
Keg and who come within one of the.
following classes; r
a person who by reason of his education, 
training, skills or other special qualifications, 
is likely to be able to establish himself 
successfully in Canada and who 
- (!) has sufficient means of support to maintain
himself in Canada until he has established 
: himself, \
(ii) has come to Canada, under arrangements made 
or approved by the Director for placement 
in employment,
(iii) has come to Canada, under arrangements made
or approved by the Director, for establishment 
in a business, trade or profession or in 
agriculture. 1
Under the same section all immigrants could sponsor close relations - 
son, daughter, brother, sister, husband, v/ife, unmarried nephew or 
niece under twenty-one years of age, and fiance - provided these 
relations were citizens of any country of American or European 
continents, Israel, Lebanon or Egypt, Once again Asia and Africa 
were ruled out under this clause.
About the general effect of the regulations the Minister (Mrs. 
Fairclough) pointed out that they would improve the position of all
without weakening anyone’s position and would, she believed, chiefly
3
benefit Asians, Africans and the nationals of the Middle East,
But the new immigration regulations made no mention of special 
agreements which v?ere in effect with India and Pakistan under section 21
1 P.C.1962-86, January 18, 1962.
2 Ibid. .
3 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, January 1962, p. 10.
of the immigration act and therefore, since no new provision had
been made, the old agreements were still in force. The Dominion
government expressed its views that the old agreements were
unnecessary and declared that it intended to make new arrangements
with South Asian countries. But the possibility of extending the
application of these new regulations to India and Pakistan migrants
seemed doubtful in actual practice:
This glaring contradiction of the ’’principles of 
equity and justice” which Mrs. Fairclough maintained 
were at the very heart of the regulations Was the 
result of a real fear that without such barrier 
there would be unprecedented influx of suitably 2
qualified immigrants from India, Pakistan and Ceylon.
Such prejudice against Asians was observed by Norma E. Walmsley in
her research report on ’’Some Aspects of Canada’s Immigration Folicy”
to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. She
pointed out:
The only case that can be made conclusively is 
that Canada’s record of immigration policy and 
administrative practice substantiates, very clearly, 
dui'ing certain periods of history_a marked 
discrimination against Asians...,^
Professor Anthony Richmond reached a similar conclusion. His sociological
investigation showed that:
Non-European immigration constituted a small 
fraction of the total.... Altogether, non-White 
immigrants have constituted less than k% of the 
total post-war immigration into Canada. Until 
1962, the way.in which the Immigration Act was. 
administered clearly discriminated against 
Asian and Negro immigrants. Immigrants from 
Britain and Western Europe, together with the 
Commonwealth countries had a ’’preferred” status, 
immigrants from Eastern, Central and Southern 
Europe in an intermediate category and those ^ 
from other parts of the world had least priority.
1 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, January 1962, p. 10.
2 G.A. Rawlyk, ’’Canada’s Immigration Folicy 19^-5-1962”,Dalhousie Revieii/,
1962, p, 298.
3 Norma E* Walmsley, ’’Some Aspects of Canada’s Immigration policy”, Report 
No.10 to Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, p. 35***
V  Anthony Richmond, ’’Immigration and Pluralism in Canada”, International
Migration Review, Vol. IV, No. 1, Fall 1969, p* 11.
Canada, by tradition, had been seeking to increase her population 
through immigration. Such an increase would expand domestic markets 
and reduce per capita costs of administration. By the mid sixties
the Dominion had declared its aim of a high standard of economic
: 2 ■ : grov/th. In order to meet the challenge of this growth in an age
of advanced technological changes Canada relied heavily on the
immigration of trained manpoiver.^ . ; Immigration, therefore, ■ was
necessary to the economic vitality of the entire country. But the
traditional source countries (Great Britain and Western Europe) from
which such migrants moved to Canada, enjoyed good economic conditions
of their own by the raid sixties and the desire to migrate was not
so strong. Besides such skilled workers were also in demand by other
countries interested in migration and expansion. Skilled workers,
therefore, found many opportunities to exploit their knowledge and
were less eager to travel to a distant place. The Financial Post
(Toronto), emphasising the need for trained people, pessimistically
declared, "Skills, oriental and occidental are not knocking at our
g ■ ;■
door." Canada's demand for trained immigrant workers seemed to be
exceeding the expected supply, so by August 1965 the Canadian government
launched an intensified programme to bring about a greater flow of
professional skilled and trained immigrants into the country. The
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (John R. Nicholson) was quoted
as telling a meeting of the Ontario Economic Council in Toronto that
1 Canada Year Book 1968, p. 227*
2 Economic Council of Canada, Towards Sustained and Balanced Economic 
Growth, Second Annual Review 19fo, EC 21-1. " I
3 Department of Manpower and Immigration, Canada's Highly Qualified 
Manpov;er Resources, p. 3« "
k Canada Year Book, 1970-71, p. 266.
3 Ibid.
6 Financial Post, Nov. 7, 19^, p. 17*
Canadian manpower development was the most important single factor 
in the country's economic growth. He said that Canada had the tools 
: and raw materials to assure economic well-being but that the country 
was facing a jshr-ibus bnd critical shortage of professional and 
trained workers that might even retard development. Therefore, 
the Minister proposed to step up the expansion of immigration 
services in various countries of Europe and even explored the 
possibilities of encouraging migration from South East Asian and 
Far Eastern countries. The Department also undertook to re-examine 
thoroughly the whole question of immigration.
This manpower-oriented attitude of the Dominion government 
seemed to dominate the immigration policy and its programme of 
expansion throughout the mid sixties. The desire was to encourage 
skilled workers to settle in Canada. The Minister for Citizenship 
and Immigration, Rene Tremblay, advised the House of Commons on 
August 14, 196^ that he proposed to initiate detailed studies on 
immigration and manpower requirements after which a revised Immigration
. 2 : ■ "Act would be introduced.. The studies included papers on the 
following subjects: immigration programing, migrant supply,
sponsorship system, social and. cultural factors in immigration, the 
participation of the Canadian public in immigration, immigration 
appeals and immigration studies. Meanwhile the Canadian government 
was.involved in the preparation of a white paper on Canadian 
immigration policies, practices and their administration. The 
results of this comprehensive study were to be presented fco the 
Canadian parliament as a guide to the administration of immigration
1 See Labour Gazette, August 19&3* PP* 700-701.
2 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, August 14, 1964, pp. 6817-26.
3 External Affairs, March 1966, pp. 131-132.
policy. In December 1965 the PrimeMinister (L.0. Pearson) went 
one step further and announced the creation of a new department 
which he called the Department of Manpower and Immigration.
Jean Marchand was named as the minister in charge. The new 
department formally opened its doors on October 3v 1966 and 011 .
3
October 1*+ the White Faper on Canadian immigration was published.
Introducing it to the-House' of Commons, the Minister of Manpower
and Immigration emphasized:
... it is expansionist. It seeks to establish 
the basis for a steadily active immigration policy 
adapted to our manpower needs, a policy that will 
assist Cehada’s growth by bringing here every year 
a good number of people able to adapt to our society 
and qualified to contribute to our economy.... It 
is not discriminatory. It establishes principles 
and procedures that can and will operate without 
regard to race, colour or creed.t
This ^2-page document opened with the proposition that Canada
needed immigrants and should encourage the entry of as many immigrants
5
as could be readily absorbed. In observed that immigration was 
important for the maintenance of Canadian independence and economic 
growth and provided the balancing force in the face of economic and 
cultural pulls from the south (United States of America). The 
White Paper pointed out that Canada was a competitive and industrial
society which required skilled manpower capable of being trained and
V- ■ .::<■■■■■ V ■ 7
retrained in line with the changing needs of the Canadian economy.
1 Globe and Mail, Dec. 18, 1965.
2 Freda Hawkins, op.cit«, p. 151.
3 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, Oct. 1*+, 1966, p. 8651*
^ Ibid.
5 Jean Marchand, Minister of Manpower and;Immigration, White Paper on 
Immigration, p. 1.
6 Ibid., p. 7-
It further, pinpointed the essential need of forming a national
immigration policy:
Perhaps the most fundamental point is that, in a 
world in which immigrants of the quality required 
by Canada are relatively scarce, we cannot expect 
to recruit them on an erratic basis. If. we were 
^o promote immigration one year and ■discourage it: 
the next year, turning the tap on and off in response 
to short-term economic conditions in Canada,-we could 
not expect to get much high qhality immigration. For 
qualified people who are reasonably assured of success in 
their original countries, migration is a complex V.. 
decision compounded of economic inducements, political 
circumstances, Social pressures and dissatisfactions, 
family traditions, ambitions, adventurous spirits.
The successful promotion of immigration requires 
capitalization on these factors as they affect skilled 
people. This cannot be achieved by sporadic action.
A selective immigration policy today must be planned 
as a steady policy of recruitment- based on long term 
considerations of economic growth.^
The White Paper opposed unskilled immigrants strongly:
The migrant who lacks the skills or competitive 
qualifications to establish his economic position 
will tend to become a permanent inhabitant of the 
ethnic concentration area to which he has first 
migrated. If many fail to move on, the balance 
will be upset and we will find ourselves with : 
ghetto-like slums, with all they entail in human 
misery and increased welfare, costs.^
About the international implication of immigration the White 
Paper clearly pointed out that Hany discrimination in.’selectionV of 
immigrants creates strong resentments in international relations.”
Thus the White Paper called for tighter screening of immigrants not 
regarding race, colour or religion but regarding individual efficiency 
only. The future policy called for more careful investigation of 
skills and the ability to adapt to Canadian life. Even before 
publication of the.White Paper Jean Marchand had advocated these 
criteria as the basis for immigration selection. Ke told the House
1 Jean Marchand, Minister of Manpower and Immigration, White paper 
on Immigration, p. 12.
of Commons that changing economic and technological conditions 
necessitated a shift in immigration perspective, and this made it
essential that immigration programmes should be geared in line with
■ ‘ V ; ■ ■ -1
the professionalization and specialization of the work force.
; The White Paper remained under the consideration of the Dominion
government for over ten months and it was not until August 16, 1967
that the immigration regulations were announced., These new regulations
were to be totally non-discriminatory and,were to be applied in the
same way to all applicants in all countries so that immigration
would reflect the economic needs of Canada* Three categories of
immigrants were set up » those who were sponsored^ nominated or
independent. Sponsorship rights were to apply on equal terms to
all areas of the world. For independent applicants education and
professional skill were the main criteria. The quota system restrictions
were abolished. Instead, under the new regulations, every independent
' 3
applicant was required to score 50 out of a possible 100 points^ in 
order to qualify for entry.
1 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 1966, pp. 5730-31*
2 P.C. 1967-1616, August 16, 1967.
3 The hundred points were distributed in this way?
(a) Education - 20 units, one for each successful year of formal 
education.
(b) Personal assessment - up to 15 units on basis of immigration 
officer’s assessment of applicant’s adaptability, motivation 
and initiative.
■"■■(c). Occupational demand - up to 15 units if demand for the applicant's 
occupation is strong within Canada.
(d) Occupational skill - up to 10 units for professional skill.
(e) Age - up to 10 units for applicants under age 35 with 1 unit 
deducted for each year over 35*
(f) Arranged employment - 10 units for a definite arranged job 
. . '7 in Canada.
■ (&) Knowledge of French and English—  up to 10 units.
(h) Employment opportunities in the area of destination - up to
5 units..
(k) Relationship - up to 5 units if the applicant had relatives 
ready to help him in Canada.
See Immigration Regulations 1967.
Under the new regulations Canadian citizens were given the 
right to apply for the admission of their dependents. They might 
also nominate for admission to Canada a wide range of non-independent 
relatives. The main objectives of these regulations were to achieve 
urLversality and objectivity in the selection process. Altogether 
nine factors would be used in assessing the admissibility of an 
applicant - education, occupational demand, age, occupational skill* 
employment arrangement, knowledge of English or French, relatives in 
Canada, area of destination, and personal qualities. The first eight 
factors were of an objective nature and would be assessed by 
immigration officers. In addition, the interviewing officers would 
take into account the personal qualities of an applicant. Besides 
qualifying by the point system, the applicant had to meet basic 
standards of good health and character established by the Immigration 
Act. Regardless of an applicant's achievements under the nine 
categories, however, the interviewing officer could recommend the 
acceptance or rejection of an applicant if there were good reasons 
why the assessment did not reflect the particular individual*s chances 
of successful establishment in Canada.
By 1967* under the new regulations, the restrictions on South 
Asian migrants to Canada were abolished. The new rules applied to 
all immigrants equally. At this time the former restrictions on 
Asians were so relaxed that even visitors to Canada v/ere allowed to 
apply for landed immigrant statusi- It appeared that Canada had an 
open-door policy on immigration. But as these changes had been 
initially presented and discussed, the Telegram (Toronto) commented:
1 Department of Manpower and Immigration to Immigration Officers, 
Background to the New Immigration Regulations, 1967.
2 Joseph Kage, "The Recent Changes in Canadian Immigration Regulations", 
International Migration Review, Vol. II, Number 1, Fall 1967* pp.^7-50*
The simple truth is that despite our professed 
idealism and humanitarianism we are a conservative, 
selfish community which jealously guards its partly 
unearned affluence. Our immigration policy is a 
faithful reflection of this attitude. '
In point of fact the new immigration policy was an economic
policy and therefore immigration was regarded more as a source of
manpower resources than as a social or humanitarian movement. This
skilled manpower-oriented policy was based on "pull11 factors to
' " : -7
select immigrants on the basis of quality. Fears of shortages of
skilled manpower was the theme underlying the new policy and the
'7- - x ■
economic needs of Canada justified the new thinking. The result
of this arrangement was that by August 1970 the Department of
Manpower and Immigration was quoted as announcing that the new
immigrants were younger, better educated, better trained, were less
A
likely to be European and v/ere fitting better into the work force.
The immigration regulations were becoming less restrictive, and an 
increased number of South Asian migrants was quite evident from the 
list of arrivals. This number rose from 658 in 1961 to 6,281 in 1971*
In 1972 a new problem was created for Canadian immigration
■ 7. : ' ;"■ ■ ' ■ ' - $
officials when Uganda expelled a large number of Asians. Canada
accepted about 6,^00 such expellees and the Canadian government
chartered commercial aircraft to bring these refugees to the Canadian
o
Forces base at Longue Points (Montreal). From there they v^ ere sent
1 Telegram (Toronto), Oct. 19, 1966.
2 W. Jones, "The Importance of Immigration to Canada", Business
Quarterly, Spring 1968, pp. 26-31.
3 Clive Baxter, "Immigration tap still turned on with skilled, young people 
in lead", Financial Post, August 22, 1970« P. 5? and H.R.How, "Brain 
gain in action", Canadian Business, December 1970, pp.38-^0 and A2.
k Ibid.
5 Immigration Statistics, 1961 and 1971.
6 People of Indian or Pakistani origin.
7 Minister of Manpower and Immigration, press Release, June 28, 1973-
8 Extract from Minister's Statement on Immigration to the Committee on
Labour, Manpower and Immigration 1973-1975 Estimate, April 5, 1973*
to various parts of Canada from Newfoundland to British Columbia.
These immigrants included among their numbers all sorts of people
from tailor to technician, businessman to professional. For the
successful movement of these Ugandan Asians across Canada, the
Canadian Minister of Manpower and Immigration (Robert Andras)
praised the Canadian press, the public and the provincial governments
By January 1, 1974 Ugandan Asians seemed to be well adapted to the
new social and cultural climate of Canada* Ugandan teenagers speak
English with a Canadian accent often punctuated by Canadian slang.
In a recent television interview a young Ugandan Asian said:
We are now living in our own country where there 
will never be a fear of expulsion as in Uganda.
People label us as D.Ps. but this is a very derogatory 
term in its usual meaning. For us D.Ps. stand for ^ 
delayed pioneers of Canada and not displaced persons.
Yet the immigration policy of Canada, as adopted since 1967?
has not been without problems. The right of visitors to apply • .
from within Canada for landed immigrant status provided a big
loophole in the immigration act and could easily be abused. Even
if a person visiting in Canada was refused a landed immigrant
status on his first application he could apply to an appeal board,
and until his case was decided he could remain in Canada. This
lengthy process resulted in an enormous backlog of pending cases.
There were 200 cases in January 1969; by January 1, 1973 the number
rose to 11,873? and by June 1, 1973 it reached 17,472.^ In October
1972 when the Canadian government announced it was considering some
amendment to the immigration regulations *f,500 visitors arrived at
Toronto International Airport in one weekend. This complication
1 Minister of Manpower and Immigration, Press Release, Dec. 5? 1972.
2 See Winnipeg Free Press, Saturday, February 2, 1974*
3 Immigration Regulations, 1967, Section 34.
4- Minister of Manpower and Immigration, press Release, June 28, 1973
3 Ibid., June 20, 1973*
of immigration cases coupled with the Liberal Party’s discouraging
results in the autumn federal elections forced the Canadian
government to take immediate action. The first step was to revoke
the right of visitors to apply for landed immigrant status.
Justifying the amendment the Minister of Manpower and Immigration
(Bryce Mackasey) stated:
We’ve tried to be reasonable and fair in permitting 
continuation of the jjolicy that permits visitors 
to apply for landed immigrant status, but there is 
increasing evidence that organized movements are 
exploiting individuals by misrepresenting our 
Immigration policy. It can best be described as 
commercial trafficking in human beings.^
In order to avoid the imposition of undue hardship the Canadian
government announced a general amnesty for all illegal immigrants
if they would come forward and apply for landed immigrant status
3
by October 15, 1973* The government’s appeals to this effect were
4
repeatedly carried in the press and thousands of dollars were spent 
on rqdio and television .broadcasts to explain the government’s 
position. Meanwhile, the government's immigration policy had been 
the subject of critical discussion since autumn 1972. In order to 
avoid a repetition of previous mistakes and to anticipate shortcomings 
in its future long-term immigration policy planning, the Canadian 
government, in 1973* invited suggestions from the provincial 
governments, one hundred voluntary organisations and individual
1 Many factors contributed to the decline of the Liberal Party’s popularity 
in the election of 1972. Those mentioned most frequently were the French 
language question and rising unemployment. Immigration was not directly 
blamed but Mackasey (Minister of Manpower and Immigration) was criticised 
for his very liberal attitude as well as for slackness and the creation 
of the huge backlog of immigration appeal cases.
2 Minister of Manpower and Immigration, Press Release, Nov. 3» 1972.
3 Ibid.* July 31, 1973-
^ Winnipeg Free Press, Sept. 18, 1973; Toronto Star, Sept. 21, 29,
b^t. 3and~llB,1973; Globe and Mail, Sept. 22 and Oct. 11,-.19735
Toronto Sun, Sept. 26, 1973; Montreal Star, Oct. 4 and 11, 1973; 
and Ottawa Citizen, Oct. 9, 1973.
citizens. The Minister of Manpower and Immigration pointed out
that the expansion of urbanised population in Canada, the fast
mobility of people, the slowing down of European migration movement
to Canada and the substantial increase in non-European migration
were some of the factors to be considered. He added that since
the 1 9 6 7regulations were formulated:
... dramatic changes have taken place in Canada 
and in the world. Not leastv attitud.es and values 
have undergone striking transformation. One trend 
concerns the increasing reluctance of Canadians to 
have large families. Our fertility rate has now 
decreased to the point where to rely on births alone 
could mean a levelling off; if not an eventual decline 
in Canada’s population. Because of the decreasing 
birth rate and the prospect that we will continue to 
lose people through emigration, immigration seems 
likely to determine, more than heretofore, Canada's 
size of population.3
The Minister pointed out that careful consideration would be given
to the impact that immigration streams might have on the balance
between English- and French-speaking Canadians and the present
multicultural fabric of Canada. He added that his aim was to shape
Canada's future immigration policy in the light of its economic,
social, cultural and demographic - growth. - '■ With these ideals in
mind the Canadian government hoped to identify the problems of
immigration and analyse policy options in terms which would finally
affect the social and economic future of Canada. Furthermore, the
government announced its intention to devise administrative techniques
and legal framework by which suitable immigrants would be recruited
according to government policy.
1 See Winnipeg Free press, Sept. 18, 1975»
2 Robert Andras, Minister of Manpower and Immigration, Press Release, 
Sept. 17, 1973.
As the immigration policy has continued to develop, its dominant 
features have been a consideration of the economic needs of Canada 
and a desire to preserge the French-English balance. When Britain 
joined the European Economic Community on January 1, 1973 there was 
more freedom of movement of workers within Europe and accordingly 
a sharp decline in migration from Western Europe to Canada, On 
the other hand there was an increase in migration from Asia,
Recently the Canadian government announced the opening of new 
immigration offices in Asia and Africa to process the large number 
of applications, Asians seem to be more readily accepted by the 
Canadian population than they were in the past. The easy absorption 
of Ugandan Asians confirms this feet, and their entry into Canada 
reflects the humanitarian concern of the Canadian government. The 
Canadian Prime Minister (Trudeau) and his colleagues proudly refer 
to Canada as a nation made up of a mosaic of cultures. Immigrants 
can hold high positions and there are human rights commissions to 
hear appeals against discrimination. In urban areas minority ethnic 
groups have their own associations and they are allowed time on 
the national broadcasting network to demonstrate their own cultures.
In the post-war period massed demonstrations against immigration are 
no longer heard in Canada.
The Canadian government has adopted a multicultural policy in 
2response to the Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and 
Biculturalism (Book IV 19&9)* This policy advocates encouragement 
and help for all cultural groups which could prove their v/ill to 
survive and their need for assistance; help for other ethnic groups
1 See Immigration Statistics 1973*
2 Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism 
Book IV: The Cultural Contribution of the Other Ethnic Groups, 1969*
to overcome cultural barriers and to enable them to enjoy full 
participation in Canadian society; promotion of creative encounters 
and interchanges among all cultural groups for national unity; and 
help forlearning English or French. The Canadian government has 
designed various programmes to implement this new policy.
In future there seems to be a strong probability of increased, 
migration from South Asian countries to Canada to compensate for : 
the small number of admissions from Europe. Currently the Canadian 
government is reviewing the whole immigration process, but the new 
policy has not yet been announced. Immigration has played an 
important part in Canadian history, yet it should not be looked 
upon as a demographic phenomenon alone. It is desirable that 
more research into the social aspects of migration be undertaken, 
for this will facilitate easier adjustment and assimilation of 
immigrant peoples. However, ethnic studies have not yet gained 
prominence in Canadian institutions of higher learning. Only tv/o 
Canadian universities for example, include Asian disciplines on 
their curricula. Yet when the Canadian society is becoming more 
and more multicultural the universities should reflect this varied 
ethnic background and should try to expand their instructional 
services in the light of new needs and demands in the community.
1 Included among these programmes are a cultural development plan which 
provides for research into the relationship between language and 
cultural development; the provision of textbooks for non-official 
language learning and a study of ethnic press; twenty ethnic histories 
to be commissioned by the Citizenship Branch; and additional programmes 
to be developed by Federal cultural agencies such as the National Museum, 
National Film Board, National Library and Public Archives. (Information 
gained from an interview with Mrs. Knirck, Official of the Citizenship 
Branch at Slater Street, Ottawa, August 1972.)
2 J. Manglam, "General Theory in the Study of Migration: Current Needs 
and Difficulties", International Migration Review, Vol. Ill, Fall 1968,
p. . 6.
3 Universities of Toronto and McGill.
The more people know about the culture and background of other 
ethnic groups the more easily doubts and fears aroused by different 
customs and manners will be removed. New migrants will be accepted 
more easily and there will be a better understanding among all peoples
Mass migration into any country would create grave problems and 
would benefit neither the migrant people nor the host country. But 
a highly selectivenon-discriminatory programme may prove to be a 
success. It is possible that Canada, will set an example as the 
first self-governing Dominion of the Commonwealth to pursue a 
selective immigration policy that has no bias toward race, creed, 
or colour. After many years of hardship the Asian migrant who can 
contribute his technical and professional skills and his cultural 
heritage as well, may find himself welcomed in the self-governing 
Dominions. However, this favourable position has not been granted 
without a struggle. A brief summation will serve to refocus the 
troubled history of the immigration of Asian peoples into Canada.
After the First World War Indian immigration into Canada was 
severely controlled by the arrangements of Reciprocity agreed to 
in the Imperial War Conferences of 1917 and 1918* Thus from 1915 
to 1920 there was no immigration, except one person in 1916. In 
1921 a new arrangement by which the entry of wives and children
of Indian migrants already settled in Canada was established. The
1 v' number of such wives and children entering Canada between the years
1921 to 1940 was as follows:
Year Number Year Number Year Number
1921 10 1928 36 1933 26
1922 13 1929 49 1936 13
1923 21 1930 80 1937 11
1924 40 1931 32 . 1938 9
1923 46 1932 61 1939 19
1926 62 1933 36 1940 6
1927 36 1934 33 -
1 See Canada Year Book 1921 to 1941.
The main source of encouragement to leave home which acted 
as a push factor for Indian migrants before the First World War. 
was the propaganda spread by certain Indian individuals who wished 
to make a profit by the exploitation of those other Indians who 
hoped emigration would better their lives. But the failure of the 
Komagata Maru affair in 1914 and its subsequent repercussions, 
combined with the application.of war emergency regulations, stopped 
the flow of immigration altogether. Instead, there was a steady 
return-home movement among Indian migrants during the war. The 
number of Indians in Canada decreased sharply. Those Indians who 
remained In Canada had no hpme life and all their activities centred 
around their temple. Thus the Khalsa Diwan Society continued to 
be their main organisation. When the period between the wars was 
marked by the internal economic troubles of the depression, Indians 
had to move from factories to other vocations which included trucking, 
fuel supplies and farming. By 1940 some Indians owned small businesses 
and this slight prosperity allowed them to send for their wives and 
children.
However, as the Second World War began the number of admissions 
(of wives and children only) began to fall. From 1941 to 1943 there 
were only five admissions. In the immediate post-war period the 
only large number of admissions noticeable was 149 In 1947* But 
when the agreements on the basis of specified quotas were signed 
with the Governments of India and Pakistan the number of arrivals 
began to increase and by 1933 it reached 249^and by 1937 it stood 
. at' 334.** .
1 Admissions of Indians to Canada were: 1941 - 1; 1942 - 3r 1943 ~ 0»
1944 - 0; 1945 - 1. See Canada Year Book 1941 to 1946.
2 As mentioned earlier in this chapter.
3 Immigration Statistics, 1933*
Ibid., 1937* 3 - ; .
The hostility tov/ard Asian immigration was quite evident in 
1914 and the same attitude persisted after the First World War. Even 
franchise rights for provincial and municipal elections were refused 
to Asians in British Columbia and this automatically deprived them 
of their vote In the Federal election. In spite of strong 
representation by the Indian government and the agreed resolutions 
of the Imperial Conferences of 1921 and 1923*-this exclusion of 
Indians continued. No Dominion government could stay in powerif 
the majority of the electorate were going to object fundamentally 
to its policies. Immigration changes could mean sharp disapproval 
of conflicting opinion and general uncertainty in British Columbia. 
Thus the successive governments in Ottawa adopted a safe course of 
no change in the immigration policy because they did not want to 
risk any of their support from the Pacific Coast province of British 
Columbia. The depression of the period between the wars and India’s 
internal problems combined with her quarrel with South Africa 
minimised the Canadian question. However, as the v/ar came to an 
end the Canadian government realised its unjustifiable stand on the 
exclusion of Indians.
In 19.47* India was about to get independence, the question 
of prestige of Indians in Commonwealth countries threatened to become 
a sensitive issue. Indian leaders could use it as a lever to justify 
their desire to depart from the Commonwealth. Therefore, disabilities 
of Indians in British Columbia, especially their exclusion from 
franchise rights, could create an awkward situation for Canada in 
the forthcomingCCommonv/ealth Conferences, United Nations assemblies 
and further international meetings. During this troubled period the
Khalsa Diwan Society kept the franchise question alive by its 
consistent efforts toward more equal rights for Indians. Finally 
the Dominion government submitted to pressure and granted franchise 
rights to Indians. With the rise of Communist China, the formation 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 19^9, the Korean War 
of 1950 &nd the beginning of the Cold War, the importance of South 
Asian countries increased. Therefore, the continued exclusion of 
Indians from migration to Commonwealth countries who mi^it have to 
ask favours of India proved to be an unavoidable and unpleasant 
subject.: Since the reaction against exclusion of Indians from 
Canada could lead to India’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth, the 
Government of Canada, in 1951» decided to enter into agreements, on 
the basis of a quota system, with the Governments of India and 
Pakistan. In practice, however, this new system seemed just mother 
device to replate the former complete exclusion of South Asians
which had been the result of the reciprocity agreement of 1918.
' , ■ 1 ■ ■The new agreement, in fact, made little difference as the quota
agreed upon wau cnLy 250 (Indo-Pakistani) migrants a year. From
1952 to 1955 the new quota was not fully utilised.^ The basis
of the Canadian government’s cautious approach seemed to be fear of
a sudden large-scale influx of South Asians with their strange looks
and customs to take over Canada,
Canada is a dualistic society is terms of language, culture
and politics. Yet the population is only 30# French Canadian!
therefore, the influx of a large number of immigrants from any one
1 Canada had adraitted about 19^ -, 391 immigrants mainly from Europe 
in 1951* See Immigration Statistics, 1951*
2 Number of migrants from India and Pakistan were: 99 in 1951*
15?2 in 1952, 139 in 1955* 175 in 195^* and 2^9 in 1955* See Canada Year. 
Book,, 1951 io 1955.
country might upset the very delicate French-English balance in
Canada. Even after the Second World War when large numbers of
migrants could be absorbed, Mackenzie King was quite concerned about
the maintenance of the basic character and composition/of the
Canadian population. So the policy (in relation to Indians) of
extreme caution, control and restriction waB pursued by the Liberal
Party until 1957* During these years the Liberal government made
only those minor changes which Mackenzie King felt could not
antagonize organised labour and the electorate in British Columbia
where most Asian immigrants were settled. As Dr. David Corbett
summed up in his book, Canada’s Immigration Policyt "A Critique,
the prime minister chose the minimum change!1
A national government dealing with immigration 
policy is like a ship buffeted by contrary winds.
Labour blows one way and employers another; French 
Canadians puff up a powerful blast against the 
prevailing English speaking majority; various 
nationality associations exert their pressures; 
and a chill-draught of prejudice against foreigners 
comes from some of the old stock. In these gusty 
waters the government must steer a course. Sometimes 
it may choose to use its auxiliary motors and go 
against the wind,^
When the Conservative party came to power in 1957 they tried 
to relax the restrictive immigration policy. Diefenbaker’s declared 
championship of non-discrimination policies and. his frontal attack 
on South Africa in the Commonwealth Conference of 1961 v/ere 
indications pointing towards his intention to liberalise Canadian 
immigration regulations. But equal treatment for non-European 
migrants was not achieved at this time. It was not until the early 
sixties when Canada’s need of skilled manpower increased that Canada 
was led to adopt a universal immigration policy based on the
1 David C. Corbett, Canada’s Immigration Policy: A Critique, Toronto 
1957, pp.lO>10V.
education, training and health of individual applicants* The racial
'i
question was finally omitted from the regulations. As a result of
this new policy South Asian migration reached k%6l^ in 19&7 anc*
6,281 in 1971*2
However, the changes in immigration regulations with their
universal application have had some practical difficulties. There
are only two Canadian immigration offices in South Asian countries,
one in New Delhi opened in 1952 and the other at Islamabad opened
in I967. On the other hand there are eight offices in the United
Kingdom and one in the Hepublic of Ireland. In addition there are
over thirty Canadian immigration offices in Western Europe.
Immigration officials have shown preference for European migrants.
Dr, Freda Hawkins, who was commissioned by the Dominion government
to carry out intensive research in this field, made three tours of
Canadian immigration offices abroad. Her reply to charges of
discrimination against immigration officials was as follows:
... it was claimed that Canadian immigration 
officials showed a marked preference for European 
and United States immigrants.... This claim was,
I think justified., Almost all visa offices 
were there £*Europe<J7* European immigrants were 
the immigrants with whom the overseas staff were 
most familiar, and also the immigrants with whom 
they themselves often had some ethnic affinity 
because of the basically European character of 
previous movements to Canada. Immigration officers 
are, inevitably, very conscious of their own family 
immigration history which I found, was often quite 
recent or quite vivid in their own minds.^
Dr. Hankins concluded that the Canadian immigration policy with its
1 The new changes were quite in line with the changes in the United 
States immigration policy. See Edward M. Kennedy, "Immigration Law 
Some Refinement and New Reforms", International Migration Review, 
Vol. IV, Number 3* Summer 1970, pp. 4-10. ~ ”
2 Immigration Statistics, 196? and 1971*
3 Freda Hawkins, op.cit., p. 280. D r .  Hawkins was surprised to know 
that she was the first to inspect the Canadian immigration offices 
abroad. But it is interesting to note that South Asian countries 
were not included in any one of her tours.
strong European bias bad been the result of, first, Canada’s historical
ties v;ith Europe and her obvious Atlantic orientation in foreign policy
and international relations; secondly, baaed on European preferential
ideology; thirdly, negative control over non-European migrants;
fourthly, concentration of Canadian visa offices in Europe and their
obvious absence from Asia and Africa. Added to this was the Canadian
special preference for migrants from the United Hingdom and the
United States. Professor Anthony Richmond found similar evidence
of particular preference for U.K. migrants in his surgey on
immigration. The Canadian Minister of Immigration (J.W. Pickersgill)
justified this bias as an easy process to ’’transplant individuals
into similar soil”.
Yet in spite of lack of information about Canada, and with
only two immigration offices to service over 600 million South Asians,
the result of the point system immigration policy has been a continued
increase from 658 Indian immigrants in 1961 to 6,281 in 1971. The
increase after ten years was over nine times. In the first ten
years after the war (1946-1953) the number of South Asian (Indian
and Pakistani) migrants was only 1,193. It rose to 16,170 during
1956 to ij967. But during the next five years (1968-1972) the number 
. r A
reached 29*45o. By 1970 in comparison with migration from other
countries, South Asian migrants were the sixth largest group comprising 
of the total number admitted.
1 Freda Hawkins, op.cit., pp. 55-60.
2 Anthony Richmond, op.cit., pp. 24-25.
3 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 1936,' p. 7219.
4 Immigration Statistics 1946 to 1972.
5 Admissions for 1970 were: Total admissions = 147,713; Great Britain
26y497; U.S. =24,424; West Indies = 12,456; Italy = 8,533; 
Portugal■= 7*902; India and Pakistan = 6,680. See ibid., 1970.
By 1973 South Asian migration was 6*3% of the total admissions
into Canada. These figures indicate the impact of changing trends
2 -in Canadian immigration. The effect of the new policy, based on 
the point system, since the end of 1967, is quite evident as the 
number of South Asian migrants from 1946 to 19b? was only 17,363 
whereas after the new regulations were formulated it was 41,095 
for the years 1968 to 1973*^
There was about .10# of the Canadian labour force employed in 
professional and technical professions in 1961 but the Department 
of Manpower and Immigration expects to raise this proportion to lS% 
by 1975- For this supply of highly skilled manpower Canada relies 
on immigration. Under this new trend in immigration, the increase 
in the number of migrants from India and Pakistan was mostly made 
up of skilled and trained people. There were only 202 labouring 
class migrants who v/ere admitted to Canada for the years 1968 to
61971 when the total number of South Asian admissions was 23,217*
Thus labouring class migrants formed less than 1# of the total 
migration from India and Pakistan.
Unskilled migrants without suitable competitive qualifications 
to establish themselves in the economic system are likely to become
1 Admissions for 1973 were: Total admissions = 184,200; Great 
Britain £= 26,973, U.S. £= 2.3,2.42; Hong Kong = 14,662; Portugal /.» 
14,483; India, Pakistan and Bangladesh £=11,639* See Press
Release March 21, 1974.
2 Immigration Statistics 1968 to 1973*
;3 Ibid.
4 B. Ahmad, A Projection of Manpower Requirements by Occupation 
in 1975, Department of Manpower and Immigration, 1969.
5. A.G. Atkinson et al., Canada^ Highly Qualified Manpower Resources 
•Department of Manpower and Immigration, 1970.
6 See Immigration Statistics 1968 to 1971.
7 Ibid.
permanent inhabitants of particular areas and may create ghetto 
or slum conditions by their lack of mobility and adaptability.
Such ghettos are often the source of dissident feelings and can 
ferment hostile attitudes and explosive situations as was the case 
in Chinatown and Japanesetown in Vancouver in 1907. The improvement 
in the quality of migrants made their movement within Canada much 
easier. The danger, therefore, of a large concentration of the 
entire South Asian immigrant group in one province or city all 
competing for the same kind of unskilled job was avoided. The variety 
Of training in different professions enlarged the distribution of 
settlers. Besides, since the Indian and Pakistani migrants come 
from all over the sub-continent of South Asia and not from one place 
or province there were no family ties or background similarities to 
draw them together in Canada. For the most part the economic and 
cultural background of the new immigrants was better than that of 
the Punjabi soldiering class who came in the beginning. Many of the 
migrants moved to Canada after studying and staying in Britain and t ' ;-%r- 
the U.S.A. For them there was no language problem. Also western 
education has minimised the rigid observance of the caste system 
and modified other conspicuous habits which can be a source of 
prejudice for the Canadian population.
Rapid changes.in the communication system and increased travelling 
have changed the outlook of Canadian people. Before the Second World 
War migration into Canada was mainly from the United Kingdom, but in 
the first twenty years (1946-63) of the post-war period migration 
fromBritain was only 33*2^ when non-British European migration was 
about double that amount. The number of U.K. migrants was 64,420 
in 196?; 26,497 in 1970, and only 13,431 in 1971* By 1973 the
1 Jean Marchand, Minister of Manpower and Immigration, White Paper 
on Canadian Immigration policy 1966, p. 15.
number of admissions from Britain further fell to 18.5% of the
' . . v  - - }
total immigration into Canada. With the decrease in migration
from the U.K. the general characteristics of the new Canadian
immigrants changed. They came from different countries and brought
with them many different cultures and manners. Indians, were seen
as just another different race among many others. So the increase
in the number of South Asian migrants did not pose a threat. By the
1960*8 Canadians had became used to the strange looks and different
customs of South Asians who had for their part adopted European
dress and living standards. No longer did there seem to be any
hostility against South Asian migrants. With regard to immigrant
acceptance and adaptability the new liberalisation of the immigration
policy of Canada lias worked well. There is no Indian or Pakistani
town in Canada. According to the Census o f 1971 there are 52*100
■2Indo-Pakistanis settled in various places right across the country.
Cut of this population 25*105 still speak their own Asian languages 
at home. Yet there has been no problem of adjustment-inlrecentnyears. 
The reason for this change is the higher level of education of the 
migrants, and education, therefore, is one of the crucial variables 
in the adjustment of migrants. The higher the education the greater 
is the likelihood of being accepted in Canadian life.
1 See Immigration Statistics 1965-1973.
2 Breakdown of number of Indo-Pakistani settled in Canadian provinces 
Newfoundland 305* Prince Edward Island 130; Nova Scotia 1165}
New Brunswick 3^0; Quebec 5000; Ontario 22,^55; Manitoba'1855? 
Saskatchewan 1250; Alberta 3215} British Columbia 16,350. See 
Census of Canada, 19?1.
3 Professor Anthony Richmond carried out two surveys in this field 
and he found education to be the crucial variable for adjustment 
and acceptance in the Canadian society. See his book, Post-War 
Immigrants In Canada, Toronto 1967.
In'the-post-war period, the Canadian government approached the 
question of migration on a very rational basis. The immigration 
department was expanded and a large number of specialised branches 
were created with special emphasis given to the economic and social 
adjustment of migrants. Research units were also established to 
study immigrant patterns across, the country. In this way any imbalance 
in the process could be detected immediately as it appeared on the 
barometer of their Canadian adjustment, and quicl$dnd rectifying 
measures could be undertaken to adjust the systemi The passing 
of the Canadian Bill of Eights and its implementation was a forward
V-;'.---'" ... ■ . . ■ V
step in the direction of tolerance and equality in Canada.
The acceptance of Ugandan Asians showed the humanitarian viewpoint 
of the Canadian government. However, when the government realized 
how many extra immigrants were coming to Canada on tourist visas 
that they attempted to convert into permanent entry, the enormous 
backlog of appeals necessitated a change in immigration regulations.
The Canadian government announced a general amnesty for those already 
in Canada but stopped this loophole by refusing permanent entry 
from visitor visas. Discrimination played no part in this action.
On the whole the new policy of the lominion government which aims at 
the promotion of multiculturalisrn in Canadian society is a constructive 
step. If future programmes can inc3.ude the expansion of university 
curricula to incorporate non-European disciplines it will be another 
constructive step. The immigration department should also sponsor 
more research in the field to keep it well informed about the social 
impacts of the immigration policy, This will help Canada to develop 
and prosper as a unique multicultural society. One can hope that
1 James 3, Frideres, "Discrimination in Western Canada", J*S££1 
October 1973» pp. 213-222. v
while the long-term immigration policy is being planned, it should 
be considered neither a demographically oriented social science nor 
an economic necessity nor a political scapegoat. Rather it should 
be considered a vital and dynamic discipline having extensive local, 
national and international implications.
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Concluding Be flee tione
The beginning of East Indian immigration into Canada was a 
byproduct of the participation of Indian soldiers in the Jubilee 
in London and their subsequent return home via Canada. Besides 
this, after the Indian army* s visit to China during the Boxer 
Rebellion, some soldiers crossed the Pacific and reahhed British 
Columbia. The Canadian pacific Railway encouraged this migration 
because of the heed for cheap labour to build railroads and'some ■ 
ticket agents saw migration as an opportunity for quick economic 
gains. Local industrialists also-were in favour of Indians coming 
to Canada because they were efficient workers who accepted minimum 
wages. Thus the number of Indians in Canada rose from 45 in 1905 
to 2,12** in 1907. It was a simple question of supply and demand.
The need for cheap labour was the main criteria and to ensure a 
sufficient number of such workers other Asians such as Chinese 
and Japanese were allowed to migrate to Canada also.
The majority of Indians in Canada came from the Tunjab and 
most of them were Sikhs. The province was noted for its loyalty 
to the British JSmpire and Sikh soldiers were proud of their service 
to the Crown,The Sikhs were hard-working and mobile people who 
wished to establish greater ox^ portunities for their economic 
betterment in a new land. However, their unusual clothes, unshaven 
beards and coloured turbans created an unfavourable impression 
among British Columbians who were; already predisposed to hate those 
whom they suspected of creating wage disparity in the labour market. 
Indians* customs were also different. Since they were without women 
of their own race the absence of normal family life darkened their
whole social existence. Usually they lived in a club of three to
a dozen men and remained apart from the rest of the established
community. They were further isolated by their lack of education.
Most were scarcely able to read and write.- their own language, let
alone ISnglish. There was no way in which they were able to
communicate with British Columbian society, Dr. R.K. Das, who
carried out a survey of the Indian community on the Pacific Coast
in 1921, noted' that the absence of recreation was a great defect
from this point of view of the Indian's health and happiness and
also represented a consequent reduction in opportunities to meet
the white community. He blamed the Indian culture for this 1
The Ideal of Hindu culture relates more to 
contemplation and meditation rather than to 
action and pleasure. While the higher castes 
may follow such ideals to the average man it is 
practically meaningless. The result has been 
that the majority of the people in India have 
been deprived of a great deal of the pleasure 
of living.1
His conclusion was that Indians indulged, during their leisure hours, 
in lengthy and unnecessary discussion which, however sharpening to 
the wits, led to frequent quarrels. This trait did not help them 
in their attempt to assimilate into new surroundings. Their one form 
of social activity appeared to be.within' associations of semi-religious 
or semi-political natures. Such associations lacked a centralizing 
and directing force. Therefore, these ignorant migrants arrived 
in Canada without any unbiased leadership among themselves and 
without any educational direction from any group or organization 
that would help them understand and conform to new end different 
standards of living. Heither the Indian nation nor the Indian 
government were attentive to their interests. Under such adverse
1 ' ■ B . D a s ,  Hindustani Workers on the Pacific Coast (Berlin, 1923), ■ 
p. S1 *
circumstances any integration with CansdianB that might have been 
possible was out of the question. Clearly, some responsibility 
toward the adjustment of .'migrants must be accepted by the country to 
which the migrant is indigenous as well as by the host country, if 
a'smooth .transition ie to be 'effected. ; This is'.especially true . 
where vast differences in social background and customs pertain.
In the case of Indian immigrants in the early twentieth century no 
such responsibility was ever assumed and this is an important reason 
why the migration was such a disastrous experience.
In Canada, arguments against Oriental'.immigration were based 
on a theory borrowed; from poHtical-economy. \ It. was assumed that 
cheap labour* would considerably lower the standard of living of 
white Canadian workers,just as imports from any country where they . 
are low priced tend to lower the price of the same goods in the 
importing country.
Since British Columbia1o geographic, economic and cultural 
set-up made the province remote from the rest of Canada, the people 
there regarded themselves as an isolated group/who had :to .be zealous 
about their own economic welfare. Exploitation of low-paid Oriental 
immigrant labourers by capitalist industrialists, therefore, was 
regarded by white workers as a threat to their own job security.
Labour leaders, anxious to increase their own political power, 
exaggerated the Asian threat and the immigrants, to whom .unions did 
not readily offer membership and who were unused to such organizations 
anyway, had no way, of communicating with white labourers to work out 
any suitable labour policy. The result was that the fears of white 
labourers were fanned into anti-Oriental riots in 190? and the two 
political Turtles, anxious to woo the votes of white workers, pledged
immigration control for Asians and this was ©con expanded to include 
their exclusion frcm Canada.
Theories of Social Darwinism posited that a superior race in 
its rise to the top would run the risk of degeneration by mixing with 
inferior stock. This belief gave a sophisticated polish to the 
expression of white supremacy and sanctioned the racist attitude 
adopted by many countries, hhite supremacy was usually judged in 
terms of technological progress, good health and the ability to 
wage war successfully and on a large scale. Underdeveloped countries, 
plagued by too many people, lack of technology, famine and disease, 
obviously could not compete with- the standard of living in Europe ■ 
and: 1'yorth • America• ■'.: Race superiority. was . the white - man * a prerogative 
and .this idea was championed by'the popular .press. "Mongrelised 
races", "miscegenation", "inferior stock", "racial contamination",
"a clean people for a clean land" were terms of reference used by 
politicians, journalists and wage earners alike to refer to coloured 
immigrants. The Canadian- immigration policy reflected this prevalent 
attitude and the exclusion of Indians was thought to be a safe and 
desirable action. The views of Lord Morley, Mackenzie King, Lord 
Minto, Colonel Swayne,- Lord Hardinge and Lionel Curtis supported 
exclusive immigration policies. However, because-of/Britain\ - 
position in India, they thought it expedient to clothe their 
discrimination in more subtle language. Morley said that East 
Indians were unsuitable immigrants because of climatic and 
institutional reasons. Mackenzie King propounded the theory of 
"Competing gtandarcis". Colonel Swayne expressed his concern that 
Indians were exposed to crude socialism which would germinate unrest 
in India. Kurdinge used the argument of "self-governing status of
Dominions" and their right of exclusion and'acceptance of the type 
of people judged suitable for their population. Curtis cited'the. 
theory of Social Darwinism, and expressed his concern about the 
Indianization. of .the British Empire.
However, India1© membership of the Empire made any kind of 
exclusion practice* difficult to justify. Indians, as citizens of 
.the 'Ihspire, - claimed equal status' and demanded the same right as 
other British citizens to .migrate within'the Bapire. / Indirect 
methods of exclusion were deployed, but these could not be sustained 
in the law courts and proved to be an embarrassment for the Dominion 
government. The migration question came to’a climax with the Kornagata 
Maru affair and its failure to land its Indian migrants in Canada.
The aftermath o f this episode was marked by the eruption of troubles 
all over the Punjab with the added possibility of a rebellion of 
Indian soldiery. Agitators against British rule made full use of 
the issue. Thus the treatment of Indians-a© unwelcome' immigrants 
within the Empire was of major importance to Britain*© future in 
India.
The number of Indian migrants who had settled or attempted to 
settle in Canada was small but the treatment they received with regard 
to their equality of status from the Canadian, Imperial and Indian 
governments became the basis for bitter feelings that had far-reaching 
consequences for British rule in India. Indeed, the question of 
superiority and inferiority of different races became an increasingly 
important issue within the British Empire and posed a grave threat 
to the continuance of its harmonious internal relations. The 
Komagata Maru affair that gave wide publicity to the Canadian government 
exclusion of Indians who had attempted to:overcome the continuous
passage clause of the .immigration laws clearly showed Canada’s racial 
prejudice. V-hen the Imperial and Indian governments did not.champion 
the cause of the immigrants they felt betrayed* The circumstances 
surrounding the entire unfortunate incident were used .by agitators 
in India to sharpen the focus on Injustice for Indians under British 
: rule. .'Thli accent' on the inferiority ,of Indians as British. citizens . 
which was evidenced.in the Dominion and which seemed to be acknowledged 
also by the British undermined the once fierce loyalty of the Sikh 
soldier class in the Punjab and .'ultimately contributed to the anti- 
-'British feelings-inIndia. in; spite of- all the- good British rule.- 
- had broughtLto India the government there was short-sighted in its 
lack of decisive action to deal with the problem of the migratory 
rights of Indians as- -British citizens* The issue was an eaotional 
one and the British did not seem to realize the strength of feeling 
that was caused by the branding of Indians as ---second class citizens 
.within the Empire. Emotional issues are the most volatile and the T 
badge of racial inferiority cannot be tolerated without serious 
eruptions. Thus, although the number of migrating Indians was small, 
the focus of attention on their exclusion from Canada because of 
-. racial bias was a precipitating cause of Indian dissent in the 
Punjab. It is unfortunate, Indeed tragic, that soar jrioish 
officials who reigned in India chose to remain oblivious to the 
consequences of racial discrimination. Clearly the responsibility 
for the successful adjustment of migrating peoples must be assumed, 
at least in part, by governments involved, whose immigration laws 
and educational and propaganda programmes'must facilitate the 
assimilation of newcomers.
Indian participation in, and immense contribution. to,the
First•World War earned the high -praise of British statesmen - and 
gave Indiana;a:sens©;of self-esteem. -Their exclusion, therefore,
.from the Dcmtnions-was a blow -to Indian..prestige.. They interpreted , ■ 
■■it- as -a•designation of inferiority* All Indian people, no. matter how 
they were divided on other matters, were united on this question.
It vae as intensely felt issue ami they attached tremendous importance' 
to ;it. The Indian !h»lio«al Congress approached the "Indian government 
to.remove all invicxous restrictive distinctions bet etn His.Majesty's- 
Xndian subjects and other, subjects of the Empire.. luring;-the-war,.the 
. question .of Indian exclusion ‘fro®; Canada,.'especially that, of wives 
and; children, became a focal point..' The' Viceroys of India (during 
191** to 19lS>, Ifcrdinge end" Chelmsford,; came' to the conclusion that. .. . 
the policy of exclusion of Indians'with, the tacit ..approval'of 
Imperial and Indian governments•could not be continued.and a change 
wae vitally important. Through diplomatic skill the arrangement of 
Reciprocity of Treatment of Indians was agreed to in the Imperial ‘War 
Conference of 19lS. Dominion representatives.promised the granting 
of Tull; citizenship status and rights to.Indian-oigrante'in Canada 
but this was not fulfilled. . The .only concession the’ Indians actually. • 
..received was the admission, of wives and children of Indians settled 
in Canada* -Though .the'new arrangement in-principle advanced equality 
of status for Indians within the Empire, in practice, their exclusion 
from the Dominion was still diplomatically agreed upon and the 
Government of India extended its open and official approval!
In a migrating situation it is vitally important that the 
immigrant peoples assume the habits of those of the host country in 
order to minimize the traits that are often objectionable to the host 
community and which contribute to racial bias.
People ;learn to adapt themselves to the communities of their
*\
childhood through the process called socialization, and the 
adjustment to new countries may be described as resocialization. 
Adjustment in a 'new society, or adaptation to a nevr environment,
;or assimilation in .the host;community/is^a lengthy process. It 
' requires , that migrants should .acquire the . ability to use the 
vernacular language colloquially, 'and should seek to possess other 
.■■skills: required for communication*, They should have knowledge of 
the history and culture of the host community, its ideology, values, 
acr^ ? id social structure* The extent to which the host community 
' is ready to accept the incoming group of people Is also an essential 
part of the adjustment process of migrants. The cause of the 
mutual interaction of immigrants. am! their host community and the 
subsequent effects on both groups are dependent on the demographic 
• and psychological characteristics of immigrants, social and economic 
. .conditions, and' prevailing frames of. reference .concerning -migrants 
in . ther host" country* An understanding of these factors as they 
.affect the individual requires the combined resources of social 
psychology,'cultural, anthropology, sociology, and the social sciences, 
and; it is not to; be easily achieved.; -
Immigrants in any society present many educational problems
1 Socialization has been defined by Merton as the process by which 
d peoples selectively acquire the values and attitudes, the interests 
skills and knowledge - in short the culture—  current in the groups 
of which they are members or seek to become members. See Merton, 
Header and Kendall, The Student physician (Harvard University Press
Z .See A. Richardson, ”The Assimilation of British Immigrants in'a 
••-•..Western Australian .-Community”, K.S.K.p. Bulletin, Vol. 9, 19$1*~ 
pp. 108l-2.
3 See S.A. Weinstock, ?,Some factors that retard or accelerate the 
rate of acculturation”, Human Relations, vol. 17, pp.--321-^0.
k  ■ See R. Taft,.Prom Stranger to'Citizen (gondon,' i960).
to the host community, esx^cially If they arrive in considerable numbers.
Adults have to be introduced into a society strange to them, a new
language may have to be acquired, and new habits of dress, hygiene,
feeding and living will be demanded. When people from widely differing
cultures attempt such a process of socialisation it is likely to extend
over a period of ;many years..
But the difficulties of reorientation of immigrants were not
sufficiently understood at the beginning of the century and no
educational process was undertaken by Indian migrants or by Canadians.
■Instead,, the policy of ;exclusion of these different peoples was :
adopted, if^car fof •' hu Indion . take-over was expressed in political
speeches as well as academic works. Indeed, the most important
facet of the situation wen'the hostility caused by the belief that
there would be a sudden and overwhelming influx of Indians (coloured
British subjects) into Canada to obliterate its small population of
white Europeans. The strange appearance and different customs of
on
the Indians were looked/as a threat to the continuance of the European 
. way of .life* . The' enmity and fear were more marked in sparsely populated 
British Columbia where racial Intolerance was built up into fixed 
habits of thought and behaviour.
Race prejudice is accompanied by incorrect or ill-informed 
opinions regarding the people or group against whom it is felt..
The majority of people.in British Columbia knew very little about 
the Indian peoples. The name applied to all of them was ^Hindus”, 
iihile it is true that the majority of the people of India are Hindus,
1 See J.W. Gregory, The Menace of Colour (London, 1925); Sir Alexander 
Kerris Carr-Saunders, o^.cit. $ H.P. Fairchild, Immigration: A World 
Movement and its American Significance (New York, 1923)*
.most"of,the;Indian immigrants•in' Canada were Sikhs with a few
Muslims end only a .very small number of Hindus. Sikhs and Muslims 
are separate religious...groups, of .India - and they do not like to be 
called Hindus, fhe fact that Sikhism is a religion and not a province 
of India, .did not occur to many'people in. British .'Columbia. This". 
ignorance about:Indian'people.was the. starting point for racial 
' prejudice*
race' prejudice is not;'an instinct#'" '. It*- real''bases are not 
biological but social and cultural. It includes. a;-.belief ;:that" one,'a". 
own standards are,universal or true, one*s-own group strong.. The ■ 
target group is defined as mxplcdtable and to oe 1 atea, i traditional 
enemy. . Many false beliefs: take‘the form of s^terc-otyqc*,” - exaggeration 
of certain physical, or : cultural:traits which .are found- :aao»g' members -. 
of the exploited group. When stereotypes exist an individual is judged 
nob by fris own.characteristics and merits but on the basis of exaggerated 
and ill-informed beliefs of whefc.are thought to be the real - 
characteristics of. the group. Ignorance of the masses -those who 
belong.to the dominant group as well as those belonging to the non- 
dominant group .I*-.;;-enables.: the., propagandists for exploitation and ■
; political domination to’ succeed more readily. If one. group of people ,■. 
knows little about another group or has false beliefs about it, it is 
more susceptible■ to the camouflaged demands of the exploiters.
Racism or the superiority complex is a strong cause of prejudice and 
racial discrimination. It exists in popular beliefs in the biological 
superiority of one group, with a conviction ox the inferiority of
p
another group.~ It develops with' the fears and anxieties about the
1 See Kimball Young, ,rThe Social Psychology of Oriental-Occidental 
prejudice”, Pacific Affairs, December 1929* Pp. 773-7^5.
2 See Arnold Rose, .The Roots of Prejudice (UNESCO,' 1951)*r' '
possibility of the degeneration of one group if it mixes with another. 
Prejudice is centred around economic and political matters, and such 
phenomena as religion and morals, quite as much as around race. It 
contains an element of dislike if not of fear and hatred. The 
tendency to prejudice comes from both personal and cultural conditions. 
Since the cultural heritage of the past is passed from parents to 
children, teacher to pupil ana older t© younger persona, it ir 
reasonable to assume that prejudice - racial, national, crceuul or 
class-based - is also passed down from generation to generation and 
is fed and conditioned by;• every/crisis. which•arises when the two 
groups of different races come into competition or conflict. Myths 
; and legends furnish the rationalization for those habits and attitudes 
which express prejudice. Prejudice also rests on cultural stereotypes 
of cultural differences, on political ambitions and on current crises 
arising out of group rivalry and competition.
In British Columbia the current situation fostered the growth
of prejudice against East Indians. The vast cultural difference
between the newcomers and the settled residents, their different
religious and social habits, were the source of suspicion and
frustration on both sides. The darker complexions of Indians were
also looked upon with disfavour by the white population, partly
because black and coloured, as concepts, are associated with dirt,
2evil, the devil and other undesirable traits. viien ono links those 
feelings about colour with further associations of inferiority 
because coloured races seem to be located in backward countries and
1 Kimball Young, op.cat., pp. 773-785*
2 Ibid.
possess strange /.manners and customs it is relatively easy to form 
a stereotyped concept of Indians ao dirty, uncivilized aliens who 
are intent upon taking white labourers1 jobs and lowering their 
standard of living. Thus fear, suspicion and lack of any means of 
communication with each other or any understanding of difference 
can only lead to prejudice in opposing groups.
Since the individual tends to identify himself with the group,
' ' k  A
he becomes the product of the group to which he belongs. Religion
and language become the instruments Of group defence. In the case of
a minority group exposed to prejudice, religious institutions become
idle most powerful means of defence both as an organizational base 
■ 2and as symbols of solidarity* The minority group tends to develop 
an oppression psychosis in which feelings of subjectivity, suspicion 
and aggressiveness lead to a sense of group solidarity. Because 
of differences, therefore, each group v/ithdraws into its own pattern 
of interests and regards with suspicion all activitiee engaged in 
by the other group. As a result prejudice really rests upon the 
construction and acceptance by a group of certain generalized notions
or perceived pictures of the typical characteristics and activities
■ \ - 3 " ■ ■ V- -
of another group. Some contribution is also made from the competitive
society which sets man against man. Thus the dork skin, strange
manners, lower standarc2 of living, lack of common language and different
religion of the Indians in British Columbia were regarded with contempt
by white Canadians who felt superior to Indians and condemned them
because they did not act in the manner of the majority.
1 II.A. Miller, Races, Rations and Class (Philadelphia, 192*0, P* 10.
2 Ibid., p. 0^. V. .
3 Kimball Young, op.cit.
On the other hand, by the very nature of their intrinsic 
beliefs, Indians, especially Sikhs, could not conform to the accepted 
pattern of life in British Columbia. Even the unorthodox members of 
the Indian migrant.community could not entirely accept the prevailing 
culture of British Columbia. Religions teach a way of life and a 
corresponding set of standards tho* arc adhered to by devotees*
, Religion is thus a part of one’s cultural heritage and figures in 
-thought and action. Although the fundamentel aspects of any religion 
teach devotion to a god figure and offer laws to govern good conduct 
that should provide the basis for man to get along with man, the 
particular differences between religions have long been the source 
of conflict instead. Since Richard the hion-Hearted engaged 
Holy Wars against the infidel, Christianity in the Western world has 
been popularly regarded os the superior religion. Indians in British 
Columbia, therefore, who practised Hinduism, Islam, and Sikhism were 
considered to be heathen and this was another mark of their inferiority. 
It seems entirely likely that much of the trouble between Indians and 
whites in British Columbia sprang from the prejudice generated by the 
Indians* strange religions, the oddity of their unpressed clothes, 
bearded faces and turbanned heads, their lack of education and 
knowledge of English, and their different standard of living. Because 
of these characteristics they were ostracized by the white coimunity 
and treated with harshness and contompt. However, such treatment 
must inevitably have reacted still further on the Indians* unsociability, 
helping to increase the impression of uriossimilibility and therefore 
magnifying the prejudice against them.
The position of Indians in the British Columbian society can be . 
explained by reference to group psychology. Group characteristics are
attitudes and habits of loyalty, mutual aid, cooperation with each 
other, a sense of social solidarity or unity anti on instinctive
"I
understanding, a ’’consciousness of kind*1. But the superiority 
complex among Europeans in Canada, ana a hatred and fe-ir of Asians 
seemed to x^ revail everywhere on the I c C3 *ic Coast. , There was no 
group solidarity of white and coloured races and the circumstances 
under which the two races were brought together seemed to preclude 
the possibility of any favourable assimilation. In fact most 
expressed opinion at the time extolled the virtues of white supremacy. 
Impressed .'by;the -.material'; progress of - the past ' two hundred years, 
in ignorance of the factors which produced it, one writer seriously 
remarked:
All we can do is to aek for the evidence that 
other races are our equals. All the evidence in 
hand seems to indicate the superiority of the 
whites.... The maximum good of the world lies in 
the continued jjrosperity of the white races.,..
Does'it not ceera that the race which has extended 
its sway over the world, politically, militarily, 
and industrially is a superior race?2
The -.-prepossession of the whites, therefore, with regard to the 
Oriental races was not dependent upon any instinct which dictated 
mutual avoidance. '..•••Rather it rested upon cultural stereotypes of 
differences . fed and enhanced by literary ;snd theatrical representations, 
by political ambitions and by current crises arising out of group 
rivalry and competition.
Any cultural assimilation of Indians was further prevented by 
the development of their separate residences. Indian migrants did 
not live in the best surroundings in British Columbia. ?fost of them 
were driven to live in the worst areas simply by inability to procure
1 E.B. Lowie, Social Organisation (London, 1930), pp. l*+-l8.
2 C.G. dosey, Race and Rational Solidarity (London, 1923)» PP* 
and '22*1.
accommodation anywhere else, for, though they were permitted to'-.own 
property, few apparently did. Most of them lived in groups of five 
or six or even as many as twenty, in shacks or barrack-like boarding 
houses. This demeaned them further in the eyes of their neighbours. 
Besides, the isolation encouraged the continuance of their racial 
■.peculiarities which the whites found objectionable, gave them no 
opportunity to learn English and created in the Indians a sense of 
being different and inferior. This inturn made them more withdrawn.
After the First World War the -Empire Settlement facilitated the 
migration of British subjects into the Dominions and Canada encouraged 
it. But this concession was not extended to British subjects of 
Indian origin. Rather the Dominions made efforts to turn the Empire 
settlement into a means of converting the British Empire into a white 
man’s country. Indians were increasingly awape oi the reality that 
the British Empire was less concerned about fair play and equality 
before the law than about racial differentiation and inequality based 
on colour. Even those Indians who were settled in Canada were not 
allowed to become citizens. They were deprived of their franchise 
rights. And when the economic recession of the late twenties and 
thirties resulted in a tightening up of immigration policies there 
was little chance that Indians would be; allowediinto the country. '
Thus the exclusion of Indians continued. The feeling of preference 
for a new land reserved for white men as well as a lack of tolerance 
for other cultures and others’ ways of life were visible in the
1 See E.B. Smilie, .’’An Historical Survey of Indian Migration within' 
the Empire”, Canadian Historical Review IV, September 1923* P* 229; 
see also C.H. Dickie (member of parliament from British Columbia),
Canada House of Commons, Debates 1923, p. *f66l, who told the Canadian 
House of Commons that the Hindus were mostly shack dwellers and dwelt 
under conditions intolerable to a white man.
2 Seed.A. Schultz, ’’Canadian Attitudes toward Empire Settlement 
1919-1930ni Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. I, no. 2, 
PPI '237-231 ;
organisation of the British Empire. There seemed to be no •understanding 
or willinghess.or; cncourage^ e'ftt to learn about pigmented British subjects 
Instead, people in Canada were fed on propaganda centred on the 
differences and inferiority'of Indian migrants as well os a' fear of 
white men losing jobs to them and being contaminated by lower standards 
of living... In British Columbia the originator^ of such.propaganda 
spread false reports for their own political e^ds; but the majority 
of the Canadian people did not know this. Therefore all the unfavourable 
Indian publicity from government officials «?nd labour leader** combined 
to reinforce the:stereotyped picture of Inch fn immigrants as wholly 
undesirable' people. Host'people in British.Columbia'w*re/therefore 
against the settlement of Indians in their province: their hostility
•was .expressed by ostracism and violence.. They had mo, compassion. for. : .
the.plight of these lonely men and thought only to rid themselves 
of an undesirable nuisance• The Indians were equally hostile and 
their bitterness was fed by their continued harassment* Neither side 
could approach the other to work out any compromise; indeed no 
government agency even suggested such a • possibility/; /Canadian, opinion •' 
in general at this time supj ortea the exclusion of luff n o r  coloured 
.races from a country they heped would'be.• settled.-by<white men only.
When /’Reciprocity of Treatment** was instituted and women and children 
of Indians in Canada were allowed to immigrate, the Indian way of 
life underwent a profound change. The rnen and children in particular 
adopted modern Canadian clothing and engaged in a more homely domestic 
life. They worked hard to establish themselves in the new land and 
in spite of the economic depression seemed to prosper in their, new 
jobs and businesses.
; However, this evidence of stability and willingness to assimilate
did not change the living conditions of Indians within the white 
community. They were still excluded by a white society that justified 
its actions by the Marxian theory (capitalist system), the stranger 
hypothesis (ignorance), the scapegoat theory (used by self-seeking 
politicians), the colour-class hypothesis (white supremacy or Social 
Darwinism) or the ’’sudden influx” theory (extinction of European culture 
by coloured take-over). The attitudes of western society seemed fixed 
on the subject of social inequality. Government leaders and ordinary 
people shared the view of white supremacy and of reserving Canada for 
white men. It is difficult to imagine that these ideas could be altered 
but the Second World War changed the world order and influenced Canadian 
thinking in the process. Slowly more reasonable and humane attitudes 
towards coloured immigration became evident. Such shattering experiences 
as the wholesale destruction involved in modern warfare and the horrors 
of the concentration camps in racist Germany were responsible, possibly, 
for making men more aware of the consequences of superiority and 
expansionist theories. Also Indian soldiers had often been comrades-in­
arms of Canadian troops and the men became*more understanding of each 
other’s ways. The post-war period in Canada was marked by more 
open-raindedness towards other cultural groups as well as a desire to 
utilize the skills of those groups to enhance economic progress* 
Immigration was seen to be an important element in Canadian 
population growth and vitally necessary to economic expansion. After 
the war the main trade unions In Canada - Trades and Labour Congress 
(T.1,0.) and Canadian Congress of Labour (C.C.L.) - changed their 
forthright opposition to partial support of immigration and the business 
community pressed for an increase in immigration. The expansion of 
the economy was rapid enough to absorb all newcomers. During the
19**08 Canada made a rapid transition from a largely agricultural society 
to one of the most advanced industrial countries in the world. Meanwhile 
in the post-war period a new trend was visible in immigration into 
Canada when the number of extern and southern European migrants 
tremendously increased. Er.ia changes i” co jnunications, automation 
and computerization have a strong bearing on Canadian social 
organization. Industrial societies create many j ouitions which . 
primarily involve responsibilities and skills of administration. As 
this change was felt the need for skilled manpower to foster continued 
industrial growth became apparent in Canada. Therefore, in order to 
encourage the process,. and to increase the skilled component of the 
immigrant labour force,- Canadian immigration regulations were .''revised , 
and were made universally applicable to everybody without any regard 
to race, colour or religion. At this time the most dramatic economic 
development was undertaken by the dominant business corporations.
During the period of the 1930s and 1960s there were several mergers
within the group of large firms as well as among the chartered banks
4 - ■
and their.associated:trust corporations.
■ In an:'industrial, society..an emphasis on loyalty, family ties, 
religiosity or any other personal attribute or inherited quality is 
not enough for choosing among people when filling a position. These 
qualities are supplemented by the cultivation of impersonal social 
relatione and impersonal considerations. An industrial society must 
give prominence to universalistic values and relations. It must 
prise efficiency arid-competence. Industrial societies tend to be 
much Concerned with performance, with iaessureable rates 'of 'Change e
1 Ronald Anderson, "The Giants get Bigger”, Globe and Mail, Jan. 9* 1962.
and with individual accomplishments within general norms that are 
impersonally applicable to diverse situations end undertakings.
Industrial societies are internally heterogeneous. They consist 
of diverse groups, aggregates and styles of life. Besides, for all the 
emphasis placed upon the idea of merging in a mass society, -with its' 
totalitarian regimentation, modern societies have become the context 
for the/development of individualism. In addition they have provided 
opportunities on c!i unprecedented scale for diverse groups and 
individuals within the society to participate in the/enjoyment.-arid - 
management of the society*
Social arrangements do not stay static under any circumstances. 
Modern societies, however, are marked by fairly rapid and comprehensive 
transformations in relatively short periods of time. They value change 
and exhibit it. They also generate movements and institutions that 
counter social change in the name of vai’ious traditions. Progress and 
improvement, as well as stability and the preservation of certain 
cultural resom’ces, belong to values that govern modern social 
arrangements. Indeed, modern societies contain a- series of dichotomies 
and strains that engender change and are the product of it.
During the industrial phase, with growing urbanization and 
expansion of commercial enterprises, a form of pluralistic integration 
of ethnic minorities was characteristic of Canada. Mot only were 
ethnic sub-cultures a distinctive feature of city life, but a variety 
of social institutions emerged to meet the special needs of immigrant 
groups. The receiving society in Canada adapted itself in many ways 
to the social changes generated as a consequence of a high rate of 
population increase and diversification due to migration.
As a result 'a' new;kind of migrant population emerged in Canada.
The outstanding characteristics of the new type of migrants were 
their high educational qualificationsp cosmopolitan outlook end lock 
of permanence in any one country or locality. Canadian immigration 
policy with its emphasis upon educational and occupational qualifications 
attracted and still attracts such migration in Increasing numbers *
Under the new immigration policy the number of migrants from South 
Asian .countries began to'increase*.. .The characteristics of this new- • 
group were quite different from those entering Canada in the earlier 
part of this century. '/
A change in taste through contact with an affluent way of life
can have a strong influence on talented people from poor countries.
Persons with moderate degrees of skill may move to rich countries in 
order to improve their qualifications and from there they can migrate 
to countries which offer bettor opportunities. /This change* or location 
or short distance movement has practical application in the case of 
new South Asian migrant;.; to Canada. Many Indians anxious to better 
their economic position and improve the social status of themselves
and their families were eager to leave India end live in a country
where their special skills would be recognised and compensated* Thus 
/■ • Canada’s'.new immigration policy attracted:talented, adventurous',V" 
enterprising peoples. These immigrants hod more knowledge of the world 
and found it easier to adapt to the new country’s social customs. They 
were also more easily assimilable and former barriers of colour, 
religion and manners were of less consequence in the new mosaic of cultures 
bhat began to define the Canadian way of life. Social distinctions 
based on birth and background that still prevail to some extent in the 
old world are replaced in the new world by distinctions based on 
education and economic position.
In-Canada the integration of immigrants:gave evidence .of. a 
cultural variety within a growing cultural unity. This view was well 
.'expressed by the Canadian 'Department of Citizenship and Immigration. 
Integration was used in Canada to express a theory which contained 
unity and diversity* In Canada the unity was sought in the common 
principle of political.philosophydnd participation in common citizenship 
The diversity was maintained by reciprocal appreciation of diverse 
cultural contributions*
For the encouragement of the "mosaic” each group with it© vested 
'.interest© - and. peculiar traditions present© a .significant and-perhaps 
a formidable problem of national dialogue. On the other hand the 
differences may have the advantage of mere clearly identifying the 
significant and pervasive'issues which individuals and groups must 
face, inetead of obscuring these difference© through attempted cultural 
standardization. The proliferation of various ethnic modes of 
.communication'and cultural activities seems to be distinctively a 
Canadian phenomenon and may indeed signify the principle that Canada 
1© integrated through-conflict and not through conformity to some 
national and majestic norm*
After the Second World '.V/ar the idea of the superiority of white . 
race© seems to have waned and is rarely supported in academic discourses 
Besides, the Canadian stand against racist regimes on the African 
continent could hardly be justified if Canada continued to share 
South African policies of racial bias. The rapidly changing economic 
need© of industrialised Canada could not support the continuation of 
an immigration policy based on racial exclusion when the skilled men 
needed for Canadian economic expansion were in demand and welcomed in 
western Europe. Thus the variegated qualities of new South Asian 
Migrants, well-equipped with technical training, cultural knowledge
emd social understanding, mad© them entirely acceptable in Canada.
In the new economic set-up of Canada the old competitiveness 
between vihite men and South Asians for unskilled jobs and the running 
of small businesses 1© out of the question. Similarly the old foar 
of a sudden enormous influx of Indians as British subjects claiming 
' the right of' admission. into Canada has been dispelled, -by the;’new' • 
immigration laws./, The.ignorance;of Canadians, and South Asians about v 
thedr respective cultures also belongs to the past. The changes In 
the Canadian immigration pa] ic,, from complete exclusion to equal 
acceptance of South Asians came about entirely in accordance withy 
Canadian social, political and economic forces and interests. In 
the case of the acceptance of Ugandan Asians Canada again reflected 
her preference for that type of migrant who could establish himself 
in the Canadian economic structure. The special professional and 
technical skills required as a qualification for immigration in Canada 
help immigrants to be absorbed in the general social structure thus 
preventing the creation of ghettos. It seems evident that, when 
migration is planned iryVolum©and in quality, it has favourable 
results.
Inter-grpup contact between immigrants and the host community 
can result either in conflict or harmony, depending upon the situation 
and conditions under which it occurs. When the contact situation 
involves a combination of equal status, common goals, no competition 
along group lines, and has the support of authorities, law and customs, 
as well as being free from the use of the scapegoat hypotheses, 
political exploitation and ignorance and the fear of a sudden influx 
of aliens, improved group relations ore likely to be realized. Canada
is trying the difficult experiment of building a multicultural society 
in which a myriad of cultural, economic, political, demographic and 
ecological factors interplay^ So for it seems to be working well.
But mass migration of people does not offer any reasonable 
possibility of resolving the tremendous problems which the steady 
growth of population Is creating in some developing countries. Besides, 
migration as a politically feasible, economically viable and socially 
acceptable -'.solution "sebais; to be a very remote possibility for the future. 
However, the:example:of.the .Canadian immigration policy based.on a 
.merit system has already-.been followed by Australia and Hew'’Zealand. ,... 
One ;can hope that the future will bring better understanding and that 
the colour barrier will disappear in the practice of migration policies 
in all countries. Socialisation of different cultural groups within 
receiving countries can be accomplished If suitable conditions prevail 
and if government policies set reasonable standards for immigration.
Under such conditions both immigrant and host community benefit. One 
can hope also that the circumstances that surrounded the Komagata Haru 
affair and the plight of the first Indian immigrants into Canada will 
never again be allowed ...to happen. In that instance ignorance and 
fear in the host community as well as the lack of any specific policies 
by the Canadian, Imperial and Indian governments were major contributory 
causes to racial bias. The intensity of emotion engendered fey race 
prejudice is often out of proportion to the actual events involved,
In the case of East Indians in British Columbia the repercussions from 
the enmity that was levelled against these-few people shook an Empire 
in India, pride of race and reaction against labels of Inferiority 
because of colour are formidable forces to which any government must 
give serious consideration when working out the problems of world
resettlement* Surely Canada's solution to these problems will provide 
a working guideline for other nations in future years.
The problems associated with the integration into a society of 
■other- people© of different race, -colour;or creed have always been • 
complicated' by; emotional issues. Ko legislation can ;wipe■out prejudice 
■ but government: action■to inform and educate-canh©lp to break:down'
'"'•'some ' terriers*A wise . immigration: policy that allow©; into the .country 
the .types of ©kill© needed for its'economic growth and a class of . 
people easily; mobile because , of education- and . training ensures the 
absorption of these people into the established society. Isolated 
ghetto communities are not typical of the present Canadian scene.
There is no need for busing of black and white students to attempt to 
ensure equality of education as there is in the United States. People 
live where they choose and send their children to neighbourhood schools* 
There are no race riots. There is no apartheid. In recent years 
Canada has managed to foster n multicultural atmosphere while maintaining 
a selective unbiased immigration policy, on paper at least. The policy 
was based on economic issues to brings in more people who could 
contribute to Canada's growth and prosperity. Even the humanitarian 
gesture extended to the Ugandan Asian© provided Canada with a group 
of ambitious hard-working people who arc anxious to contribute their 
skills toward economic advancement. Yet the bleak picture cast by 
the world's present inflation, the threat of depression and the 
tremendous increase in the number of people who ore immigrating to 
Canada have caused come labour organisations to recall the economic 
depression of the 1930s and to cast a suspicious eye on the continual 
influx of foreigners into the labour market. The government is now
forced'to make some changes in' its immigration policy. ■ Koberfc Andres, 
.Minister of Immigration, has assured the Canadian'Parliament, that 
only the number of immigrants will be reduced and no restrictions 
with regard to race or geographic region will be practised. The 
continued success of Canada's multi-cultural experiment rests now 
•with the government's formation of wise and appropriate new measures 
to deal with the current immigration situation* ’■
APPENDICES.
APPENDIX I
SOUTH ASIAN IMMIGRATION INTO CANADA
Year Number Year Number
1905 **3 1939 19
1906 387 1940 6
1907 2124 1941 : 1
1908 2623 19b2 ■- 3
1909 6 19**3 -
1910 10 1944
1911 3 1945 1
1912 3 1946 5
1913 ■ 5 - 1947 149
1914 88 1948 72
1915 19**9 33
1916 1 1950 77
1917 'r 1931 99
1918 - 1932 172
1919 1953 140
1920 - 195** 177
1921 10 1933 249
1922 13 1956 332
1923 21 1937 334
1924 40 1938 459
1923 46 1939 741
1926 62 I960 691
1927 36 1961 658
1928 36 1962 584
1929 if9 1963 858
1930 80 196** 1436
1931 32 1963 2664
1932 61 19 66 2799
1933 36 1967 4614
193** 33 1968 3856
1935 26 1969 6400
1936 13 1970 6680
1937 11 1971 6281
1938 9 1972 6239
1973 11639
APPENDIX II
POST-WAR IMMIGRATION INTO CANADA 
Source of Immigrants - Distribution of World Areas
Area 1946-1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
Europe 2 *529*196. 88,363 73,609 52,031 51,293 71,883
c/' 81,5 54.7 51.2 42.7 42.0 39*0
Africa 35,174 3,297 2,863 2,841 8,308 8,307
1.1 2.0 2.0 2.3 6.8 4.3
Asia 133,228 23,319 21,170 22,171 23,325 43,193
% 4.4 14.4’ ‘ 14-3 18.2 19*1 23.4
Australasia 44,359 4,4l4 4,388 2,906 2,148 2,671
p/
/o v  1.4 2.7 3*0 2.4 1.8 1.4
North and 313,939 36,693 37,795 36,019 31,836 45,946
Central
America % 10.1 22.7 25*6 29.6 26.1 25.1
South America 34,868 4,767 4,943 5,058 4,309 11,057
p 1.1 3.0 3*4 4.2 3.5 6.0
Oceania 12,849 678 945 874 787 1,143
and others
% 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.7 0 .7 0.6
Total number 3,105,613 161,531 147,713 121,900 122,006 184,200
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APPENDIX IV
Canadian Ministers of Immigration 1903-1973
. Prank ^ Oliver • ■ 1905- 1911 . - .
Robert Rogers - 1911 - 1912 ,
William damesRoche : 1912 - 1917
James Alexander Galder 191? - 1921
John;Wesley. Edwards -'Sept.- 1921 r ,;Dec. 1921
Hewitt Bostock Jan.. 1922 - Feb. 1922
Charles Stewart 1922 - 1923
James Alexander Robb 1923 ~ 1925
George Newcombe Gordon Sept. 1925 -Nov. 1925
Charles Stewart 1925 - 1926
Robert -James'Manion June 1926 - July 1926
Henry Lumley Drayton July 1926 - Sept. 1926
■ Hobert Porke', v 1926>; 1929 •"iv
i-Charles Stewart : , 1929 L930 ' ■
Alistair Mackenzie June 1930 - Aug. 1930
Wesley Ashton Gordon 1930 - 1935
Thomas Alexander Crerar 1935 - 19^5
James Allison Glen 19^5 r 19^8
James Angus MacKinnon 19AS - 19^9
Colin WilUam George Gibson 19^9 - 1950 V
Walter Edward Harris 1950 - 195**
John Whitney Fickersgill 195^ - 1957
Edmund Davie Fulton 1957 - 1958
Ellen Louks Fairclough 1958 1962
Kichnrd Albert Bell 1962 - 1963
Gky Favreau 1963 - 196A
Kene Tremblay I96A - 1965
John Robert Nicholson Feb. 1965 ~ Dec. 1965
Jean Marchand 1965 - 1968
Allan Joseph MacEachen 1968-1970
Otto Bail Lang 1970 - 1972
Bryce Stuart Maekasey Jan. 1972 - Nov. 1972
Robert Knight Andras Nov. 1972 -
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